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Over  the  last  few  decades,  a  large  number  of  West  European  countries  have 
decentralised  power  to  sub-national  levels  of  government.  From  the  birth  of  the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the immediate aftermath of World War 2 to the 
recent  reform  of  the  statutes  of  autonomy  of  Catalonia,  most  West  European 
countries display some form of decentralisation. During the same period of time, no 
West European country has centralised its decision-making procedures (see Hooghe 
and Marks 2001a, Table II). The phenomenon is therefore a wide-ranging one and 
seems to be characteristic of a trend among Western democracies.  
Decentralisation, regionalisation, devolution, several words refer to the transfer 
of  power  to  sub-national  levels  of  government.
1  They  all  refer  to  some  form  of 
distribution of power that is not concentrated at the centre. They also suggest, at a 
more normative  level,  that  diversity  is  healthy  and  desirable  because  it  safeguards 
individual  liberties  and  promotes  debate,  argument  and  understanding  (Heywood 
1998: 32). The argument is also made that decentralisation brings decisions closer to 
the people according to the principle of subsidiarity, and fosters democratic practices 
and citizenship skills (Teles and Landy 2001: 114). Diversity, internal debate and mass 
participation are concepts that political parties have sometimes struggled with, relying 
instead on a more controlled and centralised model of organisation and management 
of  their  internal  affairs.  Institutional  decentralisation  may  therefore  represent  a 
particular challenge for political parties and their organisation.  
The  role  and  crucial  importance of  political  parties  in  contemporary  polities 
hardly needs being restated. Since Ostrogorski's early study of British and American 
political parties (1964, first published in 1902), countless studies have come to provide 
evidence of the central position of political parties in modern politics. Even while the 
party decline thesis is gaining ground among party scholars (Selle and Svåsand 1991; 
Wattenberg 1998; Lawson and Merkl 1988), political parties still remain the central 
and quasi-unique actors of traditional electoral politics. 
The relationship between political parties and decentralisation can go both ways. 
On the one hand, as holders of the quasi-monopoly of candidate nominations (at least 
in a Western European context) and of political representation, political parties form 
governments and control parliaments. Contemporary government is indeed typically 
party government (see Katz 1982). As collective policy-makers, parties can shape their 
environment (Wilson 1994: 264). Consequently, political parties are the initiators of 
decentralising reforms and shape the structure of the state (van Biezen 2003: 5). 
On the other hand, the structure of the state and its institutions are also likely to 
have an impact on political parties. Regional decentralisation gives birth to new arenas 
of party competition. Regional assemblies, parliaments or councils create a framework 
                                                 
1  Throughout  this  dissertation,  the  term  'region'  will  refer  to  the  highest  level  of  sub-national 
government in a country, irrespective of the name these units may be given in their country or their 
aspirations to the status of nation.     2 
for a new set of elections and the designation of assembly members and regional 
governments. Organisationally, political parties have to create new structures or adapt 
existing  ones  in  order  to  compete  efficiently  in  regional  elections,  by  fielding 
candidates,  developing  party  programmes,  devising  electoral  strategies  and  leading 
campaigns in each of the regional political arenas. Programmatically, those parties that 
present candidates for both state-wide and regional elections face the unique challenge 
of  having  to  compete  for  different  electorates.  In  general  elections  they  have  to 
present a platform to the whole national electorate, while they compete to gain votes 
from territorial sub-sections of the same electorate in regional elections. Not only are 
these regional electorates potentially different in terms of their demographics, interests 
and cultures, but the division of powers between the central and regional governments 
is also likely to determine the terms of the debate and create potential differences with 
regard to the issues addressed by party programmes and election campaigns.  
Regional assemblies represent powerful new opportunity structures for political 
parties, as they increase their chances of accessing public office and gaining expertise 
and resources. Non-state-wide parties, often ethnoregionalist or minority nationalist 
parties, particularly benefit from the creation of elected bodies at the regional level. 
These parties are often at least partly responsible for the decentralisation of decision-
making to the regional level, through their lobbying in favour of the recognition of 
cultural and historical rights or special regional interests. Ethnoregionalist parties are 
not, however, the only parties to have emerged or benefited from the creation of 
regional assemblies: the Scottish Socialist Party and the Greens have failed to gain 
seats in Westminster but have won seats in Scotland or in the London Assembly,
2 and 
the German Greens gained representation in the Länder at the beginning of the 1980s 
before gaining seats in the Bundestag.  
This dissertation explores the organisation of state-wide parties and focuses on 
the articulation between the central and regional levels of party organisation. Both 
organisationally and programmatically, regionalisation is likely to represent a challenge 
for the cohesion of state-wide political parties, as they need to maintain a level of 
coherence and unity across the country while trying to appeal to different electorates. 
The degree of unity and cohesion that political parties want to maintain can vary from 
one party to another, depending – among other things – on how highly they value 
unity and the use of a single, unified message across the whole country at all times. 
The  dissertation  does  not  look  at  how  state-wide  political  parties  deal  with 
coalition  agreements  at  different  levels  (on  this  topic,  see  Stefuriuc  2007  and 
forthcoming) nor does it analyse party strategies and policies at the different levels (see 
Pogorelis et al. 2005, Fawcett 2004). The dissertation primarily aims at investigating the 
consequences of the regional decentralisation of power on the vertical organisation of 
state-wide political parties. The main questions are whether political parties mirror in 
their  organisation  the  structure  of  the  state  and  which  factors  most  affect  the 
relationship between  the  central  and  regional  levels  of  party  organisation.  To this 
effect,  the  dissertation  presents  a  comprehensive  framework  for  the  study  of  the 
vertical organisation of political parties in multi-level systems, drawing from different 
research  fields,  most  notably  the  literature  on  party  organisation  and  comparative 
federalism.  
 
                                                 
2 The Scottish Socialist Party and the Scottish Green Party also support the autonomy of Scotland but 
do not exclusively campaign on this issue.     3 
Regional decentralisation and party organisational change  
The theoretical framework of this dissertation is distinctly neo-institutionalist (Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Kato 1996). New institutionalism rejects the formalism of traditional 
institutionalism, which relies on comprehensive descriptions of laws and institutions. 
The  new  institutionalism  analyses  the  relationships  between  individuals  and 
institutions and understands that institutions and organisations are made of people 
and are not just governed by formal rules (Kato 1996; March and Olsen 1984). It is 
the  main  contention  of  this  dissertation  that  a  neo-institutionalist  perspective 
facilitates the understanding of how institutions change and how they constrain the 
behaviour of the individuals.  
The  problematic  at  the  heart  of  this  dissertation  is  double:  under  which 
conditions  do  political  parties  adopt  certain  organisational  forms,  and  which 
institutional  factors  affect  the  behaviour  of  actors  within  political  parties?  It  is 
therefore at the crossroad of two of the strands of neo-institutionalism identified by 
Hall and Taylor (1996): historical and sociological institutionalisms. From the latter, 
this research adopts a focus on the reasons why organisations adopt specific forms 
and on the type of factors that lead to a particular organisational form (Hall and 
Taylor 1996: 947). From the former, it adopts a calculus approach to the relationship 
between institutions and individual behaviour, focuses on power relations and the 
asymmetry in the distribution of power and resources, and considers that history plays 
a crucial role in the way organisations are formed and evolve (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
939-41; Kato 1996: 556). The combination of these two approaches provides a large 
framework  and  a  large  number  of  possible  interactions  between  institutions  and 
between institutions and actors. The framework investigates the effects of institutions 
on the behaviour of party actors but also recognises the agency in processes of change 
and decision-making within institutions. The aim of this dissertation is to assess which 
factors are the most relevant inductively, through the evaluation of their impact in the 
cases (Steinmo and Thelen 1992: 12). 
The starting proposition of this dissertation is that structural elements such as 
institutions and broad environmental factors shape the way political parties organise. 
Processes such as the selection of leaders and election candidates and policy-making 
are influenced by a variety of factors, both internal (the rules of the game established 
by the party constitution and other party rules) and external (the political system, the 
type of state structure, the party system). Political parties are seen as organisations that 
are influenced by the environment in which they operate, but also as organisations 
that  provide  a  framework  for  action  for  politicians  and  the  various  groups  they 
include. 
The use of a neo-institutional framework integrates the role of agency in the 
model. The organisational structure of a political party is also the result of a series of 
conscious decisions. As Wilson (1980: 528) puts it, 'parties are not simply passive 
recipients  of  pressures  from  their  socioeconomic,  cultural,  institutional,  and 
competitive  environment'.  Party  organisation  and party  change  are the result  of  a 
combination of a leadership push and party acceptance of change (Wilson 1994: 275). 
In a number of articles, Harmel and Janda (1994 and 2003) have provided evidence of 
the role of leaders and dominant factions in triggering party change. They also rightly 
emphasise the importance of the leaders' 'perception' of the environment and the 
changes it may necessitate in order to improve the party efficiency (Harmel and Janda: 
1994: 267; Harmel et al. 1995: 26, Appendix 2). As a result, the organisation of political     4 
parties  results  from  a  combination  of  environmental  constraints  and  leadership 
decisions to shape the organisation to achieve party goals. 
This research is at the crossroads of several fields of investigation. The literature 
on party organisation is obviously a core area of reference. However, this particular 
field has often only considered the issue of party centralisation and decentralisation 
with respect to the relationship between the central party and its membership. More 
rarely has the issue of intra-party central-regional relations been investigated (see, for 
some  early  exceptions  Eldersveld  1964:  98  and  1971:  80;  Duverger  1951:  59-80). 
References to the 'federal' vertical organisation of political parties can also be found in 
the literature on federalism (Riker 1975; Chandler and Chandler 1987; Scharpf 1995), 
where  the  correlation  between  forms  of  federalism  and  party  organisation  is 
investigated.  
The literature on multi-level governance and the development of 'Euro-parties' 
can also provide insights into the dynamics of multi-level organisation and the impact 
of environmental pressures and change (Deschouwer 2000). In recent years, following 
devolution in the United Kingdom, the political consequences of decentralisation on 
political  parties  and  party  systems  have  become  subjects  of  a  more  systematic 
investigation (Hopkin 2003; Deschouwer 2003; Hough and Jeffery 2003). Such studies 
have tried to bring together various hypotheses regarding the organisation of political 
parties in multi-level settings. This research will try and combine all these approaches. 
 
Why study political parties in Spain and in the United Kingdom? 
This study of the organisation of state-wide political parties in a multi-level setting will 
compare parties in two countries, Spain and the United Kingdom in the period up to 
the last state-wide election in each country, that is, 2004 in Spain and 2005 in the UK. 
Both countries have undergone more or less recent reforms of their state structure 
that have led to the creation of regional assemblies or parliaments and they have 
become some of the most decentralised countries of the continent. Both countries 
share a West European political culture, are members of the European Union and are 
parliamentary  democracies.  The  fact  that  both  are  also  monarchies  increases  the 
similarity between the two democratic systems, as both countries do not elect their 
head  of  state  and  there  is  therefore  only  one  state-wide  election.  The  regional 
decentralisation of power and their membership of the EU mean that they share the 
same multi-level challenges, both upwards and downwards. A number of institutional 
and political-system characteristics bring Spain close to the Westminster majoritarian 
model  of  democracy  epitomised  by  the  UK  (Lijphart  1999):  concentration  of 
executive power in one-party cabinets, cabinet dominance over the parliament, two-
party system for the UK and effective number of 2.5 for Spain, electoral systems with 
disproportional outcomes (even though Spain has a form of PR), and asymmetrical 
bicameral parliament with a strong lower chamber. 
There are however a number of differences between the two countries. The first 
one derives obviously from the fact that Spain is a recently democratised country 
while the UK is the oldest of all European democracies. In spite of its rather recent 
admission  into  the  club  of  European  democracies,  Spain  is  now  a  consolidated 
democracy with stable and functioning political, administrative and economic systems. 
Both countries also depart with respect to the degree of centralisation that prevailed 
prior to the decentralising reforms. On the one hand, Franco's dictatorship imposed a 
very  centralised  organisation  of  the  state,  repressed  the  expression  of  regionalist 
feelings  and  actively  supported  Spanish  nationalism.  On  the  other,  the  United     5 
Kingdom  already  allowed  some  levels  of  internal  differentiation.  For  instance, 
Scotland  kept  its  legal  system  after  the  union  with  England,  and  Wales  kept  its 
national distinctiveness and the use of its language in many areas (Bogdanor 2001: 7-
10). 
In Spain, the empirical study is limited to three autonomous communities, the 
Basque country, Galicia and Catalonia, which all have a special status recognised in the 
constitution. This status as 'historic nationalities', based on their history and specific 
regional cultures, allowed them to reach a higher level of autonomy faster than the 
other  regions.  The  rationale  behind  this  selection  of  regions  is  that  it  is  in  these 
regions  that  decentralisation  is  the  most  likely  to  have  an  impact  on  the  political 
parties  due  to  this  conjunction  of  cultural  and  institutional  factors.  The  regional 
organisation  of  the  British  state-wide  parties  is  studied  Scotland  and  Wales. 
Devolution has not been implemented in England and Northern Ireland poses several 
problems. Most importantly, the Northern Ireland Assembly has been suspended four 
times since 1998, and the last time lasted between 14 October 2002 and 7 May 2007. 
In addition, the main state-wide parties that present candidates in England, Scotland 
and Wales are nearly virtually absent from the Northern Ireland political scene.  
It was decided to make an in-depth study of several regions in two countries 
rather than a larger sample of countries, which would have led to a more superficial 
study of the organisation of each country. As a result, this study contains an in-depth 
analysis of each party system and its state-wide parties and compares the organisation 
of these parties both within but also across regions and countries up to the last general 
election in each country (2004 in Spain and 2005 in the UK).  
The state-wide parties studied in this dissertation are the most important ones in 
each country. By most important we mean state-wide parties that are in power at the 
state-wide level or at the regional level, or form the official opposition at the state-
wide  level.  As  a  result,  two  Spanish  political  parties  fit  these  criteria:  the Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español (Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE), now in power at the central 
level and in a number of autonomous communities, and the Partido Popular (Popular 
Party, PP), in power centrally between 1996 and 2004 and also in some regions such as 
the  Valencian  Community,  Murcia,  Castile  and  Leon  and  Madrid.  Another  party 
would qualify as state-wide, Izquierda Unida (United Left), the left-wing coalition born 
from the union the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista Español, PCE) and 
other small parties on the left of the PSOE. However, the party has never achieved a 
number of representatives significant enough to form a government or participate in a 
government coalition either in Madrid or at the regional level. Even though the United 
Left has blackmail potential in Sartori's sense, as it supports some PSOE regional 
governments on a law-by-law basis, the party does not fit into our criteria.  
In the United Kingdom, three parties are studied. The Labour Party is in charge 
of  the  UK  government,  has  governed  Scotland  in  coalition  with  the  Liberal 
Democrats until 2007 and has governed Wales either alone in 1999-2000 and 2003-
2007 or in coalition with the Liberal Democrats between 2000 and 2003 and with 
Plaid Cymru since the 2007 election. As a major coalition partner in Scotland and 
Wales, the Liberal Democrats are also studied. Finally, the Conservative Party is the 
official opposition party at the central level. These parties can only be considered 
state-wide if we exclude Northern Ireland. Ulster has its own party system, with a 
completely different set of parties and a distinct political debate. As a result, when we 
talk  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  this  dissertation,  what  we  actually  mean  is  Great 
Britain, that is, England, Scotland and Wales. Because England does not have any 
regional government, and that the prospects of the creation of regional assemblies in     6 
some  of  the  regions  of  England  now  seem  very  limited,  the  organisation  of  the 
political parties in England is outside the scope of this study. Finally, even though the 
city of London has also been one of the beneficiaries of the devolution reform, and in 
spite of its nearly 7.5 million inhabitants, London is not strictly speaking a region and 
is therefore also excluded from this study. 
 
Plan of the dissertation 
This  dissertation  is  divided  into  eight  chapters,  which  present  the  framework  for 
analysis, the methodology, the empirical data, and the comparison of the cases and the 
assessment of the hypotheses. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on party organisation 
and party change. It is a general chapter that introduces the framework of analysis of 
party change, which includes environmental, institutional as well as intra-party factors. 
Chapter 2 applies this framework to the analysis of party organisation in multi-level 
settings. In the process, it presents a large number of factors that are expected to 
affect party organisation: the type of multi-level institutional arrangement and how it 
came about; centre-periphery relations and regionalism; state-wide and regional party 
systems; intra-party factors such as party type, and party ideology. These factors are 
described and expected relationships are put forward so as to present a comprehensive 
framework of analysis. Chapter 3 addresses the methodological issues at stake in this 
dissertation, in particular the number of cases and the methods of data collection. It 
also defends the case selection further, and presents a coding scheme elaborated in 
order to compare the vertical organisation of political parties in multi-level settings 
and the respective powers of the central party and regional branches at the central and 
regional levels. 
The rest of the dissertation applies the framework to the cases. Chapters 4 and 6, 
which are aimed primarily at those readers unfamiliar with Spain and the UK, details 
the environment in which respectively the political parties operate: state formation; 
state structure, form of decentralisation and distribution of competencies between the 
central and regional governments; and features of the state-wide and regional party 
systems, electoral systems, voting patterns in state-wide and regional elections.  
Chapters  5  and  7  describe  the  organisation  of  respectively  the  British  and 
Spanish state-wide political parties. They summarise the formation and history of each 
party  and  describe  the  relationship  between  the  central  and  regional  levels  for  a 
number  of  party  processes.  How  do  state-wide  parties  integrate  their  regional 
branches in their central organs and in the decision-making processes of the central 
party? To what extent are regional party branches free to organise themselves, choose 
their  political  elites  and  elaborate  their  own  policies?  The  chapters  answer  these 
questions by looking at ten party processes at the central and regional levels. 
Chapters 4 to 7 present the empirical substance and the empirical findings of the 
research. Chapter 8 compares the organisation of all these parties and assesses the 
hypotheses presented in chapter 2 in order to evaluate which factors seem to account 
the most how the central and regional levels of party organisation relate with one 
another. This last chapter shows that all the parties had to devise some response to the 
decentralisation  of  power  and  the  existence  of  regional  politics  but  that  different 
forms of organisation can be found, from very autonomous regional branches to very 










The study of party organisation has a long and distinguished history, starting in the 
early 20
th century with Mosei Ostrogorski's study of the organisation of the political 
parties  of  England  and  the  United  States  (1964,  first  published  in  1902).  Michels 
(1914, first published in 1911) shortly after launched a number of themes (internal 
democracy,  relationships  between  the  leadership  and  the  membership, 
professionalisation, etc.) that were to pervade the literature for the whole century and 
beyond. 
The  importance  of  political  parties  has  been  emphasised  in  the  academic 
literature  on  countless  occasions,  either  to  complain  about  it  or  to  observe  the 
considerable role that  parties  play  in  contemporary  societies.  Political  parties have 
come  to  embody  representative  democracy  and,  in  his  much-used  quote, 
Schattschneider went as far as saying that 'modern democracy is unthinkable save in 
terms of political parties' (1942: 1). 
This chapter presents a general framework for the study of party organisational 
change. Its main contention is that both structure and agency should be taken into 
account but that structure conditions the possibility of agency. To this purpose, it 
reviews the literature on party organisation, discussing first what political parties are 
and comparing the various definitions that can be found in the literature. It then 
consider  s  how  parties  organise,  the  various  elements  that  constitute  their 
organisation, the way authors have discussed and analysed party organisation and how 
the various parts of these organisations interact. Finally, it presents a framework for 
the study of party change that illustrates how intra-party agency and party organisation 
are influenced by institutional factors and how intra-party actors can behave within 
these constraints.  
 
1.1.  The organisation of political parties 
This section aims at providing a definition of political parties. Like any definition, it 
will fall short of describing political parties in each and every one of their aspects but 
will  still  try  to  establish  their  specificity  as  organisations.  Then,  the  organisational 
issues  at  stake  within  political  parties  will  be  highlighted  through  a  review  of  the 
literature on party organisation and an overview of the party models that have been 
developed in an attempt to explain party organisation and parties change.  
 
1.1.1. Aspects of party organisation 
Definition 
Definitions can vary between 'minimal definitions' (Sartori 2005: 52) that emphasise 
the main distinguishing aspects of one phenomenon and detailed ones that aim at 
thoroughness. Since Burke's early definition of a political party as 'a body of men 
united,  for  promoting  by  their  joint  endeavours  the  national  interest,  upon  some     8 
particular  principle  in  which  they  are  all  agreed'  (quoted  in  Sartori  2005:  8),  the 
development  and  generalisation  of  the  presence  of  political  parties  in  democratic 
countries (but also in non-democratic countries, which are often ruled by a single 
party) has generated a large number of definitions. Most of them differ on their level 
of precision, amount of details provided and also focus of the author.  
In the category of minimal definitions of political parties enters Sartori's as 'any 
political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of 
placing through elections (free or non-free), candidates for public office' (2005: 56). 
Parties  are  defined  as  a  grouping  of  individuals  that  come  together  for  political 
purposes under an 'official label' and that participate in the electoral competition for 
public office. They are therefore differentiated from both factions, which are merely 
interested  in  achieving  benefits  for  their  members  (Sartori  2005:  8)  and  interest 
groups,  which  aim  at  influencing  office  holders  and  policy  without  entering  the 
electoral arena.  
Epstein proposed a similar definition of political parties as 'any group, however 
loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office-holders under a given label' 
(1967: 9). This absence of any organisational requirement allows the inclusion in the 
party category of groups of 'office-holders or aspiring office-holders' (1967: 9) that 
collectively  seek  votes  but  do  not  have  any  organisational  support  of  affiliated 
supporters. He recognised, however, that in modern democracies the instances of 
organisation-less political parties are extremely uncommon. It is indeed rare that even 
small groups of like-minded independent candidates do not form some organisation 
to co-ordinate their efforts and strengthen their visibility. Like Sartori, he argued that 
the distinguishing feature of political parties was that they filed candidates for election 
to public office. Therefore, two characteristics appear to be fundamental: a level of 
formal organisation and an official label, and the filing of candidates for elections.  
Other  definitions  have  added  elements  regarding  the  purpose  and  goals  of 
political parties. For instance, Hennessy defined parties as 'social organizations that 
attempt to influence (1) the selection and tenure of the personnel of government by 
putting  forward  candidates  for  elective  office,  (2)  the  policies  of  government 
according  to  some  general  principles  or  proclivities  upon  which  most  of  their 
members  agree'  (quoted  in  Sartori  2005:  53).  This  definition  combines  Sartori's 
definition of parties as groupings that place candidates in elections for public office 
with Burke's notion that political parties follow some principles in the elaboration and 
implementation  of  their  policies.  It  also  adds  that  political  parties  are  necessarily 
organised groups. Therefore, parties do not just aim at achieving office for the sake of 
power but for the defence and implementation of certain principles or 'proclivities'. 
In  a  similar  vein  but  with  even  more  details,  La  Palombara  and  Weiner's 
definition  (1966:  6)  includes  four  characteristics:  (1)  organisational  continuity;  (2) 
organisational presence at the local level, with communications between the local and 
national  levels;  (3)  a  power-seeking  strategy  (to  differentiate  parties  from  interest 
groups) and; (4) also a vote-seeking strategy. Hennessy's organisational requirement is 
therefore  specified.  Parties  outlive  their  leaders  and  have  a  territorial  anchorage 
through  local  associations  that  are  in  constant  communication  with  the  central, 
national level. A distinction is thereby made between political parties and movements 
that exist only for their leader(s) and/or are only composed of a national organisation. 
Political  parties  are  also  defined  in  function  of  their  goals:  they  seek  power  and 
popular support through votes. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, a minimal definition is preferred rather than 
a definition that would assume why parties act and be too restrictive. As a result,     9 
Katz's definition of parties as 'formal organizations that promote candidates for office 
under a common identifying label' (2006: 34) fits this purpose: it assigns party with an 
organisational dimension, an electoral purpose and a common set of principles shared 
by the members of the organisation. 
 
From two to three faces of party organisation 
Political parties  are not unitary actors and the literature on party organisation has 
attempted to observe and explain the relationships between the various 'faces' of party 
organisations.  Traditionally,  studies  of  party  organisation  have  focused  on  the 
relationship between the party elite and the party membership seen as a section of civil 
society, and models of party organisation used this dichotomy as their distinguishing 
criterion (Mair 1994: 2). It is the shifting balance of power between the party elite and 
the membership and the relative importance of each that determined the type of a 
party's organisation. 
Michels observed the evolution of the German SPD at the beginning of the 
century and concluded that an 'iron law of oligarchy' governed all organisations, and 
more specifically party organisations (1914). As a result of this 'law', political parties 
develop  elite  structures  and  increasingly  marginalise  their  rank  and  file.  Likewise, 
Duverger's  distinction  between  cadre  and  mass  parties  is  based  on  the  parties' 
relationship  with  civil  society  and  the  importance  of  their  membership,  both  in 
number but also in terms of intra-party power. Kirchheimer's 'catch-all party' model 
describes the organisational transformation of the mass parties in the post-war period 
as another shift in the elite-membership relationship, one in which the membership 
loses in importance and intraparty power. 
Katz and Mair argue that instead of looking at parties through the traditional 
division between party elite and party membership, we should view parties as having 
three 'faces': the 'party in public office', the 'party in central office' and the 'party on 
the ground' (Katz and Mair 1993; Mair 1994: 4). This distinction could already be 
found  in  Key's  distinction  between  the  'party-in-government',  the  'party-in-the-
electorate' and the party organisation or apparatus (Key 1958: 181-2). 
The 'party in public office' represents the parliamentary and government side of 
the party, its elected officials. The 'party in central office' is its bureaucracy. Finally, the 
'party on the ground' is the voluntary face of the party, from its registered members to 
its supporters and also, as the case may be, financial backers. This distinction is a 
useful heuristic tool to understand the multi-faceted nature of political parties. The 
history and organisational evolution of political parties can be interpreted as a fight for 
power between these three sectors of party organisation, each with its own interests, 
with temporary shifts in the balance of power between them.  
 
1.1.2. What parties do: goals and functions 
What parties do entails two aspects of their activities: the motives of their actions and 
the results of their actions. The former relates to party goals, that is, what parties aim to 
achieve when they present candidates through elections. The roles played by political 
parties in democratic polities have been the object of a great number of studies that 
have discussed and emphasised the functions of political parties, that is, the intended or 
unintended consequences of their action for the polity. 
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Party goals: arbitrating between office, vote and policy 
Typically,  three  goals  have  been  attributed  to  political  parties  to  explain  their 
behaviour in electoral competition. The first two models of party behaviour emanate 
from  coalition  theory.  A  first  perspective  considers  that parties  are  office-seekers: 
what parties really want is control over as much of the executive branch as possible 
(Riker 1962). Office is construed as government office. It means that during coalition 
negotiations, an office-seeking party would not take policy closeness to other potential 
partners into consideration. The potential of office for future electoral returns is not 
an issue for that party either. A second theory of party competition considers that 
parties seek to maximise their impact on public policy. Policy-seeking parties are first 
and foremost concerned with policy, not office. However, office is often instrumental 
to achieving policy, so the two goals are not incompatible. Office often comes as a 
complement of policy as a party goal (Strøm 1990: 567; Strøm and Müller 1999: 8).  
Finally, the rational choice tradition expects that parties try to maximise their 
electoral support. Parties try to maximise their number of votes in order to achieve 
office. Policies are only instruments in the politicians' quest for 'power, prestige and 
income' (Downs 1957: 30). However, votes can only be instrumental to other goals, 
such as office and policy.  
Parties  have  to  arbitrate  between  these  three goals  because  they  cannot  be 
achieved simultaneously. These objectives are not mutually exclusive, as for instance 
the  objective  of  gaining  the  largest  possible  share  of  the  vote  can  help  in  the 
achievement of the other two goals. However, achieving office and some level of 
control over the executive branch of government, gaining the largest possible number 
of votes from among the electorate and having their policy proposals implemented in 
public policy are objectives that cannot be simultaneously realised (Strøm and Müller 
1999: 9). The choice between these objectives depends on a number of factors, first 
and foremost on party organisation and the relationship between party leaders, who 
tend to be office-seeking, and the party rank and file, who tend to be policy-seeking. 
As a result, trade-offs have to be made between these two faces of party organisation 
for the determination of party goals (Strøm and Müller 1999: 13-18). The dominance 
of one face in the organisation is likely to facilitate the pursuit of their preferred goal.  
 
Party functions 
As we have seen earlier, parties are said to perform a number of functions both at the 
societal level and at the governmental level (Merton 1957; Merriam 1923; Kirchheimer 
1966: 188-9; Scarrow 1998). Gunther and Diamond (2001: 7-8) make a list of seven 
functions that political parties perform in democratic polities.  
First of all, parties exercise a number of functions for the democratic polity by 
providing  candidates  for  election  and  participating  in  government.  Parties  have  a 
recruitment function through the selection and fielding of candidates for election. There 
are  different  ways  in  which  parties  can  address  this  function.  While  for  parties 
recruitment can be a way to reward activists and party members by offering them an 
opportunity to gain office, a number of social expectations have tended to complicate 
the way parties perform this function. Parties are increasingly expected to select a pool 
of candidates that mirrors the structure of society (Fiers, Gerard and Van Uytven 
2006). This is where issues such as gender parity and the representation of social and 
ethnic  minorities  appear (Norris  and Lovenduski  1993,  Norris  and  Franklin  1997; 
Anwar 2001). At the same time, parties are increasingly under pressure internally to     11 
'democratise' their selection procedures and give party members and activists a say in 
the selection of their candidates.  
Parties also perform a crucial function in the governance of democratic polities 
by forming and sustaining government. Through their activities in parliament, parties have 
the  ability  to  influence  the  formation  of  government,  either  directly  through 
government  participation  alone  or  in  coalition  or  by  supporting  a  minority 
government without direct participation in government (Blondel 1991). 
Other  key  functions  include  social  representation,  interest  aggregation,  conveying 
interests, demands, preferences, etc. to the centre (expressive function) and providing a 
link  between  the  governed  and  government  (linkage)  (Chambers  1966:  89-90).  All 
participate to the integration of citizens into the political system and contribute to the 
homogenisation  of  political  preferences.  These  functions  are  closely  related,  as 
expression, interest aggregation, social representation and integration all contribute to 
the exercise of the linkage function.  
Linkage is exercised through the inclusion of segments of society into the parties 
and into the electoral process. These segments become included in the democratic 
process and understand that they have a stake in society and that their voice counts. 
Parties represent various social groups either through direct appeal to these groups or 
more  symbolically  (societal  representation).  This  function  is  exercised  during  election 
campaigns, when parties vie for the support of various groups but also in parliament 
through the implementation of legislative programmes. Parties 'represent' these groups 
and their interests at the centre of the polity. Parties express 'their' issues and their 
proposals in the political debate and try to make them visible to the authorities and 
government. By expressing opinions and interests, parties act as a relay between the 
citizens and the state and serve as a medium of citizen mobilisation in the political 
arena and political integration of the masses in the political system. 
Interest aggregation is one aspect of the parties' function as a broker between the 
governed and government. Political parties are the recipients of opinions and demands 
coming from all sectors of societies, social classes, interest groups, individual citizens, 
etc. Parties aggregate interests by combining various interests in their policy proposals. 
Interest aggregation can happen at several stages of the political game: before the 
election  when  the  party  elaborates  its  election  manifesto,  after  the  election  when 
parties have to collaborate to form a governing coalition, and/or during the policy-
making stage when the party is in government. 
In  the  process  of  their  formulation  of  policies  and  electoral  programmes, 
political parties must select from among these opinions and claims and aggregate them 
into  their  proposals  (issue  structuring).  In  the  process  of  enlarging  their  potential 
electorate,  parties  must  act  as  brokers  between  increasingly  diverse  interests  and 
encourage the different interests to strike deals and reach compromise (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967: 5). As parties become more 'catch-all', the weight of ideology decreases 
and parties must attract voters beyond their 'classe gardée'. 
The campaign activities through which parties try to mobilise support for their 
candidates  represents  their  mobilisation  function.  Their  strategies  of  electoral 
mobilisation vary on the issues they stress during electoral campaigns and the scope of 
the electorate they wish to attract. Kitschelt (1989) distinguishes between two types of 
'logics of party competition': parties that aim at representing a group of individuals 
united around common concerns or social ties ('logic of constituency representation') 
and parties that adopt strategies aimed at maximising votes and the number of elected 
candidates ('logic of electoral competition').     12 
The role of parties as brokers has changed together with the segments of society 
included  in  the political  parties.  First,  elite,  cadre  parties  only  represented  a  small 
segment of society while trying to appeal to larger sectors of the electorate, even 
though most typically elite parties exited in the period before universal suffrage. On 
the other hand, mass parties aimed at encapsulating one particular segment, albeit 
larger than the one of the cadre parties, a social class, or the members of a particular 
religious group, for instance, and aimed at getting maximum number of votes from 
that group at election time.  
With the development of catch-all parties, the notion of linkage becomes larger, 
as parties cease to appeal to one particular group but try on the contrary to attract the 
largest number of voters. Paradoxically, this larger appeal goes hand in hand with 
weaker citizen-party ties (Kirchheimer 1966: 193). Parties therefore come to represent 
broad,  and  sometimes  vague,  interests,  rather  than  well-defined  group  interests. 
Finally, Mair (1994) even argues that parties are abandoning this function, as they start 
to shift their focus from society to the state. However, even though they might not 
perform this linkage function as well as they used to and in spite of evidence of the 
decline in party membership (Mair and van Biezen 2001), parties still try to mobilize 
segments of the electorate and still represent and aggregate the interests of different 
groups into the political arena. 
In the process of this aggregation of interests and through their role as brokers 
between society and government, parties participate in the integration of the citizens 
and different groups, either based on interests, territory or social origin, in the political 
system. National integration is defined as a process 'where political allegiances are 
focused increasingly at the national level over time, while there is a corresponding 
decrease in the salience of local and more parochial allegiances' (Jackman 1972: 512). 
This  process  is  facilitated  by  the  development  of  political  parties,  which  develop 
communications between the various parts of the country, while the competitiveness 
of the party system and the extension of centrally-controlled competences 'helps to set 
the national system of government above any particular set of politicians' or local level 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 4).  
Caramani (2004: 73) shows that there is a 'clear trend across Europe toward increasing 
nationally  integrated  electorates  and  homogeneous  party  systems'  (original  emphasis).  The 
development of functional cleavages has reduced the importance of cultural-regional 
cleavages in voting behaviour and party systems have become more homogeneous as a 
result. Where cultural cleavages have remained strong, they have slowed rather than 
prevented the development of functional cleavages. Even the recent trend toward 
institutional decentralisation has not led to a re-territorialisation of voting behaviour 
across  the  board  (Caramani  2004:  291).  However,  in  a  few  cases  the  process  of 
nationalisation has been incomplete, as for instance in Italy or in Belgium, which has 
undergone a process of regionalisation of its party system. The result is party systems 
with  a  strong  presence  of  regionally-based  parties  and  heterogeneous  patterns  of 
electoral behaviour. 
The  exercise  of  these  functions  contributes  to  the  development  of  a  more 
cohesive and unified polity and political parties play a crucial role in this process. In 
the words of Sartori (2005: xxi), 'parties are the central intermediate and intermediary 
structure between society and government'. The way parties perform these functions, 
but also their ability to do so, can depend in great part on the way parties organise. 
The next section describes the models that have been used to account for the internal 
organisation of political parties. 
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1.1.3. Models of party organisation  
The way political parties organise has been the subject of numerous studies. One of 
the  key  concerns  of  researchers  on  party  organisation  has  been  internal  party 
democracy, that is, the relationship between party leadership and membership, and 
building models of party organisation generally based on the parties' relations with 
their environments and their internal balance of power. 
The concern on internal democracy has led to a focus on the dichotomy between 
the grassroots party on the one hand and the national leadership and central organs on 
the other. At the heart of this conception of political parties lies the assumption that 
parties play a particular role in society, that of representing the people, or a fraction of 
it, and expressing its preferences or grievances (Kirchheimer 1966: 189). If the parties 
operate  in  a democratic  environment  and  accept its  underlying  values,  one  would 
therefore  expect  that  parties  are  themselves  democratic  organisations,  that  is, 
miniature  democratic  polities,  with  the  membership  in  place  of  the  people,  the 
conference or convention of delegates in place of the parliament and the leadership as 
the  executive  branch  of  government.  However,  as  they  started  to  study  the 
organisation of political parties, authors realised early on that parties did not live up to 
this ideal. As Michels (1914: 24) put it, 'in a political party (…), democracy is not for 
domestic use: it is rather an export article'. The issue of party democracy remains a 
crucial element in the typologies of political parties.  
 
Elite-cadre parties 
Duverger  (1976)  distinguished  between 'internally  created'  and  'externally  created' 
political parties. Internally created parties are political parties that were created inside 
parliament  as  the  coming  together  of  MPs  that  shared  a  number  of  common 
principles  and  interests.  They  were  typically  organised  in  small  'cadre  parties', 
characterised  by  a  dominance  of  the  parliamentary  party  over  an  embryonic 
membership  and  a  loose  formal  organisation.  These  parties  represented  the  first 
organisational form of political parties and generally emerged before the extension of 
the  suffrage.  Elite  parties  are  loosely  organised  formations  aimed  primarily  at 
facilitating  the  election  of  a  number  of  prominent  individuals.  Neumann  (1956) 
branded these parties 'parties of individual representation', characterised by low levels 
of political participation. At the central level, these parties only have an embryonic 
organisation with little power over local organisations that generally control their own 
resources. The primary function of the extra-parliamentary party is to mobilise the 
vote and support party candidates at election time.  
 
The mass party model 
Mass parties were often initially externally created parties, that is, parties that were 
created outside of parliament in order to represent groups previously excluded from 
the political game. Unlike elite parties, their existence preceded accession to power. 
Because they originally  lacked the resources that come with public office and the 
support of business backers, these parties had to find other resources, and a large, 
active membership can compensate in number and involvement what the parties lack 
in wealthy supporters (Wolinetz 2002: 140). They organised as mass organisations 
aimed at encapsulating the members of a social class or particular group. Neumann 
(1956) labelled these parties 'parties of social integration'. Their dense organisation was 
built around a network of ancillary organisations that provided services and channels     14 
of participation to the members and that constituted instruments of control for the 
party (Neumann 1956: 404). In his description of 'mass parties', Duverger (1976: 91) 
showed how the national leadership rested on a wide membership, often drawn from 
a particular section of the population and organised in a centralised system. 
Duverger (1976) argued that the organisation of externally created parties was 
superior to that of internally created parties in that it was better suited to mobilise 
masses and bring out the vote. As a result of what he called a 'contagion from the left', 
internally created parties would transform their structures to become mass parties. 
In  organisational  terms,  mass  parties  are  built  around  a  strong,  centralised 
bureaucracy at the national level. The extra-parliamentary leadership controls the other 
branches of the party through their command of the bureaucracy and resources. In 
order  to  attach  themselves  the  loyalty  of  party  members,  mass  parties  encourage 
participation  at  the  local  level  in  constituency  associations  but  also  through  the 
election  of  the  party  leadership  and  the  representation  of  the  membership  in  the 
national  congress.  However,  in  practice  'the  ideological  rigidity  and  the  internal 
processes  of  training  and  recruiting  members  of  the  elite  (through  extensive 
socialization  in  the  local  branches  and  the  internal  educational  system)  make  real 
competitive intra-party elections unlikely' (Krouwel 2006: 255).  
In his early classical work on party organisation, Michels analysed the way the 
leadership tended to seize power over the rank and file and how the need for a more 
efficient  political  organisation  induced  a  professional  approach  to  politics  that 
increased the gap between the leaders and the membership. He observed that an 'iron 
law of oligarchy' resulted from the organisational imperative of political parties. Put 
differently, 'who says organisation says tendency towards oligarchy' (Michels 1919: 15). 
This study documented how social-democratic parties, and in particular the German 
SPD,  evolved  from  an  equalitarian  organisation  based  on  principles  of  intra-party 
direct democracy towards an increasingly specialised organisation characterised by an 
internal  division  of  labour  and  the  emergence  of  an  increasingly  autonomous 
leadership. 
 
The catch-all party model 
Using  the  same  argument  of  electoral  efficiency,  Epstein  (1967)  argued  that  the 
organisation  of  American parties  was  in  fact  better  suited  to  the  development  of 
modern electioneering methods based on television campaigning and broad electoral 
appeals that go beyond class and traditional ties. As a result, he expected a 'contagion 
from  the  right'  to  happen  so  that  political  parties  would  then  take  the  form  of 
professionalised  parties  with  a  centralised  organisation,  a  lesser  reliance  of  the 
membership organisation and a more autonomous leadership. 
Kirchheimer's  'catch-all'  party  model  (1966)  and  Panebianco's  'electoral-
professional'  model  (1988)  also  focus  on  the  dichotomy  (and  increasing  distance) 
between  the  national  leadership  and  the  membership.  Kirchheimer  observed  that 
changes in the social structures, with high levels of economic growth and the rise of 
new middle classes, reduced social and political polarisation and diminished the appeal 
of mass parties. As political polarisation decreased, parties abandoned 'attempts at the 
intellectual  and  moral  encadrement  of  the  masses'  (Kirchheimer  1966:  184).  This 
manifested  itself  through  a lesser  importance  of  ideologies  and  a  focus  on  more 
immediate electoral results. Catch-all parties broaden their appeal beyond their classe 
gardée by reducing the ideological load of their programmes. At the same time, the 
party leadership gains more decisional autonomy while the role of individual party     15 
members is downgraded (Kirchheimer 1966: 190). Like for Epstein and Duverger, the 
transformation of mass parties into catch-all parties is a competitive phenomenon. If 
one  party  becomes  catch-all,  the  other  parties  are  likely  to  follow  suit.  However, 
Kirchheimer remained relatively vague about the precise organisational characteristics 
that make a party 'catch-all' (Krouwel 2006: 256).  
Panebianco  (1988)  specified  the  organisational  characteristics  of  the  catch-all 
party model with his 'electoral-professional party' model. Defined as an ideal-type, the 
'electoral-professional party' is characterised by the rise of paid professionals within 
the party, the increasing importance of public representatives and the strengthening of 
the role for the leadership inside and outside the party (Panebianco 1988: 262-74). 
This  means that  the  party bureaucracy and the  extra-parliamentary party  see their 
importance decrease. The party rank and file also lose influence as the leadership 
increasingly  appeals  to  the  opinion  at  large  and  relies  on  professionals  for  its 
campaigns and big private donors and the state for their funding. Finally, parties de-
emphasise their ideological baggage and focus instead on the leadership and issues that 
have a wide appeal in the electorate (Panebianco 1988: 264). 
 
The cartel party model 
Retracing the evolution of party models from the elite party to the mass party and 
then to the catch-all party, Katz and Mair (1995: 17) proposed a new party model, the 
'cartel party', which is primarily characterised by the 'interpenetration of party and 
state'. As parties cease to be ideologically driven, office becomes the main party goal 
and parties are increasingly interested in maintaining their position in office. The state 
has become essential for the survival of political parties, being a source of legitimacy 
through positions in public office and a supplier of resources, in particular with regard 
to the state funding of political parties but also in terms of staff and expertise (Mair 
1994: 8-9). As a result, 'existing parties are able to use their control over resources to 
sustain themselves and to hinder the rise of new parties' (Ware 1996: 108). One of the 
provocative arguments of the cartel thesis is the claim that established parties colluded 
in order to secure their access to and control of state resources.  
In organisational terms, the parliamentary elite has increased its power within the 
party through long periods in government and control over resources. Through public 
funding, the party in public office is able to hire more staff and gain independence 
from the party in central office (Katz and Mair 2002: 123). The increasing reliance on 
professionals  and  the  use of  television  and  electronic media  as  direct  channels  of 
communication  with  the  electorate  mean  that  election  campaigns  are  increasingly 
nationalised and centralised (Katz and Mair 2002: 125). The party in public office is 
increasingly isolated from both the party in central office and the party on the ground. 
The  party  in  central  office  has  also  become  more  professionalised  and  it  has 
simultaneously ceased to be an organisation that holds the parliamentary leadership 
accountable for the membership (Katz and Mair 2002: 125).  
The party on the ground is in a rather paradoxical situation. There seems to be a 
trend towards the empowerment of party members in the selection of candidates and 
party leaders. Party leaders have simultaneously become more autonomous and tend 
to appeal directly to the electorate rather than their rank and file. At a time, while 
evidence points to a steady decline in membership figures (Mair and van Biezen 2001), 
party  members  remain  useful  for  the  image  of  the  parties:  party  members  are 
symbolically important and act as 'legitimisers' (Mair 1994: 15) by providing the image 
of a party connected with civil society. Moreover, party members represent a pool of     16 
'warm  bodies'  from  which  to  select  candidates  and  an  important  source  of  party 
resources, both financial but also as campaigners at the local level (Katz and Mair 
2002: 127-9). At the same time, the new rights of the membership are accompanied by 
an  increased  atomisation  of  the  membership  by  means  of  consultation  via 
membership ballots. Local activists are marginalised and the newly empowered party 
members are assumed to be more easily influenced by the party leadership (Katz and 
Mair 2002: 129). 
The autonomy of the party in public office is partly matched by the autonomy of 
lower party strata. As the national leadership frees itself from the pressures from the 
regional and local party leaders, those also assert their right to decide autonomously 
from the central party in the management of party affairs at their respective levels 
(Mair 1994: 17; Katz and Mair 1995: 21) 
Doubts have been expressed on the validity and reality of this new party type 
(Koole  1996;  Kitschelt  2000).  The  cartelisation  hypothesis  still  lacks  empirical 
confirmation. Whereas it is true that political parties are increasingly reliant on the 
state for subsidies, there are still countries that resist state funding of political parties' 
activities (the UK and Switzerland, for instance). Moreover, evidence shows that the 
development of state funding has not necessarily led to the transformation of political 
parties into 'cartel parties ' (Young 1998). It is also true to say that, if they have 
attempted to prevent new parties from emerging, established parties have relatively 
failed to achieve their goal and that cartels of parties have not emerged (Detterbeck 
2005: 185-6).  
Rather than a new party type distinct from its predecessors, this category of 
cartel  parties  represents  rather  a  development,  or  a  variation,  from  the  catch-
all/electoral-professional party model (Krouwel 2006). All these party models are ideal 
types, and real parties never completely conform to one of them. Rather, they display 
characteristics of two or more types, often some features of the mass-bureaucratic 
model and others of the electoral professional party (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999: 308) 
and appear closer to one model than to another. In this discussion of models of party 
organisation, little was said of the sources of these changes and about how parties 
change from one organisational form to another. The next section addresses this issue 
in order to develop a model of party change that will be used in the analysis of party 
organisation in multi-level settings.  
 
1.2. Party organisation and change: a framework for analysis 
A great deal of literature addresses party change and how new pressures on established 
political parties give rise to new organisational forms. Change can take many forms 
from wholesale change to small-scale change in some aspects of the party's structure 
or programmatic orientation. At this stage, it is important to define a term that is often 
related to change: adaptation. Generally, this term is used to refer to change made in 
response to environmental changes. However, it is interesting – and more fruitful – to 
broaden its definition so as to include 'change intended to better suit the party to its 
environment or to some other circumstance which the party cannot immediately or 
directly alter' (Harmel 2002: 139). Change would then refer to any alteration to the 
organisation of a political party, whatever its source and scope. Here the focus will be 
on the organisational aspect of adaptation and change and the issue of programmatic 
change, however interesting and important, is left aside. 
Theories of party change and adaptation all argue that many factors shape, or at 
least  influence,  the  organisation  of  political  parties.  The  main  issue  relates  to  the     17 
respective role of environmental factors and party agency. The framework adopted 
here  emphasises  the  important  role  of  historical  and  environmental  factors  in 
processes of change and adaptation. The environment encompasses a wide range of 
factors, from the legal-institutional framework of a country to social trends and the 
political  environment,  such  as  the  party  system  and  conditions  of  electoral 
competition. However, an element of agency needs to be included in order to avoid 
presenting parties as passive institutions. The framework also considers that without 
some action or decision taken at the leadership level, no change can happen. 
 
1.2.1. The context of party formation and institutionalisation 
The third wave of democratisation has led to the renewal of scholarly interest in party 
formation  and  consolidation.  In  the  new  South  European  democracies  of  Spain, 
Portugal and Greece as well as in the Central and Eastern European post-communist 
democracies,  political  parties  have  come  to  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  process  of 
democratic transition, the formation of governments and the consolidation of the 
democratic regimes. The comparison between the organisation of these parties and 
the  models  of  party  organisation  and  change  of  their  older  West  European 
counterparts  proved  to  be  rather  problematic  as  new  democracies  provide  very 
different constraints and opportunity structures (van Biezen 2005: 149 and 154).  
The neo-institutionalist school argues that history and institutions play a crucial 
role. After Panebianco (1988), van Biezen (2003: 16) argues that the historical and 
institutional context in which parties operate is a key element in the understanding of 
party  organisation  and  party  change.  Panebianco  (1988:  50)  argues  that  'a  party's 
organizational  characteristics  depend  more  upon  its  history,  i.e.  on  how  the 
organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor'. History 
is important as it sets the context in which parties are born and develop.  
The level of institutionalisation of party organisations depends on the context of 
party formation ('the genetic model') (Panebianco 1988: 55). Institutionalisation can be 
defined as 'the process by which an organisation, from being a means to an end, 
becomes an end in itself' (Hopkin 1999: 2). Janda defines an institutionalised party as 
'one that is reified in the public mind so that "the party" exists as a social organisation 
apart  from  its  momentary  leaders  and  this  organization  demonstrates  recurring 
patterns  of behavior  valued  by  those  who  identify  with  it'  (Janda  1980:  19).  This 
definition  sees  the  development  of  attachments  to  and  identification  with  the 
organisation as a crucial aspect of party institutionalisation. In his operationalisation of 
the concept, Janda emphasises the importance of the passage of time (Janda 1980: 19-
20). The longer the party has been in existence and the higher its value in the eyes of 
its members and supporters the higher the degree of institutionalisation of a party. An 
institutionalised party has ceased to be an organisation used only in order to achieve 
personal  objectives  but  rather  a  stable  and  valued  structure  (Hopkin  1999:  2-3; 
Panebianco 1988: 53). 
Three main factors contribute to a party's genetic model: first, the pattern of 
territorial  construction  of  the  party,  that  is,  whether  the  party  formation  occurs 
through territorial penetration (from the centre to the peripheries) or diffusion (local 
elites  form  build  local  political  associations  that  are  later  integrated  into  a  single, 
national organisation); second, the presence (or absence) of an external sponsor (such 
as a trade union or the USSR Communist party, for instance) that influences the 
leadership's legitimacy and authority; and third, the role played by a charismatic leader 
in the party's formation (Panebianco 1988: 50-3).      18 
Territorial penetration is likely to produce more highly institutionalised parties, 
as  central  elites  control  the  formation  of  the party  structure.  On the other hand, 
parties built through territorial diffusion are more likely to have a complex mode of 
unification and be under the influence of local organisations that jealous guard their 
original  autonomy.  Territorial  diffusion  is  likely  to  give  rise  to  more  decentralised 
political parties. The presence of an external sponsor organisation is likely to hinder 
the formation of a strongly institutionalised party, as the party remains dependent on 
an external organisation. The existence of an external source of leadership legitimacy 
leads to indirect forms of loyalty within the party as the party comes second to the 
'sponsor'. However, evidence has shown that parties with an extra-national external 
sponsor (like Communist parties) could be strongly institutionalised parties. Finally, 
the creation of a party as a vehicle for a charismatic individual is likely to result in 
weakly  institutionalised  parties.  Organisations  based  on  'pure  charisma'  are 
characterised by a strong level of centralisation but they are weakly institutionalised 
because institutionalisation would require a transfer of authority from the leader to the 
organisation itself. As a result, they are unlikely to survive their leader (Panebianco 
1988: 50-3, 63-7).  
Panebianco's 'genetic' model of party change (1988) emphasises the 'stickiness' of 
organisational  forms  and  rules.  As  a  result  of 'organisational  resistance',  a  party's 
genetic  structure  would  continue  to  prevail  through  subsequent  stages  of  party 
development and hinder (or slow down) attempts to change party organisation and in 
particular  internal  power  balance  (Wilson  1994:  532;  Hopkin  2003:  228).  Path 
dependency implies that each organisational decision taken by political parties (and 
organisations  in  general)  restricts  the  range  of  available  options  and  potential 
organisational  changes  in  the  future.  Today's  party  organisation  and  options  for 
organisational change are partly determined by the organisational decisions taken in 
the  past  and  the  organisational  stage  in  which  the  parties  are  (formation, 
institutionalisation or consolidation). For instance, it may be difficult for a party that 
has given some voice or privilege to a group to rid this group of its advantages. Unless 
there is a broad consensus in the rest of the party and the section of the party in 
question  is  not  ready  to  fight  hard  to  keep  its  position  within  the party  (see  for 
instance the trade unions and the Labour party at the beginning of the 1990s), such a 
change may be difficult.  
As a result, and  in the words of Hopkin and Paolucci (1999:  309), 'Historic 
political  parties,  whist  responding  to the  opportunities  and  constraints  of modern 
electoral competition, remain rooted to their original identities, and are unlikely to 
jeopardise their electoral and social foundations for unpredictable short-term gains'. 
However, the limit of this emphasis on the 'genetic model' of party organisation is that 
it does not account well for the incentives for party change (Ware 1996: 104). 
 
1.2.2. Institutions, society and electoral competition 
Neo-institutionalists emphasise the role of environmental factors. Parties are said to 
respond to their environment and are expected to adapt to it (van Biezen 2003: 15; 
Panebianco 1988: 19-20). Keefe went as far as saying that 'parties are less what they 
make  of  themselves  that  what their environment makes  of  them' (Keefe  1972:  1, 
quoted  in  Harmel  and  Janda  1982:  7).  There  are  three  main  elements  in  this 
environment: the structure of the state, the social environment and the competitive 
electoral context.      19 
The structure of the state, often constitutionally entrenched, is a first factor. It 
influences such things as the vertical articulation of political parties, the importance of 
the parliamentary and presidential (when applicable) electoral contests for the parties 
and  the  respective  role  and  power  of  the  parties'  elected  representatives  in  the 
executive and legislative branches. Some constitutions mention political parties and 
recognise their role in the exercise of democratic rights and the government of the 
country. At the same time, this recognition is often supplemented by legal restrictions 
or  obligations.  Parties  are  also  affected  by  an  increasing  amount  of  legislation 
regulating their behaviour, in some cases their methods of candidate selection and 
more often their finance (van Biezen 2004).  
Sociological explanations have also been put forward: parties change in response 
to changes in the structure of society. For instance, Kirchheimer (1966) observes that 
the weakening strength of traditional bonds and ideologies leads to the loosening of 
the ties between leaders and party members, which in turn pushes parties to transform 
their  structures  so  that  ordinary  party  members  are  less  important  and  the  party 
leadership gains in power and autonomy. Likewise, the emergence of the 'cartel party' 
model is supposed to result from political, socioeconomic and technological trends, 
such  as  the  increasing  disaffection  of  the  electorate  vis-à-vis  political  parties, 
decreasing levels of participation in party activities, declining party identification and 
changing patterns of electoral competition and party funding (Katz and Mair 1995: 15-
6). As the levels of party membership decrease across the board (Mair and van Biezen 
2001) and the costs of electoral competition increase, political parties are expected to 
change their organisation and also change the rules of party competition in order to 
reinforce  their  position  and  limit  entry  into  the political  arena  for  small  and  new 
parties. 
The cleavage structure of society has been singled out as a crucial factor in the 
development  of  the  party  system  and  the  development  and  relative  strength  of 
political parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Changes in social alignments and in the 
class structure of society have an impact on the structure of party competition and 
political parties. For instance, Lipset (2001) showed how changes in the economy 
produced  changes  in  the  occupational  structure  of  society  like  the  growth  of  the 
middle classes and the subsequent decline of the industrial working class, which, in 
conjunction with the development of post-materialist values, led to the decline of class 
conflict and what he calls the 'Americanisation' of European social-democratic parties. 
Finally, other theories of party organisation and change emphasise the role of 
inter-party competition. A particular example of this is the 'contagion hypothesis': 
parties change their organisation in order to mimic the organisation of other, more 
successful, parties. Duverger (1976) expected cadre parties to transform themselves 
into  mass  parties  because  mass  parties  were  more  efficient  in  the  post-
enfranchisement  era  of  mass  politics.  In  a  time  of  mass  democratisation,  the 
organisation  of  mass  parties  seemed  better  suited  to  the new  conditions  of  party 
competition.  In  this  case,  the  pressure  comes  from  the  integration  of  new  social 
groups in democratic politics, other parties and the developments of modern party 
competition.  While  he  disagreed  with  Duverger  on  the  direction  of party  change, 
Epstein (1967) considered that the integration of new voters and the new methods of 
communications were likely to produce a 'contagion from the right'. Epstein therefore 
expected  political  parties  to  adapt  their  structures  to  resemble  American  political 
parties, that is, less institutionalised parties with a more flexible organisation and less 
permanent membership structures. For Epstein and Duverger, while social factors 
influence the way parties organise, change from one type of party to another is the     20 
result of the pressures of party competition. While both turned out to be wrong (there 
was  no  general  convergence of  political  parties  towards  one  model  or  the other), 
electoral competitiveness remains a strong incentive for party change (Ware 1996: 
104). 
There are several consequences to this assumed role of the environment. First, 
all  the  parties  of  a  country  are  expected  to  display  a  number  of  common 
characteristics as they are all under the influence of the same institutional and social 
environment  (Harmel  and  Janda  1982:  44-5).  Second,  this  image  of  party  change 
assumes a clear causal primacy of the environment (Harmel and Janda 1982: 11). This 
first point will be discussed in the light of the evidence provided in the empirical study 
later. The second point, on the other hand, needs to be mitigated, as it may give the 
impression  that  parties  are  expected  to  adapt  automatically  to  their  environment. 
Whereas it can easily be admitted that the environment in which political parties are 
embedded has a strong effect on their organisation, the environment alone cannot 
explain how parties organise. An argument against this strong institutionalist paradigm 
is  that  parties  are  also  purposive  agents  that  are  capable  of  changing  their 
environment. The institutional structure of the state, from the regime to the level of 
centralisation, is often the result of the government or parliamentary action of political 
parties. This aspect of the environment-parties interaction will be mostly left aside, as 
the focus of this dissertation is instead on what influences the structure of the political 
parties rather than how the political parties influence their environment, but it shows 
that parties are not passive organisations and it helps emphasise the active role played 
by political parties in the political system.  
Finally, if parties are shaped in the first place by their environment, any change – 
at least, any change of a significant nature – in the environment should result in some 
adaptational change on the part of the parties. The argument is that 'parties do not 
exist in a vacuum' (Lawson, 1976: 27) and that the most striking and influential aspect 
of  their  environment  is  the  institutional  framework  of  the  polity.  Whereas  some 
changes are too important to be ignored by the parties, others may be met with more 
resistance. As a result, there is a hierarchy of environmental changes that are likely to 
generate party change.  
 
1.2.3. Intra-party power relations and leadership effect 
This  hierarchy  of  environmental  factors  is  not  innate  and  there  has  to  be  some 
decision taken by the parties in order to determine what kind of change is worth 
transforming the party organisation for. Party change can be a long process, as some 
formal  rules  have  to  be  followed  and  the  assent  of  various  sectors  of  the  party 
organisation has to be secured. In the process, party change can turn out to be divisive 
for the party if the internal balance of power or the party's core values are to be 
altered by the proposed changes. As a result, political parties are likely to select the 
type  of  environmental  factors  that  have  sufficient  significance  for  the  party  to 
transform itself and embark on a potentially divisive process of party re-organisation. 
This  means  that  the  parties  themselves  are  responsible  for  processes  of  party 
adaptation and that a level of agency should be added to the framework.  
The next questions are then: under which circumstances do parties change, and 
what or who are the triggers of change? A framework is therefore needed to establish 
the 'micro-foundations' that explain internal relationships within political parties and 
the motives of party actors in processes of organisational change (Kitschelt 1989: 43; 
Kitschelt  2000:  150).  At  the  same  time  as  he  emphasises  the  role  of  history  and     21 
institutional factors, Panebianco describes intra-party dynamics, that is, the relations 
between party leadership and party membership, in terms of strategies and power 
relations.  Power  is  relational  and  is  an  unequal  exchange  relation  between  the 
leadership and the membership (Panebianco 1988: 22). Power is relational because it is 
not  an  attribute:  leaders  only  have  power  insofar  as  they  have  a  membership  to 
exercise it on. At the same time, the existence of a membership conditions the exercise 
of the leaders' powers over it, and it is therefore the source of the members' power.  
The  exchange  relation  is  unequal  because  the  leadership  is  the  group  that 
benefits the most from the exchange. Leaders receive selective incentives, i.e. benefits 
that  are  distributed  to  only  some  of  the  participants,  such  as  elective  positions, 
possible government portfolios and high-ranking positions within the organisation. In 
contrast, party members only receive collective incentives, that is, benefits – or prospects 
of benefits – that the organisation distributes equally among its members (Panebianco 
1988: 23). The leaders and elected officials of the party are those who benefits from 
'private goods' and the party membership receives mainly 'public goods' (Gaxie 1977).
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Party  bureaucrats  also  benefit  from  selective  incentives,  as  their  employment  is 
dependent on the party's survival and may also depend on the party success if the 
party's resources are highly dependent on public funding (the amount of which is 
often dependent on the parties' shares of the vote and number of elected officials). 
From this account, we understand that the leadership has more resources than 
the  membership  and  is  able  to  devote  more  time  to  the  maintenance  and 
administration of the organisation than party members. Thanks to the resources they 
obtain from the organisation, the leadership acquires a greater ability to affect the 
party and influence its decisions. The role of the party leadership is a disputed issue. 
For instance, van Biezen (2005: 153) argues that 'the behaviour of party leaderships 
and party strategies cannot be seen to be independent from the structural context in 
which  the  party  is  embedded'  and  concludes  that  studies  of  party  formation  and 
change  should  focus  on  'environmental  factors  external  to  the  party  as  key 
determinants of party formation'. On the other hand, a number of authors consider 
that party leaders, or the dominant coalition, play a crucial role in the process of party 
change  (Wilson  1980  and  1994;  Panebianco  1988;  Deschouwer  1992;  Harmel  and 
Janda 1994; Harmel 2002).  
The leadership group is more than simply the party leader and his deputy. It is 
what Panebianco calls 'dominant coalition', that is, an alliance of groups of national, 
local and regional leaders, and also sometimes leaders of ancillary organisations, who 
'control the most vital zones of uncertainty' (Panebianco 1988: 38). Panebianco argues 
that the leader is never alone and that he is at the centre of a coalition of forces that 
come together to rule the party (Panebianco 1988: 38-9). 
For  instance, Gunther  and  Diamond (2001:  33)  emphasise  the  role  of  party 
leaders in processes of party change and the way their decisions may run counter to 
'trends' in party organisation and produce different types of party responses to the 
same institutional factors: 
'while  socioeconomic  and  technological  developments  may  create 
circumstances favourable to the development and progressive dominance 
of organizationally thin parties, they cannot predict precisely what kind of 
party  is  likely  to  emerge,  let  alone  become  a  dominant  model.  Elite 
decision to pursue different strategies of voter mobilization or different 
                                                 
3 For a full explanation of the role of collective goods in organisations, see Olson (1971).     22 
goals  altogether  (like,  constituency  representation  instead  of  vote 
maximization) can lead to the adoption of a much more sharply defined 
ideological or programmatic stand'. 
Leadership-driven party change occurs in three situations: change of party leadership, 
change in dominant coalition, and external stimuli perceived by the leadership. The 
first two assume that changes in the leadership structure – the election of a new leader 
or a change in the coalition that leads the party – are triggers of party change. The 
election of a new leader gives him/her a mandate to lead the party, and this might 
entail party change if such a change is perceived to be necessary. Likewise, if a new 
internal coalition takes over the party, it is likely to try and adapt the party structure to 
its needs and according to its principles and primary goals.  
The 'external shock' theory assumes that environmental changes or pressures 
cannot  become  sources  of party organisational  change  unless  the  party  leadership 
perceives the need to change the organisation (Deschouwer 1992; Harmel and Janda 
1994:  267).  Party  change  is  therefore  the  result  of  the  perception  by  the  party 
leadership (in a broad sense) that the conditions of the environment have changed and 
that the party needs to adapt (Mair et al. 2004: 9). The necessity will be felt if the 
party's performance is undermined by the changes in the environment. This notion of 
performance relates to the ability of political parties to achieve their goals. As we saw 
earlier, possible party goals are votes and election victory (generating vote-seeking 
behaviour),  placing  representatives  in  public  office  (office-seeking  behaviour)  and 
promoting values and implementing policies (policy-seeking behaviour) (Strøm and 
Müller  1999).  The  perception  that  environmental  changes  prevent  the  party from 
achieving its optimal electoral results is likely to be the most salient to party leaders. 
Consequently, changes to the conditions of electoral competition are likely to be the 
type of change that affects party leaders the most, and they are therefore the most 
likely to prompt party adaptation (Wilson 1980: 528; see also Mair, Müller and Plasser 
2004).  
At the same time, the party leaders or the dominant coalition are unlikely to 
promote  changes  that  limit  their  power  or  that  shift  the  balance  of  power  too 
dramatically  against  their  own  interests.  Changes  will  only  be  implemented  if  the 
organisation's survival and performance are at stake or to consolidate the leadership or 
dominant coalition (Harmel and Janda 1994: 279). Because the leadership's primary 
goal is to preserve the performance and stability of the organisation, this involves 
most  of  the  time  the  preservation  of  'the  party's  internal  authority  channels' 
(Panebianco 1988: 42). 
Leadership perception is only a step in the process of change: party leaders and 
the dominant coalition must then convince the rest of the party that the changes are 
indeed  necessary.  As  we  saw  earlier,  parties  are  creatures  of  habit,  with 'sticky' 
procedures and a tendency towards internal inertia. In particular, party leaders have to 
overcome the resistance of the party bureaucracy and the rank and file (Wilson 1994: 
275).  According  to  Panebianco  (1988:  13-4),  '[h]olding  environmental  constraints 
constant, the more the selective incentives prevail in the organization, the more the 
organization will tend to adapt. The more collective incentives prevail, the more the 
organization will adopt strategies of domination [of the environment]'. It results that 
change is likely to be easier in office-seeking parties than in policy-seeking parties.  
 
Overall,  party  change  is  likely  to  be  prompted  by  party  leaders  and  their 
perception that changes in the environment require the party to change in order to     23 
maintain or improve its ability to achieve its goals. Party organisations have a tendency 
toward organisational inertia, and only those environmental changes that affect the 
most their survival and electoral chances are likely to induce party change. 
Figure 1.1. A Model of Party Organisation and Party Change 
Source: adapted from Wilson 1980. 
To  conclude  this  chapter,  the  figure  above  recapitulates  the  model  of  party 
change adopted in this dissertation. The 'genetic model' of party formation exerts a 
constraint  on  the  party's  ability  to  change  and  the  direction  of  change.  The 
'environment' is divided into two categories of independent variables: constitutional 
and  institutional  settings  and  structure  of  electoral  competition.  A  third  category 
includes  intra-party  factors  such  as  the  internal  balance  of  power  between  party 
leadership,  party  bureaucracy  and  party  membership  and  the  party's  ideology  and 
goals. Their effect on party organisation and party change is finally mediated through 
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CHAPTER 2.  DETERMINANTS OF PARTY 





Chapter 1 elaborated a general framework through which the organisation of political 
parties can be studied. This chapter adapts this framework to the study of state-wide 
political parties in multi-level settings. The territorial dimension of state-wide parties 
and the relationships between central and regional levels of organisation become a 
crucial aspect of party organisation in multi-level systems, but the literature reviewed 
in  chapter  1  says  very  little  on  this  issue.  The  first  section  presents  number  of 
organisational  strategies  can  be  adopted  by  the  parties  in  order  to  overcome  co-
ordination problems. Three categories of variables are then considered in turn: the 
institutional  and  social  environment,  which  consists  of  the  characteristics  of  the 
decentralised institutional arrangement and the territorial cleavages that shape society; 
the structure of party competition, that is, the electoral system, the electoral cycle and 
the state-wide and regional party systems; and finally internal party factors such as 
party type, party ideology and party finance.  
 
2.1. The territorial dimension of party organisation 
2.1.1. State-wide parties: definition and organisational issues 
While political parties were often born in single-level polities, today most democratic 
polities are multi-levelled. This is especially the case in Europe, where power is pooled 
together at the European level for a large number of issues and areas of competence 
while being simultaneously spread within the member states through more or less 
advanced processes of territorial decentralisation. As office-holders have to be elected 
in a range of territorial institutions, political parties play a crucial role in the running of 
elections and governments at all levels. In a multi-level system, political parties are not 
only brokers between the state and the citizens. They also provide a linkage between 
the levels, presenting voters with easily identifiable labels and an element of cohesion 
across the country, and influencing the way the multi-level system works (Deschouwer 
2000: 14).  
The multi-level nature of the polity creates opportunity structures for political 
parties to compete at different levels and choose which level is their 'core level', that is, 
their level of reference for electoral competition (Deschouwer 2003: 216-7). Parties 
can participate in elections at the regional level, at the national level or at both levels. 
Another dimension to the territorial organisation of political parties is their 'territorial 
pervasiveness', that is the number of regions in which the party runs for election 
(Deschouwer 2006: 292). From these two dimensions, a typology of parties in multi-
level setting can be established, with parties participating in elections at the regional 
level, at the national level or at both levels, in one region, some regions or all the 
regions, which makes a total of nine possible forms of organisation (Deschouwer 
2006).     25 
Within  the  whole  population  of  political  parties  in  multi-level  polities,  this 
dissertation  focuses  only  on  some  of  them:  state-wide  parties.  The  distinguishing 
features  of  state-wide  parties  are  their  participation  in  electoral  contests  at  both 
national and regional levels and their territorial coverage or pervasiveness. State-wide 
parties are political parties that present candidates for election in all or most of the 
constituencies for general and regional elections. The term 'state-wide' is preferred to 
federal or national for two reasons. First, state-wide political parties are not only found 
in federal countries. With the spread of decentralisation and devolution reforms, the 
forms of decentralised distribution of power and competences are numerous and do 
not necessarily conform to the classical definition of a federation. The term 'federal 
party' is moreover sometimes used to define political parties that file candidates for 
federal elections in opposition to parties that present candidates for sub-national level 
elections, as is the case in Canada for instance (Chandler and Chandler 1987). As a 
result, the term 'state-wide' seems more appropriate, as it conveys a sense that the 
party is present all over the country and contest different types of elections. The terms 
'national'  and 'central'  are used to refer  to  the  central party  and 'regional'  for the 
highest tier of sub-state government. This is not to say that some sub-national units 
are not nations, but this distinction between 'national' and 'regional' remains useful for 
the sake of clarity.  
State-wide  parties  are  'integrated  parties',  that  is,  parties  in  which  there  is  a 
mutual  interdependence  between  the  levels  (Renzsch  2001:  2).  As  the  party's 
organisation is present at all levels, electoral success at one level facilitates electoral 
success at other levels. If the national level is the most important level, this link is 
likely to be top-down, from the national to the regional level. The survival of the 
overall structure is a crucial goal of the national party elite because the defection of 
one sub-national unit affects the cohesion of the whole and harms its strength as a 
national organisation. As a result, national elites are likely to give some autonomy to 
regional elites to preserve the organisation (Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 2004: 
192-4). However, the relative autonomy of regional party branches may vary between 
and within parties, as control over party processes and party organs at both levels 
becomes a critical aspect of party organisation. 
State-wide parties that compete in a federal or devolved state are confronted 
with a specific challenge. On the one hand, they compete in general elections and file 
candidates  in  all  the  regions.  For  these  elections,  they  devise  a  single  electoral 
programme that should appeal to as large a group of voters as possible. On the other 
hand, they compete in regional elections, for which they need to take the specific 
interests of each region into account. This challenge is nowhere greater than in federal 
or devolved states with a multinational character (van Biezen and Hopkin 2006: 15) 
because the issues that are discussed at the regional level will often diverge from those 
that dominate general elections (Fabre et al. 2005: 37). Issues of regional identity and 
regional institution-building are more likely to be at stake in regional elections than in 
general elections. In multinational federations state-wide parties will often face the 
competition of ethno-regionalist parties (de Winter and Türsan 1998), which tend to 
build their electoral appeal on criticising all political actors that can be identified with 
the  centre.  Such  parties  also  tend  to  question  the  state-wide  parties'  'regional' 
credentials. This tension between national campaigns and more particularistic regional 
campaigns may represent a source of conflict for state-wide parties, as regional leaders 
may want to emphasise regional issues and adapt their programme to the regional 
context while the central party is more likely to prefer programmatic homogeneity. In 
other words, the issue of their vertical organisation is a potential conundrum for state-    26 
wide  parties,  as  they have  to  find  a  balance  between party  cohesion  and regional 
demands for autonomy. 
The  focus  of  this  dissertation  is  on  one  aspect  of  party  organisation:  the 
distribution of decision-making authority among units and across levels (Harmel 2002: 
138), with a focus on two levels, the central party organs of the state-wide party and 
the  regional  branches.  The  degree  of  centralisation  or  regional  decentralisation  of 
party structures is observed though two aspects of party organisation, which mirror 
the way in which decentralised and federal states are organised. Elazar (1987:  12) 
defines a federal political system as a form of government that combines 'elements of 
shared-rule and regional self-rule'. On the one hand, two levels of government can act 
on their citizens through their respective institutions, and on the other hand they are 
involved in some form of joint decision-making. In terms of party organisation, this 
means looking at the level of involvement of regional sub-units in central party organs 
and the level of autonomy of regional sub-units. The former relates to the degree to 
which regional sub-units are represented in central organs and involved  in central 
decision-making processes, for instance in relation with the selection of the state-wide 
party leader, the selection of candidates for general elections, and the elaboration of 
the programme for these same elections. The latter refers to the same processes at the 
regional level and to the extent to which regional sub-units are able to perform these 
competences independently from the central party. 
 
2.1.2. Political parties and decentralisation  
The literature on political parties has often focused on national politics and as a result 
references to the regional tier of organisation are rather scarce (Filippov, Ordeshook 
and  Shvetsova  2004:  178-9).  When  it  mentions  organisational  centralisation,  this 
literature often refers to the relationship between the centre and the membership or 
the increasing power of the party leadership at the expense of the other party groups. 
However, in federal, regionalised and decentralised polities, the regional level should 
also be taken into account.  
One of the first references to the territorial dimension of party organisation can 
be  found  in  Duverger's  study  of  political  parties.  He  observes  that 'the  political 
articulation [of political parties] tends to copy the administrative articulation of the 
state: the grouping of the 'basic elements' therefore looks like a pyramid with degrees, 
often coinciding with the official territorial divisions' (Duverger 1976: 91). Duverger 
also  briefly  discusses  the  organisation  of  political  parties  in  federal  countries  and 
points out a potential paradox. He argues that because the organisation of federal 
states accommodates regional particularisms and allows their expression at the central 
level, state-wide parties need not grant autonomous powers to their regional branches. 
On the other hand, when the distinct regional groups of a country cannot express 
their originality through a federal framework, then the accommodation of regional 
interests  through  the  autonomy  of  regional  party  branches  becomes  necessary 
(Duverger  1976:  109).  At  a  more  general  level,  he  considers  that  the  degree  of 
(de)centralisation of political parties is influenced by a number of factors, such as the 
origins of the party (externally created parties, such as labour parties, are generally 
more centralised that parties with a parliamentary origin), party finance ('bourgeois' 
parties where campaign costs are paid by local candidates and constituencies allow 
more autonomy to their local level than mass parties that centralise their resources), 
and  the  electoral  system  (majoritarian  systems  tend  to  increase  constituency  level 
autonomy) (Duverger 1976: 113-4).     27 
The literature on federalism, often influenced by the example of the US, also 
turned some – albeit little – of its attention to the organisation of political parties. For 
instance, Riker (1975: 137) argues that 'when parties are somewhat decentralized, then 
federalism is only partially centralized. Because of this perfect correlation, […] the 
inference  is  immediate:  one  can  measure  federalism  by  measuring  parties.  The 
structure of parties is thus a surrogate for the structure of the whole constitution'. 
Because Riker talks about a 'perfect correlation', one can also assume that one can 
measure  the  (de)centralised  organisation  of  political  parties  from  the  type  of 
federalism  of  the  state.  Beyond  the  fact  that  Riker  reached  this  conclusion  by 
comparing democratic federal countries, such as Canada, Australia and the US to non-
democratic federations such as the Soviet Union, Tito's Yugoslavia and Mexico under 
PRI rule, therefore making democracy a more relevant factor in explaining the degree 
of decentralisation of political parties, this statement reflects a strong institutional bias, 
a perception that the distribution of powers within of political parties automatically 
reflects that of the state.  
Already visible in Duverger's earlier quote, and here reproduced by Riker, this 
tendency  to  consider  that  the  federal  or  decentralised  nature  of  a  polity  is  a  key 
element in explaining the relations between a party's centre and its sub-national units 
remains very strong. For instance, the organisation of integrated parties has also been 
described  as  'a  "wedding  cake"  structure  that  mimics  the  federation'  (Filippov, 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova 2004: 193). However, the fact that the structure of the 
parties reflects that of the federation does not say much about the relationships and 
the type of distribution of powers between the levels.  
Assuming again a 'perfect correlation' between the distribution of competences 
of a federation and the division of power within political parties might be a step too 
far. Duchacek (1970: 331-2) forcefully disagrees with this tendency to correlate party 
organisation and federal organisation: 'a classic political party negates the federal idea 
of  power  dispersion,  because  political  parties  are  deemed  to  aim  primarily  at 
aggregating and welding different elements of territorial and functional interests and 
power into one phalanx, committed to a common goal under one leadership'. Indeed, 
if parties are to have an aggregative function, it can be assumed that they also aim at 
aggregating regional interests into a single locus.  
In the 1960s Eldersveld introduced the concept of stratarchy in order to describe 
some aspects of the vertical organisation of American political parties. By 'stratarchy', 
Eldersveld (1964: 9) means that parties are characterised by an important 'diffusion of 
power  prerogatives  and  power  exercise'  and  'the  existence  of  "strata  commands", 
which operate with a varying, but considerable degree of, independence'. It results that 
American  political  parties  are  not  centralised  structures  but  on  the  contrary 
organisations characterised by limited integration and central control and by important 
sub-level autonomy (Wright 1971: 6). While not restricted to the Washington-states 
relationship, this concept of stratarchy can be a useful heuristic tool to observe multi-
level party organisation. 
This concept is also used by Katz and Mair (1994, 1995) in their study of party 
organisation.  In  their  cartel  model  of  party  organisation,  they  claim  that  party 
organisations are becoming increasingly stratarchical, as opposed to hierarchical. Local 
elites are granted more autonomy vis-à-vis the central party, as both levels consider 
this situation mutually advantageous. Local office-holders and elites intervene little in 
national politics, while the central party gives them a large degree of autonomy in local 
politics  (Katz  and  Mair  1995:  21).  Political  parties  are  also  likely  to  adopt  a 
stratarchical  form  of  organisation  because  parties  are  increasingly  close  to  and     28 
dependent on the state for their resources (Mair 1994: 7). The closeness between state 
and political parties is such that 'the very structure of party organisations is determined 
at least in part by the structure of the state itself' (Mair 1994: 10). Indeed, if parties 
increasingly rely on the state for their resources, they are likely to make the most of 
the organisation of the state and try to gain advantages and resources at all levels of 
government within a country. The regional organisation of the state provides parties 
with  opportunities  to  gain  access  to  positions  in  public  office  and  financial  and 
patronage  resources  at  another  level.  It  becomes  particularly  useful  for  parties  in 
opposition at the central level, as being in government at the regional level provides 
them with resources to which they would not have access in a unitary state. State-wide 
parties  may  find  it  preferable  to  leave  regional  elites  organise  and  campaign 
autonomously  in  order  to  give  them  the  possibility  of  adapting  to  the  electoral 
demands of each particular region and increase the odds of getting candidates elected. 
However, the levels remain 'interdependent elements of a wider organisation' (Carty 
and  Cross  2006:  95).  Unlike  'bifurcated  parties'  in  which  central  and  regional 
organisations of the same label are 'divorced' (Renzsch 2001), they still need to co-
ordinate  their  activities  and  organise  the  separation  of  powers  and  competences 
between the various levels of organisation.  
Carty developed the notion of 'franchise parties' that describes this articulation 
between two levels of party organisation (Carty 2002 and 2004). Because it is inspired 
by the organisation of Canadian federal parties where there is very little interaction (if 
any) between federal and provincial parties with the same political label, it describes 
the  articulation  between the  federal  and  constituency  levels  of  organisation.  Carty 
compares  the  stratarchical  organisation  of  Canadian  political  parties  to  franchise 
organisations in which the central organisation provides a 'product line, sets standards, 
manages  marketing  and  advertising',  and  the  local  units  (the  individual  franchises) 
'deliver the product to a particular market, invest local resources, build an organisation 
focused on the needs and resources of the (local) community' (Carty 2004: 10). For 
political parties, this means that the central party organisation provides the political 
line,  the  overall  image  and  the  organisational  framework  of  the  party,  while  the 
constituency units provide a structure for local involvement and campaign support. 
Local party branches are able to adapt the party to the needs of the local level.  
In a multi-level context, this provides a template for the study of the relationship 
between the central organisation of political parties and their regional party branches. 
Franchise organisations can take many forms, from centralised to the federalised, and 
can also be asymmetrical, with larger, richer units enjoying more autonomy and power 
than smaller, poorer ones. It means that the franchise contract (the party constitution) 
can  give  sub-units  different  levels  of  organisational  autonomy  and  powers.  The 
constitution provides a framework for the distribution of competences between the 
central party and its sub-units, for the level of autonomy of the sub-units and for the 
organisation of the interdependence between the levels. The constitution attempts to 
solve co-ordination problems by 'exchanging autonomy for clear limits on the bounds 
of action' (Carty 2004: 20). The limit of this model resides in its flexibility: because the 
existence of a franchise contract does not prescribe the type of autonomy of the sub-
national units, it fails to provide clear categories or ideal-types to compare different 
forms of party organisation.  
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2.1.3. Organisational strategies of state-wide parties 
This section first looks at the range of possible forms of organisation at the regional 
level  and  then  distinguishes  between  the  different  levels  of  involvement  of  the 
regional branches in central decision-making. The final organisation of the parties is a 
combination of these two dimensions, as table 2.1 below shows.  
In a regionalised or federal polity, state-wide parties have the choice between 
different organisational strategies with respect to the degree of autonomy of their 
regional  branches  (Roller  and  van  Houten  2003).  This  scheme  adds  one  category 
(federalisation) to Roller and van Houten's range of possible relationships between 
central and regional levels of party organisation.  
Centralisation: the state-wide party centralises its organisation in order to co-ordinate 
more  efficiently  its  activities,  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  intra-party  cohesion  and 
ensure the uniformity of its message and policies all over the country. The central 
party therefore controls the selection of regional elites and the content of election 
programmes for regional elections.  
Regionalisation: the state-wide party gives more power and autonomy to its regional 
branches. It is a way to recognise that devolution is about letting the regions decide, at 
least partly, by themselves, and that decentralisation of powers should also extend to 
party organisation. It may be considered electorally advantageous to leave some room 
for manoeuvre to the regional branches, as they can adapt the party to regional party 
competition. The amount of power allocated to the regional party branches in the 
management of their own affairs and in regional party competition may vary, but the 
central party reserves itself the powers to oversee and/or veto regional choices in 
order to ensure that the policies and candidates of the regional party branches do not 
jeopardise the overall cohesion of the party. 
Federalisation: a federal form of organisation gives regional party branches complete 
freedom in the management of party affairs corresponding to their level. They are able 
to independently organise, select their candidates for regional elections, make their 
own election manifestos, design their regional election campaign and raise their own 
funds to support their activities. The link between the central party and its regional 
branches mainly lies in the compliance with the principles of the party constitution 
and adherence to a common political doctrine, which the regional branches adapt to 
the regional context, on the model of the franchise contract (Carty 2002 and 2004).  
Split organisation: the state-wide party dissolves its central organisation, abandons its 
state-wide nature and splits into regional parties. However, the moment this strategy is 
developed, the state-wide party ceases to exist (see the example of Belgium in Lecours 
2001a: 61). This strategy is therefore likely to be a last-resort solution when it appears 
to  party  leaders  that  the  maintenance  of  unified  party  structures  has  become 
impossible.  
At the same time, the party must also decide which role it wants to give to the 
regional branches in its central organs. This can lead to three potential configurations: 
No involvement in central party organs: because central party organs deal with national 
issues, the party considers that it is not a matter for regional party branches. This is in 
line with Duverger's argument that if the structure of the state accommodates regional 
groups and interests, political parties may feel that they need not concern themselves 
with issues of regional representation within their organisations. In the case of a split 
organisation, there is no central level of organisation. 
Involvement  of  regional  branches  in  central  party  organs:  the  regional  branches  gain 
representation in the central organs of the state-wide party. They are therefore able to     30 
convey their problems and interests at the centre. It also allows a certain level of co-
ordination between the levels and reminds the regional branches that they still have 
links with, and obligations towards, the rest of the party. 
Central party as a confederation: central party organs are composed of representatives 
from the regional branches. There is no separate central organisation, only regional 
branches  coming  together  for  the  purpose  of  co-ordinating  their  activities  at  the 
national level. 
Table 2.1. Range of possible forms of multi-level party organisation: autonomy and 
involvement of the regional branches within state-wide parties 
  Centralisation  Regionalisation  Federalisation  Split organisation 
No involvement   Possible  Possible  Possible  Possible  
Involvement   Possible  Possible  Possible  Impossible  
Confederation   Impossible   Unlikely  Possible   Impossible  
 
Table 2.1 shows that three combinations are impossible. The central level of a state-
wide party cannot take a confederal form if the regional branches are not powerful 
entities. This is why that the confederal form of the central party is even unlikely to 
occur if the central level is strong enough to intervene, even moderately, in regional 
party affairs. The confederal form of the centre is more likely to occur when the 
regional branches are powerful organisations able to manage their own affairs without 
any central intervention. In addition, a split organisation means that there is no central 
level  to  co-ordinate  regional  parties,  making  it  impossible  to  have  some  form  of 
central-level involvement in regional party affairs. 
 
The factors that influence the adaptation of state-wide parties to the challenge of 
multi-level politics of political parties are described in detail in the rest of this chapter. 
Faced  with  the  difficult  task  of  participating  in  national  and  regional  party 
competition, state-wide political parties and the nature of the 'franchise contract' are 
influenced  by  a  number  of  factors  that  range  from  their  institutional  and  social 
environment  to  the  multi-level  structure  of  party  competition  and  the  intra-party 
distribution of power and resources.  
 
2.2. Regionalisation and territorial diversity  
Harmel  and  Janda  (1982:  12-3)  argue  that  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  environmental 
factors, from the physical environment (size, shape of the country), to socioeconomic 
factors and finally political factors. Whereas physical characteristics such as the size 
and  shape  of  a  country  have  little  bearing  on  the  matter,  its  institutional  and 
socioeconomic structure, on the other hand, is of crucial importance. The multi-level 
nature  of  the  polity  is  a  first  variable  to  be  considered.  Indeed,  the  issue  of  the 
territorial dimension of party organisation takes on a particular relevance in a multi-
level institutional context.  
There  is  a  general  expectation  about the  impact of  a  regionalised  or  federal 
system on party organisation. Parties seem to be expected to adapt quasi-automatically 
to  the  structure  of  the  state,  mimicking  its  overall  structure.    At  the  same  time, 
regionalisation can be more than institutional: it may be based on the geographical 
concentration  of  cultural  and  economic  differences.  If  mobilised  politically,  these 
geographical  cleavages  can  provide  the  basis  of  support  for  regionalist  ideas  and 
regionalist parties.  
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2.2.1. Multi-level institutional arrangement and party adaptation 
The form of regionalisation of the state is the main variable of this category (Méndez 
Lago 2004). It is then subdivided into a number of dimensions to grasp the multi-
faceted  aspect  of  regionalisation:  the  historical  development  of  the  regionalised 
arrangement, the degree of institutional autonomy of the regions, the extent to which 
the regions have access to central decision-making and the asymmetry of the whole 
arrangement.  
 
Regionalisation, devolution, federalism: the various faces of multi-level governance 
Federalism is a term that refers to the promotion of multi-tiered government, which 
combines  a  central  government  and  regional  governments.  It  is  based  on  the 
principles of balance between diversity and unity within a complex society, freedom 
and shared power to achieve common ends (Elazar 1987). 
A federation is the application to the state of the principles of federalism. There 
is no single model of federal political systems, but they all share a number of common 
characteristics (Riker 1975: 103). Elazar (1987: 12) defines a federal political system as 
a form of government that combines 'elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule'. 
Two levels of government can act directly on their citizens on the basis of formal, 
democratically elected legislative and executive powers listed in a constitution that can 
only be amended by mutual agreement of the federal and regional governments. The 
autonomy of the two levels of government is ensured by this constitutional guarantee 
and  the  sharing  of  revenue  resources.  The  constitution  also  provides  for  the 
representation of the constituent units and regional interests in the federal policy-
making process, generally through a federal second chamber and intergovernmental 
collaboration  (Elazar  1987;  Watts  1999:  7).  Swenden  (2006:  10-11)  adds  some 
elements to this definition: the entities of government should be mainly territorial in 
character, as it facilitates the distinction between federal and consociational systems; 
both  federal  and  regional  governments  should  have  democratic  structures;  and 
unilateral secession of one of the constituent units is generally impossible.  
Federalism  is  not the  only  form  of  distribution  of  power  between  a  central 
government and regional units. A regionalised system is a political system that displays 
some elements of federalism while at the same time retaining some characteristics of 
unitary or centralised systems. A regionalised political system is relatively close to the 
model of decentralised unitary states but it also has some federal arrangements that 
provide  for  stronger  regions  than  in  simply  decentralised  systems:  the  ultimate 
authority rests with the central government but sub-national units can also act upon 
their  citizens  with  some  degree  of  authority  (Watts  1999:  8;  Elazar  1987:  47-9; 
Swenden  2006:  14-5).  There  is  therefore  a  sort  of  continuum  between  unitary, 
regionalised  and  federal  states.  Devolution,  a  term  generally  used  to  refer  to  the 
process  that  occurred  in  the  UK  in  the  late  1990s,  fits  into  the  category  of 
regionalisation.  It  is  defined  as  'the  transfer  and  subsequent  sharing  of  powers 
between institutions of government within a limited framework set out in legislation' 
(Burrows 2000: 1). Regional governments can have relatively considerable powers but 
remain subordinate entities to a central government. The distinction between regional 
and unitary decentralised states is not clear cut, as there is no unambiguous 'cut-off 
point'. The difference between decentralised unitary and regionalised systems rests on 
the evaluation of the strength of the regional institutions in the overall institutional 
design (Swenden 2006: 14). 
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The historical development of decentralisation/federalism  
Varying  degrees  of  centralisation  in  federal  or  regionalised  states  can  in  part  be 
explained by the process of federalisation or regionalisation. A country may become 
federal  or  regionalised  in  two  ways:  either  a  number  of  independent  units  come 
together to form a federal state or a centralised state decides to give some powers to 
its constituent regions. The first case, 'federalisation by aggregation', involves distinct 
entities getting together and surrendering some of their sovereignty to share some 
responsibilities such as international relations, defence, security and taxes. At the same 
time,  the  constituent  units  keep  some  policy-making  powers  in  areas  of  local 
relevance. Under such circumstances, the regions often want to retain as much power 
as possible and keep the powers of the federal government limited and under control 
(Watts 1999: 36; Baldi 1999: 18-9). The distribution of powers tends to benefit the 
regions.  The  powers  of  the  federal  and  regional  government  are  detailed  in  a 
constitution and the residual powers, i.e., the powers that are not otherwise listed, are 
generally assigned to the regions. 
The other case is called 'federalism by decentralisation'. A unitary state, often 
under the pressure of regionalist movements or parties, decentralises power to its 
constituent  regions.  The  central  government  is  more  likely  to  hold  on  to  its 
prerogatives and the regions are likely to be less powerful than the regions of an 
'aggregated' state (Baldi 1999: 19). The constitution tends to assign the residual powers 
to the central government and circumscribe the competences of the regions (Watts 
1999: 38). 
If  a  country  was  created  relatively  recently  as  the  result  of  a  process  of 
aggregation, some form of party system is likely to have preceded the formation of the 
state. Some parties, created on a regional basis and used to being independent, are 
likely to have resisted the extension of a national structure. The regional party system 
may also have retained some particularities: some parties may be competing in only 
one  or  a  few  regions,  or  different  parties  may  be  competing  for  the  federal  and 
provincial elections. This is what Renzsch (2001: 2) calls a 'bifurcated party system'. 
The later the formation of the state, the more likely this will be the case, as a 'modern' 
form of a party system will have a greater impact on state-building.  
If a federation formed through a process of devolution, the original centralised 
organisation  is  likely  to  have  some  lasting  effects  on  the  organisation  of  political 
parties.  The  parties'  national  organs  are  likely  to  have  the  upper  hand  on  party 
business, at least in the early stages following devolution. Later, parties may adapt their 
structure to that of the state and hand over some centrally-managed functions to the 
regional party branches. In such countries, we are likely to find 'integrated' parties 
competing  at  both  national  and  regional  levels  and  trying  to  keep  'closed  ranks' 
(Renzsch 2001: 2).  
  
Distribution of competences: the dual-integrative continuum and the scope of decentralised powers 
The notion of federalism or regional devolution is not sufficient in itself, as there are 
two dimensions to the issue: the nature of the distribution of powers and the scope of 
regional autonomy. The first dimension relates to the way competences are distributed 
and shared between the central and regional levels: whether each level has exclusive 
competence over policy areas or central and regional governments share responsibility 
over policy-making and implementation. The second dimension refers to the amount 
of power given to the sub-national level of government.      33 
Federal systems can be ranked along a scale ranging from very dual to very 
cooperative (Swenden 2006: 49-50). In a dual federal system, the federal and regional 
levels are virtually independent from one another in their decision-making. Dual (or 
jurisdictional)  federalism  means  that  each  level  has  a  clearly  identifiable  set  of 
legislative,  executive  and  fiscal  responsibilities  (Chandler  and  Chandler  1987:  95; 
Scharpf 1995: 31). Each level tends to be exclusively responsible for the areas over 
which it has competence (even though some level of overlap, however small, is always 
bound to occur) and the machinery of government tends to be replicated at each level. 
Because of the low level of policy-sharing, intergovernmental relations at the executive 
level are generally limited. A complete separation of fields of competence is rather 
impossible,  and  areas  of  shared  (or  concurrent)  competence  occur,  so  that  both 
federal and regional governments have the possibility to legislate over a particular 
matter (Swenden 2006: 50-1). The more competences are shared between the levels, 
the more cooperative the federal system becomes.   
In  contrast,  joint-decision  federal  systems  are  characterised  by  a  division  of 
labour  –  rather  than  areas  of  competence  –  between  the  federal  and  regional 
governments  (Chandler  and  Chandler  1987:  94).  The  classic  example  of  a  joint-
decision federation is Germany, where the federal level is responsible for legislation 
and  the  Länder  have  responsibility  over  policy  implementation  and  tax  collection. 
Federal legislation moreover requires the agreement of the federal government with 
the regional governments because of the nature of the second federal chamber, the 
Bundesrat, which is composed of representatives of the Länder governments (Scharpf 
1995: 33). As a result, the levels are highly interdependent and co-operation becomes a 
necessity of efficient government. Intergovernmental relations are strongly developed 
and the regions are involved in the central decision-making process in order to ensure 
that their interests are properly taken into account and that they do not become mere 
administrative appendages of the federal government.  
This distinction between dual and cooperative can also apply to regionalised but 
not  yet  federal  multi-level  polities.  The  difference  between  regionalised  and  fully 
federal systems does not lie in the way powers are distributed, that is, in either a dual 
or  an  integrative  way,  but  in  the  scope  of  devolved  powers  (or  the  fiscal  or 
administrative capacity that goes with it) that is more limited in regionalised systems. 
Hence, we can analytically distinguish between the nature (dual vs. integrative) of the 
institutional  arrangement  and  the  scope  of  the  regionalised  powers.  The  scope  of 
regionalised powers refers to the capacity of regional governments to legislate over a 
large number of issues and the level of their financial autonomy. In addition, this 
hierarchy  also  depends  on  the  security  of  the  regionalised  powers,  that  is,  the 
protection  of  the  competences  of  the  regional  governments  provided  by  the 
constitution. 
Riker (1975: 13-4) quite generally expressed the effect of federalism on political 
parties  when  he  wrote  that  'the  multiplicity  of  authorities  in  an  only  partially 
centralized federation is correlated with the decentralization of parties'. However, with 
the  distinction  between  nature  and  scope  of  federalism,  we  can  formulate  more 
detailed hypotheses regarding the impact of federalism on party organisation.  
Following Scharpf (1995: 32), we would expect dual federal systems to favour 
highly regionalised, if not truncated, state-wide parties. In such states, the relations 
between the centre and the regions can be difficult insofar as regional political elites 
may find it convenient and strategically  useful to exploit conflicts with the centre 
(Chandler and Chandler 1987: 95). As the relations between the state and the regions 
become more politicised, regional branches may distance themselves from the state-    34 
wide party. Moreover, each level of government has areas of competence for which it 
is responsible and accountable, different issues are discussed at each level and there is 
a  clear  distinction  between  state-wide  and  regional  politics.  The  existence  of  two 
political games being played at different levels of government allows for more internal 
differentiation within political parties (Deschouwer 2000: 6). Central parties do not 
have to keep their regional branches under tight control out of fear that the lack of 
popularity  or  bad  record  of  a  regional  branch  might  adversely  affect  its  electoral 
prospects at the state level. On the contrary, the situation creates incentives for state-
wide parties to allow internal differentiation and also possibly bifurcation, with distinct 
parties of the same name operating at different levels of government. As a result, we 
expect state-wide parties that operate in a dual system to give more autonomy to their 
regional branches. In keeping with the dual model of organisation, we hypothesise that 
regional branches will have limited access to the central decision-making organs of the 
state-wide party. 
Figure 2.1. Expected organisation of state-wide parties in function of the degree of 
cooperation and distribution of competences of the regionalised arrangement 
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Abbreviations: SWP: state-wide party; RPB: regional party branches. 
Conversely, we expect party organisations to be less regionalised in integrative 
federations  but  anticipate  a  stronger  involvement  of  the  regional  branches  in  the 
central organs of state-wide parties. This would be consistent with the typical pattern 
of  intergovernmental  relations  that  we  find  in  highly  integrative  federations.    As 
federal  legislation  is  passed  and  implemented  in  co-operation  with  regional 
governments or representatives, it is in the interest of the ruling party or coalition at 
the federal level to ensure that regional party branches follow central party policy. 
Likewise,  opposition  parties  will  want  to  present a  united  front  across  the  whole 
country. Regional elections moreover influence the federal legislative process. They 
are  closely  followed  by  state-wide  party  headquarters  and  the  media.  Regional 
elections, with their state-wide significance, tend to be seen as a test for the federal 
government (Chandler and Chandler 1987: 98). This connection between national and 
regional politics strengthens the need for party cohesion. State-wide parties therefore 
tend to wield more control over their regional branches in order to ensure loyalty and 
compliance with party policy at the regional level (Deschouwer 2000: 17). As a result, 
we  expect that the  incentive  for  the  state-wide  party  to  control  its  regional  party 
branches will be high in cooperative federations. 
With respect to the effect of the scope of regionalised powers, we expect that the 
powers of the regional branches will be more extensive as the scope of decentralised     35 
powers is large. Significant regional autonomy can also provide regional branches with 
enough resources to increase their representation in central party organs. Conversely, 
the more limited the powers of regional governments, the lower the autonomy of the 




An additional characteristic of federalism should be taken into account: institutional 
(or de jure) asymmetry. Institutional asymmetry refers to 'constitutionally embedded 
differences between the legal status and prerogatives of different subunits within the 
same federation' (Stepan 2001: 326). This means that some regions enjoy more self-
government than others (Kymlica 2001: 104; Requejo 2001: 44). The literature on 
federalism  also  refers  to  de  facto  asymmetry.  This  relates  to  non-institutional 
geographical diversity, based on economic, social and cultural differences between the 
regions. This will be addressed in the next sub-section. However, de facto asymmetry is 
often the reason for institutional asymmetry (Swenden 2006: 63; Bauböck 2002: 1). 
Stepan  (2001:  327-8)  shows  how  all  the  multinational  federations  (India,  Belgium, 
Canada and Spain) are constitutionally asymmetrical.  
As a result, state-wide parties may not have the same form of organisation all 
over  the  country  and  some  regions  may  carry  more  weight  at  the  centre.  In  an 
asymmetrical federation the regional party branches of the most powerful regions are 
likely to enjoy more autonomy than those in less powerful regions. They can also have 
different responsibilities or special representation in the party's state-wide organs.  
 
2.2.2. Territorial diversity  
The most crucial socioeconomic factor is the level of homogeneity or heterogeneity of 
society  and  inter-regional  differences.  Economic  differences  create  internal 
differentiation  between  the  regions,  which  might  in  turn  be  reflected  in  party 
competition at the regional level. The shape of the multi-level territorial arrangement 
often correlates with the geographical cleavage structure of the country. Whereas the 
importance of the centre-periphery cleavage on the regionalisation of the state is not 
the prime concern of this study, the influence of this cleavage first on the structure of 
party competition and then on party organisation is a factor to take into account. The 
strength of the centre-periphery cleavage partly explains the presence of regionalist 
parties (de Winter and Türsan 1998) and the degree of nationalisation of the party 
system (Caramani 2004). Moreover, by creating regional differences, economic factors 
and  centre-periphery  cleavages  also  influence  the  internal  structures  of  state-wide 
political parties, creating needs to emphasise different issues in different regions and 
also differences in the salience of identity politics in regional party competition. 
Territorial cleavages are likely to have an impact on state-wide political parties in 
two  ways:  directly,  through  calls  for  internal  differentiation  within  the  parties 
themselves in order to accommodate local and regional differences, and indirectly via 
the party system and the possible presence of regionalist or separatist parties.  
 
Territorial versus functional cleavages 
Lipset  and  Rokkan  (1967)  describe  how  processes  of  nation-building  can  trigger 
feelings  of  resentment  from  the  peripheries.  The  development  of  modern  states 
generally involved the establishment of a centralising bureaucracy with a monopoly     36 
over political and administrative powers and economic resources. It typically involved 
the extraction of resources from the regions for the edification and strengthening of 
the centre (Eisenstadt 1981: 97). The movement of unification often resulted in the 
promotion of the culture of the centre as a set of unifying values and traditions and 
corresponding attempts to marginalise the cultures of the other regions. 
At  the  same  time,  a  number  of  political  and  social  processes  facilitated  the 
emergence of a national polity. Rokkan (1966: 244) described this change from mainly 
territorial  politics  to  nationalised  politics  as  a  process  in  four  steps:  first,  formal 
incorporation of new citizens in the polity through the extension of suffrage; then the 
mobilisation of these citizens through their engagement in electoral politics; third, the 
activation  of  these  citizens  via  direct  participation  in  public  life;  and  finally  the 
replacement of the old local and regional ruling elites by the penetration of national 
political  parties  in  local  and  municipal  electoral  contests  (politicisation).  The  overall 
result  was  then  the  development  of 'obedience  and  loyalties  to  the  nation  which 
transcend loyalties to its parts' and the 'emergence of shared values and perspectives' 
(Chambers 1966: 98). 
The early literature on cleavages often assumed that territorial cleavages would 
eventually  disappear  while  functional  cleavages  (church-state,  land-industry  and 
owner-worker) would dominate. The survival of local and regional movements and 
demands was generally seen as the last signs of an obsolete political culture. Moreover, 
after  World  War  II,  references  to  ethnic  origins  and  national  identity  were  often 
frowned upon. As a result, political integration was seen as desirable, if not inevitable 
(Urwin 1985: 151; Williams 1997: 112).  
Caramani (2004 and 2005) shows how over time parties and party systems have 
become  increasingly  nationalised  across  Western  Europe.  Looking  at  patterns  of 
electoral support, party coverage and turnout, he observes that over the 19
th and 20
th 
centuries,  electoral  participation,  voting  per  party  family  and  party  presence  are 
increasingly territorially homogeneous across the countries. The functional left-right 
alignment  has  become  the  most  common  and  influential  dimension  of  Western 
electoral politics (Caramani 2005: 319; Budge and Robertson 1987: 390-1, table 18.1). 
Politics are therefore characterised by a 'progressive reduction of territorial disparities 
of  cleavages  in  Europe,  except  for  linguistic,  territorial  and  ethnic  cleavages  that 
specifically refer to the distinctiveness of the cultural and economic regions' (Caramani 
2005: 315).  
In spite of this wide-ranging process of homogenisation, there are still 'pockets 
of resistance' to the nationalisation of politics, which 'can be principally explained 
through cultural cleavages that resisted the homogenizing impact of class politics – the 
most important cause of de-territorialization processes' (Caramani 2005: 318). 
 
The territorial cleavage and sources of territorial differentiation 
Territorial  resistance  to  the  nationalisation  of  politics  and  the  development  of  a 
centralising centre are often thought of in terms of centre-periphery conflict (Rokkan 
and Urwin 1982; Mény and Wright 1985). The notions of centre and periphery should 
not be understood literally, i.e., in terms of geographical distance. Territorial resistance 
to unification and centralisation is likely to happen in a number of cases, when there is 
competition between several centres (or potential centres) of political control; between 
several  centres  of  economic  power;  or  'between  the  culturally  and  economically 
advanced areas and the backward periphery' (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 41). There are 
therefore  several  sources  of  territorial  conflict:  over  political  and  administrative     37 
control, economic power and cultural homogenisation (Rokkan and Urwin 1982: 5; 
Keating and Loughlin 1997: 2-5). A region is most likely to claim special recognition if 
this claim can be based on a variety of sources or grievances, thereby strengthening its 
claim to uniqueness and distinctiveness. The emphasis is often put on the cultural 
and/or  linguistic  nature  of  a  region's  specificity,  but  the  existence  of  economic 
interests different from those of the centre can also be a source of territorial claims. 
The  combination  of  economic,  political  and  cultural  distinctiveness  is  likely  to 
constitute a solid ground for regionalist claims. 
The notion  of  centre-periphery  conflict  is  based on the  assumption  that  the 
periphery is in some way dependent upon the centre for its economic survival, its 
culture or its government (Rokkan and Urwin 1982: 5). The centre is a location where 
key resources are concentrated (political, administrative, economic and/or cultural), 
while  the  periphery  is  isolated  and  lacks  the  resources  to  weigh on  the  country's 
internal flow of wealth and communications. However, territorial conflict can also 
emerge as a result of a rivalry between a capital and one or several territories that also 
possess at least one of the resources mentioned above.  
Territorial diversity, or societal heterogeneity with a territorial basis, is likely to 
have a direct impact on the organisation of political parties, as the existence of a 
specific culture, interests, etc. may result in calls  for internal differentiation within 
state-wide parties (Deschouwer 2003). The existence of regionally concentrated sets of 
interests may prompt regional party elites to ask for some level of intra-party power. 
They may argue for instance that they can be seen as more legitimate than the national 
party organisation but also that they understand the local and regional circumstances 
better because of their better knowledge of regional specificities (Harmel and Janda 
1982: 63). However, we expect party leaderships to be wary of change and eager to 
preserve their power, unless their electoral performances are likely to be affected by 
not granting some autonomy to their regional branches. As a result, we can expect 
intra-party autonomy in the most vocally regionalist territories, and therefore some 
asymmetry in the internal organisation of the state-wide parties.  
 
Regionalism and regionalist parties 
In recent decades, the notion of nation-state has been increasingly questioned and 
most European countries have had to come to terms with an increasing electoral 
mobilisation of some of their regions around specifically regional issues. However, not 
all ethno-national or ethno-linguistic groups organise for the defence of their rights or 
interests or even to actively seek self-government. As Urwin (1985: 154) puts it,  
'because of decades, if not centuries, of the diffusion and implementation 
of standardizing central practices, the simple fact is that in most parts of 
Europe ethnic groups find it possible to possess two or more identities 
that enjoy a benign relationship – or at least to keep them in separate, 
and not necessarily, antagonistic compartments'. 
The existence of a distinct identity is not enough, however, for a regionalist movement 
or party to emerge. Indeed, this specific regional identity must be electorally mobilised 
and the stakes of the relationship between the centre and the region must be raised so 
as to be perceived as problematic by significant sections of the electorate.  
The  parties  that mobilise  on  this  issue  are  often  called  regionalist  or  ethno-
regionalist parties. The term ethno-regionalist refers to the fact that these parties tend 
to define themselves on the basis of an exclusive group identity (Türsan 1998: 5-6). 
Müller-Rommel (1998: 19) define ethnoregionalist parties as parties that represent 'the     38 
efforts  of  geographically  concentrated  peripheral  minorities  which  challenge  the 
working  order  and  sometimes  even  the  democratic  order  of  a  nation-state  by 
demanding recognition of their cultural identity'. 
Keating  (1997:  24)  argues  that  there  are three  types  of  regionalisms: defensive 
regionalism, which aims at defending a region against perceived threats to its economic 
status or cultural, religious or linguistic identity; integrating regionalism, whose claims at 
essentially  economic,  as  the  stated  objective  is  to  modernise  the  region  and  re-
integrate it into the larger national economic community; and autonomist regionalism, 
which wishes to protect and promote the regions in terms of economic status, culture 
and  identity  through  regional  autonomy.  Some  element  (culture,  economic 
development, etc.) might dominate one region's regionalism, but a mix of demands 
can cohabitate, often fuelled by both 'cultural and economic discontent' (Urwin 1985: 
165). Defensive and integrative regionalisms are also often combined with autonomist 
regionalism to claim that a region's interests and culture can best be defended if the 
region enjoys some level of self-government. 
This phenomenon seems to have regained in strength all across Europe in the 
last  few  decades.  In  the  late  1960s  the  electoral  results  of  the  Flemish Volksunie 
increased as the Flemings were claiming their rights as a nation against the French-
speaking Belgian elites (de Winter 1998). Since the 1970s, the United Kingdom has 
seen the revival of Scottish and Welsh nationalism (Garner and Kelly 1998 chapter 8). 
At  the  same  time,  Corsican  nationalism  became  more  vocal  in  France  (Dominici 
2005),  while  the  new  Spanish  democracy  saw  the  emergence  of  many  regionalist 
parties in the various autonomous communities of the country. In northern Italy, a 
number of local and regional movements were created in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
from  the  Union  Valdôtaine  to  the  Lega  Nord,  while  the  Südtiroler  Volkspartei  has 
defended the rights of the German- and Ladin-speakers in South Tyrol since 1945 
(Holzer and Schwegler 1998: 162). These are some of the most salient examples of the 
1960s-1970s electoral revival of regionalist claims.  
Their success has been explained by a variety of factors: economic divergence, 
processes of modernisation and state-building (Lipset and Rokkan 1967); resentment 
from 'colonised' peripheries that depend on the economic support of industrialised 
centres (Hechter 1975); successful electoral mobilisation of 'feelings of belonging' by 
political leaders (de Winter 1998). Beyond the aim of defending or promoting the 
rights of their regions, regionalist parties often wish to achieve some degree of self-
government and regional autonomy for their region or even to separate the region 
from the rest of the country and create a new country for the group they defend. 
Regardless of their ultimate goal, these parties constitute a specific challenge to state-
wide parties by stressing issues that do not necessarily directly concern the whole 
polity,  question  the  existing  organisation  of  the  political  system  or  threaten  the 
country's territorial integrity. 
State-wide parties are more likely to give autonomous powers to their regional 
branches  when  these  claims  of  regional  distinctiveness  lead  to  the  creation  of 
ethnoregionalist  political  parties  that  threaten  their  electoral  prospects.  State-wide 
parties may see their electoral position threatened in regions where regionalism and 
electoral  support  for  regionalist  parties  are  strong.  If  the  electoral  challenge  is 
considered to be serious by the party leadership, state-wide parties are likely to adopt 
some  form  of  decentralised  organisation,  giving  their  regional  branches  some 
organisational, but also possibly programmatic, autonomy in order to increase their 
chances in national and regional elections.     39 
The level of the challenge posed by regionalist parties is also a function of the 
opportunity  structures  constituted  by the multi-level  electoral  framework  for both 
state-wide and regionalist parties. The existence of regional elections and their overall 
impact on the political system, the electoral system and the status of the regional 
elections as self-standing or second-order elections are crucial factors in the impact of 
regionalism and regionalist parties on state-wide parties. This will be the subject of the 
next section of this chapter. 
 
2.3. Multi-level party competition 
The simple existence of a second set of elections at the regional level affects the state-
wide  parties'  strategies  and  organisation.  Regional  elections  generate  the  need  for 
another level of organisation and create a new level of intermediary party elites. The 
electoral system in use for regional elections is likely to have a great impact on the 
parties, as it either facilitates or hinders the challenge posed by regionalist parties or 
simply regionally-based parties that decide to use this new opportunity structure to 
advance their interests. When regional elections produce different results from the 
national  elections  and  when  the  set  of  actors  involved  in  national  and  regional 
elections differ, state-wide parties may perceive a need to adjust their structures to the 
regional level of competition because the differentiation of the regional political arena 
means that political parties increasingly need to adapt their strategies to the regional 
context. This form of adaptation may be more difficult to operate from the centre, 
and the national party may consider it more efficient to give regional elites some level 
of autonomy in the management of regional elections. 
 
2.3.1. Electoral system and multi-level party competition 
Electoral systems and party centralisation  
The  direct  influence  of  electoral  systems  on  party  organisation  is  rather  scarcely 
documented, and the existing literature bases its affirmations more on observation 
than on any theoretical perspective. For obvious reasons, the emphasis is principally 
on intra-party methods of candidate selection and then on how candidate selection 
affects the larger organisation of the party. 
Duverger  first  expressed  the  link  between  electoral  system  and  party 
organisation.  He  argues  that  electoral  systems  with  single-member  constituencies 
encourage  constituency  autonomy,  while  list  systems  require  some  level  of  co-
ordination  above  the  local  level  (Duverger  1976:  96-7).
4  List  systems  therefore 
facilitate a form of articulation above the local level in order to elaborate the lists. 
They  reduce  the  importance  of  personalities  and  increase  that  of  ideas  and 
programmes. As a result, list systems encourage the development of a national, state-
wide  organisation  (Duverger  1976:  97).  On  the  other  hand,  single-member 
constituencies strengthen the role of the candidate and focus electoral campaigns on 
local issues at the expense of more general issues and programmatic considerations. 
                                                 
4 'Le scrutin de liste, fonctionnant dans le cadre d'une grande circonscription, oblige les comités ou les 
sections locales du parti à établir entre eux une articulation forte à l'intérieur de la circonscription, afin 
de s'entendre sur la composition des listes. Au contraire, le scrutin uninominal, fonctionnant dans une 
circonscription étroite, tend à faire de chaque petit groupe local du parti une entité indépendante, et par 
conséquent à affaiblir l'articulation de celui-ci' (Duverger 1976: 96).     40 
Single-member electoral systems undermine the overall articulation of political parties 
and encourage constituency-level autonomy. 
Farrell  reformulated  this  by  making  a  distinction  between  on  the  one  hand 
candidate-based  systems,  such  as  single-member  but  also  single-transferable  vote 
systems, and on the other party-based electoral systems. Party-based systems facilitate 
top-down control over candidate selection: the elaboration of party lists requires a 
level  of  co-ordination  that  makes  central  control  possible,  and  individual  list 
candidates tend to rely more on the party machine as personal campaigning is unlikely 
to make any real difference to their chances of being elected (Ware 1996: 291-6). 
When electoral systems require that voters choose between candidates, the emphasis is 
more on the legitimacy of the individual candidate.  
Recent  studies  on  changes  in  party  organisation  show  that  parties  tend  to 
emphasise  grassroots  involvement  in  candidate  selection  at  constituency  level 
(Scarrow 1999; Bille 2001; Hopkin 2001). Mair (1997: 113-4) however points to a 
paradox: at the same time as party members are balloted on candidate selection and 
leadership  selection,  an  increasingly  atomistic  conception  of  party  membership 
emerges. Members are consulted via postal ballots rather in local meetings, and the 
role of local party elites and activists is undermined. Consequently, the autonomy of 
party leaders increases, as they owe their position and legitimacy to the membership 
vote, and organised leadership challenges are less likely to be successful. Other trends 
in party change also indicate an increased centralisation of party processes and the 
evolution of campaigning techniques point to a tighter control of the central party 
apparatus over campaign processes and a tendency for central party leadership to have 
some level of oversight over candidate selection (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000). 
These observations all relate to national elections and focus on constituency-
level autonomy and national party control. In federal or regionalised systems, the issue 
is whether this oversight or control over candidate selection happens at the central or 
regional  level.  Regional  party  units  and  regional  party  leaders  seem to  have  more 
autonomy over candidate selection in federal systems (Gallagher 1988: 257). However, 
some evidence also point to a strengthening of central party powers over candidate 
selection  for  federal  elections  in  the  cases  of  Canadian  federal  parties  and  the 
Australian Labor Party (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000: 141). Overall, the direct 
effect  of  electoral  system  on  the  vertical  organisation  of  political  parties  and  the 
distribution  of  competences  is  difficult  to  predict.  However,  if  the  logic  of 
regionalisation were to be respected with regards to candidate selection, and given the 
well-documented contemporary changes in party organisation, we could expect that 
the central party controls or oversees the process of candidate selection – but also 
campaigning at the local level – for general elections, while the regional party branches 
have  more  autonomy  to  select  their  candidates  and  develop  their  own  electoral 
programme and strategy for regional elections. 
 
Electoral systems and party systems in a multi-level environment 
In parallel, an abundant literature stresses the crucial importance of electoral systems 
on the structure of party systems. This section only aims at emphasising the most 
crucial  aspects of this literature, at the risk of over-generalisation. Nevertheless, it 
intends to stress how electoral systems influence the territorial organisation of state-
wide parties, using the party system as an intervening variable. 
Duverger provided a very explicit formulation of the impact of electoral systems 
on the party systems and the number of parties in particular. What came to be known     41 
as  'Duverger's  law'  states  that:  1)  proportional  representation  (PR)  and  two-round 
majoritarian  systems  favour  multi-party  systems  and  2)  single-member  plurality 
systems  (SMP)  encourage  the  development  of  two-party  systems  (Duverger  1976: 
291). There are actually two effects that generate the tendency of SMP to generate 
dual party systems. There is first a mechanical effect in the way votes are translated into 
seats. SMP tends to have a high level of disproportionality in the votes/seat ratio, 
which is beneficial to a limited number of big parties, often two. Accordingly, small 
parties are disadvantaged by SMP. There is also a psychological effect in the way strategic 
considerations influence voters, who understand that voting for a third party could be 
a  'waste  of  votes'  (Duverger  1976:  315-6).  As  a  result,  third  parties  tend  to  have 
difficulties in gaining seats in SMP systems, unless their electorate is geographically 
concentrated. But then, their number of seats is inevitably limited to the number of 
constituencies available in their region. 
On  the  other  hand,  PR  systems  are  supposed  to  benefit  smaller  parties  by 
providing a more proportional translation of the number of votes into seats. However, 
the proportionality of PR electoral systems depends on a number of factors. The 
number of seats allocated to each electoral constituency (the district magnitude) is 
probably  the  single  most  important  factor  affecting  list-system  proportionality 
(Taagepera and Shugart 1989 chapter 11) and the rule is that the greater the district 
magnitude, the more proportional the electoral system (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 
19). 
In  a  multi-level  setting,  state-wide  parties  may  be  confronted  with  different 
electoral systems for different elections. The existence of different electoral laws for 
different elections means that 'some parties might not have the same chances to elect 
candidates in regional or national elections' because of several factors, such as district 
magnitude and election timing (Deschouwer 2003: 223). As a result, they would have 
to adapt their procedures and strategies to the different electoral systems.  
Moreover, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that when a polity is characterised by 
cultural, ethnic or religious cleavages, the most likely electoral system is some form of 
proportional representation. The logic of this argument is that cultural cleavages do 
not accommodate well with the 'winner-take-all' logic of majoritarian democracy. They 
argue that 'the deeper the [cultural, ethnic or religious] cleavages the less the likelihood 
of  loyal  acceptance  of  decisions  by  representatives  of  the  other  side'  (Lipset  and 
Rokkan 1967: 32). Such differences would then lead to the adoption of a proportional 
electoral formula, whereby minorities would have more chances of getting some of 
their representatives elected. Regionalist parties would then find it easier to obtain 
seats, in particular in regional elections, when the district magnitude is often higher 
than that of national elections. The more proportional the electoral system the more 
state-wide parties will face the competition of regional parties. 
In a multi-level system, parties may choose to adapt their organisation and give 
some autonomy to their regional branches if more parties, and in particular regionally-
based parties such as regionalist parties, are able to gain representation in the regional 
parliament thanks  to  a more proportional  electoral  system.  Indicators  such  as  the 
effective  number of parties  represented  in national  and  regional  elections  and the 
deviation from proportionality in regional and general elections may come to help us 
explain how electoral systems affect party strategies and organisation. 
     42 
2.3.2. Regional elections in the general electoral context 
Another issue with regard to regional politics is the relative importance of regional 
elections  vis-à-vis  general  elections.  In  general,  regional  elections  cannot  be  taken 
completely independently from the national political context, and there is a level of 
dependence of regional politics on national politics. When regional elections are of 
secondary significance compared to the national elections, they are often said to be 
'second-order' elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). The significance of regional elections 
in the wider electoral context can depend on a number of factors. It has been argued, 
for instance, that the electoral cycle influences electoral results in regional elections 
and causes varying levels of interconnection between national and regional elections.  
 
Second-order elections 
Regional elections belong to a cycle of elections than range from local elections to 
national and even European elections. State-wide political parties compete in all of 
these elections in most of a country's constituencies. As a result, they represent a link 
between these levels, presenting voters with clear, identifiable labels and a sense of 
continuity  and  political  coherence.  The  degree  to  which  regional  elections  are 
connected to the wider political context is a crucial element in the study of regional 
politics. The existence of a link between electoral results at different levels is also likely 
to affect the organisation of state-wide parties.  
The literature on second-order elections considers whether regional elections are 
elections 'in their own right' or whether their results depend on national debates and 
electoral considerations. The notion of 'second-order' elections was first developed by 
Reif and Schmitt (1980) for the study of European election. In this seminal article, 
they argue that national elections are the most salient elections and dominate all other 
electoral contests, including 'by-elections, municipal elections, various sorts of regional 
elections, those to a 'second chamber', and the like' (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 8). The 
connection between the two levels means that voters do not only vote according to 
the stakes of the regional elections, the candidates and the regional situation, but also 
according to the national situation. Their explanation goes beyond the sole effect of 
the electoral cycle. 
The framework for analysis of second-order elections is based on the idea that 
there is 'less at stake' in second-order elections than in national elections, which serve 
as reference for voters but also for party strategies. Second-order elections have three 
characteristics: 
1) Lower levels of electoral participation. Because the stakes of second-order elections 
are lower, fewer citizens make an effort to vote. At the same time, the campaign is 
likely to have a lower intensity and media-coverage than national elections. The result 
is a lower turnout rate. 
2) Small and new parties fare better in regional elections. Because the stakes are lower, 
voters feel free to 'experiment' with smaller parties that reflect their positions better 
but have little chance of becoming significant political forces in national elections.  
3)  Government  parties  lose  while  opposition  parties  see  their  share  of  the  vote 
increase, in particular if regional elections are held around the middle of the national 
electoral cycle.  
Reif and Schmitt recognise that some election-specific elements must be taken 
into account, such as whether the same parties compete at both levels, whether the 
same parties are in power, whether similar patterns of coalition-building are at play at 
both levels (1980: 10-1). However, their interpretation of voting patterns and electoral     43 
results makes it virtually impossible to reach a conclusion other than that non-national 
elections  are  second-order  elections.  For  instance,  they expect  lower  turnout,  but 
higher turnout is also possible if a country uses a PR electoral system. The fact that 
voters tend to vote for smaller parties is interpreted as 'experimentation' and not as a 
possible  voters'  calculus  that  these  parties  are  more likely  to  have  an  impact  on 
regional politics or represent them better in the particular circumstances presented by 
the election.  
Recent  studies  on  regional  elections  have  come  to  add  some  nuance  to  the 
notion  of  second-order  election.  For  instance,  Jeffery  and  Hough  (2003)  and 
Detterbeck and Renzsch (2003) have shown that the territorial cleavages and levels of 
regional  identification  also  play  an  important  role  in  determining  the  level  of 
independence of regional election results from state-wide results. Studies on Spain and 
Germany reveal some evidence that regional elections are more self-standing when 
voters have a higher level of identification with the region or national-regional double 
identity (Jeffery and Hough 2003; Pallarés and Keating 2003). When a region displays 
high levels of regional identification, voters are more likely to vote for a regionalist 
party but they are also more likely to be interested in regional politics and to be aware 
of the stakes of the election. 
Chhibber and Kollman (2004) argue that the level of interest in sub-national 
elections  depends  on  the  stakes  of  the  election.  The  stakes  are  higher  when  the 
election  is  likely  to  elect  members  of  a  parliament  or  assembly  and  regional 
government  with  significant  powers  and  competences  over  regional  policy.  If  a 
regional government has some influence over the way people live, people will be more 
interested in the election, and this should be reflected by rather high levels of electoral 
participation (or at least not significantly lower levels than the national turnout rate). 
When the stakes of a regional election are high, voters are more likely to distinguish 
between regional and national elections and vote on regional issues only rather than 
react to the policies of the national government. As a result, regional elections may 
present different results than those of the national election for different reasons than 
those assumed by Reif and Schmitt. Distinct voting behaviour is actually in this case a 
rational choice made on the basis of the regional situation. More distinct patterns of 
voting behaviour and different electoral results are to be expected in regions with 
important competences over regional policy. On the other hand, when a region has 
little power to determine its own policies, the election is more likely to be dominated 
by national factors. 
Finally,  regional  elections  are  more  likely  to  be  interconnected  with  national 
politics if their results directly affect national politics. This is especially the case when 
there is a second chamber that includes representatives of regional governments, like 
the German Bundesrat. When the national and regional levels are interconnected for 
policy  development  and  implementation,  the  regional  elections  are  likely  to  be 
influenced by national considerations (Scharpf 1995: 33). In such cases, national party 
elites are likely to be more involved in the campaign and the national stakes of the 
election are ever present in the regional campaign. The opposition parties are likely to 
present the election as a referendum on the national government, and the media focus 
on the election will emphasise the national consequences of the poll. 
All these considerations have an effect on political parties and their organisation. 
If  regional  elections  are  seen  as  second-order,  or  if  they  have  an  impact  on  the 
national level, either directly as in the case of the Bundesrat or indirectly if opposition 
parties  use  regional  elections  as  electoral  tests  in  prevision  for  the  next  national 
election, then state-wide parties will be inclined to keep a close eye on what their     44 
regional party branches do in terms of candidate selection, electoral programme and 
campaigning.  In  such  a  case,  state-wide  parties  will  be  more  integrated  and  the 
national leadership will have some level of control over the party's leadership and 
candidates at the regional level to ensure that they are in the same party faction or 
agree  with  the  dominant  party  group  at  the  national  level,  but  also  over  the 
programme,  in  order  to  enhance  party  cohesion  and  policy  coherence  across  the 
country (Chandler and Chandler 1987: 98). 
On the other hand, if the two electoral arenas are disconnected and regional 
voters vote on regional issues for regional elections, state-wide parties are more likely 
to adopt a regionalised structure, giving their regional branches more autonomy to 
adapt their programmes to regional circumstances. This is also likely to be a self-
reinforcing cycle, as successful regional leaders will gain more legitimacy and clout 
over their party branch and the national leaders will find it more difficult to have a say 
over  regional  party  affairs.  This  process  may  take  place  some  time  after  the 
establishment of a set of regional institutions, as the electorate needs some time to 
adapt to and understand the powers of the new regional bodies and political parties 
need time to register those changes as well.  
 
Electoral cycle 
The timing of elections is also likely to have a crucial impact on whether regional 
elections are overshadowed by national considerations. Observations of the results of 
American midterm elections have suggested that electoral support for government and 
opposition parties follow a cycle. After a 'honeymoon period' in which its level of 
support remains stable, the party of the President loses support with an all-time low at 
the  moment  of  the  midterm  Congressional  elections  (Campbell  1960:  408).  The 
American example is particularly symptomatic of this phenomenon: '[w]ith the single 
exception of the 1934 election, the president's party has lost congressional seats in 
each midterm election since the Civil War' (Campbell 1987: 965).
5 The party starts to 
recover support shortly before the next presidential election (Johnston 1999). During 
the same period, opposition parties see their electoral support increase, with a peak 
around  the  midterm  point.  A  number  of  explanations  have  come  to  explain  this 
pattern:  lower  intensity of  the midterm  election  (Campbell  1960),  support  for  the 
president, state of the economy (Tufte 1975), dramatic political events and long-term 
patterns of party support (Simon, Ostrom and Marra 1991). 
The same sort of cycle was observed in multi-level systems. What has come to 
be called the 'Dinkel curve' (after a 1977 article by Rainer Dinkel on electoral support 
of  government  and  opposition  parties  in  federal  and  Land  elections)  shows  how 
federal government parties have a lower level of support in Land elections compared 
to the preceding or succeeding federal election in that Land (Jeffery and Hough 2001: 
80; Hough and Jeffery 2006: 125-6). The 'electoral cycle' effect theory assumes a link 
between  the  results  of  the  first-order  (national)  election  and  the  performance  of 
national  government  and  opposition  parties  in  regional  elections.  Voters  use  the 
regional elections to send a message to the national level and parties. Generally, it 
means  expressing  their  dissatisfaction  with  the  national  government.  A pattern  of 
electoral support emerges in which support for government parties decreases until the 
middle of the electoral cycle and then slowly recovers, while electoral support for 
                                                 
5 The 1998 and 2002 elections have since come to contradict this 'rule', which was confirmed again in 
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opposition parties tend to follow an opposite pattern, with both parties converging 
toward the end of the cycle (Jeffery and Hough 2001: 76-7; Johnston 1999: 499-503). 
When  general  and  regional  elections  are  concurrent,  regional  elections  are 
overshadowed by the national contest and voters are likely to cast their vote in similar 
ways for the national and regional elections. The simultaneity of national and regional 
elections is likely to reduce the level of autonomy of the regional parties, as the state-
wide parties want to keep the whole party 'on message' (Deschouwer 2006: 296).  
Regional elections taking place shortly before or after state-wide elections are 
also likely to be closely related to the national level. If regional elections take place 
immediately after the national election, the party that has won the national election is 
likely to benefit from a 'honeymoon period' in the aftermath of the election. The 
regional election is likely to replicate the results of the national election or even to see 
an increase in the support for the government party (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 9-10; 
Marsh 2000: 287). The contest is likely to be 'nationalised' by its proximity with the 
national election. The regional branch of the winning party 'might try to surf the 
winning wave' (Deschouwer 2006: 297), while the losing parties will try to limit their 
losses in the regional arena. As a result, national parties are likely to exercise a strong 
control  over  their  regional  branches  if  regional  elections  closely  follow  national 
elections. This centripetal pull is however likely to be stronger in the winning state-
wide party than in opposition parties.  
Regional elections taking place immediately before national elections are likely to 
be  considered  as  'test  elections'.  The  proximity  with  a  national  election  tends  to 
'nationalise' the stakes of regional elections, as the national leaderships of state-wide 
parties  tend  to  consider  such  elections  as  a  test  and  want  to  use  these  regional 
elections as part of their wider state-wide campaign, testing themes and campaign 
strategies (Deschouwer 2006: 297). Again, the regional autonomy of regional party 
branches is likely to be limited because of this electoral connexion with the national 
level.  
For  regional  election  at  other  times  of  the  electoral  cycle  and  further  from 
national elections, the situation is likely to depend on other factors, as seen above with 
the  issue  of  second-order  elections.  Opposition  parties  are  likely  to  present  the 
regional election as a referendum on the performance of the government. As a result, 
government parties tend to lose votes, while opposition parties gain votes. The results 
of government parties are assumed to reach a nadir at mid-term (Pallarés and Keating 
2003). During this period, the leaderships of the state-wide parties might pay less 
attention to regional elections and a disconnection between the two levels becomes 
possible.  The  more  independent  the  regional  elections  from  the  national  political 
context,  the  higher  the  likelihood  that  regional  party  branches  will  gain  some 
autonomy. 
Another aspect of the electoral cycle is the horizontal simultaneity of the regional 
elections. Horizontal simultaneity occurs when all or several regional elections happen 
at the same time. When all, or a large number of, the regional elections happen on the 
same day, the likely outcome is a nationalisation of the stakes of the contests and 
therefore state-wide parties are likely to try and keep closed ranks and deliver a single 
coherent  message  all  across  the  country  (Deschouwer  2003:  223).  Horizontal 
simultaneity  is  likely  to  encourage  party  centralisation  and  limit  the  autonomy  of 
regional party branches. 
Overall, a single regional election occurring far from the national election can 
provide regional branches with more opportunities to gain some autonomy from the 
central party (provided the region is sufficiently powerful and/or culturally distinctive     46 
so as to increase the stakes of the regional election and make it distinct from the 
national  campaign  themes).  In  contrast,  the  proximity  to  a  national  election  and 
concurrence of several elections will most likely push state-wide parties to maintain 
high  levels  of  party  cohesion  and  therefore  limit  the  autonomy of  their  regional 
branches.  
 
2.4. Endogenous factors of party organisation 
The way political parties are organised in general and the respective powers of the 
three faces of party organisation (party in public office, party in central office and 
party  on  the  ground)  are  likely  to  affect  the  level  of  autonomy  of  their  regional 
branches. This section looks at patterns of party change and intra-party relations, the 
impact of party ideology, and the role of party finance and the internal distribution of 
resources. 
 
2.4.1. Models of party organisation and intra-party behaviour 
Party formation, party types and adaptation to the regional structure of the state 
The way a state-wide party was formed and its organisational structure when the state 
adopted its regionalised structure are crucial factors in the way it will adapt to the 
challenge of regionalisation. To reiterate the point made in the previous chapter on the 
role  of  history  and  the  'generic  model'  of  political  parties,  parties  remain  heavily 
influenced by their original organisation. Change happens incrementally and occurs 
insofar as the proposed change is not too far removed from the previous form of 
organisation (Panebianco 1988). As  a result, a centralised party is very unlikely to 
rapidly transform into a federal organisation. Rather, if it feels the need to change its 
organisation, it is likely to tread carefully and start by granting moderate powers to its 
regional branches. 
To recapitulate the description of party types made in chapter 1, table 2.2 below 
summarises the major organisational aspects of the major contemporary party types 
found  in  the  literature.
6  Models  of  party  organisation  are  useful  heuristic  tools  to 
determine the relative importance of party leadership, bureaucracy and membership. 
They show the relationship between these three faces of the party organisation, the 
type of goals followed by the parties and the strategy that each type is likely to adopt. 
All these bear a significant influence on the way parties organise at the regional level. 
For instance, parties that place a high value on office may adapt their organisation 
more  easily,  while  policy-oriented  parties  may  find  that  giving  autonomy  to  their 
regional branches carries too much of a risk of policy differentiation. 
The organisation of mass parties seems rather unsuited to the regionalisation of 
party structures. In their ideal-type form, mass parties are often ideologically rigid and 
centralised at the national level (Krouwel 2006: 255). The combination of these two 
elements  makes  the  development  of  autonomous  regional  elites  unlikely.  In  mass 
parties, collective incentives tend to prevail. Consequently, mass parties are more rigid 
and are more unlikely to change. 
                                                 
6 Elite-cadre parties are excluded from the table, as this party type does not describe any existing party; 





Table 2.2. Models of party organisation 
Characteristics  Mass party  Catch-all electoralist party  Cartel party 
Period  1880-1950  1950-present  1950-present 
Origin   Extra-parliamentary origin  Originates from mass parties, 
linking or merging themselves 
with interest groups 
Fusion  of  parliamentary  parties 
with  the  state  apparatus  (and 
interest groups) 
Electoral appeal and social  
support 
Appeal to specific social, religious 
or ethnic group on the basis of 
social cleavages such as class and 
religion 
Appeal to broad middle class, 
beyond core group of support 
'Regular  clientele'  that  provides 
support  in  exchange  for 
favourable policies 
Importance of membership 
organisation 
Voluntary membership 
organisation is the core of the 
party 
Marginalisation of members  Members as pool for recruitment 
of political personnel 
Position of party in central office  Symbiosis between party in 
central office and party on the 
ground 
Subordinate to party in public 
office 
Symbiosis  between  party  in 
central office and party in public 
office 
Position of party in public office  Subject to extra-parliamentary 
leadership 
Concentration of power and 
resources at the parliamentary 
group 
Concentration  of  power  at  the 
parliamentary party leadership and 
government 
Resource structure  Membership contributions, 
ancillary organisations and party 
press 
Interest groups and state subsidies  State subsidies  
Regional decentralisation  Unlikely –centralisation of party 
apparatus 
Subordination to electoralist 
considerations makes adaptation 
likely 
Stratarchical organisation 
Source: Krouwel 2006: 262-3 (extracts of Table 21.2), last line (regional decentralisation) own elaboration   48 
On the other hand, catch-all electoralist parties and cartel parties, where selective 
incentives  tend  to  prevail,  are  likely  to  be  more  adaptable.  When  office  rewards 
become the goal of the organisation, it is more likely to adapt to its environment. 
Catch-all parties are characterised by an increased autonomy of the leadership. As 
Kitschelt (1994: 35) puts it  
'the more a party's electoral and office payoffs are sensitive to strategic 
appeals of competitors because citizens vote more on issues than party 
identification, the more important is the ability of party leaders to set and 
revise party objectives during campaigns and in legislative politics'.  
This increased autonomy of party leaderships and the increasing personalisation of 
electoral contests mean that political parties have become 'presidentialised' (Poguntke 
and Webb 2005). Presidentialised parties, in which party power has shifted to the 
benefit of the party leaders, are more likely to change rapidly than parties in which 
intermediary-level elites and activists have a veto power. This does not mean that 
presidentialised parties will systematically give more powers to their regional branches. 
However, party leaders are more sensitive to organisational failures to deliver party 
goals, in particular when the party fails to win seats and achieve office. If they perceive 
that the existing organisation fails to achieve their objectives, they will be more easily 
inclined to change the organisation. If party leaders are unrestrained by controls of 
vetoes  from  other  party  sectors,  the  party's  organisation  is  likely  to  change  more 
rapidly. 
Katz  and  Mair  (1994)  consider  that  cartel  parties  are  likely  to  adopt  a 
stratarchical form of organisation. It is beneficial to both national and regional leaders, 
as  they  all  gain  a  large  degree  of  autonomy  and  increase  their  ability  to  react 
strategically to electoral demands. As a result, when parties have an organisation close 
to that of a cartel party, we can assume that they will be more adaptable and will give a 
large degree of autonomy to their regional party branches. The stratarchical model 
moreover implies a limited input from the sub-national level in state-wide party affairs. 
 
Organisational strategies: cost and benefits of central-regional relationships 
Regardless  of  what  type  of  organisation  political  parties  adopt,  the  relationship 
between the central and the regional levels of party organisation occurs mainly at the 
leadership level. Decisions regarding fundamental aspects of party organisation as well 
as the relations between levels are mainly taken through formal and informal contacts 
between  national  and  regional  leaders,  who  may  have  multiple,  and  sometimes 
contradicting, motives for action.  
The national, central leadership primarily wishes to maximise votes in state-wide 
elections, as votes can help the party achieve office or policy goals. Regional leaders 
want to achieve the best possible electoral results in regional elections while making 
sure  that  they  will  not  be  overruled  or  dismissed  by  the  national  leadership  (van 
Houten forthcoming). 
There are a number of potential benefits for the central party to give some level 
of  autonomy  to  their  regional  branches.  For  instance,  the  central  party  might  see 
giving  the  regional  branches  more  responsibilities  as  a  strategy  to  avoid  'work 
overload' and offload some responsibilities onto others (Hopkin 2003). At the same 
time, in the context of the 'party crisis' theory, decentralising power within the party 
can be seen as a strategy to bring the party closer to the people while central party 
intervention can be seen as the undue intervention of a remote national elite.    49 
Moreover, the national leadership may expect to obtain some form of advantage 
from giving autonomy to the regional party branches. The regional leadership has an 
information advantage over the national leadership with regard to what happens in the 
regional political arena and a better understanding of the regional electorate. This form 
of expertise is not easily available to the national leadership and would otherwise be 
costly to obtain (van Houten forthcoming). Electorally, regional leaders are likely to be 
seen as having more credibility in regional politics and the party would rather suffer if 
regional leaders were to be seen as agents (some would say 'puppets') of the national 
leadership.  
National elites can also hope that some form of positive spill-over from regional 
electoral success may occur: popularity at the regional level can transform into votes 
for the party in national elections. Electoral success and government positions at the 
regional level can be particularly useful for parties that are in opposition at the central 
level, as holding power at the regional level can provide them with some record on 
which to build a reputation and an image as a responsible governing party.  
The national leadership can also expect redistributive consequences favourable 
to the party's support base through a better adaptation of the party's strategies to the 
regional  context  (Hopkin  2003).  For  instance,  better  electoral  results  mean  more 
opportunities to place party members in public office, more patronage resources, and 
more money when public funding is made available at the regional level. The interests 
of the national and regional parties therefore coincide in this instance: they both want 
to achieve the best electoral results and consider that the ability of regional branches 
to adapt their campaign strategies and messages to the regional context is the strategy 
most likely to achieve these results. 
Regional elites also prefer some form of organisation that gives them the largest 
possible  autonomy  within  the party.  Autonomy  can  give  them the  image  of 'self-
standing'  political  leaders  and  increase  their  credibility  on  the  regional  scene  as 
defenders of the region. Being able to elaborate their policies and strategies at the 
regional level allows them to counter possible attacks by regionalist parties, which are 
likely to try and use the link of the regional party branches with the centre as a sign 
that their loyalty lies with the centre rather than the region. In other words, by having 
some room for manoeuvre within the state-wide party, regional leaders can present 
themselves as being 'their own men' rather than 'puppets' of the centre. 
However,  the  autonomy  of  the  regional  party  branches  can  be  a  source  of 
conflict between the two levels (van Houten, forthcoming). There are indeed risks of 
conflict  over  zones of autonomy  and  control  and  over  election  strategies.  In  this 
respect, policy can be the greatest source of conflict. Devolution and decentralisation 
create  potential  for  policy  divergence  between  national  and  regional  platforms. 
Different  political  arenas  and  different  issues  being  discussed  both  between  the 
national and regional levels and across the regions can cause policy divergence. This 
may  put  party  cohesion  in  jeopardy,  with  different  messages  being  delivered  to 
different audiences by the same party. Policy divergence can be a source of crises for 
the party, as national and regional leaders argue about party policy and programs. It 
can also have negative consequences on the party's electoral prospects if the electorate 
sees it as  lacking coherence and having different messages for different audiences 
(Roller and van Houten 2003: 4).  
Finally,  national  leaders  may  be  wary  of  the  way  the  negative  image  of  one 
regional branch can affect the party as a whole. The distinction between the two levels 
is not as clear-cut as it might seem. Voters may not perceive very clearly the difference 
between the regional and national political arenas; regional politics may have an impact   50 
on national politics, through media focus or intergovernmental relations for instance. 
The national leadership may therefore be reluctant to relinquish all control over its 
regional branches. 
Another issue is that of the involvement of regional party branches in central 
party  organs.  For  national  leaders,  the  integration  of  regional  leaders  and 
representatives in the state-wide party can have a number of advantages: first of all, 
they can provide expertise and a better understanding of the issues that are important 
to each region. The participation of regional branches in central party organs can 
therefore  improve  the  party's  exercise  of  its  aggregative  function  with  respect  to 
territorial  issues.  Their  participation  can  also  serve  national  leaders  to  remind  the 
regions that they are part of a larger whole, with which they share both interests and 
common principles. It can therefore improve the level of co-ordination between the 
levels and across the regions.  
At the same time, regional elites gain access to central decision-making and gain 
some influence over policy and the distribution of party resources. They can hope that 
through their presence in central party organs the state-wide party will understand 
better regional interests and issues. This access to central decision-making provides 
regional  leaders  and  representatives  with  resources that  they  can  use  either  as  a 
stepping stone into national politics or as a source of prestige and influence at the 
regional level. 
For national party leaders, the main drawback of regional participation in central 
decision-making  organs  is  that  it  creates  checks  between  the  levels  and  can  limit 
leadership autonomy. National elites may want to limit the involvement of potentially 
powerful regional leaders, who could wield some power at the central level and curtail 
their freedom of manoeuvre over state-wide party matters. Moreover, there is a risk 
for national elites that regional representatives use their involvement at the centre 
uniquely  to  voice  regional  grievances.  This  could  potentially  be  disruptive  for  the 
functioning of national party bodies.  
Likewise, regional elites may fear that the co-operation between the national and 
regional levels limit their autonomy at their own level. Co-operation provides national 
elites with an opportunity to oversee regional processes and try to influence regional 
decision-making. Finally, in regions with a high level of support for regionalist parties, 
this link with the centre can be seen as a political liability for regional party branches. 
Regionalist parties are likely to use this link to emphasise the fact that regional party 
leaders of state-wide parties have divided loyalties. 
 
Incumbency and the changing nature of central-regional relationships  
One  factor  that  may  contribute  to  periodic  changes  in  the  relationships  between 
central and regional levels of organisation is incumbency. Holding executive office 
provides  considerable  resources,  which  office-holders  may  try  to  use  to  their 
advantage in intra-party affairs. The relationships between the levels may therefore 
vary depending on the incumbency status of the central and regional levels.  
Table 2.3 below provides an overview of the possible incumbency situations in a 
multi-level system and indicates the possible relationships between the central and 
regional levels of organisation in these different situations. Four scenarios are possible: 
both levels are in government, the central level is in government and the regional level 
in  the  opposition,  the  central  level  is  in  the  opposition  and  the  regional  level  in 
government, and finally both levels are in the opposition. It is also possible that some 
regional branches are in government while others are in the opposition, which means   51 
that central-regional relations might be asymmetrical. When the central party is in 
government, it will try to control its regional branches, as it is in its interests to have 
compliant regional branches and to see the regional branches follow the government's 
line. It is more likely to succeed when the regional branches are in the opposition. 
When both levels are in government, the task of the central party may be a little more 
difficult,  as  the  regional  branches  may  also  argue  that  they  have  some  legitimacy 
independently from the central party and should therefore be more autonomous.  
Table 2.3. Incumbency and central-regional relationships 
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When both levels are 
in government, the 
central level is likely 
to dominate and 
submit the regional 
branches to the 
strategy of the state-
wide party 
The regional branches 
in power at the regional 
level are likely to 
increase their level of 
autonomy and central 
influence when the 




























The central level is 
very likely to 
dominate the 
regional branches 
that are in the 
opposition 
The central party is 
likely to prevail in 
central-regional 
relations, but regional 
branches may 
occasionally try to 
increase their level of 
autonomy 
When the central party is in the opposition, the regional party branches may 
enjoy more autonomy. First of all, the central party may be focusing on its state-wide 
strategy, momentarily paying less attention to the regional branches. As a result, the 
regional branches may feel freer to follow their own strategies and to adopt their own 
policies. This is even more likely to occur when regional branches are in government 
at the regional level. In addition, regional office-holders may use this asymmetry to 
increase their influence at the centre, using to their advantage the temporary weakness 
and opposition status of the central party. 
However, the central party's strategy to rebuild its influence at the central level 
may also involve attempts to control the party's regional branches in order to project 
the image of a united party fit to govern the whole country. In this case, regional party 
branches may find it more difficult to diverge from the central party line, as the central 
party is likely to intervene to prevent this from happening.  
 
2.4.2. Parties and their ideology 
As  a  'more  or  less  coherent  set  of  ideas  that  provide  a  basis  for  some  kind  of 
organised political action' (Heywood 2000: 22), ideologies have three dimensions that 
provide a framework for action: they offer an interpretation of the current state of 
society, present a model of how society ought to be and provide a programme of 
changes  in  order  to  bring  about  this  new,  improved  society  (Heywood  2000:  22; 
Adams 1993: 3). Even as ideologies are said to be in crisis (Bell 1965; Fukuyama 
1992), political parties still structure their message around a number of values and   52 
beliefs about how society is organised, how it should be organised, and which changes 
need to be implemented in order to bring about their vision of a good society. 
This  part  briefly  presents  the  main  tenets  of  three  contemporary  political 
ideologies:  social  democracy/socialism7,  liberalism,  and  conservatism.8  These  three 
ideologies  influence  the  main  governing  parties  in  contemporary  Western 
democracies.  Because  of  national  differences,  this  description  will  stay  at  a  rather 
general level. It will however focus on a few points of particular relevance here: role of 
the state, preferred structure of the state, and perception of the nation and relations 
with peripheries. 
Because political parties maintain an identity 'that is anchored in the cleavages 
and issues that gave rise to their birth' (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994: 24), 
the label under which parties are born, but also the ideas that they set themselves to 
defend at the moment of their birth, still constitute a reference for political parties and 
the electorate in terms of what the parties are and the bedrock of values they stand 




Liberalism is the child of the Enlightenment and modern, capitalist society (Eccleshall 
1994: 28). Its main tenet is undoubtedly the defence and promotion of individual 
freedom. Liberalism emerged as a political force against tradition and the entrenched 
privileges  of  the  aristocracy  and  established  churches  in  the  name  of  reason  and 
individual freedom. Its initial success came during the 19
th century, with the rise of the 
bourgeoisie, which contested the privileges of the landed aristocracy, and demanded 
more economic freedom and individual rights and liberties (Smith 1988: 17). 
For liberals, individuals should be as free as possible within the limits of freedom 
for  all,  and  they  should  be  able  to  fulfil  their  potential  and  satisfy  their  interests 
(Heywood  2000:  60).  Their  primary  aim  was  individual  emancipation  from 
paternalism,  authoritarian  state  intervention  and  restriction  of  civil  liberties.  They 
campaigned in favour of the extension of civil rights, including suffrage, freedom of 
speech  and  association,  and  freedom  of  enterprise.  Other  core  values  include 
'rationalism, freedom, justice and toleration' (Heywood 2000: 60). Liberals believe that 
individuals have an equal right to freedom. Given the possibility, they have the equal 
ability  to  reason,  and conflict  should  be  resolved  through  debate  and  negotiation 
(Heywood 1998: 32). 
Throughout its history, the liberal movement has been divided over the means to 
achieve  its  goals.  In  their  early  days,  they  were  divided  between  moderates  and 
radicals.  A  crucial  point  of  divergence  between  moderates  and  radicals  was  the 
definition  of  freedom  and the  role of the  state. Liberals  have  always  been  united 
behind  the  idea  that  power  corrupts  and  that  concentration  of  power  should  be 
avoided at all costs (Heywood 1998: 40-1). As a result, early liberals argued in favour 
of a limited state and a 'negative' definition of freedom, that is, freedom from (the state, 
                                                 
7  Both  terms  will  be  used  interchangeably.  Social  democracy  covers  a  broader  group  of  parties, 
including  socialist,  labour  and  social  democratic  parties  (see  Kitschelt  1994).  In  spite  of  some 
differences, these parties belong to the same 'party family' (see Mair and Mudde 1998). 
8 The list of political ideologies  is rather  large and also includes for  instance: Christian-democracy, 
nationalism, fascism, ecologism, feminism, communism, anarchism, religious fundamentalism (see for 
instance Eccleshall et al. 1994 and Adams 2001).   53 
coercion, etc.). As time went by and the industrial revolution failed to alleviate poverty 
and spread the newly created wealth, liberals realised that negative freedom did not 
mean freedom for all. A new form of 'progressive' liberalism was then developed. This 
positive  definition  of  freedom  involved  providing  the  means  for  all  to  achieve 
freedom (freedom to). As a result, progressive liberals campaigned in favour of the 
introduction of welfare programmes in the first half of the 20
th century. 
Liberal  distrust  of  power  concentration  is  also  combined  with  a  belief  in 
community and people's right of self-determination. Leach (2002: 69) reminds us that 
in 19
th century continental Europe,  
'the  cause  of  individual  liberty  was  […]  inextricably  bound  with 
national  self-determination.  Movements  for  national  freedom  or 
national  unity  were  closely  associated  with  demands  for  civil  and 
political rights and for constitutional limits on government'.  
This means that for the most part, liberals are likely to favour the recognition of 
minority rights and promote regional dispersion of power. 
 
Conservatism  
Conservatism was born as a reaction against the French revolution and the emergence 
of the liberal movement. It rejected liberalism on the basis of a deep-seated distrust in 
man's rational capacities. Against the 'great ideas' of liberalism, conservatism proposed 
a few principles to maintain the structure of society. For conservatives, 'a stable and 
well-organised society is the work of centuries' (Adams 1993: 72). While the nature of 
conservatism is highly dependent on the national context, the European centre-right 
still shares a large number of characteristics and principles (Wilson 1998: ix).  
Conservatives therefore tend to be wary of change. They reject radical change 
because it breaks the natural order of society, but they accept piecemeal change. After 
Burke,  conservatives  believe  that  'a  state  without  the  means  of  change  is  a  state 
without the means of its conservation' (quoted in Norton 1996: 72). From Burke, they 
also inherited a tendency to prefer the institutional status quo and to support existing 
constitutional practices (Garner and Kelly 1998: 57).  
To preserve the cohesion of society, conservatives believe that it is important to 
maintain  a  structure  of  authority.  The  early  conservative  tradition  was  highly 
paternalistic,  with  a  hierarchical  view  of  society. For  the Tories, the  people owed 
obedience to their rulers and the latter owed protection to the former. Conservatives 
often  compare  society  to  a  living  organism  in  which  the  various  parts  are 
interdependent. Each part of this organism, be it family, church, work or government 
has a role to play in sustaining the whole. A natural consequence of this emphasis on 
authority is a conviction that government should be strong, albeit within the limits of 
the rule of law (Norton 1996: 75-6). As a result, whereas 'organic units' such as local 
communities may be given some autonomy, conservatives are likely to be suspicious 
of  power  dispersal  and  weakening  the  power  of  central  government.  As  a  result, 
conservatives are unlikely to support the regionalisation or federalisation of the state.  
 
Social-democratic/socialist parties 
Contemporary  social-democratic  and  socialist  parties  are  the  children  of  the 
enfranchisement and political mobilisation of the working class at the late 19
th century 
and early 20
th century. Their origins in the workers' movement give them a common   54 
base of values and beliefs in relation with the defence and protection of the rights of 
the working class in the framework of the cleavage between workers and industrialists.  
At birth, socialism is characterised by a rejection of capitalism and a will to create 
a more humane society built around the principle of equality (Heywood 2000: 75-6). 
There are important differences among socialists groups, as some emphasise more 
equality while others would choose to support freedom first. Whereas today all would 
support  liberal  democracy,  the  early  20
th  century  and  the  Russian  revolution  saw 
socialist parties split into two groups, with on the one hand communists who rejected 
the western liberal model of democracy, and on the other, the moderate socialist or 
social-democratic reformist left.  
The second half of the 20
th century saw the convergence of social liberals and 
social-democrats in the promotion of the welfare state. The core policies of social-
democratic  parties  were  the  management  of  market  economy  through  central 
planning,  the  redistribution  of  wealth  through  progressive  taxation  and  the 
development of a welfare state bureaucracy providing education, health and social 
services for all (Funderburk and Thobaben 1994: 88-9; Browning 2002: 267).  
Today's  European  socialist  parties  are  in  fact  social-democratic  parties  that 
accept the values of liberal representative democracy and want to reform capitalism in 
order to reduce  the  disparities  it  creates  in  terms  of  wealth  and  wellbeing.  Social 
democrats therefore defend both socialist and liberal values (Kitschelt 1994: 258). 
With respect to decentralisation, this means that socialist and social-democratic 
parties are under two contradicting influences. The legacy of welfarism and egalitarian 
values means that these parties tend to rely on a centralising centre. If equality is to be 
achieved, the state has to be able to reach every corner of the country and set equal 
standards for all. Citizens are entitled to equal services in terms of social services, 
education, health services, and such equality is best achieved through a centralised 
bureaucracy and the definition of national standards of service provision and taxation. 
The  liberal  influence,  on  the  other  hand,  encourages  social-democratic  parties  to 
recognise  and  accept  diversity.  Social-democratic  parties  are  therefore  likely  to 
recognise linguistic, ethnic, and religious minorities. As a result, they are likely to be 
receptive of claims to regional self-government, but they may find that the defence of 
these rights and self-determination put the welfare state and its principle of equality in 
jeopardy.  The  position  of  a  social-democratic  party  on  regionalisation  is  likely  to 
depend on the balance between the socialist and liberal tendencies inside the party. 
 
Comparison and hypotheses 
A factor analysis of party positions on decentralisation by party family by Budge and 
Robertson  provides  insights  into  party  positions  on  decentralisation  (Budge  and 
Robertson 1987: 410-2). First, it shows that conservatives are divided between two 
apparently conflicting positions: on the one hand they support decentralisation and 
defend  ethnic,  religious  and  linguistic  traditions,  and  on the  other they  emphasise 
government  authority  and  efficiency.  Social-democratic  parties  are  opposed  to 
decentralisation and emphasise nationalisation and social justice. Finally, liberal parties 
support decentralisation while also emphasising government authority and national 
effort.  However,  unlike  conservatives,  liberals  believe  that  decentralisation  can 
strengthen rather than weaken national unity. 
Whether a party supports a social-democratic, conservative or liberal ideology 
will affect the view of decentralisation it will adopt. This, in turn, affects the form of 
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ideologies, and parties rarely conform to all the tenets of the ideologies to which they 
refer themselves. As a result, things might not be so clear-cut in reality and 'cross-
contamination' between parties and ideologies may occur. 
 Conservative  parties  tend  to  have  a  unionist  perspective  on  constitutional 
matters.  They  also  place  a major  emphasis  on the  issue  of  authority.  As  a  result, 
national  party  elites  are  unlikely  to  encourage  the  development  of  autonomous 
regional  elites  inside  the  party.  Conservative  parties  are  therefore  likely  to  resist 
pressures to give autonomy to their regional branches. 
Socialist and social-democratic parties tend to value highly the notion of equality. 
Because decentralisation means that people can have access to different services in 
different parts of the territory and that measures of 'social engineering' from the centre 
become more difficult, these parties may oppose decentralisation. Social-democratic 
parties can be conflicted between their centralising tradition and their understanding 
and acceptance of minority rights. We can then expect that the stronger the socialist 
influence and contemporary identity, the more centralising the party will be. On the 
other hand, if the liberal influence is stronger, the party is more likely to support 
decentralisation and federalism.  
Finally, liberal parties tend to encourage diversity and decentralisation of power. 
They  are  the  most  enthusiastic  supporters  of  regionalisation  and  federalism.  In 
organisational terms, this position on federalism is likely to be reflected in the degree 
of autonomy of the regional party branches. 
 
2.4.3. Party finance 
The 1990s saw many countries adopt far-reaching legislative packages regarding the 
control of political resources. The funding of political parties has been one of the 
major issues  in contemporary democracies, and in the last four decades nearly 50 
countries  adopted  laws  regulating  party  finance  (Casas-Zamora  2005:  4).  This 
legislative  activity  was  fuelled  by  the  uncovering  of  a  large  number  of  political 
corruption scandals related to the illegal financing of political parties (Hopkin 2004: 
628). Theses scandals posed the question of party finance at a time when election 
campaigns have become particularly resource-intensive and last for longer periods of 
time (Farrell and Webb 2000: 104-8).  
At the same time, parties face a challenge regarding their sources of funding. 
Whereas the mass party model assumed that political parties would rely on the fees of 
their large membership to support their activities, the decline in party membership and 
spiralling costs of modern-day campaign techniques pushes parties to find alternative 
sources  of  funding.  Leaving  resources  obtained  illegally  aside,  there  are two  main 
sources of political money: private donors and the state, each covering a range of 
practices.  None of  these methods  is  without  problem,  and  states  have  adopted  a 
variety of legislative methods to control party funding. 
The way parties are funded influences the distribution of resources between the 
central and regional levels of organisation, which then affects the degree of autonomy 
of the latter. Control over financial resources is a crucial resource in the control over 
'zones of uncertainty' between party levels (Panebianco 1988: 35).  
 
Different sources of party funding 
Private party funding can come from a variety of sources. One of them is membership 
fees. The amount of this fee varies and parties sometimes have different rates, with 
lower fees to attract young people or the unemployed for instance. However, the   56 
decline in membership figures (Mair and van Biezen 2001; Poguntke 2002) means that 
this source of party funding is slowly drying up. Political parties can also sometimes 
rely on the support of ancillary organisations that contribute to their budget either 
through  affiliation  fees  or  donations.  A  combination  of  fees  and  voluntary 
contributions  is  also  possible.  The  most  famous  case  of an  ancillary  organisation 
contributing to a party's funding is that of the trade unions and social-democratic or 
communist parties. 
The  next  private  sources  are  individual  and  corporate  donations.  Individual 
private contributions are a rather traditional source of party funding. Early political 
parties often relied on their candidates to pay for their campaign expenses. Such cadre 
parties were highly dependent on the candidates' wealth and on that of their financial 
backers. The development of mass organisations may have reduced the relative weight 
of  individual  donations,  but  the  current  decline  in  party  membership  means  that 
donations have once again become a potentially important source of party funding. 
They are however unlikely to be sufficient to cover the entire costs of maintaining 
party activities and organisation. Private companies can then be an important source 
of party funding. 
State funding of political parties can be divided into two categories, direct and 
indirect  state  funding,  and  can  cover  campaign  and  routine,  daily  party  activities 
(Nassmacher 2003: 4). Indirect funding includes a variety of ways in which the state 
can help parties without giving them money directly: free political advertising on the 
television and radio, subsidies to research or education centres linked with political 
parties, etc. All the European countries provide political parties with some form of 
indirect public funding. 
Direct funding refers to the allowance awarded to parties and their candidates 
with the aim of supporting their political activities within the framework established 
by the law (Casas-Zamora 2005: 4). These public subsidies are often calculated on the 
basis of the parties' share or number of votes or seats on Parliament. Direct public 
subsidies can be of two sorts: to refund campaign expenditures (electoral subsidies) or 
to support parties' routine activities and parliamentary activities (permanent subsidies) 
(Casas-Zamora 2005: 32).  
 
Party funding and party organisation 
A combination of private and public funding can be found across Western Europe. 
Casas-Zamora  (2005:  19)  shows  that  most  of the  world's  democracies  have  some 
legislation over party funding that controls or limits donations and/or provide the 
parties with some level of state subsidies. Within the EU-15, seven countries do not 
control private donations, and Germany only limits foreign contributions from non-
EU countries. France has the most restrictive legislation, as it only allows individual 
donations within a set limit and bans all other sources of private donations. In terms 
of state funding, all the countries provide political parties with some state subsidies. 
The UK and Luxembourg are the most restrictive ones, as they only provide indirect 
funding and specific grants. The other EU-15 countries provide some form of direct 
subsidy, permanent and/or campaign spending. 
In  terms  of  organisation,  the  way  resources  are  allocated  within  parties  is  a 
crucial  factor  in  the  distribution  of  power  between  the  levels.  If  resources  are 
centralised and regional party branches rely on the centre for their own resources, they 
are more likely to be under the influence of the central party leadership, which may 
use financial resources as a pressure tool to ensure the regional branches' loyalty to the   57 
centre. When regional party branches are financially autonomous from the rest of the 
party, they are more likely to be independent in other respects, like policy-making and 
candidate recruitment for instance. 
The mode of party funding can have an impact on the autonomy of regional 
party branches. If political parties rely mainly on private funding, autonomous regional 
parties might be in direct competition with their national counterparts over funding. 
They  are  likely  to  have  the  same  donors,  be  they  party  members,  individual  or 
corporate donors. National and regional parties compete over the same donors, who 
have to choose the level where they think their money will be put to the best use. If 
the core level of party competition is the state-wide election, donors are more likely to 
fund the central party.  
If parties rely mainly on public funding, the autonomy of regional party branches 
will depend on the mode of allocation of public subsidies. If direct public funding is 
allocated to the parties themselves, regional party branches will be more autonomous 
if state subsidies are also allocated for regional elections, and not only for general 
elections.  If  public  funding  is  only  available  for  state-wide  elections,  party 
organisation, like party resources, is likely to be centralised. 
 
2.5. Multi-level party organisation: a framework for analysis  
Figure 2.2 summarises the research framework described above and the independent 
variables of the model. The factors that influence party organisation are first, the type 
and  extent  of  the  regionalisation  of  the  state,  territorial  cleavages  and  territorial 
diversity, and regionalism; then the electoral systems, the party system, the impact of 
regional elections and the notion of second-order elections; and finally the models of 
party organisation, party ideologies and party finance. These factors are filtered by the 
party leadership, so that only the most significant changes in the environment lead to 
organisational change.  
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To recapitulate, the framework expects that state-wide parties adapt to the form 
of regionalisation or federalism and are influenced by the historical circumstances that 
generated the devolution of power to regional sub-units of government. All things 
being equal, we expect a direct, positive correlation between the scope of powers of 
regional governments and the level of autonomy of regional party branches in state-
wide parties. A dual distribution of powers between central and regional governments 
is expected to create conditions that facilitate the autonomy of regional party branches 
and  limit  their  involvement  in  the  party's  central  decision-making  processes. 
Conversely, with a cooperative distribution of competences, regional party branches 
are expected to have more limited powers and the central party is expected to be more 
involved in regional party affairs. To compensate for these limited powers, regional 
party  branches  should  be  more  included  in  central  decision-making.  Moreover, 
institutional  asymmetry  is  likely  to  be  reflected  in  the  organisation  of  state-wide 
parties,  with more powers  given  to  the branches  in  those  regions that  have  been 
granted more competences. 
Territorial cleavages are also expected to affect the organisation of state-wide 
parties. First of all, the regional branches are expected to be more autonomous in 
those regions where the territorial cleavage is stronger, with distinct regional traits 
such as language, cultural practices, etc. Strong regionalist feelings and a high level of 
support for regionalist parties also create conditions that increase the likelihood of 
regional differences and therefore increase the pressure on state-wide parties to give 
more autonomy to their regional branches.  
In this respect, electoral factors are very important. The electoral system can 
have a direct impact on the organisation of the parties, facilitating central control or 
making it more difficult. For instance, candidate-based electoral systems are likely to 
make the autonomy of lower party echelons easier, while list-based electoral systems 
are  expected  to  facilitate  top-down  control.  Electoral  systems can  also  affect  the 
parties indirectly by influencing the number of parties and allowing ethnoregionalist 
parties to be serious electoral challengers against the state-wide parties. PR electoral 
systems  are  likely  to  facilitate  the  representation  of  a  larger  number  of  parties, 
including ethnoregionalist parties. We expect that the regional branches of state-wide 
parties will be more autonomous when ethnoregionalist parties threaten their electoral 
position.  
The electoral cycle and the sequence of elections between the state-wide and 
regional  levels  are  also  expected  to  influence  party  organisation.  Vertical  and 
horizontal simultaneity are expected to facilitate the nationalisation of elections and 
therefore limit the autonomy of the regional branches. Likewise, regional elections are 
likely to be influenced by state-wide elections when they occur closely before or after 
state-wide elections, thereby strengthening the central level oversight of regional party 
branches.  
When  regional  elections  are  considered  as  second-order  elections  and  are 
connected to state-wide politics, the central party is likely to play a role in regional 
affairs. In contrast, the higher the stakes of the regional elections for the regional 
electorate and the more the regional arena is disconnected from national politics, the 
higher the pressure will be for state-wide parties to grant autonomous competences to 
their regional branches.  
A  number  of  endogenous  factors  also  affect  the  organisation  of  state-wide 
parties. The type of party organisation (mass, catch-all or cartel party) is likely to create 
conditions  that  either  facilitate  or hinder  the party's  decentralisation  of  powers  to 
regional sub-units. It is expected that parties close to the mass party model will be   59 
centralised and that cartel parties will adopt a stratarchical form of organisation. The 
catch-all party model does not address this issue of multi-level organisation, but they 
are expected to be rather flexible and to decentralise their structure if some electoral 
advantage can be gained from such an organisational change.  
Party ideology and the parties' positions on decentralisation and the state are also 
expected  to  influence  the  level  of  party  centralisation.  Conservative  parties  are 
expected to be rather centralised, while liberal parties are expected to be decentralised. 
Social-democratic parties should be somewhat in between: the stronger the classical 
socialist component in the party's ideology, the more centralised the party.  
The way parties are funded is also likely to influence the internal distribution of 
power between the central and regional levels. If resources are distributed from the 
centre, regional party branches will be more dependent on the centre and the party is 
therefore likely to be more centralised. Conversely, if they directly receive donations 
and/or public subsidies, they are more likely to be autonomous.  
The relations between the levels may also be affected by the incumbency status 
of the regional and central levels if party organisation. When the central party is in 
government, the central leadership will try to centralise the organisation and control 
the regional branches. When the central party is in the opposition and a regional 
branch is in government, the regional branch is likely to increase its autonomy thanks 
to the resources of regional executive office. As a result, the balance of power between 
the centre and the regional branches may change, depending on the electoral results of 
either or both.  
The power and autonomy of the leadership is deemed to be a crucial factor in 
the ability of parties to adapt to their environment. The effects of all internal and 
external factors on party organisation are mediated by party leaders (at both levels, but 
in particular at the central level), whose perception of the need to adapt to changes in 
the environment is a crucial trigger of party change. The central party leadership is a 
very important element in this process of change, as  its perception of the party's 
environment can either facilitate or hinder change. Regional party leaders can also play 
a significant role in this process, as they can affect the perception of state-wide party 
leaders. They can either put pressure on the central leadership to accommodate their 
need for regional adaptation of the party's message and strategy to the regional context 
or on the contrary bow to the authority of the central party.  
The relationship between the central and regional levels of party organisation 
takes two aspects: on the one hand, the degree of autonomy of the regional party 
branches  in  the  management  of  regional  functions  (and  the  concomitant  level  of 
involvement of the central party in regional party affairs), and the extent to which 
regional branches are involved in the central organs of the state-wide parties. Overall, 
it is easier to predict the level of autonomy than the degree of integration of regional 
party branches in central decision-making organs. For this last indicator, only the type 
and scope of regionalisation can help us predict the level of involvement of regional 









Now that we have defined our research question and developed a research framework 
that hypothesises a number of possible relationships to account for party organisation 
in multi-level settings, we can turn to the research design. As already explained in the 
introduction, this dissertation will compare the organisation of state-wide parties in 
two countries, Spain and the United Kingdom up to their last state-wide election 
(2004 in the former and 2005 in the latter), to test the hypotheses presented in chapter 
2. This chapter addresses the issue of the number of cases, justifies the case selection, 
presents the methods of data collection and introduces a coding scheme that will be 
used compare the organisation of state-wide parties. 
 
3.1. Number of units of observation and case selection 
3.1.1. The issue of the number of cases 
Case selection is a difficult issue, as it is always a matter of balancing comparability, 
number  of  cases,  quality  of  the  information  provided  and  the  possible  degree  of 
generalisation. The method chosen for this empirical analysis is the comparative case 
study.  This  method  requires  that  the  same  in-depth  study  is  made  for  a  limited 
number of cases and that the same variables are used systematically across each unit of 
analysis (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 45). Through case study research, we can 
obtain detailed information about the cases, observe the complexities of the social 
phenomena under investigation and try to assess the strength of the hypothesised 
relationships (Denscombe 2000: 31). The comparison of several cases strengthens the 
validity of the study and it results, as it produces results that do not apply only to one 
case. The present study compares the organisation of the main state-wide parties in 
two  countries,  adding  another  level  of  comparison:  not  only  are  several  parties 
compared with regard to their organisation, but they are also compared across two 
countries, increasing the validity of the observations. A number of reasons come to 
explain this choice.  
Data on the issue of the vertical dimension of party organisation is scarce and 
unsystematic,  and  it  had to  be  collected  for  the purpose  of the  dissertation.  This 
research aims at studying party organisation through the analysis of many internal 
party  processes.  This  called  for  the  realisation  of  interviews  in  the  countries 
themselves  and  limited  the  number  of  countries  that  could  be  compared.  An 
international  comparison  was  preferred  to  a  simple  case  study  (study  of  the 
organisation of one party) or a single-country analysis, as it can offer conclusions that 
are valid beyond the context of a single country. The comparison of party organisation 
in two countries therefore allows our hypotheses to be tested in a manner that is less 
dependent upon the national context.  
The method of case selection is a combination of two types of methods. First, a 
most similar systems design was chosen in order to control for a number of variables. 
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as possible on a maximum number of aspects in order to control for as many variables 
as  possible  and  focus  on  a  limited  number  of  possible  relationships.  As  no  two 
political parties or countries share the exact same characteristics, it is more a matter of 
comparing  'relatively  similar'  countries  (Dogan  and  Pelassy  1990:  133).  This  is 
combined with a strongest case analysis, designed to alleviate some, albeit not all, the 
doubts about the main hypotheses. The underlying assumption behind this research 
strategy  is  that  if  the  hypotheses  are  not  validated  by  the  study  of  apparently 
favourable cases, then they are very unlikely to be validated at all (Rallings 1987: 2). If 
this may seem somewhat too deterministic and increases the likelihood of positive 
results, it still has the merits of testing hypotheses that have been rarely tested in the 
past. 
As a result of this choice, we cannot expect to achieve a high level of external 
validity for the answers provided to our research questions, but we endeavour instead 
to achieve a higher level of internal validity (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 
1999: 12). Whereas the conclusions of the comparison of two countries cannot lead to 
broad  generalisations,  it  can  at  least  provide  a  detailed  account  of  the  internal 
processes in the parties studied and test the validity of the hypotheses in the selected 
cases. The comparison can also offer interesting cues on the relationship between the 
variables selected in the model. From this investigation, some tendencies, in the form 
of organisational trends or relationships between independent and dependent variables 
may appear. Moreover, the two cases share characteristics that are common with other 
countries  (regionalised  nature  of  their  government,  multinational  character, 
regionalism, etc.), for which some of the findings of this study might also apply. 
 
3.1.2. Country comparison 
Choosing the countries to compare in Western Europe 
To study the relationship between regionalisation, regionalism and multi-level party 
organisation,  the  countries  analysed  had  to  be  regionalised  or  federal  states  with 
instances of regionalist feelings and regionalist parties in at least some of the regions 
of  the  countries.  Table  3.1  below  compares  the  regionalised  arrangements  of  15 
member states of the European Union (the EU between 1 January 1995 and 30 April 
2004)  and  the  presence  of  regionalist  parties.  Among  the  federal  states  of  the 
European Union, Austria does not have any regionalist party. Belgium is ruled out, as 
it does not have any state-wide party: all the Belgian parties are now divided along 
linguistic lines. Germany has limited regionalism,  most notably among the Danish 
minority in the Schleswig-Holstein.  
The table also shows that of the non-federal European countries (countries that 
score less than 4 for 'constitutional federalism'), Spain and the UK without England 
receive the highest scores with Italy following them. Italy is regionalised state and it 
has regionalist parties, in particular the Lega Nord, the Südtiroler Volkspartei and the 
Union Valdôtaine. Five of its 20 regions enjoy special autonomy status that allows them 
to pass legislation over local matters, based on the recognition of regional minority 
rights and geography. The other 15 regions originally had administrative powers, but 
saw their areas of competence expanded in 2001. In 2005, a process of devolution 
(devoluzzione)  of  further  competences  was  initiated  and  but  was  rejected  in  a 
referendum  held  in  June  2006.  Because  of  the  more  limited  extent  of  Italian 
regionalisation, the countries chosen to illustrate a regionalised setting are Spain and 
the United Kingdom. 
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Table 3.1. Regional governance in the European Union (EU 15), 2005 


















Austria  4  0  2  2  8  No 
Belgium  4  1  2  2  9  Yes 
Denmark  0  1  0  0  1  No 
Finland  0  1  0  0  1  No 
France  2  0.5  0  2  4.5  Yes 
Germany  4  0  4  2  10  Yes 
Greece  1  0  0  0  1  Yes 
Ireland  0  0  0  0  0  No 
Italy  3  0  1  2  6  Yes 
Netherlands  1  0  0  2  3  Yes 
Portugal  1  1  0  0  2  No 
Spain  3  2  1  2  8  Yes 
Sweden  0  0  0  0  0  No 
UK  1  2  0  0  3  Yes 
UK 2   2  2  1  2  7  Yes 
Note: 'UK2' stands for the devolved parts of the UK: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
that is, the UK without England. 
Source: Hooghe and Marks (2001a, Table II) and extrapolation from the same. For the coding 
scheme, see Hooghe and Marks (2001b). 
 
Comparing party organisation in Spain and in the UK 
Both  countries  share  a  number  of  characteristics  that  go  beyond  the  regionalised 
character of their decision-making procedures. Whereas the details of the history and 
party systems of both countries will be described in chapters 4 and 6, it is worth 
pointing out the main common points between the UK and Spain at this stage to 
argue in favour of comparing parties in these two countries.   
Both are West European parliamentary democracies with a monarch as head of 
state,  are  members  of  the  European  Union  and  have  undergone  (and  are  still 
undergoing)  processes  of  power  transfer  to  their  constituent  regions.  The  party 
systems of Spain and the UK include both state-wide and regionally-based parties. 
These parties are in most cases regionalist parties that advocate stronger powers for 
their  regions  and  occasionally  separatist  parties  that  argue  in  favour  of  the 
independence of a region (such as the Scottish National Party and Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya). Even though both countries have different electoral systems (plurality in 
the UK and PR with the D'Hondt formula of seat allocation in Spain), they have fairly 
similar degrees of disproportionality, favour larger parties and discriminate against the 
smaller parties (Lijphart 1994: 162; Lijphart 1999: 162-4). 
Lijphart's criteria to evaluate the character of a democratic system (1999) show 
that the UK and Spain have many characteristics in common. Both countries favour 
single-party  cabinets  (even  single-party  minority  cabinets  in  Spain)  rather  than 
coalition cabinets, they have a high level of interest group pluralism and the executive 
dominates the legislative branch of government. They have different electoral systems 
that nevertheless produce rather similar effects (high disproportionality, advantage to 
large parties) and their state-wide party systems are dominated by two large parties, 
with  smaller  parties  gaining  small  shares  of  the  seats.  Both  have  decentralised 
government  to  their  regions  (albeit  unevenly  in  the  UK),  have  an  asymmetrical 
legislature with a stronger lower chamber and have independent central banks. Spain 
and the UK diverge only on two criteria out of ten: Spain has a written constitution   63 
and medium-strength judicial review of the constitutionality of the laws passed by its 
parliament, while the UK does not have a written constitution and has no judicial 
review of its laws.  
As a result, we can control for a number of factors, such as the regime type 
(republic  vs.  monarchy, parliamentary  vs.  presidential:  the  fact  that  there  are only 
parliamentary elections means that there is only one type of state-wide elections to 
consider), the main characteristics of the political system, the multi-level structure of 
decision-making and changing capabilities of the state (with constraints imposed at a 
higher level by the European Union and at a lower level by regional governments), the 
direct election of regional assemblies, and the presence of regionally-based political 
parties, sometimes of a regionalist or nationalist nature (Winter and Türsan 1998). 
Both countries are quite similar  with respect to their decentralised character. 
There are no two countries that share the exact same form of regionalised structure, 
both in terms of scope of the powers assigned to the regions and with respect to the 
nature  of  the  type  of  distribution  of  competence  (dual  versus  integrative). 
Consequently, we have to allow for a certain level of variation in that respect. Spain 
scores  high  for  constitutional  federalism  (3  on  a  scale  of  4),  special  territorial 
autonomy (2) and regional elections (2). It only receives a score of 1 for 'role of 
regions in central government'. The first crucial difference between Spain and the UK 
is that whereas Spain has decentralised power to all of its regions, the UK is only 
decentralised in Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and London. The largest and most 
populated part of the country, England, remains ruled by the central parliament. Table 
3.1 above illustrates that overall, regional governance in the UK is less developed than 
in Spain.  
An extrapolation using Hooghe and Marks coding system (2001a Table II and 
2001b Appendix 2) shows that if the non-decentralised part of the UK, England, is 
excluded, then the British regionalised arrangement is much closer to the Spanish one. 
If we consider only Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the coding of the UK (UK 
2)  is  then  very  different:  the  regions  empowered  since  1999  have  extensive 
authoritative competences over a range of policy areas but these competences are not 
guaranteed in a constitution (code 2 for 'Constitutional federalism'); the UK allows 
special territorial autonomy for some regions, with the Scottish and Northern Irish 
institutions
9 having powers of primary legislation while the Welsh Assembly only has 
powers of secondary legislation (score 2 for 'Special territorial autonomy', as Scotland 
and  Northern Ireland constitute over  10%  of  the  population);  the regions have  a 
limited and non-binding influence at the central level through executive cooperation 
(score of 1 for 'Role of regions in central government'); and finally, the three regional 
assemblies considered are directly elected (score of 2 for 'Regional elections'). 
Both  countries  have  an  asymmetric  design.  There  is,  however,  an  important 
difference in terms of the scope of that asymmetry between the two countries. The 
Spanish system was originally quite asymmetric because of the distinction between 
'historic nationalities', a term used to refer to the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia 
and  Navarre,  and  the  other regions.  This  distinction  provided  two  distinct  routes 
towards autonomy and allowed the first group of regions (together with Andalusia, 
which 'forced' its way into this group) to obtain more powers than the other regions. 
Progressively,  however,  the  non-historic  regions  have  caught  up  on  most  of  the 
                                                 
9 The suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly between October 2002 and May 2007 is ignored, as 
it remains that this institution, should it have functioned then, would have had such powers.   64 
competences of the historic regions. Only a few differences in competences remain, 
most  notably  with  respect  to  the  police  force  in  the  historic  regions  and  fiscal 
autonomy in the provinces of the Basque Country and Navarra.
10  
There is a much stronger asymmetry between Scotland and Wales. Whereas the 
Scottish Parliament has powers of primary legislation, the Welsh Assembly can only 
pass secondary legislation within the framework of Westminster bills. This asymmetry 
can in part be explained by the different levels of regionalism and the strength of the 
regionalist feelings in the regions: in Spain, it is the regions with the historical claims 
of regional rights to self-government that have been awarded the largest degree of 
autonomy. Likewise, Scotland has more claims to regional autonomy based on history 
and stronger support for regional self-government than Wales (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
The regions where regionalism is strongest and that have some historical precedents 
of self-government or special rights have been awarded more powers than the other 
regions in both countries.  
The  two  countries  also  differ  in  other  respects,  starting  with  two  crucial 
differences,  the  transition  from  a  centralised  to  a  decentralised  state  and  the 
constitutional guarantee of decentralisation. While the UK has an old parliamentary 
tradition, Spain, on the other hand, has only recently become a democracy. In Spain, 
the  transition  from  Franco's  authoritarian  regime  to  parliamentary  democracy 
happened  only  in  1978  but  also  quasi-simultaneously  as  the  process  of 
decentralisation. The long discussions of the transition period also included the shape 
of  the  state  and  the  extent  of  its  competences.  The  final  agreement  produced  a 
singular process of asymmetric decentralisation, with each newly created Autonomous 
Community negotiating its attributions with the central state within the framework 
established by the constitution (Articles 2 and  143-158). As a result, the different 
Autonomous Communities obtained their Statutes of Autonomy one at a time, and 
the  first  regional  elections  took  place  in  1980  (Basque  Country,  Catalonia),  1981 
(Galicia) and 1983 (Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, 
Castile La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Extremadura, La Rioja, the Madrid Community, 
Murcia Region, Navarre, Valencian Community). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  United  Kingdom  has  a  very  long  tradition  of 
parliamentary  democracy,  which  will  not  be  developed  here  any  further  as  it  is 
generally well known. While being until recently one of the most centralised countries 
in Europe, as a union the UK allowed some internal diversity. For instance Scotland 
was able to keep its Church and legal system after the 1707 union with England, and 
Wales managed to retain its cultural distinctiveness and linguistic rights (Bogdanor 
2001: 7-10). Devolution in Scotland and Wales is very recent. It is the result of two 
bills  passed  in  1998,  the  Scotland  Act  and  Government  of  Wales  Act.  The  first 
Scottish  and  Welsh  elections  were  held  simultaneously  the  following  year.  Unlike 
Spanish decentralisation, devolution in Britain is not constitutionally protected and 
could be repealed by a simple Act of Parliament. 
 
Choosing the regions for the analysis of regional party processes 
In the UK, the range of regions to choose from is limited, as devolution only applied 
to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London. London, in spite of its very large 
population, is not a 'region' in the strictest sense of the term. Rather, it is more like a 
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large urban district. The London Assembly has fewer powers than the other three 
regional institutions. Another distinguishing feature of the London Assembly is its 
directly elected mayor. The Northern Ireland Assembly has been out of office for 
most of the period since its creation. As a result, the Greater London Assembly and 
the  Northern  Ireland  Assembly  are  excluded  from  the  comparison  as  outliers. 
Scotland and Wales are both geographical regions with a distinct culture and language, 
past experience of special administration and new devolved institutions. 
Table 3.2. Data on the Spanish autonomous communities 
Support for regionalist 
parties in regional 
elections * (%) 
Spanish (SP)/ 
regional (R) identity 
2002** (%) 
  Statute of 
autonomy 





1999  Average  SP > R  R > SP 
Navarre  Additional 
Provision 1  Yes†  70.93#  58.37#  7  31 
Basque Country  151  Yes  54.61  63.03  8  44 
Catalonia  151  Yes  46.81  48.92  20  40 
Canary Islands  143  No  42.38  33.25  7  38 
Galicia  151  Yes  25.11  19.29  9  32 
Aragon  143  No  24.82  25.60  10  15 
Balearic Islands  143  Yes  19.39  17.18  17  27 
Cantabria  143  No  17  22.01  28  11 
Asturias  143  No  9.88  3.53  8  23 
Valencian 
Community  
143  Yes  9.36  9.14  34  14 
Andalusia  143  No  7.53  7.18  14  15 
La Rioja  143  No  5.90  6.44  19  19 
Castile and Leon  143  No  5.23°  3.48°  40  5 
Extremadura  143  No  2.85  5.02  9  15 
Murcia  143  No  -  1.95  29  5 
Castile-La Mancha  143  No  -  -  37  3 
Madrid  143  No  -  -  44  5 
† Euskera for the Basque minority.  
# These percentages include the votes for UPN (Unión del Pueblo Navarra), which is closely 
allied with PP. Both parties have an agreement according to which only the UPN competes in 
regional elections and the PP competes in state-wide general elections. It is a matter of dispute 
whether  the  UPN  should  be  considered  a  separate  'regionalist'  party.  If  the  party  is  not 
included, the percentages drop to 28.6% (1999) and 26.6 (average).  
° Regionalist parties in Castile and Leon are actually parties that defend either part of the 
region: Tierra Comunera- Partido Nacionalista Castellano and Unidad del Pueblo Leonés. 
*  Source:  compilation  of  data  from  the Archivo  Histórico  Electoral,  Presidencia  de  la Generalitat 
Valenciana (Argos) http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.html  
**Source:  CIS  Boletín  31,  January-April  2003:  Instituciones  y  Autonomías 
(http://www.cis.es/page.aspx?condicion=boletín%2031) 
As we saw above, the Spanish autonomous communities differ in their history, 
the way they obtained their statute of autonomy and the strength of regionalism. Table 
3.2 below recapitulates some of these differences. Because of the 'most likely-most 
similar' method of case selection chosen in this study, it was decided to focus the 
analysis of party organisation in the three autonomous communities known as 'historic 
nationalities', that is, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. All three obtained 
their statute of autonomy via the fast route (article 151 of the constitution) on the 
basis  of  some  previous  historical  experience  of  autonomous  government  and  the   66 
existence of distinctive language and cultural practices. As a result, they have a longer 
experience  of  a  high  level  of  regional  self-government.  These  regions  are  also 
characterised  by  the  presence  of  regionalist  parties  and  a  strong  level  of  regional 
feelings combined with relatively low level of identification with the Spanish identity. 
 
British and Spanish state-wide parties 
The political parties analysed here are all the parties with a significant weight in the 
party system that present candidates for general and regional elections in most of the 
constituencies of their country. In both countries, none of what we call the 'state-wide 
parties' actually fields candidates in each and every single constituency for general and 
regional elections.  
Table 3.3. Territorial coverage of the British parties represented in Westminster (2005) 






















Conservative  529  58  40  3  198  Yes (no)  No 
DUP  0  0  0  18  9  No  Yes (no) 
Labour  529  58  40  0  356  Yes (yes)  Yes (yes) 
LibDem  528  58  40  0  62  No  Yes (yes) 
KHHC  1  0  0  0  1  No  No 
Plaid Cymru  0  0  40  0  3  No  No 
Respect  24  0  2  0  1  No  No 
SNP  0  59  0  0  6  No  No 
Sinn Fein  0  0  0  18  5  No  Yes (no) 
SDLP  0  0  0  18  3  No  Yes (no) 
UUP  0  0  0  18  1  No  Yes 
Notes: The data covers the period up to the 2005 general election and the 2003 Northern Irish, 
Scottish and Welsh elections. National and regional government indicate whether the party 
has government experience. In brackets is whether the party is currently in government.  
Source: Richard Kimber's website http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/ge05/candidates.htm  
Table 3.3 above shows that only three parties present candidates all over Great 
Britain, that is, in England, Scotland and Wales for general elections. In contrast, 
Northern Ireland has a party system that is altogether different from the party system 
of Great Britain. The parties there are divided first along community lines and then in 
function of their position on the Good Friday Agreement and the IRA. Some Ulster 
parties have some links with British parties but these are nonetheless different parties. 
For instance, the small Alliance Party (it received 3.7% of the votes in the Northern 
Ireland Assembly elections of 2003) is a sister party of the Liberal Democrats. Only 
the  Conservative  party,  faithful  to  its  name  (the Conservative  and Unionist  Party), 
keeps there an embryonic structure. It presented three candidates in 2005 and they all 
achieved between 1.4 and 2.6% of the votes. Only three parties with representation in 
the House of Commons presented candidates all across Great Britain. The main state-
wide parties traditionally do not contest the seat of the Speaker of the House. In 2005, 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative party did not contest Speaker 
Michael Martin's seat of Glasgow North East.  
Table 3.4 below presents the same data for Spain. It shows that three parties are 
state-wide: the Partido Popular (PP), the Socialist party PSOE and Izquierda Unida, the 
successor  of  the  Communist  party  allied  with  other  left-wing  groups.  The Partido 
Popular does dot field candidates in Navarre, where it has an electoral agreement with   67 
the Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN). The elected members of the UPN then join the PP 
parliamentary group in the Parliament. The PSOE is also absent from one region: in 
Catalonia,  the  socialist  family  is  represented by the Partit  dels  Socialites  de  Catalunya 
(PSC). However, the PSC is a party federated to the PSOE, and its members sit in the 
same parliamentary group in the Congreso de los Diputados in Madrid.  























BNG  4  1 (Galicia)  1  No  Yes (yes) 
CC  2  1 (Canary Islands)  3  No  Yes (yes) 
CHA  3  1 (Aragon)  1  No  No 
CiU  4  1 (Catalonia)  10  No  Yes (no) 
EAJ-PNV  3  1 (Basque Country)  7  No  Yes (yes –  
Basque Country) 
ERC  8  3 (Catalonia, 
Valencian 
Community and the 
Balearic Islands) 




52  17  3  No  Yes (yes – 
Asturias  and 
Basque Country) 
Nafarroa-Bai  1  1 (Navarre)  1  No  No 
PP  51  16  146  Yes (no)  Yes (yes) 
PSC  4  1 (Catalonia)  21  Yes (yes)  Yes (yes) 
PSOE  48  16  143  Yes (yes)  Yes (yes) 
UPN  1  1 (Navarre)  2  Yes  Yes (no) 
Notes: The data presented covers the 2005 general election and the regional elections during 
the period 2003-2005.  
Sources: Ministerio del Interior http://www.mir.es/DGPI/Elecciones/, and Josep Mª Reniu i 
Vilamala's website on coalitions in Spain http://www.ub.edu/grepa/  
In some autonomous communities Izquierda Unida and its regional branches 
presented lists in coalition with other parties. For instance, in the Balearic Islands, the 
party presented a common list 'Progressistes' with the PSM, the Greens and ERC. In 
Catalonia, the list was Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (ICV-
EUiA). The Catalan and Basque branches of IU are actually sovereign parties affiliated 
to Izquierda Unida. In the Valencian Community, IU is merged together with other 
parties (2 Green parties and 2 republic and nationalist parties) to form Entesa.  
All the other parties represented in the Spanish Parliament are regionalist parties: 
Convergència i Unió and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya from Catalonia, the Galician 
Nationalist Bloc (BNG), the Canarian Coalition (CC), the Aragonist Council (CHA), 
the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) and the Basque nationalist Nafarroa-Bai from 
Navarre. 
A second criterion is the size of the state-wide parties. It was decided that only 
the most important ones would be selected, the state-wide parties with a governing 
experience at the central level or at the regional level. As a result, the three British 
state-wide  parties  were  selected.  Throughout  the  period  under  investigation,  the 
Labour party has governed alone the UK (since 1997) and Wales (1999-2000 and since 
2003) and has been the main partner of the coalitions governing Wales (2000-2003)   68 
and Scotland (since 1999).
11 The Liberal Democrats, third party nationally, have been 
Scottish  Labour's  coalition  partners  in  Scotland  since  1999,  and  they  have  also 
governed in coalition with Labour in Wales between 2000 and 2003. The Conservative 
party has no current governing position either in the UK or the devolved assemblies. 
It is, however, the second party of the UK, with over 30% of the votes in each general 
election since 1997, and before that it had governed since 1979. It remains the party 
most likely to take over power in Westminster. 
In Spain, both the PP and the PSOE have had governing experience at the state-
wide level in the past few years. The PP has ruled at the central level between 1996 
and 2004, and the PSOE governs the country since the 2004 general election. The PP 
presently  governs  alone  in  6  autonomous  communities  (Castile  and  Leon,  the 
Valencian Community, the Balearic Islands, La Rioja, the Madrid Community and 
Murcia) and in coalition in the Canary Islands (together with the Canarian Coalition). 
The PSOE governs the regions of Andalusia, Castile-la Mancha and Extremadura. It 
governs the major coalition party in Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria and Galicia. Its sister 
party PSC is also part of the Catalan governing coalition. Finally, the last state-wide 
party, IU, was considered too small: it won only three seats in the last parliament 
(down 5 seats from the 2000 election) and is only a small coalition partner in both 
Asturias and the Basque Country (with 4 and 3 seats respectively). It lacks the strength 
and in some cases degree of integration that would make it relevant throughout the 
whole country. 
As a result, five parties were selected: the Labour party, the Conservative party 
and the Liberal Democrats in the UK, the PP and the PSOE in Spain. In addition, the 
relationships between central and regional levels in these parties are studied mainly 
during the legislature that preceded the last general election: 2001-2005 in the UK and 
2000-2004 in Spain. As a result, events that have occurred in the most recent years are 
not included.  
 
3.2. Data collection 
3.2.1. Documentary  sources:  party  statutes  and  secondary  literature  on  party 
organisation 
The data collection process was divided into several stages. First of all, the statutes of 
all the parties and their regional branches were analysed and compared. The party 
statutes gave a first indication of the internal party processes of the parties and the 
respective roles and powers of the central party and the regional party branches. Party 
statutes provide a first indication of the way the parties work, or at least the way they 
want to be perceived to work. Whereas Sartori (2005: 84) rightly argued that 'party 
statutes are seldom complied with beyond the extent that suits the interests of the 
interested parties', it is also true that they offer 'a fundamental guide to the character 
of a given party' (Katz and Mair 1992: 7). Moreover, party statutes are rare sources of 
comparable data on the rules that govern party life, and they constitute the framework 
of action of political actors (by allowing certain behaviours, constraining actors to a 
certain course of action and prohibiting other actions) within party organisations. 
This first analysis of party statutes was then complemented by the literature on 
the British and Spanish parties and party systems. Some inequalities in the literature 
                                                 
11 The situation has changed after the  2007 Scottish and  Welsh  elections:  Wales  is  governed by a 
Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition and Labour has lost power in Scotland to the SNP.   69 
are evident from the start. First of all, the literature on Spanish political parties and the 
Spanish  party  system  is  more  limited  than  the  literature  on  British  parties.  The 
English-language literature on the topic is limited to a few authors such as Heywood 
(1995),  Gibbons  (1999),  Magone  (2004)  and  Balfour  (2005)  for  introductions  to 
Spanish politics. The focus on political parties is then on a number of specific aspect 
of Spanish politics, including ethno-regionalist parties, Catalan and Basque politics, the 
PSC in Catalonia. The Spanish-language literature is obviously more important, with a 
number of textbooks of a general nature on Spanish politics (Alcántara and Martínez 
2001, for instance) and a larger number of sources on party politics at the regional 
level (see the annual Informes de las Comunidades Autonómicas or Alcántara and Martínez 
1998). With respect to the political parties, the literature is scarcer, with a clear bias 
towards the study of the Socialist Party PSOE rather than the Partido Popular. 
The same bias can be observed with respect to the British political parties: the 
literature on the Labour party is much more abundant than that on the Conservative 
party and the Liberal Democrats (see for instance Ludlam and Smith 2001, Shaw 1994 
and  1996,  and  White  2001  for  the  Labour  Party,  McIver  1996  and  Russell  and 
Fieldhouse 2005 for the Liberal Democrats, Garnett and Lynch 2003 and Gamble 
1994 for the Conservative party). Moreover, the literature on party organisation at the 
regional level is rather limited, again with more resources on Labour than on the other 
parties. 
Because of this lack of available systematic data, a strategy of data collection 
through  interviews  was  also  adopted  to  complement  the  information  on  party 
organisation at both central and regional levels.  
 
3.2.2. In-depth semi-structured elite interviews 
The nature of the data to be collected (description of intra-party processes) prompted 
the  choice  of  an  open-question  format  for  the  interviews.  Open  questions  were 
necessary in order to leave respondents develop their own responses, follow their trail 
of thoughts and describe in details the internal procedures of their party (Denscombe 
2000: 118-9). At the same time, the discussion had to have a certain level of structure 
to  ensure  that  no  aspect  of  the  party  organisation  was  forgotten  and  that  the 
knowledge of the respondent was used in the best possible way. Consequently, a very 
detailed  questionnaire  was  developed  (see  Appendix  2  for  the  questionnaire  in 
English).  
The detailed questionnaire provided the interviewer with a detailed checklist of 
topics to cover during the interview and broad categories for the transcripts. It also 
helped ascertain the areas of intra-party activity with which the respondent was most 
familiar, covered all the processes in relation to regional party affairs, and established 
the  responsibilities  of  all  the  party bodies  at  the national  and  regional  levels  with 
respect to regional affairs. The aims of this questionnaire were to evaluate the level of 
involvement of the regional organs and leaders in the affairs of the state-wide party 
and the level of autonomy of the regional party branches in the management of the 
party's regional affairs, and to assess changes in the composition of the party organs, 
the  distribution  of  competences  and  the  way  intra-party  activities  were  managed. 
Because  of  the  sheer  amount  of  information  necessary  and  the 'tailoring'  of  the 
questionnaire to the particular circumstances and experience of each respondent, it 
became necessary to realise face-to-face interviews rather than send questionnaires.  
The type of information that was necessary guided the choice of the category of 
respondents. Most rank and file members are unlikely to have first hand knowledge of   70 
the inner workings of their party's executive bodies, let alone of the more informal 
processes and discussions that can happen at a higher level. This consideration led to a 
choice of respondents from the mid- to higher levels of party organisation: members 
of  the  parties'  bureaucracy,  members  of  the  parties'  executive  bodies  and  elected 
representatives from both national and regional levels.  
The chosen method of interview is therefore the in-depth semi-structured elite 
interview (Johnson and Reynolds 2005: 271-5; Dexter 2006). The in-depth nature of 
the interviews took precedence over the structured aspect. Experience also showed 
that respondents often answered several questions at once and jumped from one part 
of  the  interview  to  another,  as  they  would  compare  various  aspects  of  party 
organisation. 
The choice of the respondents was made from among each party's executive 
organs,  members  of  parliament  and  sometimes  party  staffers.  The  selection  of 
respondents  was  not  based  on  probability  sampling  but  rather  on  the  personal 
qualities of each individual, as well as issues such as availability and access. Overall, 22 
interviews were made with members of the British state-wide parties (6 in London, 7 
in Wales, 8 in Scotland and 1 in Brussels). The distribution by party is as follows: 6 
members of the Conservative party (2 in London, 2 in Scotland and 2 in Wales), 7 
from the Labour party (2 in London, 3 in Scotland, 2 in Wales) and 9 from the Liberal 
Democrats (3 in London, 2 in Scotland, 3 in Wales and 1 in Brussels, with a member 
of  a  Scottish  party).  27  interviews  were  carried  out  in  Spain  (10  in  Madrid,  8  in 
Barcelona, 1 in Brussels with a Catalan MEP, 1 in Bilbao, 3 in Vitoria-Gasteiz and 4 in 
Santiago de Compostela), with 11 respondents from the Partido Popular and 16 from 
the PSOE (see appendix 1 for a complete list of interviews). 
During  the  interviews  every  step  was  made  to  ensure  the  rights  of  the 
respondents were respected and that they were properly informed on the purpose of 
the interview and its subsequent use, from the introductory letters sent as first contact 
to  the  presentation  of  the  researcher  and  the  research  project  at  the  start  of  the 
interview.   
 
3.3. Coding multi-level party organisation 
3.3.1. Existing schemes coding party organisation in the party literature  
Attempts to code party organisation are rather rare. Katz and Mair's Data Handbook 
(1992) provides a wealth of numerical (albeit by now a little dated) information on 
political parties but does not provide any analytical categories. In this respect, Janda's 
International  Comparative  Political  Parties  Project  (1980)  is  more  interesting  because  it 
provides  an  extensive  framework  of  analysis  and  codification.  This  wide-ranging 
analysis  of  political  parties  in  53  countries  codes  party  organisation  along  a  large 
number of categories.  
The  concept  that  comes  closest  to  this  dissertation's  concerns  is  that  of 
'centralisation of power', which measures 'the location and distribution of effective 
decision-making authority within the party' (Janda 1980: 108). This concept is broken 
down into 8 variables. One of them is the centralisation of the party structure, which 
measures  'the  hierarchical  distribution  of  power  without  regard  to  the  functional 
differentiation' (Janda 1980: 108). It measures the degree of (de)centralisation of party 
structures and hypothesises that federalism is likely to produce a separation between 
regional and central party levels. The concept of centralisation of power also includes 
such variables as the selection of the party leader and of candidates for state-wide   71 
parliamentary elections, the formulation of party policy, the distribution of resources 
between levels and party discipline (Janda 1980: 109-16). 
These coding categories are not, however, completely suited to our purposes. A 
first problem is that it is a very detailed description of all the party processes and that 
it takes all the party levels into account, down to the constituency level, while the 
focus of this study is on the respective powers of the central and regional levels of 
party organisation. The powers of other levels, such as the constituency level, are only 
important  insofar  as  they  impinge  on  or  strengthen  the  power  of  the  central  or 
regional levels. The other problem is that the variables of the 'centralisation of power' 
category only refer to state-wide party processes and therefore only cover one part of 
the scope of the present analysis. The respective allocation of power between central 
and regional levels of party organisation in regional party processes also need to be 
taken into account. As a result, it became necessary to design a coding scheme for the 
specific purposes of this dimension of party organisation. 
 
3.3.2. Coding  the  relationship  between  central  and  regional  levels  of  party 
organisation 
The coding scheme developed for this dissertation aims at comparing the vertical 
dimension of party organisation of state-wide parties, with respect to the allocation of 
power  between  the  central  party  organisation  and  its  regional  party  branches.  As 
explained in chapter 2, there are two aspects to this relationship: the involvement of 
the regional party branches in the state-wide party and the autonomy of the regional 
party branches in the management of regional party affairs and their own organisation. 
This  dual  aspect  translates  into  two  groups  of  5  variables,  each  group 
representing one of these dimensions. Each variable represents a party process. The 
first  group  of  variables  refers  to  state-wide  party  processes  and  the  degree  of 
involvement of regional party branches in these processes. These variables are (1) the 
selection of the leader of the state-wide party, (2) the involvement of regional party 
branches in the central party executive, (3) the selection of candidates for state-wide 
parliamentary elections, (4) the formulation of party programmes, or manifestos, for 
state-wide parliamentary elections, and (5) the statutory guarantee of the powers of 
regional party branches and the involvement of the regional party branches in the 
process of amending the party constitution.  
The second group of variables describes the degree of autonomy of regional 
party  branches  in  the management  of party  processes  at  the  regional  level.  These 
variables are (6) the ability of regional party branches to organise themselves freely, 
that is, to have an internal organisation that is not dictated by the centre, (7) the 
selection of regional party leaders, (8) the selection of candidates for regional elections, 
(9) the adoption of regional party programmes, or manifestos, and (10) the degree of 
financial autonomy of regional party branches.  
Each party receives a code between 0 and 4 for each indicator. Table 3.4 below 
recapitulates the indicators and the meaning of each score. A score of 0 represents the 
most centralised form of organisation. This means that only the central party has 
responsibility  over  the party process  and that  the  regional  party  branches  are  not 
involved  in  the  decision-making  process.  As  the  value  of  the  code  increases,  the 
degree of involvement of regional party branches in the central party (for indicators of 
the first group) or the autonomy of the regional party branches (for indicators of the 
second group) also increases. A score of 4 represents a situation in which the regional 
party branches have full power. This means that the central party, when it exists, is a   72 
confederation of regional parties, and that the regional party branches are completely 
autonomous, without any central party to refer to (as in a case of split organisation). 
For indicators of the first group, a score of 0 means that only the central party 
decides and that the regional party branches are not represented at the central level. A 
score of 1 represents a situation in which regional party branches are represented at 
the central level but have a limited influence, or a situation in which regional party 
branches  or  regional  leaders  are  consulted  without  their  opinion  being  formally 
binding for the central party. A score of 2 means that the regional party branches have 
a number of representatives in central party organs and an influence over state-wide 
processes  similar  to  that  of  other  party  sectors,  such  as  the  membership,  the 
parliamentary party, and affiliated organisations. A score of 3 signifies that regional party 
branches have a significant level of influence in central decision-making, through a 
sizeable representation in central party organs (set at one half of all members of the 
most important organ) and a strong influence over state-wide electoral processes. This 
strong presence at the centre amounts to a regional veto over state-wide matters. A 
score of 4 means that the central party is the sum of it regional parts: central party 
organs  are  controlled  by  the  regional  party  units  and  regional  branches  have  full 
control over state-wide electoral processes in their region.  
For indicators of the second group, similar codes ranging between 0 and 4 are 
applied,  with  a  similar  increment  in  value  representing  an  increase  in  the  level  of 
autonomy of the regional party units. A score of 0 represents a case in which the 
regional branches are mere administrative arms of the central party, which is in charge 
of all the decisions that affect regional organisation and regional elections. A score of 
1 indicates that the autonomy of the regional party branches is limited by the direct 
involvement of the central party in regional affairs. The central party oversees the 
regional party branches and occasionally participates in the decision-making process at 
the regional level. A score of 2 indicates that the decisions taken by the regional party 
branches need to be approved by the central party, which has a de facto veto power 
over decisions made by the regional branches. A score of 3 means that regional party 
branches are autonomous and that the central party has no official influence over 
regional  party  matters.  Because  of  the  state-wide  nature  of  the  party,  national 
considerations,  informal  discussions  with  other  regions  or  the  central  party  and 
examples from other regional branches can nevertheless influence the decisions of the 
regional party branches. A score of 4 represents a case of split organisation, in which a 
regional party of the same ideological family takes over the functions of a state-wide 
party in a region. The state-wide party ceases to be involved at the regional level, and 
the regional party is an independent recognised political party, organisationally distinct 
from the state-wide party of the same family. 
To facilitate the comparison of political parties, the score of each indicator are 
added to make a total score and for both groups of indicators. The total score can give 
a numerical indication of the degree of centralisation of each party. The total by group 
of variable facilitates the comparison of party organisation at the central level and at 
the regional level. The codes reflect the situation of each party at the end of the period 
under investigation. As a result, they do not account for changes within the parties. 
They should be considered as a snapshot of the organisation of the state-wide parties 
at the moment of the last state-wide election in each country (2004 in Spain and 2005 






Table 3.5. Organisational dimensions (indicators) and codes 
Involvement of regional party branches in the central party 





By central party organs, with no regional representatives; 
By central party organs, but with a small number of regional representatives;  
By central party organs, with a number of regional representatives equal to that of other party sections; 
By central party organs, with necessary approval by regional party branches; 
By regional party branches. 
2. Involvement of regional branches 







No regional representatives; 
Limited number of regional representatives among a much larger number of representatives of other 
party sections; 
Number of regional representatives similar to that of other groups; 
At least half of the executive is composed of regional representatives; 
National executive composed only of regional representatives. 
3. Selection of candidates for state-






By central party organs only; 
By central party organs, with limited consultation of regional branches; 
By central party organs, with compulsory consultation of regional branches; 
By regional organs, with compulsory approval of central party; 
By regional party branches only. 
4. Adoption of manifesto/ 
programme for state-wide 







By central party organs only; 
By central party organs, with some regional input; 
By central party organs, with a significant input or necessary approval of the manifesto by regional 
branches; 
By regional party branches, with necessary approval of central party organs and central coordination; 
Only regional manifestos. 
5. Amending the constitution of the 







By central party organs without regional representatives; 
By central party organs including regional representatives; 
By central party organs, with consultation of regional party branches/leaders; 
By central party organs, with separate approval by regional party branches; 




Autonomy of regional party branches at the regional level 








Decided by the central party, the regional party branch does not have its own constitution; 
The regional party branch has its own constitution, but with organisational constraints from the state-
wide party constitution and subject to approval of the central party; 
The regional branch makes its own constitution, subject to the approval of the central party; 
The regional branch organises freely, without any central oversight; 
By the regional party (split organisation). 





By the central party; 
The central party is involved alongside the regional branch; 
By the regional party branch, with necessary approval of the central party; 
By the regional party branch; 
By the regional party (split organisation). 







By the central party; 
The central party is involved alongside the regional branch; 
By the regional party branch, with necessary approval of the central party; 
By the regional party branch; 
By the regional party (split organisation). 
9. Adoption of manifesto/ 






By the central party; 
The central party is involved alongside the regional branch; 
By the regional party branch, with necessary approval of the central party; 
By the regional party branch; 
By the regional party (split organisation). 








The central party centralises all the resources; 
The regional party branch has some independent  resources but also receives support from the central 
party; 
The regional branch may receive occasional financial support from the central party; 
The regional party branch is financially autonomous from the central party; 




Practice showed however that it could sometimes be difficult to make reality 
coincide  with  a  code.  The  reality  of  party  organisation  and  the  actual  practice  is 
sometimes in contradiction with the party statutes. As a result, the question is whether 
a code should be attributed according to the distribution of competences stipulated in 
party constitutions or whether it should be given according the party's practice at a 
given time. Indeed, practices may change, depending on the particular circumstances 
of a party or an election. The resulting codes are therefore an approximation designed 
to facilitate the comparison. They should be read in combination with the qualitative 
part of the study, which describes in great detail the organisation of the parties and the 
changing relationships between levels of party organisation.  
 
3.4. Conclusion  
This chapter has presented the methodological problems posed by this particular topic 
and the manner in which this dissertation will try to solve them, or, more modestly, 
deal  with  them  in  order  to  present  a  methodologically  sound  study  of  party 
organisation. It was argued that the type of subject required an in-depth study of party 
organisation and a personal data collection via interviews. This, in turn, meant that 
only a relatively limited number of cases could be studied. The issue of the number of 
cases was addressed and the case selection supported by arguments of comparability 
and  feasibility.  This  led  to  the  selection  of  five  state-wide  political  parties  in  two 
countries, with an emphasis on their organisation in the regions where the centrifugal 
forces were likely to be strongest and therefore influence party organisation the most.  
The following chapters present the country cases and the empirical findings. For 
each country, one chapter presents the context in which state-wide political parties 
operate  (history  and  form  of  state  decentralisation,  electoral  systems  and  party 







CHAPTER 4.  THE UNITED KINDGOM – 





This chapter studies the institutional and political framework in which British state-
wide parties operate. The first section describes the devolved structure of the British 
state and the devolution reforms in Scotland and Wales. The second section explores 
the party systems in which these parties compete: the British party system and the 
Scottish and Welsh party systems. Finally, the last section looks at party finance and 
funding rules at the central and devolved levels.  
 
4.1. Devolution in Scotland and Wales 
4.1.1. Devolution  and  the  establishment  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  the 
National Assembly for Wales 
State formation, peripheral nationalism and devolution before the 1990s 
The UK is typically a 'union state' (Rokkan and Unwin 1985), that is, a state built 
through  dynastic  unions  that  incorporated  Scotland  and  Wales  into  the  United 
Kingdom. Unlike Wales, Scotland experienced united self-rule before its union with 
England. With the Treaty of Union, Scotland lost its parliament but retained its court 
system and its Church (Bogdanor 2003: 10-11). Wales was more fully integrated into 
the Union (Pilkington 2002: 23-5), which nevertheless allowed the Welsh to remain 
culturally different, cultivate their own language and be administered by local elites. 
Calls  for  home  rule  spread  from  Ireland  to  Scotland  and  Wales  in  the  19
th 
century and nationalist movements and parties emerged in these regions. The Welsh 
nationalist movement was mainly concerned with cultural and linguistic issues, while 
the issue of Scottish home rule was discussed but defeated 13 times between 1890 and 
1914 (Bogdanor 2003: 110-2 and 144-8; Pilkington 44-8 and 57-8).  
In the 1970s, the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru increased their share 
of the vote, gaining votes from the Labour party in its strongholds. At the same time, 
Labour  Prime  minister  Harold  Wilson  set  up  a  commission  to  investigate 
constitutional  reform.  The  Kilbrandon  report,  which  advocated  devolution  in 
Scotland and Wales, was however shelved by the Conservative government that came 
into power in 1973. Labour came back into power in 1974 and the government passed 
two separate bills to devolve power to a Scottish legislative parliament and to a Welsh 
executive assembly. Devolution was to be finally endorsed by the peoples of Scotland 
and Wales in a referendum, with a requirement that at least 40% of those eligible to 
vote  should  vote  'yes'.  Both  referendums  were  held  on  1  March  1979.  In  Wales 
devolution was massively rejected, with 79.8% of the votes against devolution and a 
turnout of just 58.8%. In Scotland 51.6% of the voters said 'yes' to devolution. With 
such a narrow victory and a turnout of 62.9 %, only 32.85% of the whole electorate 




The 1997 devolution referendums 
Devolution came back in the political debate in Scotland and Wales in a context of the 
Conservative  domination  of  Westminster  during  Margaret  Thatcher's  premiership, 
which  contrasted  with  Labour's  electoral  domination  in  both  regions.  The 
Conservatives also displayed a particular disregard for the political traditions and a 
strong  lack  of  sensitivity  with  the  peripheries  of  the  union,  exemplified  by  the 
government's decision to implement the poll tax in Scotland a year before it was 
introduced in England and Wales (Bogdanor 2003: 196).  
The Labour party had remained in favour of devolution throughout the 1980s, 
mostly with regard to Scotland, but the issue still had some opponents inside the 
party.  It  is  only  at the  end of  that  decade that  Labour  renewed  its  proposals  for 
devolution  in  Wales.  In  1992  under  the  leadership  of  John  Smith,  a  Scot  deeply 
committed to  devolution, the  party proposed  to establish  a  Scottish  parliament,  a 
Welsh Assembly, an elected authority for London and 'a tier of regional government 
in the English regions' (Dale 2000: 230-1). Since 1989, Labour was participating in the 
Scottish  Constitutional  Convention,  which  also  included  the  Scottish  Liberal 
Democrats, local government officials, members of the trade unions and the church. 
The Conservatives, who did not support the idea of devolution, did not participate, 
and  the  SNP  also  refused  to  participate  in  a  discussion  that  did  not  consider 
independence.  The  goal  of  the  Convention  was  to  place  again  devolution  into 
Westminster's agenda. It produced two reports that proposed that the new parliament 
is elected by proportional representation with the additional-member system formula. 
The Convention did not go as far as ask for tax-raising powers for the new assembly 
(Bogdanor 2003: 196-8).  
Table 4.1. Results of the 1997 referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales 
There should be a Scottish Parliament: 
    Votes  % of voters  % of electorate 
  Agree  1,775,054  74.3  44.87 
  Disagree  614,400  25.7  15.53 
  Total  2,389,445  100  60.40 
A Scottish Parliament should have tax-raising powers: 
    Votes  % of voters   % of electorate  
  Agree  1,512,889  63.5  38.24 
  Disagree  870,263  36.5  22.00 
  Total  2,383,152  100  60.24 
There should be a National Assembly for Wales: 
    Votes  % of voters  % of electorate 
  Agree  559,419  50.3  25.2 
  Disagree  552,698  47.7  24.9 
  Total  1,112,117  100  50.1 
Sources: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk; http://www.bbc.co.uk 
After Labour's 1997 general election victory, two referendums were held to ask 
the  peoples  of  Scotland  and  Wales  whether  they  agreed  to  devolution  (Table  4.1 
above). The Scottish referendum was held first and two questions were asked, one on 
the  creation  of  a  Scottish  parliament  and  one  on  the  tax-raising  powers  of  the 
parliament.  A  week  later  the  Welsh  people  was  asked only  one  question  on  the 
establishment of a Welsh assembly. In order to avoid the situation that led to the 
failure of the 1979 referendum in Scotland, there was no minimal level of support 
from  the  whole  electorate.  Devolution  was  therefore  accepted  in Scotland,  even 
though only 44% of the electorate voted in favour of the parliament and a mere 38%  
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in favour of tax-raising powers. The Welsh referendum was held a week after the 
Scottish one because its result was uncertain, and the government hoped that the likely 
positive result of the Scottish vote would influence the Welsh. The Welsh only agreed 
to the creation of an Assembly by a small margin, with fewer than 7,000 more votes in 
favour of the Assembly. 
 
4.1.2. Institutional features of devolution in Scotland and Wales 
The general framework of devolution 
It is true to say that the stakes of the two referendums were very different, as the 
chosen  model  of  devolution  is  very  asymmetrical.  A  highly  integrative  pattern  of 
decentralisation was chosen in Wales, whereas devolution more closely resembles the 
dual model in Scotland. Devolution is far-reaching in Scotland, more limited in Wales 
and has bypassed England, by far the largest component of the Union. 12  
Devolution for Scotland and Wales was the result of separate legislations. The 
separate devolution settlements that created the devolved institutions and organised 
the division of powers between the centre and the regions were drawn up by the 
centre.  A  peculiarity  of  British  devolution  is  the  absence  of  any  constitutional 
guarantee.  The  first  reason  is  that  the  United  Kingdom  does  not  have  a  written 
constitution. The second reason is that devolution 'seeks to reconcile two seemingly 
conflicting principles, the sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament and the grant of 
self-government  in  domestic  affairs  to  Scotland,  Wales  and  Northern  Ireland' 
(Bogdanor 2003: 1). Distinct from federalism, devolution does not divide but devolves 
the  supreme  power  of  Parliament  (Bogdanor  2003:  3).  Devolution  is  therefore  a 
delegation of power from the centre to the regions (Hoods Philips et al. 2001: 89), a 
transfer and the sharing of powers between governing institutions within a legislative 
framework  (Burrows  2000:  1).  As  a  result,  the  Westminster  Parliament  remains 
sovereign and the only limit to its ability to legislate on devolved issues is political 
rather than legal (Trench 2004: 167). 
Scotland and Wales are financed primarily by a central block grant determined 
using the so-called 'Barnett formula'. The formula adjusts automatically some elements 
of  public  expenditure  in  Northern  Ireland,  Scotland  and  Wales  to  reflect  budget 
decisions affecting other parts of the country (England). Devised in the late 1970s by 
Joel Barnett, the then Chief Secretary to the UK Treasury department, it allocates 
public  funding  to  the  component  parts  of  the  Union  as  a  proportion  of  their 
population. Today, for every increase of public expenditure by £85 on services in 
England comparable to those contained in the Scottish and Welsh block grants, £10 
would be allocated to Scotland, and £5 to Wales (Bogdanor 2003: 243; Swenden 2006: 
137). The sums allocated to Scotland and Wales are not dependent on their needs but 
rather on changes in the level of public expenditures in England.  
                                                 
12 In 1997 Labour promised regional assemblies for the English regions that wished to have one but 
then failed to deliver its pledge. Labour reiterated its promise of voluntary devolution in England in 
2001. Referendums  were to  be held in the regions that  wished to have their own assemblies.  The 
negative  results  of  the  referendum  in  the  North-East  have  cast  a  shadow  on  the  future  of  other 
referendums and potential devolution in other regions.  
See Hélène Mulholland 'North-East voters reject regional assembly', The Guardian, Friday November 4, 
2004  http://society.guardian.co.uk/regionalgovernment/story/0,8150,1343801,00.html,  and  also 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/northyorkshire/iloveny/devolution/postponement/index.shtml  on  the 
postponed referendum in Yorkshire and the Humber.  
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If this method of allocation is often considered as an argument against the block-
grant system, the formula has a number of advantages, starting with consistency and 
predictability, as the resources available to the Scottish and Welsh devolved authorities 
do  not  have  to  be  negotiated  with  the  central  government.  However,  the  central 
government is not obliged to follow this formula, as shown by the UK government's 
decision to increase the Welsh budget in 2000, whereas the strict application of the 
Barnett formula would have led to a reduction of this budget. While Scotland and 
Wales lack fiscal autonomy, this method of financing also gives them a large measure 
of freedom. The regions are free to spend the money given as a block grant on the 
areas  and  services  they  want  (Trench  2004:  173).  Scotland  and  Wales  can  find 
additional sources of funding in their control over local authority finances. Part of the 
block grant, 40% in the case of Scotland, goes to the financing of local authority 
expenditures.  However,  the  devolved  authorities  have  the  power  to  define  their 
spending priorities, and they could earmark some of these funds for other purposes 
and therefore increase their own resources.  
Finally, as far as intergovernmental relations (IGR) are concerned, the formal 
processes of co-operation between the central government and the regions are very 
limited. Intergovernmental relations within the UK are mainly at the executive level. 
Institutional devices for vertical co-operation exist in the form of the Joint Ministerial 
Committee (JMC), which can bring together ministers and/or civil servants from both 
central and devolved levels. However, they have been little used and often take a 
rather ritualistic form that carefully avoids any public display of disagreement. Very 
little discussions actually happen in these meetings, and their formal dispute-solving 
function tends to be neglected in favour of more informal meetings, in particular 
between officials. The JMC appears to be too formal and this formality might have 
given rise to disputes that could be avoided in a more informal setting.  
The other reason for the weakness of formal IGR is the political consensus 
between the central and devolved administrations. Labour has not only formed the 
British government since 1997 but also the Welsh Executive between 1999 and 2000 
and  again  since  2003.  Labour  has  also  been  the major  partner  in  Wales  between 
October 2000 and April 2003 and in Scotland since 1999 (in both cases, Labour's 
coalition  partners  were  the  Liberal  Democrats).  As  a  result,  intergovernmental 
relations can take a more informal turn, as ministers on both sides of the negotiating 
table tend to be from the same 'family' (Trench 2004: 176-181). Inter-governmental 
relations are mediated through the Labour party, which channels informal relations 
between the governments.  
Overall,  the  participation  of  the  constituent  regions  of  the  UK  in  central 
decision-making is rather restricted. The British government includes Secretaries of 
State for Scotland and for Wales, but neither is selected from or by the corresponding 
regional government. The role of the Secretaries of State is rather peculiar and can 
also be confusing: his or her role is to speak 'for the UK government on matters 
relating to that territory' and to speak 'for the territory on matters on which it had 
dealings with the UK Government' (Trench 2004: 182). Representing alternatively the 
UK government and the region depending on the issue at stake, it is hard to see how 
this can be achieved without problems of legitimacy from a regional point of view. So 
far, the fact that Labour has been in power at both levels has certainly facilitated 
intergovernmental  relations,  but  it  will  become  more  difficult  when  there  is 
government incongruence between the national and regional levels. Moreover, both  
80 
 
positions have been somewhat undermined by their downgrading from full-time to 
'part-time jobs' in 2003.13 Just like the regions are not directly represented in Cabinet, 
neither are they represented in Parliament. The Scottish and Welsh governments and 
assemblies are not represented in Parliament like the German Länder are represented 
in  the  Bundesrat  or,  to  a  more  limited  extent,  the  Spanish  regions  in  the  Senate. 
Regional representation in Parliament is made virtually impossible by the asymmetrical 
character of the devolution process and the absence of any regional government in 
England.  
 
The Scottish devolution agreement 
The Scotland Act 1998 established the Scottish Parliament, which consists of 129 
members,  and  a  Scottish  Executive  elected  by  the  Scottish  Parliament  from  its 
members. The Parliament is elected by the additional-member system of proportional 
representation, with 73 members (MSPs) elected in single-member constituencies with 
the plurality rule and the remaining 56 elected from top-up lists. The 73 members are 
elected from the 72 Westminster constituencies (before the boundary change of 2005) 
with Orkney and Shetland being split to form two constituencies. The top-up areas 
have the boundaries of the regional constituencies used in Scotland for the elections 
to the European Parliament until 1999 (Bogdanor 2003: 203).  
The  Parliament  is  elected  for  a  term  of  four  years.  It  can  be  dissolved  if  a 
majority of two thirds of the MSPs votes for dissolution or if the Parliament is unable 
to select a First Minister within 28 days. Unless the dissolution leads to an election 
within 6 months of the scheduled next elections, the new Parliament is only elected to 
complete the duration of the previous legislature, and the electoral calendar would 
remain the same. For instance, the last Scottish elections were held in May 2003. If the 
Parliament  was  dissolved  before  December  2006,  the  next  elections  of May  2007 
would  still  be  held.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Parliament  was  dissolved  between 
December 2006 and May 2007, then the May 2007 elections would be cancelled and 
the Parliament would be elected for a whole 4-year term. 
The Parliament has a period of 28 days to elect a First Minister to lead the 
Scottish Executive, which is the government of Scotland for all devolved matters. The 
Scottish Executive should also comprise a number of ministers and junior ministers 
appointed by the First Minister and two law officers, the Lord Advocate and the 
Solicitor General for Scotland. 
The Scotland Act lists the powers retained by Westminster. The main reserved 
matters are the Constitution and the Union of Scotland and England, foreign affairs 
and the European Union, defence, immigration and nationality, national security, the 
civil service, fiscal and monetary policy, rules of market competition, financial services 
and markets, import and export control, transport not particular to Scotland, energy 
policy, social security, employment and industrial relations, and election rules (except 
local  government  elections,  save  from  the  franchise)  (see  Appendix 3  for  a more 
                                                 
13 Between October 2002 and January 2008, Peter Hain has shared his responsibilities as Secretary of 
State for Wales with those of Leader of the House of Commons (June 2003-May 2005), Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland (May 2005-June 2007) and finally Secretary of State for Works and Pensions. 
Today, Paul Murphy is exclusively Secretary of State for Wales. Alistair Darling (June 2003-May 2006) 
and Douglas Alexander (May  2006-June 2007) have both been Secretary of State for Scotland and 
Secretary  of State for Transport. The current Secreatry of  State for Scotland, Des  Browne,  is also 
Secretary of State for Defence.   
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complete list of reserved powers). The Scottish Parliament can pass and implement 
legislation  over  any  matter  that  is  not  contained in  this  list.  Scotland  is  therefore 
responsible  for  health  services  (with  a  few  restrictions),  home  affairs,  local 
government, education, arts and culture, housing, transport, law and order (but not 
the courts), agriculture and economic development (Scotland Act 1998). The Scottish 
Parliament can also pass secondary (or subordinate) legislation as the need might arise 
from bills passed in Westminster (Pilkington 2002: 108). 
The Scottish parliament has very limited fiscal autonomy in the sense that it has 
little independently raised resources. Most of its funding comes from a block grant 
from  the  central  government,  which  the  Scottish  Executive  may  spend  at  its 
discretion. It has a tax-varying power of 3 percent of the state level of the income tax 
that has not been used yet. It is therefore very dependent on London for its resources.  
 
The Welsh devolution agreement 
The National Assembly for Wales is a 60-member chamber. It chooses a Cabinet (the 
Welsh Executive) from its members. The National Assembly for Wales is elected for a 
period  of  four  years  with  the  additional-member  system  of  proportional 
representation. 40 of its members are elected in single-member constituencies and 20 
from  regional  lists.  The  single-member  constituencies  are  the  Westminster 
constituencies and the top-up areas are the regions formerly used as constituencies of 
the European parliamentary elections. Unlike the Scottish Parliament, the Assembly 
cannot be dissolved. 
The Assembly was created as an executive body headed by a First Secretary and 
Assembly Secretaries, forming its executive committee. The corporate-body structure 
meant that legislative and executive functions were merged. The British Parliament 
remains  responsible  for  primary  legislation  over  all  aspects  of  the  government  of 
Wales and secondary legislation over all the non-listed matters. The Assembly is only 
able to pass 'orders, rules and regulations which fill in the details of the framework set 
out in the primary legislation, the Act of Parliament' (Bogdanor 1999: 255).  
It has powers of secondary legislation over the powers previously exercised by 
the Secretary of State for Wales: economic development, agriculture, education, local 
government,  health  and  services,  the  environment,  transports,  arts  and  culture 
(Government  of  Wales  Act  1998:  Schedule  2;  for  a  complete  list  of  the  fields 
transferred  to  the  National  Assembly,  see  Appendix  2).  The  first  Transfer  of 
Functions Order included a list of over 5,000 functions that were to be exercised by 
the Assembly. Unlike Scotland, Wales has been assigned a list of areas of competence, 
and Westminster has retained competence over the rest, including residual powers. 
Moreover, the National Assembly has no tax-varying powers and relies entirely on 
London's block grant, which it may use to define different spending priorities (Webb 
2000: 27).  
Initially  designed  as  a  'corporate  body'  in  which  legislative  and  executive 
functions were merged, the National Assembly changed into a parliamentary body, the 
'Welsh Executive' became the 'Welsh Assembly Government' in 2001 and the 'First 
Secretary'  became  the  'First  Minister',  like  the  Scottish  First  minister  (McAllister 
20004: 81; Osmond 2003: 18-9). One of the reasons for such a change was that the 
corporate mode of operation gave the impression that decisions were taken by the 
National Assembly as a whole, impression that both government and opposition were 
keen  to  dispel  (Osmond  2004:  48).  At  the  same  time,  this  change  allowed  the 
Assembly to function along lines and following methods that were familiar to both the  
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AMs  and  the  Welsh  public,  giving  the  Assembly  a  clearer  profile  and  better 
recognition of how it works. 
In practice, even though the Assembly only has powers of secondary legislation, 
its  government  and  Welsh  civil  servants  are  actively  involved  in  making  primary 
legislation when Wales' interests are at stake, advising the Secretary of State, drafting 
proposals  and  scrutinising  the  legislative  process  to  ensure the  success  of  the  bill 
(Osmond 2004: 63-4). 
 
4.2. The British party system 
4.2.1. The Westminster party system 
The  British  party  system  has  long  been  described  as  a  classic  two-party  system. 
Following Duverger (1976), it was assumed that the single-member plurality (SMP) 
electoral system used in British general elections encouraged the emergence and then 
domination  of  two-party  politics.  Table  4.2  shows  that  since  1945,  the  period 
characterised  by  the  domination  of  two  political  parties  is  relatively  brief:  if  the 
combined share of the votes of the Labour and Conservative parties averaged 90% 
until the 1970s, it dropped below the 80% mark after 1974, reaching the all time low 
of 67.6% in 2005 and averaging 73.77% over the period 1974-2005. However, the 
effective number of electoral parties (ENEP), which is based on the parties' share of 
vote, suggests that the party system was more like a two-and-a-half party system in the 
1960s and a three-party system after 1974. After that date, the ENEP went below 3 
only once (in 1979) and rose to 3.47 in 2005. 
The February 1974 election marked a change in the voting pattern of the British 
electorate, with better results for the Liberal Party (19.3% of the votes against 7.5% in 
the previous election). From then on, with the exception of the 1979 election, the 
Liberals never polled less than 15% of the votes. They managed to pass the 20% mark 
on three occasions, 1983, 1987 (the SDP-Liberal Alliance years) and 2005. During the 
same period, the share of the vote of 'others', which includes such diverse parties as 
regionalist parties in Scotland and Wales, the Green party, UK Independence party 
(UKIP), increased and reached levels between 5 and 10% nationally.
 14 Whereas their 
share of the vote was between 4 and 6% between 1974 and 1992, it rose to around 9% 
in 1997 and 2001 and 10.4% in 2005. 
Sartori (2005) considers that for a party system to be a two-party system, we should 
look  at  the  parties'  number of  seats  rather than their  share  of the  vote. The  key 
properties of a two-party system are that two political parties dominate the electoral 
competition, with each a chance of winning (expectation of alternation) and that one 
is able to govern alone. A two-party system is then a system in which (1) two parties 
are in a position of winning the absolute majority of the seats in parliament, (2) one of 
them manages to win said absolute majority, (3) the winning party wants to party 
govern  alone,  and (4)  alternation,  that  is,  government  turnover,  is  to  be  expected 
(Sartori  2005:  165-7).  Over  the  last  60  years,  only  two  parties  have  been  serious 
contenders for parliamentary majority. The effective number of parliamentary parties 
(ENPP), which is based on the parties' number of seats, is consistently around 2, 
reaching an all-time low in 1966 (1.68) and its highest value in 2005. 
 
                                                 
14 The combined national share of the votes of the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru varies 




Table 4.2. General election results since 1945 
Notes: '% votes' stands for 'share of the votes'; 'Liberal' stands for the Liberal Party prior to 1979, 
SDP-Liberal Alliance in 1983 and 1987, and the Liberal Democrats since 1992; 'Con+Lab' 
refers to the combined share of the votes of the two main state-wide parties, the Conservative 
and Labour parties; 'ENEP' refers to the effective number of electoral parties and 'ENPP' 
stands for effective number of parliamentary parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979)15; 'D' refers 
to Gallagher's least squares index of disproportionality (Gallagher 1991)16. 
Sources: House of Commons (2003); Electoral Commission (2005a). 
                                                 





 with p the fractional share of 
the vote (ENEP) or of the seats (ENPP) (share /100) of the i
th party. Because the 'others' category is the 
sum  of  several  party  results,  the  effective  number  of  parties  is  slightly  underestimated.  This  bias 
increases as the share of votes or seats of this category increases. 




i i s v  with v the share of the votes of the ith party and s 
the share of the seats of the ith party. 
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+ Lab  ENEP  ENPP  D 
1945  39.7  210 
(32.8) 
47.7  393 
(61.4) 
9.0  12 
(1.9) 
3.6  25 
(3.9) 
87.4  2.53  2.05  11.90 
1950  43.3  297 
(47.5) 
46.1  315 
(50.4) 
9.1  9 
(1.4) 
1.5  4 
(0.7) 
89.4  2.44  2.08  8.79 
1951  48.0  321 
(51.4) 
48.8  295 
(47.2) 
2.6  6 
(0.9) 
0.7  3 
(0.5) 
96.8  2.13  2.05  2.87 
1955  49.6  344 
(54.3) 
46.4  277 
(44.0) 
2.7  6 
(0.9) 
1.3  3 
(0.5) 
96  2.16  2.03  4.16 
1959  49.4  365 
(57.9) 
43.8  258 
(41.0) 
5.9  6 
(0.9) 
1.0  1 
(0.1) 
93.2  2.27  1.98  7.27 
1964  43.3  303 
(48.1) 
44.1  317 
(50.3) 
11.2  9 
(0.9) 
1.4  1 
(0.1) 
87.4  2.53  2.06  8.90 
1966  41.9  253 
(40.2) 
47.9  363 
(57.6) 
8.5  12 
(1.9) 
1.7  2 
(0.3) 
89.8  2.42  1.68  8.44 
1970  46.4  330 
(52.4) 
43.0  287 
(45.6) 
7.5  6 
(0.9) 
3.2  7 
(1.1) 
89.4  2.45  2.07  7.65 
1974 
Feb 
37.8  297 
(46.8) 
37.2  301 
(47.4) 
19.3  14 
(2.2) 
5.8  23 
(3.6) 
75  3.10  2.24  15.51 
1974 
Oct 
35.7  276 
(43.5) 
39.3  319 
(50.2) 
18.3  13 
(2.0) 
6.7  27 
(4.3) 
75  3.12  2.25  14.99 
1979  43.9  339 
(53.4) 
36.9  268 
(42.2) 
13.8  11 
(1.7) 
5.4  17 
(2.7) 
80.8  2.85  2.15  11.64 
1983  42.4  397 
(61.1) 
27.6  209 
(31.2) 
25.4  23 
(3.5) 
4.6  21 
(3.2) 
70  3.09  2.11  20.50 
1987  42.2  375 
(57.7) 
30.8  229 
(35.2) 
22.6  22 
(3.4) 
4.4  24 
(3.7) 
73  3.06  2.17  17.74 
1992  41.9  336 
(51.6) 
34.4  271 
(41.6) 
17.8  20 
(3.1) 
5.8  24 
(3.7) 
76.3  3.04  2.26  13.56 
1997  30.7  165 
(25.0) 
43.2  418 
(63.4) 
16.8  46 
(7.0) 
9.3  30 
(4.6) 
73.9  3.14  2.11  16.73 
2001  31.7  166 
(25.2) 
40.7  412 
(62.5) 
18.3  52 
(7.9) 
9.4  29 
(4.4) 
72.4  3.24  2.16  18.05 
2005  32.4  198 
(30.7) 
35.2  355 
(55.0) 
22.0  62 
(9.6) 
10.4  30 
(4.7) 
67.6  3.47  2.44  17.12  
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Instances of minority government have been a matter of exception in post-war 
British politics: the election of February 1974 is the only case of an election in which a 
party did not gain the majority of the seats. The last case of minority government is 
that of the Major government during the Eurosceptics' revolt between November 
1994 and April 1995. As for the condition of the will to govern alone, there is only one 
case when government coalition seemed possible. After Tony Blair's accession to the 
leadership of the Labour party, there were talks between Blair and Paddy Ashdown, 
the Liberal Democratic leader, about a renewed Lib-Lab pact and Liberal participation 
in government, irrespective of what Labour's majority would be in 1997. Eventually, 
the sheer scale of Labour's majority on 1 May 1997 and the strong opposition from 
the Labour backbench meant that this project was not carried out (Dutton 2004:281-
286). Overall, one-party government has been the rule of British politics, with regular 
alternation between the Conservative and Labour parties.  
This assessment of the two-party nature of the British system has to be specified 
for  the  1979-1997  period.  During this  period, the  Conservative  party managed  to 
govern alone (with the exception of a brief period during which John Major had to 
rely on the votes of the Ulster Unionists in Parliament) and won 4 consecutive general 
elections.  Four  consecutive  election  victories  place  this  period  in  the  category  of 
predominant-party systems, defined by Sartori as a party system in which 'its major 
party is consistently supported by a winning majority (the absolute majority of seats) 
of the voters' for at least four consecutive legislatures (Sartori 2005: 173-4). This does 
not change the two-party nature of the parliamentary system but shows the lasting 
electoral domination of one party. All the while, alternation remained possible. Since 
1997,  the  Labour  party  has  dominated  British  politics  and  managed  to  win  three 
successive general elections. Because of the numerical criterion of 4 election victories, 
the period since 1997 still qualifies as one of competitive two-party system. 
The  continuation  of  this  two-party  domination  in  Parliament  can  to  a  large 
extent be attributed to the effects of the electoral system. While the ENEP averaged 
3.12 over the period 1974-2005, the ENPP averaged a mere 2.21. The rise of the 
Liberal  party  and  subsequent  good  electoral  showings  of  the  SDP  and  Liberal 
Democrats  failed  to  be  reflected  in  their  number  of  seats.  The  index  of 
disproportionality reflects the bias of single member plurality (SMP) in favour of the 
main parties and the difficulty for third parties to gain a share of seats in proportion 
with their share of votes, as it clearly increased after 1974.  
The SMP electoral system managed a reasonably proportional distribution of 
seats in the 1950s and 1960s, when Labour and the Conservatives polled over 95% of 
the votes and each with over 40% of the votes. As voting patterns started to change, 
voters increasingly turned to the Liberals or other parties and the two big parties 
regularly scored under 40% (and as low as 27.6% for Labour in 1983). The electoral 
system then started to reach high levels of disproportionality. A typical effect of single 
member plurality is to give a bonus to the party with the biggest share of the vote and 
produce an even higher share of the seats. This is exactly what happened: between 
1979 and 1992, the Conservatives won between 50 and 61% of the seats with shares 
of  the  vote  between  41.9  and  43.9%.  Likewise,  the  Labour  party  won  the  1997 
election with 43.2% of the votes and received 63.4% of the seats. In 2005, it received 
55% of the seats with a mere 35.2% of the votes. 
The big losers of the SMP system are the Liberals. They systematically see a large 
gap between their share of the vote and share of the seats. For example, in February 
1974, they won 2.2% of the seats with 19.3% of the votes, and in 1983 they won 3.5%  
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of the seats with 25.4% of the votes. They received their highest share of the seats in 
2005 (9.6%) with 22% of the votes. 
 
4.2.2. The Scottish and Welsh party systems for Westminster general elections 
This section describes the Scottish and Welsh party systems for Westminster elections 
and then analyses the results of the 1999 and 2003 elections to the Scottish Parliament 
and National Assembly for Wales. It focuses on the specificities of each party system 
compared to national electoral trends and voting patterns. Finally, it discusses the 
nature of the Scottish and Welsh elections as elections in their own right or as second-
order elections.  
 
The Scottish party system 
The Scottish party system has changed to a quite considerable extent since 1945, and it 
now displays rather different characteristics than that of the UK party system. These 
differences are principally of two kinds: first, Scottish voters have displayed different 
patterns of electoral behaviour, with electoral results often different from the national 
ones. At the same time, the politicisation of the issue of national identity has led to the 
formation of an additional political party, the Scottish National Party. 
The electoral results of general elections in Scotland show distinct patterns of 
voting.  First  and  foremost,  table  4.3  documents  the  continuous  decline  of  the 
Conservative party and the domination of the Labour party. Until the 1960s Scottish 
voters  voted  like  the  rest  of  the  country.  They  started  to  diverge  with  the  1970 
election, when they gave the majority to the Labour party, while the Conservative won 
the majority nationwide. By then, the Conservative party already polled under 40% 
and had lost votes in every election since 1955. This decline went on unabated in the 
following years. During the Thatcher and Major years of Conservative government, 
the Scottish Conservatives' share of the vote lost another 6 points and they polled as 
low as 15% in the 2001 and 2005 elections. They failed to return a single MP from 
Scotland in 1997, and returned only one MP in the last two elections. At the same 
time, the share of Labour's vote remained high, varying between 36 and 50%. The 
party had its worst results in the 1983 election, following the national trend, but it 
recovered faster in Scotland than in the rest of the country. 
Table  4.3  also  shows  that  the  electoral  system  has  produced  increasingly 
disproportional results since 1964 and that this disproportionality has been to the 
exclusive advantage of the Labour party. With between 35 and 50 % of the votes, 
Labour has systematically won over 55% of the seats and up to over 75% in 1997 and 
2001. This disproportionality becomes apparent when we compare the ENEP and the 
ENPP: while the ENEP has been increasing over the whole period and has been over 
3 since 1974, the number of parliamentary parties has on the contrary decreased, going 
under 2 in each election after 1987. The Gallagher index confirms this increasing 
disproportionality of the results in Scotland.  
The  rise  of  the  ENEP  is  in  part  a  reflection  of  the  revival  of  the  Liberal 
movement. Scotland almost gave 25% of the votes to the SDP in 1983, and the party 
has followed the national trend in vote share since then The Liberal Democrats have 
achieved  better  results  than  the  Conservatives  in  the  last  two  elections  and  have 





Table 4.3. General elections results in Scotland, 1945-2005 
  Conservative  Labour  Liberal  SNP  Others 
  Votes  Seats  Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
Con+ 
Lab 
ENEP ENPP  D  L 
1945  40.3  27  47.9  37  5.6  0  1.3  0  4.9  7  88.2  2.52  2,35  6.36  3.44 
1950  44.8  31  46.2  37  6.6  2  0.4  0  2.0  1  91  239  2.16  5.05  2.545 
1951  48.6  35  47.9  35  2.7  1  0.3  0  0.5  0  96.5  2.14  2.06  2.03  0.99 
1955  50.1  36  46.7  34  1.9  1  0.5  0  0.9  0  96.8  2.13  2.05  1.25  1.125 
1959  47.2  31  46.7  38  4.1  1  0.8  0  1.2  1  93.9  2.26  2.09  5.76  4.1 
1964  40.6  24  48.7  43  7.6  4  2.4  0  0.6  0  89.3  2.45  2,06  9.95  6.685 
1966  37.6  20  49.9  46  6.8  5  5.0  0  0.7  0  87.5  2.52  1.98  13.66  9.415 
1970  38.0  23  44.5  44  5.5  3  11.4  1  0.6  0  82.5  2.79  2.04  14.83  11.55 
1974 F  32.9  21  36.6  40  7.9  3  21.9  7  0.6  0  69.5  3.37  2.40  16.69  19.69 
1974 O  24.7  16  36.3  41  8.3  3  30.4  11  0.3  0  61  3.42  2.44  18.73  27.26 
1979  31.4  22  41.5  44  9.0  3  17.3  2  0.8  0  72.9  3.24  2.07  18.09  20.09 
1983  28.4  21  35.1  41  24.5  8  11.8  2  0.3  0  63.5  3.60  2.37  19.25  17.96 
1987  24.0  10  42.4  50  19.2  9  14.0  3  0.3  0  66.4  3.40  1.93  22.05  24.16 
1992  25.6  11  39.0  49  13.1  9  21.5  3  0.8  0  64.6  3.56  1.99  24.97  23.96 
1997  17.5  0  45.6  56  13.0  10  22.1  6  1.9  0  63.1  3.28  1.58  27.73  22.2 
2001  15.6  1  43.3  55  16.3  10  20.1  5  4.7  1  58.9  3.56  1.66  27.28  20.62 
2005  15.8  1  39.5  41  22.6  11  17.7  6  4.4  0  55.3  3.77  1.89  24.40  21.82 
Notes: 'votes' stands for 'share of the votes' (%); 'Liberal' refers to the Liberal Party prior to 
1979,  SDP-Liberal  Alliance  in  1983  and  1987,  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  since  1988; 
'Con+Lab' refers to the combined share of the votes of the main two state-wide parties, the 
Conservative and Labour parties; 'L' refers to the Lee index of regional distinctiveness (Hearl, 
Budge and Pearson 1996: 169).17 
Sources:  House  of  Commons  (2003);  Burnside,  Herbert  and  Curtis  (2003);  Electoral 
Commission (2005a). 
The increase in the value of the ENEP also reflects the fact that Scotland counts 
one important party that hardly registers at the national level but plays an important 
role in the Scottish political arena, the Scottish National Party. Founded in 1934 from 
the merger of two small nationalist parties, the SNP's raison d'être was Scottish self-
government  (Garner  and  Kelly  1998:  285-7).  With  regard  to  the  issue  of  Scottish 
independence, the party has been divided between a moderate wing, willing to accept 
devolution as a first step in the direction of self-government, and the hard-liners, who 
would not accept any reform to Scotland's government short of independence. After a 
period of opposition to Europe, the SNP has now adopted a position in favour of 
'independence within a Europe of nations' (SNP 2003). 
The party saw a sharp increase in its share of the vote in the 1974 elections. Its 
share of the vote decreased in the aftermath of the failure of the 1979 devolution 
referendum. It passed the 20% mark again only in 1992, only to fall back to 17.7% of 
the votes in 2005. It seems that devolution has not played in the party's favour, as its 
share of the vote has decreased again after 1997. The party is supported in its efforts 
by a strong feeling of regional identity.  
                                                 
17 The Lee index of regional distinctiveness is calculated as one-half of the aggregate of (absolute value) 
differences in levels of party support between the national and regional voting for national elections and 
measures the extent to which regional election results are different from the national aggregate results 
(Hearl, Budge and Pearson 1996: 169).  
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Table 4.4. Feeling of Scottish national identity: (%)
18 
Note: Years marked # refer to BES data. 
Sources: British General Election Study 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005 (http://www.besis.org), 
Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2003 (http://www.data-archive.ac.uk).  
Table 4.4 above reports the results of the so-called 'Moreno question', which 
identifies the source(s) of the respondents' identity (Moreno 2005a). It shows that the 
majority of the electorate has a dual identity, identify with varying degree with both 
Scotland  and  Britain. The proportion  of people with  a  dual  identity  has however 
decreased since 1992, while the proportion of people declaring themselves 'Scottish 
not British' has increased from just under 20% to over 30%. Overall, the proportion 
of people declaring themselves only Scottish and primarily Scottish has increased to 
represent about two thirds of the population.  
A number of obstacles come to limit the success of the SNP. One of them is the 
electoral system. With a rather dispersed vote, the SNP has failed to receive a number 
of  seats  in  proportion to  its  share of  the  vote. With  the  recent  reduction  of  the 
number of Scottish MPs following devolution, even with half of the Scottish seats, it 
would only make 30 MPs. Another obvious obstacle to the success of the SNP is the 
limited support for independence that prevails in Scotland. Table 4.5 shows below that 
support for independence of Scotland, whether in or outside of the European Union, 
has increased significantly over the years but still remains far below the 50% mark.  
Table 4.5. Constitutional preferences in Scotland, 1997-200419 
  1997  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Scot not UK not EU  6.0  10.0  11.2  9.5  11.1  9.6  8.8 
Scot not UK in EU  10.8  16.7  18.5  18.6  17.8  16.0  21.6 
Total independence  16.8  26.7  29.7  28.1  28.9  25.6  30.4 
Scot in UK own tax  38.6  50.8  46.8  53.0  43.3  48.4  41.1 
Scot in UK no tax  14.9  8.8  7.6  5.6  8.2  6.8  4.7 
Scot in UK no parl  22.1  8.7  11.7  9.1  13.2  12.8  18.1 
d.n./n.a.  7.5  5.0  4.2  4.1  6.4  6.3  5.6 
Source: Heath et al. 1999; National Centre for Social Research 2001, 2002, 2004a and 2004b; 
Scottish Centre for Social Research 2005 and 2006 (http://www.data-archive.ac.uk).  
                                                 
18 Response to the question 'Which of the following statements best describes how you see yourself?' 
19 The SSAS question is: 'Which of the following statements comes closest to your view? Scotland 
should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union; Scotland should become 
independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union; Scotland should remain part of 
the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers; Scotland should remain part 
of the UK, with its own parliament which has no taxation powers; Scotland should remain part of the 
UK  without  an  elected  parliament.'  In  the  1997  BES,  the  question  is  'An  issue  in  Scotland  is  the 
question of an elected parliament - a special parliament for Scotland dealing with Scottish affairs. Which 
of these statements comes closest to your view?'. See http://www.besis.org  
  1992 #  1997 #  1999  2000  2001 #  2001   2003  2005# 
1. Scottish not British  19.2  23.1  32.3  36.9  44.9  35.6  32.2  31.8 
2. More Scottish than British  40.1  38.8  34.2  29.7  14.7  30.5  32.5  29.2 
3. Equally Scottish and British  32.8  25.9  22.5  21.0  11.3  23.2  22.4  25.4 
4. More British than Scottish  3.3  4.1  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.0  4.3  4.0 
5. British not Scottish  2.7  3.5  3.6  3.9  6.2  3.6  4.1  3.7 
6. Other/none  1.1  3.5  3.8  4.9  19.3  3.9  4.5  5.7 
n.a./d.n.  0.6  1.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.1  0  0.1  
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A final problem for the SNP is its close ideological position with the Liberal 
Democrats. Using expert survey data, Webb shows how in 1997 the SNP and the 
Liberal  Democrats  occupy  very  close  policy  positions  both  on  the  left-right 
continuum  and  on  the  issue  of  Scottish  nationalism  (Webb  2000:  19).  The  main 
difference  between  the  two  parties  is  their  position  on  independence:  the  SNP 
advocates the independence of Scotland, while the Liberal Democrats prefer a federal 
Britain. The policy space on the left is rather crowded, with the Labour party closer to 
the centre and with a more moderate position on constitutional reform. On the other 
hand, the Conservative party stands alone on the right, with a unionist position.  
Overall, the Scottish party system displays distinctive traits, as shown by the Lee 
index of regional distinctiveness (Table 4.3 above). The value of this index remained 
rather low until the mid-1960s and increased as the Conservative party started to lose 
ground in Scotland and the SNP became more successful. It has remained relatively 
stable since the mid-80s, varying between 20 and 25. These results only refer to the 
Westminster election. Scottish Parliament elections will be analysed after the analysis 
of Westminster election results in Wales.  
 
The Welsh party system 
The Welsh party system also displays some unique characteristics. As in Scotland, the 
main  state-wide  parties  receive  shares  of  the  vote  that  differ  from  the  state-wide 
average. In Wales too a political party, Plaid Cymru, tries to attract voters on the basis 
of a reference to their distinct regional culture and right to regional self-government. 
Table 4.6. General election results in Wales, 1945-2005 
Notes: 'votes' stands for 'share of the votes' (%); 'Liberal' stands for the Liberal Party prior to 
1979,  SDP-Liberal  Alliance  in  1983  and  1987,  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  since  1992; 
'Con+Lab' refers to the combined share of the votes of the main two state-wide parties, the 
Conservative and Labour parties. 
Sources:  House  of Commons (2003); Electoral Commission (2003c); Electoral Commission 
(2005a). 
Labour has been Wales' most successful party in every election since 1945, with 
shares of the vote varying between 37.5 and 60%. Over the period, Labour has 








ENEP ENPP  D  L 
1945  23.8  4  58. 
6 
25  14.9  6  1.1  0  1.6  0  82.4  2.37  1.81  12.78  17.77 
1950  27.4  4  58.1  27  12.6  5  1.2  0  0.7  0  85.5  2.33  1.68  16.65  16.63 
1951  30.8  6  60.5  27  7.6  3  0.7  0  0.3  0  91.3  2.14  1.67  14.32  17.43 
1955  29.9  6  57.6  27  7.3  3  3.1  0  2.1  0  87.5  2.34  1.67  15.68  19.73 
1959  32.6  7  56.4  27  5.3  2  5.2  0  0.5  0  89  2.33  1.66  16.55  17.5 
1964  29.4  6  57.8  28  7.3  2  4.8  0  0.6  0  87.2  2.34  1.57  17.14  18.18 
1966  27.9  3  60.7  32  6.3  1  4.3  0  0.9  0  88.6  2.21  1.25  24.61  16.59 
1970  27.7  7  51.6  27  6.8  1  11.5  0  2.4  1  79.3  2.77  1.66  19.56  19.89 
1974 F  25.9  8  46.8  24  16.0  2  10.8  2  0.6  0  72.7  3.09  2.0  16.45  18.83 
1974 O  23.9  8  49.5  23  15.5  2  10.8  3  0.2  0  73.4  2.96  2.14  12.54  19.06 
1979  32.2  11  47.0  21  10.6  1  8.1  2  2.2  1  79.2  2.92  2.29  9.95  16.94 
1983  31.0  14  37.5  20  23.2  2  7.8  2  0.4  0  68.5  3.37  2.39  17.15  16.80 
1987  29.5  8  45.1  24  17.9  3  7.3  3  0.2  0  74.6  3.05  2.20  15.73  20.56 
1992  28.6  6  49.5  27  12.4  1  8.9  4  0.6  0  78.1  2.86  1.84  19.10  22.57 
1997  19.6  0  54.7  34  12.3  2  9.9  4  3.4  0  74.3  2.75  1.36  26.14  19.95 
2001  21.0  0  48.6  34  13.8  2  14.3  4  2.3  0  69.6  3.12  1.36  30.55  20.63 
2005  21.4  3  42.7  29  18.4  4  12.6  3  4.9  1  64.1  3.57  1.83  24.33  19.8  
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received on average 51.9% of the vote, but since 1970 the party has polled over 50% 
of the vote only once (in 1997). Its share of the vote fell to 42% in 2005, which is still 
10 points above the state-wide results. As a consequence of the Westminster electoral 
system, these large shares of the vote were transformed in even larger shares of the 
seats. In its worst year (1983, when it received 37.5% of the votes), Labour still won 
20 out of 38 possible Welsh seats. In 1997 and 2001, it won 89.5% of the seats with 
respectively 54.7 and 48.6% of the votes.  
This disproportionality is reflected by the high values of the Gallagher index, 
which has been higher in Wales than at the state-wide level in all but 4 elections. The 
difference between the number of electoral parties and the number of parliamentary 
parties is particularly telling. The ENEP rose from slightly over 2 to 3 over the whole 
period, but at the same time the ENPP has had a value under 2 in every election, save 
for the period 1974-1992. This clear bias in favour of Labour is also reflected in the 
results of the other parties, as they all compete for a small share of the seats. 
While the Conservative party has been losing ground since the 1950s in Scotland, 
the party has always been weak in Wales, arriving in second place in each and every 
election since 1945. The Welsh Conservatives achieved their best electoral results in 
1979 but even then they failed to attract a third of the Welsh electorate. Like at the 
national level, they had their worst results in 1997, when they failed to return a single 
MP from Wales. The party failed again to win a single seat in 2001 but returned 3 MPs 
in the last election. Wales has always been a challenging territory for the party, and it 
was often a place where promising Conservative candidates were sent to in order to 
'toughen up' before being sent to more winnable parts of the country (Jones and 
Trystan 2000: 4). 
Wales also has a nationalist party, Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales). Founded in 
1925, the party started as a movement for the defence and promotion of the Welsh 
language and culture, only occasionally moving into politics. After 1945, Plaid Cymru 
became a social democratic party committed to self-government for Wales. Today the 
party campaigns on a left-wing, green and nationalist platform (Cunningham, 1998: 
190-2) and, like the SNP, advocates 'self-government in Europe', sometimes shying 
away from using the word 'independence' by fear of frightening the Welsh electorate, 
which is in its majority against independence (see table 4.7 below). 
Table 4.7. Constitutional preferences in Wales, 1997-2003   
  1997#  1999  2001  2001#  2003 
Independent   4.5  4.2  5.0  6.1 
Independent in EU  9.2  5.4  6.5 
6.0 
7.5 
Total independence  13.7  9.6  11.5  6.0  13.6 
In UK parl/assem own tax  36.3  35.4  37.1  42.5  35.5 
In UK assembly no tax  15.6  34.1  24.8  20.7  25.7 
Total devolution  51.9  69.5  61.9  63.2  61.2 
In UK no assembly  22.8  17.8  22.5  24.0  20.6 
d.n./n.a.  11.6  3.1  4.2  6.8  4.6 
Note: Years marked # refer to BES studies. 
Sources: Heath et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 200320; Jones et al.2000, 2002 and 2004.  
                                                 
20 The BES question  was 'Which of these statements  comes closest to your view…  Wales should 
become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union, Wales should be independent, 
separate from the UK but part of the European Union, Wales should remain part of the UK but with 




Table 4.7 illustrates the ambivalence of the Welsh vis-à-vis devolution and how 
little devolution has changed people's preferences. Over a third of the respondents 
would  prefer  a  parliament  with  its  own  tax-raising  powers  like  in  Scotland.  The 
proportion of respondents who declare that they would prefer Wales to be governed 
from Westminster is much higher than in Scotland. The weakness of the Welsh pro-
devolution movement is not a new phenomenon. Jones and Scully (2003: 3) qualify 
the Welsh engagement with the issue as both 'shallow' and 'narrow', and they point to 
a number of reasons, from the 'culturalist' focus of Plaid Cymru to Labour's traditional 
lack of interest in devolution in Wales, and the absence of a separate constitutional 
history  like  in  Scotland.  Plaid  Cymru  also  faces  an  electorate  in  which  a  high 
proportion of respondents declare themselves to be 'British not Welsh' (between 10 
and 15%, against 3 to 4% in Scotland).   
Table 4.8. Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself? ( %) 
Note: Years marked # refer to BES data. 
Source: Heath et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2003 and 2005; Jones et al. 2000, 2002 and 2004.  
The share of people who feel predominantly Welsh is lower than in Scotland, 
where it is close to two thirds of the population. In Wales, this proportion varies 
between 35 and 45%, and the proportion of people with a dual identity is high. Plaid 
Cymru  is  therefore  challenged  by  the  weakness  of  the  exclusively  Welsh  identity. 
Moreover, in its programme it emphasises the issue of language in spite of the fact 
that only 25% of the Welsh population speaks Welsh (British General Election Study 
2001).
21 Its heartland is the centre and eastern parts of Wales, where most of the 
Welsh-speaking population is concentrated. 
Like  the  SNP,  Plaid  Cymru  also  suffers  from  the  electoral  system  and  the 
domination of Labour in Wales. Webb illustrates how the Welsh party system closely 
resembles the Scottish one, with Plaid Cymru replacing the SNP (Webb, 2000: 28-9). 
In Wales, 'the left […] is quite a crowded place' (interview with Rob Humphreys). 
Plaid  Cymru is  a  nationalist  left-wing  party,  very close  in  the  policy  space  to the 
Liberal  Democrats,  the  main  difference  lying  in  their  position  with  regard  to 
independence. The Welsh Labour party is at the centre of the policy space, and the 
Conservative party is alone on the right, with a unionist position. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
with its own assembly which has no taxation powers, or, Wales should remain part of the UK without 
an assembly?'. In  2001,  the  question  was: 'Which of  these statements comes closest to your view?  
Wales should become independent, separate from the UK, Wales should remain part of the UK, with 
its own elected assembly that has some taxation powers, Wales should remain part of the UK, with its 
own elected assembly that has no taxation powers, Wales should be part of the UK without an elected 
assembly?'  
21 Question BQ102A 'Can you speak Welsh?': 25.0% Yes, 75.0% No. http://www.besis.org  
  1997 #  1999  2001 #  2001   2003  2005# 
Welsh not British  13.2  17.8  16.2  23.3  21.4  16.0 
More Welsh than British  29.1  19.6  21.7  22.0  25.4  18.9 
Equally Welsh and British  25.8  34.9  31.1  19.0  29.8  32.7 
More British than Welsh  10.4  7.4  8.8  11.1  8.7  10.7 
British not Welsh  15.4  13.7  18.2  11.1  8.9  14.0 
Other/none  5.5  6.2  3.5  3.5  5.7  7.6 
n.a./d.n.  0.5  0.4  0.4  0  0.2  0.1 
Sample size  182  796  488  1085  988  773  
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Elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales: the electoral system 
As a result of the bargaining of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, Labour had 
agreed  to  introduce  PR  for  the election of  the  devolved  institutions.  The  chosen 
electoral  system  is  the  compensatory  additional-member  system  (AMS).  This  is  a 
mixed-member system of proportional representation in which a number of assembly 
members are elected nominally by first past the post and the remaining members are 
elected  from  regional  lists  in  top-up  areas  (Shugart  and  Wattenberg  2001:  10).  It 
combines  the  geographical  link  between  citizens  and  their  elected  officials  of  the 
constituency  system  and  the  proportionality  of  the  list  system.  Table  4.9  below 
describes the distribution of constituency and top-up seats for the elections of the 
Scottish and Welsh devolved assemblies. 
Table 4.9. Composition of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly  










TU seats as 
% of all 
Scottish Parliament  129  73  8  56  7  43.4 
National Assembly  60  40  5  20  4  33.3 
Source: Bogdanor 2003: 203 and 210. 
In  Scotland  and  Wales,  the  top-up  seats  are  used  to  compensate  the 
disproportionality  of  the  plurality  rule  of  the  nominal  ballot  with  a  seat  linkage 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 5, 12-3; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 13-6). Figure 4.1 
provides a fictional example of the allocation of top-up seats in a compensatory AMS 
electoral system.  
The system works in the following way: voters have two votes, one to elect a 
constituency candidate and one for a closed list in their region. Constituency seats are 
allocated first. The votes for each regional list are then counted and divided by the 
number of seats won in the first ballot in the region plus 1. The list with the highest 
ratio wins the first seat, then its number of votes is divided by its number of seats plus 
1, and the party with the highest ratio wins the second seat, etc. until all the seats are 
allocated. The parties that win a large number of constituency seats are 'penalised' in 
the second ballot, as their ratio starts with the highest divisor. 











The higher the proportion of top-up seats the more proportional the system, as 
it reduces the impact of the single-member district simple plurality. Full compensation 
is estimated to be achieved when the percentage of higher-tier seats is at least equal to 
                                                 
22 Gallagher and Mitchell (2005: 16) claim that 'higher-tier seats would need to amount only to a third of 
the total number in order to ensure something close to full proportionality when the lower-tier seats are 
filled  with  SMDs'.  In  this  case,  district  magnitude  is  determined  by  the  higher  tier  (Gallagher  and 
Mitchell 2005: 17). 
30 seats are to be allocated, 20 with first past the post, and 10 in the regional, top-up (TU) 
list ballot. 
Distribution of seats after the constituency ballot: 
Party A: 3 seats; Party B: 5 seats; Party C: 11 seats; Party D: 1 seat. 
Number of votes in the second ballot: 
A: 200,000; B: 300,000; C: 500,000; and D: 200,000. 
The winning party of each round is highlighted in the table below. 




A  50000  50000  50000  40000  40000  40000  40000  33333  33333  33333  2  5 
B  50000  50000  50000  50000  42857  37500  37500  37500  37500  33333  2  7 
C  41666  41666  41666  41666  41666  41666  38461  38461  35714  35714  2  13 




the  deviation  from  disproportionality.  For  plurality  system,  deviation  from 
disproportionality can be estimated at 25% (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 110). With 
one third of the seats allocated to the higher-tier in Wales and above 40% in Scotland, 
the two systems are likely to be very proportional. The effect of district magnitude 
should also be taken into account. With district magnitudes of respectively 4 and 7, 
Scotland and Wales have comparatively low district magnitude (compare to Germany's 
magnitude of 41 for instance). With a district magnitude of 4, Wales has an effective 
threshold of 15%, and Scotland has an effective threshold of 9.375% with a district 
magnitude of 7.
23 Such effective thresholds make it relatively easy for medium-size 
parties to obtain representation but still represent a hurdle for the smallest parties. In 
any case, it makes it uneasy for a single party to win a majority of the seats.  
 
Are Scottish and Welsh elections second-order elections? 
A  first  factor  to  consider  when  evaluating  the  relative  importance  of  a  regional 
electoral contest in relation to the national general elections is the electoral cycle. 
Electoral cycle theory assumes that the timing of the elections to the Welsh Assembly 
and the Scottish Parliament in the overall electoral cycle and in particular in relation to 
Westminster general elections is crucial for the significance of the regional ballots. The 
two  Scottish  and  Welsh  general  elections  have  taken  place  in  the  middle  of  the 
electoral cycle: general elections have occurred every four years since 1997, and the 
Scottish and Welsh elections have taken place in between, also every four years.  






Figure 4.2 illustrates this regular alternation of general and regional elections. 
Elections  occurring  close  to  the  mid-term  point  are  assumed  to  represent  an 
opportunity for opposition parties to transform regional elections into a referendum 
on the performance of the national government and government parties are expected 
to perform poorly (Pallarés and Keating 2003). It is also assumed that when regional 
elections happen together they take a national dimension. Taken together, the fact that 
the Scottish and Welsh elections are horizontally simultaneous and that they are in the 
middle  of  the  electoral  cycle  suggests  that  regional  elections  should  be  rather 
nationalised and display elements of second-orderness, characterised by low turnout 
levels, poor electoral performance of the party in power at the national level  and 
stronger results for opposition and small parties.  
A first indicator of the second-order nature of regional elections is the level of 
turnout. It is assumed that in second-order elections, turnout rates will be lower than 
in  first-order  elections.  Table  4.10  compares  turnout  rates  for  Westminster  and 
devolved elections with European Parliament elections, which are the second-order 
election par excellence. The data show that turnout in devolved elections has been lower 
than in Westminster elections and has steadily decreased between the 1997 referenda 
                                                 




, with T the effective threshold and M 
the district magnitude (Lijphart 1999: 153). 
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and the 2003 elections, even though there also seems to be a downward trend in 
turnout at the UK level. In Wales, even more people voted in the 2004 European 
elections than in the 2003 Welsh Assembly elections. 
Table 4.10. Turnout in Scotland and Wales, 1997-2005 























Scotland  71.3  60.4  58.3  24.7  58.2  46.8  30.7  60.8 
Wales  73.5  50.1  46.3  29.0  61.6  38.1  41.9  62.6 
UK  71.4      24.0  59.4    38.8  61.4 
Notes: The turnout rates given for the devolved elections refer to the regional ballot. 
Sources:  House  of  Commons  (2003);  Electoral  Commission  (2005b); 
http://www.europarl.org.uk/guide/Gelectionfacts.htm  (UK  Office  of  the  European 
Parliament). 
Both sets of elections display a number of common characteristics (table 4.11 
below). Labour, the party in power in London in 1999 and in London, Edinburgh and 
Cardiff  in  2003,  remained  the  first  party  in  Scotland  and  Wales.  However,  it 
performed relatively badly when compared to the general elections. In Wales, Labour 
lost 19.3 points between 1997 and 1999 and 12 points between 2001 and 2003.  
In Scotland, the party's losses were also important: 12 points in 1999 and 13.9 
points in 2003. The electoral system placed the party in a minority situation in 3 out of 
4 elections, the exception being Wales after the 2003 election. In Scotland, Labour 
chose to enter a coalition together with the Liberal Democrats, while in Wales the 
party chose to run a minority government after two and a half years of coalition. 
Table 4.11. Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly election results, 1999 and 2003 
Notes:  The  share  of  the  vote  refers  to  the  regional  ballot.  The  figures  in  parentheses  are 
respectively for the number of constituency MSPs/AMs and regional (top-up) MSPs/AMs.  
Source: House of Commons (2003). 
                                                 
24 The three 'other' MSPs are Dennis Canavan, who campaigned as an independent in the Falkirk West 
constituency after the Labour party, for which he had been an MP since 1974, rejected his candidacy; 
Tommy Sheridan for the Scottish Socialist party; and Robin Harper for the Scottish Green party.  
25 The 'other' MSPs are 7 for the Scottish Green party, 6 for the Scottish Socialist party, 1 MSP elected 
for the Scottish Senior Citizens party, Dennis Canavan and Jean Turner, both independents elected in a 
constituency seat. 
26 John Marek Independence party. John Marek, Labour MP for Wrexham from 1983 to 2001 and 
Labour AM 1999-2003, stood as an independent candidate after Labour deselected him in 2003. 
    Conservative  Labour  Liberal Dem.  SNP/PC  Other 




ENEP  ENPP  D 
1999  15.4  18 
(0+18) 
33.6  56 
(53+3) 
12.4  17 
(12+5) 
27.3  35 
(7+28) 
11.3  324  
(1+2) 
49.0  4.09  3.35  8.70 
2003  15.6  18 
(3+15) 
29.4  50 
(46+4) 
11.8  17 
(13+4) 
20.9  27 
(9+18) 
22.3  1725 
(2+15) 










Change  +0.2  -  -4.2  -6  -0.6  -  -6.4  -8  +10.0  +14  -4  +1.44 +0.88 +0.81 
1999  16.5  9   
(1+8) 
35.4  28 
(27+1) 
12.5  6    
(3+3) 
30.5  17 
(9+8) 
5.1  0  51.9  3.83  3.02  8.4 
2003  19.2  11 
(1+10) 
36.6  30 
(30+0) 
12.7  6    
(3+3) 
19.7  1 2 
(5+7) 
8.4  126 
(1+0) 







Change  2.7  +2  +1.2  +2  +0.2  -  -10.8  -5  +3.4  +1  +3.9 +0.44 -0.02 +3.23  
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However,  the  other  two  state-wide  parties  have  benefited  very  little  from 
Labour's weakness in terms of votes. In Scotland the Conservative party lost another 2 
points between 1997 and 1999 and maintained its score in the next round of elections, 
while the Liberal Democrats lost 0.6 point between 1997 and 1999 and 4.5 points 
between 2001 and 2003. In Wales, the Conservative party also failed to increase their 
share of the votes (it lost 3.1 and 1.8 points) and the Liberal Democrats gained a mere 
0.2  point  in  1999  but  lost  1.1  point  in  2003.  The  different  electoral  system 
nevertheless allowed both parties to gain representation in the Scottish Parliament and 
the Welsh Assembly. This allowed the Conservative party to regain political visibility 
in Scotland and Wales, two years after they had failed to gain any single MP in both 
regions. In Scotland, the Conservatives won all their seats through the regional ballot 
in 1999 and all but 3 in 2003, while the Liberal Democrats managed to win 17 seats, 
mainly through the constituency ballot.  In Wales, the Conservatives only won one of 
their seats (9 in 1999 and 11 in 2003) through the constituency ballot, and the Liberals 
won 6 seats in both ballots, have of which from the regional ballot. 
In the 1999 election, the nationalist parties obtained a share of the vote that was 
significantly higher than what they had previously won. With 28% of the votes, the 
SNP  failed  to  repeat  its  October  1974  results  but  came  close,  gaining  5.1  points 
compared to 1997. Plaid Cymru saw a bigger increase in its share of the vote, as it 
went  from  9.9%  to  30.5%.  Both  parties  failed  to  repeat this  success  in the  2003 
election, when they both lost ground. The SNP repeated its score of the 2001 general 
election (-6.4 points compared to the 1999 election) and Plaid Cymru won 5.4 points 
compared to 2001 but lost 10.8 points to 1999, when it performed much better than it 
had itself expected (McAllister 2004: 74). 
Table 4.12. Index of dissimilarity for Scotland and Wales, 1997-2005 
Table 4.12 records the level of divergence of the Scottish and Welsh elections 
compared to the general elections that came before and after.
27 It appears that in 1999 
the Welsh electorate deviated more in its voting pattern than the Scottish electorate, 
while the Scottish electorate voted most differently in 2003. The increase in the Plaid 
Cymru vote explains most of the divergence in voting behaviour in Wales. The main 
difference in 2003 is the number of MSPs from small parties, whereas the Welsh party 
system has remained the same as for Westminster elections, with the three state-wide 
parties and Plaid Cymru. In the 2003 Scottish election, the Scottish Green party won 7 
seats (compared to only one in 1999), the Scottish Socialist party 6 seats (+5) and two 
independents managed to win constituency seats. 
The issue of the stakes of devolved elections and of their perception by the 
electorate is not easy to calculate. A first way to consider the stakes of the election is 
to look at the respective powers of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National 
                                                 
27 The index of dissimilarity compares the results of a general election in a region with the results of the 
election to the regional parliament of that same region nearest in time to the regional election (Jeffery 
and Hough 2003: 209). It is calculated as one-half of the aggregate of (absolute value) differences in 
levels of party support across the two electoral arenas (Jones and Scully, 2006: 132, n.5). 
  Scotland  Wales 
1997-1999  14.35  23.3 
1999-2001  13.5  18.75 
2001-2003  18.6  13.2 
2003-2005  21.3  12.3  
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Assembly. As we saw earlier, the Scottish Parliament has powers of primary legislation 
over a large range of areas of competence and tax-raising powers, while the National 
Assembly has powers of secondary legislation over a more limited range of fields and 
no tax-raising powers. As a result, the stakes appear to be higher in Scotland than in 
Wales. The higher turnout in Scottish elections seems to confirm this hypothesis.  
Survey questions that ask people which institutions they believe have the most 
influence over the way their region is run is a simple way to measure the relative 
importance that people give to national, regional, local and European institution, and 
can be used as a proxy to evaluate the perceived stakes of the devolved elections 
compared to UK general elections. It can be assumed that people will consider that 
the stakes are higher when they perceive the institution as having a greater impact on 
the  way  their  region  is  governed.  The  elections  to  the  most  influential  institution 
should  then  be  considered  as  the  first-order  election.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
institution is perceived as being without influence, then the stakes are deemed to be 
low.  
In Wales most people expected the Westminster parliament to remain the most 
important  institution  in  1999  and  this  position had  gained  strength by  2003.  The 
National Assembly was considered to be the most important institution for Wales' 
government by 30% in 1999 and by only 21% in 2003. In Scotland a majority of 
respondents initially expected the Scottish parliament to become the most influential 
institution  for  the  government  of  Scotland.  However,  by  2003  only  one  in  6 
respondents shared this view and nearly two thirds believed that the Westminster 
parliament was the most influential institution. In both regions, the majority of people 
consider that the UK government in London is the most important one, making the 
UK general elections the first-order elections. The data suggests that there is a strong 
aspiration to self-government: over 50% of the Welsh respondents and over 2 in 3 
respondents  in  Scotland  consider that the  devolved  institutions  should  have  most 
influence in the way Scotland and Wales are run. 
Table 4.13. Most influential institutions in Scotland and Wales, 1999-2003 
  Wales  Scotland 
  1999  2001  2003  1999  2001  2003 
  is  ought 
to be 
is  ought 
to be 
is  ought 
to be 
is  ought 
to be 
is  ought 
to be 
is  ought 
to be 
WNA/ SP  30.9  60.4  16.9  53.8  21.4  53.6  41.0  74.2  15.0  74.0  16.6  67.6 
UK gov.  44.6  23.4  60.7  25.7  53.4  26.7  38.2  12.3  64.6  14.0  63.7  18.5 
Local coun.  11.3  10.9  14.2  16.1  13.5  13.9  7.8  7.6  9.6  8.3  7.6  8.6 
EU  6.7  1.1  2.9  0.6  4.4  1.1  4.7  1.6  6.6  1.0  5.4  1.1 
d.n./n.a.  6.5  4.1  5.3  3.7  7.4  4.7  8.3  4.4  4.2  2.7  6.8  4.2 
Sources: National Centre for Social Research 2001 and Scottish Centre for Social  Research 
2005; Jones et al. 2000, 2002 and 2004.28 
                                                 
28 In 1999, the question was 'When the new parliament/National Assembly starts work, which of the 
following do you think will have most influence over the way Scotland/Wales is run… the Scottish 
Parliament/Welsh  National  Assembly,  the  UK  government  at  Westminster,  local  councils  in 
Scotland/Wales, or, the European Union?'. In 2003, the question was 'Which of the following do you 
think will have most influence over the way Scotland/Wales is run… the Scottish Parliament/Welsh 
National  Assembly,  the  UK  government  at  Westminster,  local  councils  in  Scotland/Wales,  or,  the 
European Union?'. For the preferred institution, the question started by 'Which do you think ought to 
have most influence over the way Scotland/Wales is run', giving the same possible answers as before.   
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Most of the data points in the direction of Welsh and Scottish elections being 
second-order elections: turnout is much lower in Scottish and Welsh elections than for 
UK  general  elections;  the  governing  party  sees  its  share  of  the  vote  decrease  in 
devolved elections, though not to the point of slipping from its first position in both 
regions; smaller parties, in particular nationalist parties, gained a significant number of 
seats. This is confirmed by the fact that most Scottish and Welsh people consider that 
Westminster has remained the centre of government in spite of devolution.  
The nationalisation of the Scottish and Welsh elections is harder to prove. The 
combined share of the largest two state-wide parties is just under 50% in Scotland and 
just over 50% in Wales. In Scotland, the share of the vote and the number of seats of 
the non-state-wide parties has increased in the second Scottish election, while it lost 
7.5 points (but won one seat) in Wales. In terms of the media campaign, there was 
little of a UK-wide campaign in the sense that the London-based media demonstrated 
little interests in the Scottish and Welsh elections. In 1999, the UK media focused 
mostly  on  Scotland,  largely  ignoring  Wales,  where  little  surprise  was  expected  to 
happen (Jones and Trystan 2000: 5). In 2003 the campaigns were overshadowed by 
the war in Iraq and the UK media barely mentioned the Scottish and Welsh elections. 
Both in Scotland and Wales, the visit of UK leaders, most notably Blair in Wales and 
Blair and Brown in Scotland, made front-page news, reviving campaigns that were 
often described as 'lacklustre' and that were dominated by the issue of voter apathy 
(Institute of Governance Report to the Electoral Commission, 2003: 7 and 35-42; 
Thomas, Jewell and Cushion 2003: 4 and 18-20). The media campaign can be a major 
problem  in  Wales,  where  the  Welsh  media  are  not  people's  main  source  of 
information (Osmond 2004: 67-8).29 The Scottish media, and in particular the press 
have a larger readership, and it allows parties to campaign through the Scottish media 
and develop a Scotland-wide strategy. The problem for the parties in Wales is that the 
media campaign has little impact on the voters, and parties have to resort to local 
campaigning and more traditional campaign methods, like canvassing and leafleting 
(McAllister 2004: 74).  
Table 4.14. Election issues for the Welsh and Scottish elections  
  Wales  Scotland 
  1999  2003  1999  2003 
Scottish/Welsh issues  41.7  50.4  52.6  56.6 
British issues  31.9  32.2  30.9  25.8 
Both equally  20.1  10.9  12.8  12.9 
World/war  -  2.5  -  1.3 
Other answer  5.2  3.6  1.9  2.3 
d.k./n.a.  1.1  0.4  1.8  1.1 
Notes: non-voters are excluded from all calculations. The answer 'what was going on in the 
world, war in Iraq' was only possible in 2003. 
Sources: National Centre for Social Research 2001 and Scottish Centre for Social  Research 
2005; Jones et al. 2000, 2002 and 2004. 
By using survey data that records the types of issues (British and/or Scottish/ 
Welsh  issues)  that  prompted  people  to  vote,  we  can  see  whether  people  voted 
                                                 
29 Osmond (2004: 65-6) reports that the BBC's Wales Today news programme recorded its highest rating 
with half of the available audience (when Alun Michael resigned) and that the Welsh daily press has a 
daily circulation of around 100,000 which pales in comparison with the circulation of the London-based 
press, in particular the tabloid press.  
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primarily on Scottish or Welsh issues or whether they were influenced by the UK 
political  debate  and  the  issues  that  were  important  in  the  UK  as  a  whole  at  the 
moment of voting (table 4.14 above). In spite of the relatively low profile campaigns 
and the high prominence of the war in Iraq and news of the spread of the SARS 
epidemic, a clear majority of people declared that they voted on Scottish issues. This 
contradicts  the  nationalisation  argument  according  to  which  concurrent  regional 
elections occurring at the mid-term point should become nationalised. Whereas all the 
state-wide party leaders (Tony Blair, Iain Duncan Smith and Charles Kennedy) visited 
both regions in 2003, the campaigns were mainly fought on regional or local issues. 
To conclude, the use of the second-order election theory only partly explains 
Scottish and Welsh elections. Scottish and Welsh elections did have a lower intensity 
than Westminster elections, as witnessed by lower turnout rates. However, it is also 
true that there seems to be a more general trend toward lower electoral participation 
(McAllister 2004: 81). The lower intensity of these elections is also visible from the 
stakes  that  people  attributed  to  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  elections.  Survey  data 
nevertheless  show  that  Scottish  and  Welsh  voters  consider  that  their  regional 
institutions should have more influence than Westminster, but also that people took 
Scottish and Welsh issues into account in their voting decision. Again, while it is true 
that  the  Labour  party  has  scored  lower  in  Scottish  and  Welsh  elections  than  in 
Westminster elections, it seems that the results are specific to this context. Opinion 
polls on general election voting intentions at the time of the 1999 elections showed 
that Labour scored high all across the country. People may have therefore shown a 
'specific disinclination to support the party [Labour] in this particular electoral contest' 
(Trystan, Scully and Jones 2003: 648). The level of regional identification appears to 
have an impact on voting behaviour, as turnout is higher in Scotland than in Wales 
and people vote more on regional issues in Scotland than in Wales.  
 
4.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the main characteristics of the institutional and electoral 
framework of the United Kingdom. As a union state in which parties emerged in a 
context of a centralised system of government, the UK should have engendered quite 
centralised  state-wide  political  parties.  The  existence  and  persistence  of  regional 
differences,  in  the  form  of  cultural  particularisms  but  also  via  the  administrative 
decentralisation  of  Scotland,  leave  open  the  possibility  of  intra-party  regional 
differentiation. The asymmetrical form of the devolution settlement should strengthen 
the differences between Scotland and Wales in the organisation of state-wide parties. 
In Scotland, the dual form of devolution means that the regional branches are likely to 
demand more autonomy and assert their difference more than in Wales, where the 
National Assembly has fewer powers and is still highly dependent on the legislation 
passed  by  the  Westminster  parliament.  The  fact  that  regionalism  and  support  for 
devolution are stronger in Scotland than in Wales is likely to strengthen this trend. 
Because  devolution  in  Wales  follows  an  integrative  pattern,  Welsh  party  branches 
should be more integrated into the party's central organs than the Scottish branches. 
In  terms  of  party  competition,  the  Welsh  devolved  party  system  is  very 
comparable to the party system for Westminster elections in the principality. The data 
shows that the patterns of voting between Welsh and UK elections have become 
more similar in 2003, while the opposite has occurred in Scotland. There, the party 
system is quite different, with regionally-based parties achieving representation in the 
Scottish Parliament. The low level of turnout would tend to support the argument that  
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Scottish and Welsh elections are second order. The survey data on the importance of 
the devolved bodies compared to the UK government suggest that voters consider 
that  the  UK  government  remain  the  most  influential  level  of  government.  Even 
though they believe that the devolved institutions should be the most important level 
of government, their evaluation of the stakes of the devolved elections seems rather 
low. At the same time, half of the people surveyed in the Scottish and Welsh election 
studies declared that they voted on regional issues, against 25 to 30% who voted on 
UK issues. As a result, the second-order nature of Scottish and Welsh elections is 
difficult to confirm. Again, the most different patterns of voting of Scotland should 
translate  into  more  demands  for  independence  from  the  Scottish  regional  party 
branches.  
Chapter 5 will describe the organisation of the British state-wide parties and will 
analyse the articulation between the central and regional levels of party organisation of 











The British state-wide political parties all have very old historical roots and are very 
well-institutionalised organisations. Unlike in most European states, where parties are 
recognised and regulated by law, the United Kingdom does not recognise an official 
role to its political parties and it has only recently established a register of political 
parties. 
The UK is one of the European countries where the public funding of political 
parties  is  the  least  developed  and  party  finance the  least  regulated  (Casas-Zamora 
2005: 19). The regulation of party funding was comprehensively reformed with the 
Political  Parties,  Elections  and  Referendum  Act  (PPERA)  2000.  The  2000  Act 
established the Electoral Commission, an independent body entrusted among other 
things with the control of campaign expenditure and donations and the administration 
of a new subsidy, the policy development grant. The PPERA also introduced rules 
regarding political donations and spending caps (Fisher 2002: 392-3). Party finance still 
remains relatively unregulated, as there is no cap on donations and very generous 
spending limits. The PPERA nevertheless constitutes a significant improvement with 
regard to the transparency of party finances. 
State-wide opposition parties receive subsidies for their parliamentary activities 
(Short money in the House of Commons and Cranborne money in the House of 
Lords). The new Policy Development Grant is also made available to the governing 
party.  There  are  no  electoral  subsidies  in  the  UK.  The  devolved  assemblies  have 
developed  relatively  similar  funding  schemes,  with  support  to  opposition 
parliamentary groups in Scotland and to all the groups in Wales. The British parties, in 
spite of their crucial role in the UK and monopoly of representation in Parliament, 
receive relatively small amounts of public subsidies and must rely on private sources 
of funding for their extra-parliamentary organisation and campaign activities. 
This  chapter  studies  the  history  and  organisation  of  the  Labour  party,  the 
Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats. The formation and recent history of 
each  party  is  detailed,  as  well  as  its  main  ideological  tenets.  Then  the  British 
organisation is described, with a special emphasis on the processes for the selection of 
the leader and party candidates for Westminster elections, the role and composition of 
the main executive party organs, the policy-making process for general elections and 
the  redaction  of  the  general  election  manifesto,  and  finally  party  finance  and  the 
distribution of resources between the levels. In each of the state-wide party functions, 
the role and representation of the regional branches is evaluated. Finally the processes 
of leadership and selection, candidate selection for Scottish and Welsh elections and 








5.1. The Labour Party 
5.1.1. History and change in the Labour party 
Party formation 
The Labour party was born from the will of the trade unions to achieve representation 
in Parliament. Keir Hardie's Independent Labour Party joined forces with some trade 
unions and the Fabian Society in 1900 to form the Labour Representation Committee 
(LRC),  which  became  the  Labour  party  in  1906. It  initially  co-operated  with  the 
Liberal party, so that the Liberals would reserve thirty constituencies to the Labour 
party. This continued the co-operation between trade unions and the Liberal party that 
had started at the end of the 19
th century in industrial constituencies and provided 
electoral support for the new organisation. However, the Liberal party's failure to 
integrate working-class interests and its reluctance to select working-class candidates 
convinced Labour to run alone after 1918 (Ball 1987: 44-5). Labour's share of the vote 
thereafter rose steadily, eventually relegating the Liberal party into third position. 
The  party's  birth  under  the  auspices  of  the  trade  unions,  Fabianism  and 
liberalism influenced its doctrine. Labour was born as a moderate party that aimed at 
improving the living conditions of the working class  in the respect of the British 
constitution and via democratic means. The trade unions' domination of the party also 
meant that the party was relatively immune to the influence of socialism and to the 
debates between reform and revolution (Shaw 1996: 3-6). Taylor (1997: 8) argues that 
'Labour's ideological  identity is fundamentally based on its practical politics'. As  a 
result, most of its internal struggles revolved around the debate between power and 
principle, that is, between the principle of the defence of working-class interest and 
office goals (Taylor 1997: 8-9).  























% votes % seats
 
Labour officially organised in 1918, when it adopted its constitution, which set 
its standards of organisation but also included the party's political 'mission statement' 
in its Clause IV section 4.
30 In organisational terms, the 1918 constitution provided for 
                                                 
30 'To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the fruits of their industry and the most equitable 
distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and 
control of each industry or service' (Ball: 72).   
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the  development  of  an  individual  membership  together  with  indirect  membership 
through  trade  unions  and  socialist  societies,  the  dominance  of  the  unions  in  the 
composition of the conference and the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the 
establishment of local constituency parties as the basic unit of organisation (Ball 1987: 
71). The leader (originally called Chairman) was initially considered as nothing more 
than the 'mouthpiece' of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) (McKenzie 1955: 301-
2). The constitution states that the conference, which is largely dominated by the trade 
unions,  is  the  sovereign  party organ.  However,  as  Michels  predicted,  a  leadership 
emerged and managed to gain some autonomy from the rest of the party. MacDonald 
was to be the first to be named leader of the party after Labour formed the official 
opposition for the first time in 1923, and he enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom 
in the formation of his Cabinet in 1924 and 1929 (McKenzie 1955: 307-9). However, 
MacDonald's eventual betrayal of the Labour party in 1931 was to have a lasting effect 
on the party in terms of trust (or lack thereof) in the leader (Shaw 1996: 8).
31 The 
dialectics between leadership autonomy and principles of intra-party democracy are 
still ever present in the Labour party.  
 
New Labour: contemporary party organisation and principles 
The transformation of the Labour party into 'New Labour' is the result of a long 
process that took place during the long years of opposition during the Thatcher and 
Major premierships. In the immediate years after Thatcher's 1979 victory, the Labour 
party lurched to the left, changing in the process the way the party selected its leader 
(by  an  electoral  college  rather  than  by  the  PLP)  and  imposing  the  compulsory 
reselection of parliamentary candidates, including sitting MPs (Shaw 1996: 163-4).  
These changes prompted the departure of some social democrats from the party 
to  form  the  Social  Democratic  Party  (SDP)  in  1981.  This  period  of  left-wing 
domination culminated with a second defeat in 1983. Derided as 'the longest suicide 
note  in  history',  the  1983  manifesto  promised  full  employment,  improved  public 
services, re-nationalisation of privatised industries, and withdrawal from the European 
Community (Shaw 1996: 166). Shaw (1996: 167) argues that the adoption of such a 
radical programme was a calculated move by the right-wing of the party, who hoped 
to discredit the left and prove that it was impossible to win on a left-wing platform.  
True or not, the new leader Neil Kinnock considered that the party needed to 
move to the centre if it was to regain power (Taylor 1997: 6). Initially, Kinnock did 
not have the necessary control over the party to engage in any substantial reform. By 
1987, while he had managed to end Trotskyist entryism and forged an alliance with the 
moderate elements of the left, Kinnock could only compromise with the so-called 
'loony left' and the trade unions over the programme. At the same time, he had started 
to professionalise the party's organisation and campaign machine.  
The  move  to  the  centre  and  the  'catch-allisation'  of  the  Labour  party  were 
accelerated  after  the  1987  election.  Kinnock  launched  the  Policy  Review,  which 
produced four reports that led the way towards the party's right-wing shift. For Taylor 
(1997: 102), it represented  
'a symbolic break from the historic concerns and values of the Labour 
Party. This suggests that the Review was not merely concerned with issue 
                                                 
31 MacDonald and other Labour members of Cabinet joined the so-called 'National Government' with 
the Liberals and Conservatives, relegating the Labour party in opposition. MacDonald and the other 
rebels were eventually expelled from the party.   
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voting, with presenting electable policies, but that it also saw its historic 
form of party identification, based largely on class, as being redundant'.  
The Policy Review adopted an original framework, with policy commissions and at the 
margins of the party's official policy-making process. Kinnock increased the autonomy 
of the leadership, reduced the role of the NEC and increased the leader's policy role 
(Shaw 1996: 191). At the same time, 'the party had […] come to unite behind the 
leader in the elusive search for electoral success, and factionalism within the PLP has 
become far less pronounced' (Garner and Kelly 1998: 137). 
After the party's fourth consecutive electoral defeat in 1992, John Smith replaced 
Kinnock. The new leader launched the Commission on Social Justice, with a brief to 
review  the  party's  approach  toward  social  justice  and  social  policy  in  an  inclusive 
manner. However, Smith died before the Commission published its final report. The 
new leader, Tony Blair, launched a comprehensive process of reform of the party. At a 
programmatic level, he started by reforming Clause IV of the party's constitution. This 
change had two interests for a moderniser like Blair: ridding the party of 'outdated' 
notions such as collective ownership and symbolically signalling to the electorate that 
Labour  was  a  changed  party  (Taylor  1997:  169).  The  reform  was  adopted  via  a 
consultation of the membership, and Blair managed to use his resources as leader to 
campaign in favour of the change (Taylor 1997: 176-7).  
Blair inherited a party in which the influence of the left was much weakened 
while the leadership has gained considerable autonomy thanks to the introduction 
one-member-one-vote (OMOV), which effectively marginalised more radical middle-
level activists, the reduction of the power of the trade unions, and the development of 
professionalised  communications  techniques  (Driver  and  Martell  1998:  13).  He 
extended  the  use  of  membership  ballots  for  the  adoption  of  the  intermediary 
document Road to the Manifesto and changed the policy-making process (see below).  
In terms of policy, New Labour represents for Jones (1996: 149) the culmination 
of the efforts of the 1950s revisionists to transform Labour into a social democratic 
party that endorses market economy. The party has now adopted market capitalism, 
neo-liberal macroeconomics and tax moderation, promising in 1997 to stick to the 
Conservatives'  tax  plans  (Ludlam  2004:  1-2).  These  changes  were  eventually 
successful, as the party regained office in 1997 and was re-elected in 2001 and 2005. 
Modernisation became one of the party's key words, as it was to be the way forward to 
improve British public services. Often, it involved introducing the private sector in the 
running of public services (Prabhakar 2004: 170-2). A largely shared interpretation of 
New Labour is to view it as a centre-left version of Thatcherism (Heffernan 2001). It 
is a mix of  social democratic aims, neo-liberal economic recipes and, increasingly, 
populist stances on law and order and immigration (Smith 2004: 220). 
 
5.1.2. Organisation at the central level, state-wide party processes 
In general terms, there are three organisational levels within the Labour party: the 
constituency  associations  (constituency  Labour  parties,  CLPs),  the  regional  party 
offices and the national organisation. In Wales, there is a Welsh Labour party with a 
Welsh executive, in Scotland there is a Scottish Labour party with a Scottish executive, 
and there is a regional office with a regional board in each of the nine English regions. 
In this sub-section, we will only focus on the distribution of powers between the 
national and regional levels, the powers of the central party organisation over state-






The general constitution of the UK party can be amended by the party conference, in 
which the votes of the affiliated organisations and of the CLPs count for 50% each. In 
theory, it remains possible for the UK party to decide the distribution of powers 
between  the  levels  without  the  involvement  and  consent  of  the  regional  party 
branches. This means that the Labour party receives a code of 0 for the indicator 
relating to the revision of its constitution.   
The  constitution  of  the  Labour  party  is  rather  unspecific  on  the  exact 
distribution of powers between the UK party and the Scottish and Welsh regional 
party  branches.  The  rules  of  the  regional  party  branches  are  determined  by  the 
Scottish and Welsh party executives and are approved by the NEC. This translates 
into a code of 2 for the organisational freedom of the party's regional branches. 
 
Selecting the party leader 
The last time the Labour party selected its leader (and deputy leader) was in 1994. 
Tony Blair was selected by an electoral college composed of three sections with an 
equal  share  of  the  vote.  The  first  section  is  composed  of  the ex  officio  members: 
members  of  the  NEC,  of  the  Parliamentary  Labour  Party  (PLP)  and  European 
Parliamentary Labour Party, the second of all the individual members of the party, and 
the third of the members of the affiliated organisations (trade unions and socialist or 
co-operative societies).  
Until 1980, Labour leaders were elected by the party's MPs. Under the impulsion 
of left-wing activists, a change was initiated in 1981: instead, party leaders would be 
elected by an electoral college composed of the affiliated organisations (40% of the 
vote),  CLPs  (30%)  and  Labour  MPs  (30%)  (Garner  and  Kelly  1998:  140).  This 
division into three groups, and the weight of the trade unions, reflect the historical 
role  played  by  the  unions  in  the  creation  and  support  of  the  Labour  party. 
Nevertheless, some changes have occurred, and the general trend towards less union 
involvement in the party that started in the 1980s and was confirmed in the 1990s has 
also affected the procedure for the election of the party leader. As criticisms rose 
against the extent of the trade union involvement in the party and the block vote, 
through which union leaders decided for their whole membership, party leaders in the 
1990s tried to limit the their weight in the party's voting procedure and enforced a 
system of internal votes of levy-paying trade union members prior to conferences and 
leadership conventions.
32 One member one vote (OMOV) was imposed to the trade 
unions in 1993 by John Smith (leader between 1992 and 1994). This rule also applies 
for the membership section of the party since 1989 (Garner and Kelly 1998: 143). The 
main effect of OMOV has been to strengthen the leadership's position and a parallel 
marginalisation of the leadership's critics, in particular the most left-wing faction of 
the party (Shaw 1996: 190-1). 
                                                 
32 Levy-paying members are those members of TUC-affiliated trade unions who have declared that they 
wanted  to  pay  a  'political  levy'  to  the  Labour  party.  It  entitles  them  to  take  part  in  Labour  party 
elections. In 1994, 779,426 levy-payers participated in the election (out of close to 4 million levy-payers 
eligible to vote) (Garner and Kelly 1998: 144). Today, it is estimated that about a third of trade union 
members (6.7 millions) pay a levy to the Labour party. See Leader 'Power to the Workers', Guardian 12 
September 2006  
http://society.guardian.co.uk/conferences/story/0,,1870111,00.html   
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At the time of the last election, there was no formal regional input into the 
election of the party leader. The advent of devolution has led to a change in the 
composition of  the  first  section  of  the  electoral  college,  with  the  addition  of  the 
Labour members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. There is still no 
formal role for the regional party branches or their leaders in the process. Moreover, 
the members of the Scottish Parliament and of the Welsh Assembly represent only 
around  a  hundred  delegates  in  a  much  larger  group  and  are outnumbered  by  the 
current Westminster Labour representation of over four hundred MPs. Consequently, 
the regional input in the election of the next Labour leader will be very limited. The 
weight of the regional parties is likely to be rather limited in the membership ballot as 
well, as the Scottish membership figures have traditionally been low in spite of the 
party's electoral strength in the region (Hassan 2004: 4; Lynch and Birrell 2004: 180-2). 
Besides, the membership section only constitutes one third of the votes. 
As so far the selection of the leader has been made by a central party organ, the 
conference,  without  any  input  from  representatives  of  the  regional  branches  or 
regional executives, the party receives a code of 0. In the future, the integration of 
Welsh Assembly members and Scottish Members of Parliament is unlikely to have a 
significant  impact  on  the  vote,  unless  if  the  Westminster  parliamentary  group  is 
particularly small. 
 
Managing the party from the centre: the National Executive Committee 
The party is managed centrally by the National Executive Committee (NEC), which is, 
according to the party's constitution, the 'administrative authority of the party' (Clause 
II,  art.  1).  The  NEC  counts  32  members, 24  of  whom  are  elected  by  the  party 
conference.  The  members  elected  by  the  conference  are  distributed  as  follows:  6 
members are elected by the CLP delegates, 12 by the trade unions, one by the other 
affiliated organisations (socialist societies, co-operative society, etc.), 2 members by the 
Association of Labour Councillors and 3 members of the PLP or the European PLP. 
For each section, provisions are made for the election of at least as many women as 
men. The remaining 8 members of the NEC are the leader and the deputy leader, the 
party treasurer, 3 frontbench MPs nominated by the Parliamentary Labour Party and 
two members elected by respectively the conference of the Young Labour movement 
and the Black Socialist Society. There is no direct representation of the Scottish and 
Welsh  regional  parties  or  the  Labour  groups  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  the 
National Assembly on the NEC. The Celtic fringes can only be represented indirectly, 
when Scottish and Welsh party members are elected by the constituency parties or the 
trade unions, or when Scottish or Welsh frontbench MPs are selected by the PLP or 
the conference. 
The NEC is the party's ruling body between conferences. Its functions include 
making sure that the vote of the conference and the party constitution are respected in 
the  day-to-day  administration  of  the  party  and  that  the  party  has  the  necessary 
structure and level of organisation, in particular at constituency level, to run efficient 
election campaigns. It sets up the candidate panel that is responsible for the making of 
the list of approved candidates for general elections, ensures that all the constituencies 
have selected a candidate for the general elections and vets the selection procedure. 
The central party is also responsible for membership management and recruitment. 
Party members join at the central level. It is impossible to join the Scottish or Welsh 
Labour parties (Lynch and Birrell 2004: 181). In addition, the NEC has a policy role. 
It  controls  the  workings  of  the  National  Policy  Forum  (NPF)  and  its  policy  
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commissions.  The  members  of  the  NEC  participate  in  the  NPF  and  in  policy 
commissions.  Its  policy  role  has  nevertheless  been  considerably  reduced  by  new 
policy-making procedures. 
The  absence  of  regional  representatives  in  the  NEC  means  that  the  party 
receives a code of 0 for the indicator reflecting the involvement of regional branches 
in the central executive organ. 
 
Candidate selection for general elections 
The party used the need to establish selection rules for the new devolved bodies and 
the  European  Parliament  to  revise  the  rules  for  the  selection  of  Westminster 
parliamentary  candidates.  Since  1993,  locally  affiliated  trade  unions  have  lost  their 
collective right to vote in constituency sections. Candidates are then selected by postal 
ballot of the party members of each constituency (Seyd 1999: 388). The review of the 
selection procedures that took place in 1997 led to an increased role for the leadership 
and the NEC.  
The  selection  of  Westminster  parliamentary  candidates  is  now  a  two-stage 
process: first, applicants are interviewed by a national selection panel that operates a 
first screening of the candidates and produces a list of approved candidates from 
which Constituency Labour parties are strongly encouraged to choose their candidate. 
Each CLP then makes a shortlist from among the party members who applied to 
become a parliamentary candidate, and then the candidate is elected by the members 
of the CLP on the basis of one-member-one-vote. All the candidates elected by the 
CLPs have to obtain the final approval of the NEC. If the selected candidate is not on 
the national panel, she will have to be interviewed by the NEC, which can refuse to 
endorse the candidate and force the CLP to start a new selection procedure.  
This first stage serves a number of purposes: to establish that the candidates do 
share the concerns and values of the party, to make sure that the candidates have the 
appropriate training, in particular in respect with campaigning techniques and media 
management, and to encourage the selection of candidates from more diverse social 
backgrounds as well as to increase the representation of women and ethnic minorities 
(Shaw 2001: 38).  
This  process  is  controlled  and  implemented  by  the  NEC.  The  Scottish  and 
Welsh executive committees run the panel interviews on behalf of the NEC, following 
the rules  set  out by the  NEC  (interview  with  Stuart  Clark,  Scottish  Labour  party 
treasurer). The WEC and the SEC then act in their role of regional office of the 
national  party.  For  the  2001  election,  candidates  in  a  Scottish  constituency  were 
interviewed in Glasgow (where the party has its Scottish headquarters) by a panel that 
comprised a member of the NEC, a Scottish member of the Westminster PLP, a 
member of the House of Lords and a person with some expertise in PR. While there 
was a link with Scotland through the presence of a Scottish MP, the Scottish Labour 
party leadership was not involved in the process (interview with Iain Luke MP). In 
Wales the regional party only had a role in the last-minute selection of a number of 
candidates,  in  particular  in  a  few  constituencies  in  mid-Wales  where  the  party's 
chances to win were very slim (interview with Michael Penn).   
Constituencies are theoretically free to select any applicant included in the panel. 
In general, the constituency party organises one or several meetings in order to allow 
the candidates to be introduced to the party members and to provide members with 
an opportunity to question the various applicants. Finally, party members select their 
candidate by postal vote. The NEC must approve each selection. It therefore enables  
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the NEC to make sure that the candidates come from the panel and then vet any 
candidate that had not gone through the panel interviews. There have been a few cases 
of disputed candidates, as was the case with Shaun Woodward, a former Conservative 
MP who switched to Labour in 2000. His selection in the St Helens constituency led 
to considerable turmoil in the constituency party and even a protest candidate who left 
the party.
33 
The power of the NEC is even stronger in the case of a by-election. While for a 
normal election an applicant might be given the campaign and media training deemed 
necessary the NEC, a by-election candidate should already possess these qualities. As a 
result, the process is even more centralised in the case of a by-election.   
We saw earlier that the NEC is under the influence of the parliamentary party, 
and the party leadership more in particular. This means that the selection process is 
very much controlled by the leadership and has become a more centralised process. 
The regional branches are not involved in the process, and the party therefore receives 
a  code  of  0  for  the  indicator  of  the  regional  branches'  involvement  in  candidate 
selection for general elections.  
 
Making party policy: Partnership in Power, the National Policy Forum and the Conference 
The annual conference is the 'sovereign body' of the party. It elects two thirds of the 
NEC and it is responsible for amending the party's constitution. It also adopts the 
party  programme  and  decides  the  general  orientation  of  the  party.  Conference 
delegates with general voting power are mainly appointed by the affiliated trade unions 
and  the  Constituency  Labour  parties.  The  number  of ex  officio  members  (without 
voting power unless they are part of a constituency or trade union delegation) is rather 
large. It includes the members of the NEC, the PLP, the European PLP, General 
Secretary of the party and the candidates for Westminster and European elections 
whose candidatures have been approved by the NEC. The regional parties are not 
represented directly at the conference for the vote of the national programme. The 
members of the Labour groups of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly 
can attend the conference as ex officio members without voting power. Scotland and 
Wales are represented through their constituency delegations, but there appears to be 
a tendency, more pronounced in Scotland, towards declining levels of interest and 
presence from both regions.
34 First of all, party conferences are generally held in the 
south of England, so going to the conference represents for a Scottish, but also for a 
Welsh  delegate  a  considerable  investment  in  time  and  money.  Moreover,  with 
devolution, a large number of issues discussed in the annual national conference are of 
no direct concern and consequence to Scotland and Wales. The incentives for Scottish 
and Welsh delegates to go to the national conference are therefore rather limited. 
The conference, a very important time in the political year, represents the image 
of the party leadership being held accountable to its members and other party sections 
via their delegates and a time when these delegates meets to decide on party policy.
35 
                                                 
33 See BBC News Online '"I'm a Labour Man Now" – Woodward', 14 May 2001  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/vote2001/hi/english/newsid_1329000/1329410.stm  
34 Ann Black's website: Regarding the 2005 conference held in Brighton, 'Press reports claimed that 
only  two-thirds  sent  delegates,  and  Scotland  had  just  28,  including  five  from  a  single  CLP.' 
http://www.annblack.com/nec_Oct2005.htm (Ann Black has been a member of the NEC since 2000). 
35 'The traditional theory of Labour's intra-party democracy focused upon the input from below by 




Once a year in September, like the other two state-wide parties, Labour party delegates 
take  over  a  seaside  town  to  discuss  and  vote  on  party  policy.  Traditionally,  the 
conference represented a unique opportunity for the delegates as representatives of 
the party at large to measure their strength and authority over a parliamentary party 
that  also  asserted  its  right  to  decide  independently  from  the  party  conference. 
However, this image of intra-party delegation democracy should be mitigated, as the 
leadership and trade union bosses often agreed beforehand and managed to control 
conference proceedings while the chances for each delegate to be heard in a debate 
were often slim. 
After the party's third consecutive defeat in 1987, Neil Kinnock embarked on a 
Policy Review in order to transform the party's policies. One of its conclusions was 
that the policy-making process also needed to be reformed. The conference was then 
where policy was proposed, discussed and voted. When the party was divided like in 
the 1980s, conference easily became a battleground between the warring sections of 
the  party  and  gave  the  public  the  image  of  a  party  deeply  divided  and  unfit  for 
government (Seyd 1988: 3). A more consensual policy-making process was therefore 
preferred by the party leadership, which became the main source of party policy and 
started to sideline the NEC along with the other party organs (Shaw 1996: 188-191).  
The  reform  started  in  the  early  1990s,  with  the  end  of  the  block  vote,  the 
introduction  of  OMOV,  and  the  reduction  of  the  weight  of  the  trade  unions  in 
decision-making (they used to count for 90% of the vote, they now hold 50% of the 
votes).  The  idea  of  a  national  policy  forum  in  which  policy  proposals  would  be 
discussed all through the year was introduced in 1991 and it started to work in parallel 
with the conference in 1993, meeting occasionally and advising the NEC (Faucher 
1999:  7).  Introduced  in  1997  after  Labour's  landslide  victory,  Partnership  in  Power 
transformed the conference into an arena where policy was mainly voted rather than 
discussed. Members, constituency parties and trade unions are consulted beforehand, 
and new policy is only discussed during conference if a new topic emerges and has not 
been included in consultation documents. Conference delegates are called in to vote 
on the consultation documents that are put to them by the NEC. The conference was 
transformed from an arena of often intense policy debate, public displays of policy 
divergence  or  plain  disagreement  into  a  much  more  stage-managed  event  to 
demonstrate that the party is united and provide the leadership with an opportunity to 
explain its policies in front of television cameras (Shaw 2004: 59).  
The  policies  discussed  at  Conference  are  policy  documents  drafted  by  the 
National Policy Forum (NPF), a policy-making body created after the adoption of 
Partnership in Power (1997). The NPF is a 180-member strong commission with the 
function of overseeing the development of a two-year rolling programme. The NPF 
counts 55 members elected by the CLPs, 30 by the trade unions, the 32 members of 
the NEC, 22 representatives from the regional parties, 9 MPs, 6 MEPs, 8 members of 
Government, 9 representatives from local government, and 9 representatives from the 
socialist societies, co-operative society and Black Socialist Society.
36 The representation 
of the regional parties is therefore very narrow, while the parliamentary representation 
                                                                                                                                      
Conference and then became party policy as a result of the votes of the mandated delegates' (Minkin 
1991: 398 – quoted in Faucher 1999). 
36 At its creation, the NPF counted 175 members: 54 elected by constituency parties, 18 elected by 
regional parties, 30 elected by affiliated trade unions, 9 elected by Labour MPs, 6 elected by Labour 
MEPs, 8 ministers, 9 elected by local government, 9 elected by socialist societies, the Co-operative 
party…, 32 members of the NEC (ex-officio members).  
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reaches close to 25 members (MPs, members of Government, the leader and deputy 
leader, 3 frontbench MPs and 3 members of the PLP or the EPLP from the NEC). 
The NPF is responsible for establishing a number of policy commissions on particular 
issues, and these commissions are composed of 3 representatives of the government, 
3 representatives of the NEC and 4 representatives of the NPF. During the first year 
of  policy  development,  a  number  of  policy  commissions  elaborate  draft  policy 
documents, which are then debated in local policy forum by party members, affiliated 
and external organisations. The views and ideas expressed during these meetings are 
added to the reports of the policy commissions, which are then presented to the 
annual  conference.  The  annual  conference  votes  the  reports  and  possible 
amendments.  However,  the  expression  and  inclusion  of  alternative  views  is  made 
rather difficult by a number of procedural 'gateways' in the hands of the NEC (Shaw 
2004: 56). 
The second year is an internal process. The documents voted by the conference 
are amended by the Policy Forum. The membership and affiliated associations can 
comment on these policy proposals. They can also submit one motion on a topic 
which is either not substantially addressed in the reports to conference or by the NPF 
or the NEC, or which has arisen since the publication of these reports. The policy 
commissions make the final reports with all the contributions. The NEC presents 
these documents to the annual conference, which votes the programme of the party. 
The  strategic  oversight  of  this  process  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Joint  Policy 
Committee (JPC), which is composed of 8 members of the government, 8 members 
of NEC, 8 members of NPF and 6 ex officio members, including the Prime minister, 
who chairs the committee (Labour 2005a: 48).  
The party programme is only a basis for the manifesto. The manifesto is drafted 
by  the  Joint  Executive  Committee,  which  includes  the  Prime  Minister,  Cabinet 
members and members of the NEC and of the NPF. The manifesto takes the party 
programme as a starting point. The issues emphasised in the manifesto and in the 
campaign are chosen by the Cabinet and parliamentary leaderships, informed of the 
larger party's preferences by the programme voted at Conference.
37  
In addition to the main general election manifesto, there are also Scottish and 
Welsh general election manifestos. These documents have been produced in parallel 
with the main manifesto for close to 30 years. Whereas they only used to include the 
sections of the UK manifesto that were of special relevance to either region, they 
started to be more consequent documents with an emphasis on the impact of the 
national  campaign  themes  on  the  region  in  1992.  With  devolution,  these  regional 
manifestos have become separate documents that are quite different from the UK 
manifesto. While they use similar campaign themes, slogans and identical layouts, they 
cover Westminster issues and how they might affect the region, the way the regional 
executive  sees  these  policies  as  developed  in  the  region.  It  is  mainly  a  shift  in 
emphasis, as the position of the UK party is intended to be the same all over the 
country.  
Regional manifestos for state-wide elections are mainly drafted in the regions by 
a policy officer of the relevant regional executive, but the ultimate policy responsibility 
                                                 
37 See Clause V.2: 'The NEC and the Parliamentary Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
('PLP') shall decide which items from the party programme shall be included in the manifesto which 
shall be issued by the NEC prior to every general election. The joint meeting of those two committees 
shall also define the attitude of the party to the principal issues raised by the election campaign which 
are not covered by the manifesto'.  
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for these manifestos rests with the secretary of state (interview with Michael Penn). 
The regional manifesto is the result of a co-operation with the Scottish or Welsh 
executives,  the  NEC  and  senior  Westminster  members  (interview  with  Rosemary 
McKenna MP). The secretary of state and his advisors are heavily involved in the 
process, and he writes a preface to the document (in addition to the preface written by 
the  party  leader).  The  Scottish  and  Welsh  manifestos  nevertheless  address  the 
different policies of the regional party and the different needs of the regions, therefore 
also  mentioning  policy  differences.  For  instance  in  Scotland,  the  2005  election 
manifesto contained a number of policies that differed from the policies of the UK 
party: smoking ban (the UK party proposed a more limited measure), health policy 
focus (because of the special needs of Scotland in terms of cancer and heart diseases), 
free personal care for the elderly, etc. (interview with Stephen Lawther). The Scottish 
and Welsh manifestos would also emphasise economic issues, public services, the level 
of investment proposed by the UK party and their consequences on the funding of 
Scottish services and the amount of money made available to the Scottish executive 
(interview with Bristow Muldoon MSP). 
The national process is very much in the hands of the national leadership. Local 
policy forums provide opportunities for local activists and party members to discuss 
policy, but also for the party leadership to explain the government's policies and the 
constraints of power. The whole structure of the NPF and its policy commissions is 
designed  to  enhance  the  dominance of  the  party  leadership,  even  though  the old 
conference system should not be too romanticised at a time when the leadership was 
kept in checks by the party on the ground. With 4 representatives in the NPF each, 
the  Welsh  and  Scottish  parties  have  again  a  very  limited  influence  over  central 
decision-making.  The  party  leadership  has  a  rather  large  autonomy  and  room  for 
interpretation in the elaboration of the party manifesto. Through the Secretaries of 
state for Scotland and Wales, it is also involved in the drafting of the general election 
manifestos for the regions. While differences from the national manifesto can appear, 
these  are  differences  that the national  leadership  is  willing  to  accept  or  based  on 
existing policies in the regions. The party's impulse to produce a homogenous message 
all across the country remains very strong. Moreover, the regional policies described in 
the Scottish and Welsh manifestos are for regional government and not for the UK 
government, which is not constrained by these proposals. 
Because of the existence of regional manifestos, the party receives a score of 1. 
The Scottish and Welsh party branches are otherwise not involved in the process of 
policy-making  for  general  elections,  and  the  pledges  of  the  Scottish  and  Welsh 
manifestos do not bind the state-wide party. 
 
5.1.3. Organisation in Scotland and Wales, powers and autonomy of the regional 
party branches 
The Labour parties of Scotland and Wales are not completely autonomous parties that 
operate  far  from  the  gaze  of  their  UK  party  leadership.  The  sub-sections  below 
describe the party processes of the Scottish and Welsh Labour parties and how the 
central party leadership has had to come to terms with devolution and the potential 
for divergence it creates.  
 
Selecting the Scottish and Welsh party leaders 
There is officially only one leader in the Labour party: the leader of the UK Labour 
party. The Scottish and Welsh parties nevertheless have a de facto leader in the person  
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of  their  First  Ministers.  Since  1997,  both  parties  have  had  three  leaders  selected 
through different methods.  
In Scotland, the main problem has been the little time that the party has had to 
select its leader, as the leader of the Labour group of MSPs is also the First minister. 
The first leader was Donald Dewar. Seen as the 'father of devolution' and in his 
position of Secretary of State for Scotland, his candidacy to be the first Scottish First 
minister was rather evident. The new leader was elected from among the prospective 
MSPs by an electoral college composed of three sections, like for the election of the 
UK leader: CLPs, trade unions and Scottish MPs. Dewar was the only candidate and 
his selection was confirmed at the 1998 Scottish conference.  
When Dewar died in October 2000, the party needed a new leader and Scotland 
a new First minister. The rules of the Scottish Parliament stipulate that the Parliament 
has 28 days to select a new First minister. It rapidly became clear that it would be 
impossible for the party to select a new leader within 28 days and follow the party 
rules. It was then decided to limit the electoral college to the Labour MSPs and the 
members of the Scottish Executive Committee (SEC), which makes close to 80 people 
To be nominated a candidate needed the support of at least 7 MSPs, and two fairly 
uncontroversial  candidates  stood (Hopkin  and  Bradbury  2006:  141).  After  a  short 
campaign,  the  electoral  college  convened  and held  a  vote  (interview  with  Bristow 
Muldoon  MSP).  Henry  McLeish  won  against  the  former  general  secretary  of  the 
Scottish Labour party, Jack McConnell.  
In  November  2001  Henry  McLeish  resigned  after  a  scandal  regarding  the 
expenses of his constituency office. The party was faced with the same problem after 
only one year, and the same electoral college was reconvened. This time with only one 
candidate (Jack McConnell), they held a for-or-against vote. 
The formal influence of the state-wide party on this process is limited to the 
number of MPs included in the SEC. It can also be said that the UK party could have 
influenced the selection through its prior selection of Holyrood candidates. Indeed, 
even though there is no reported evidence of direct attempts to influence the MSPs, 
only New Labour candidates obtained the nomination. In 2001, two left-wing MSPs 
declared their intention to participate in the contest but failed to secure the necessary 
7 nominations from their colleagues (Birrell 2002). Hassan and Warhurst (2001: 222) 
report that Gordon Brown, Scotland's most prominent UK minister, who tends to 
view Scotland as his territory, failed in his attempt to influence the process in 2000 so 
that McLeish would get elected without a contest. McLeish was nevertheless elected, 
and Brown has also been involved in the appointment of a number of party officials in 
Scotland. The relationships between McLeish and the UK party however turned out 
to be rather problematic at times (he once described John Reid, the then Scottish 
secretary, as a 'patronising bastard'). Today, relations seem to run more smoothly, but 
this does not mean that McConnell has become a puppet of the central party.
38  
In Wales, a first consensual candidate was elected by a special conference in 
1998. Ron Davies, like Dewar in Scotland, was the Secretary of state. The conference 
worked in the same way: one section for the CLPs, one for the trade unions and one 
for the people on the panel of candidates. The trade unions did not have to ballot 
their members, and a party official declared that this caused 'some controversies at the 
                                                 
38 ' I'm  my  Own  Man,  McConnell  Tells  Stormont  Gathering',  The  Scotsman,  23  May  2006. 
http://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=1331&id=762742006   
111 
 
time'. In October 1998, Ron Davies resigned as secretary of state and as Labour leader 
in Wales.  
The party had to elect a new leader 6 months before the election to the Welsh 
Assembly. Rhodri Morgan, who had just lost to Davies, stood again but was rejected 
by the party and Tony Blair, who thought Morgan was too 'old Labour'. The central 
party supported Alun Michael, a junior minister from the Home Office seen as a 'safe 
pair of hands' (Shaw 2001: 43). Rawnsley (2000: 250) quotes a conversation between 
Tony Blair and John Prescott and comments: 
'Blair responded: "What do I do if he [Rhodri Morgan] wins?", to which 
Prescott  countered:  "Say  it's  democracy,  for  Christ's  sake.  That  it's  a 
triumph for democracy!" This argument, excellent though it was, could 
not budge the Prime Minister'. 
The party then resorted to use the 'old Labour' methods that Blair and his allies 
had  so  much  criticised  when  they  were  building  and  promoting  their  own  'new' 
Labour. The electoral college that elected the Welsh candidate as First secretary was 
not based on full 'one member, one vote'. Michael was rather unpopular within the 
party at large (he lost the constituency vote to Morgan) but he won the candidates 
vote and the trade union. The largest unions voted as a block for Michael when it 
appeared that those trade unions that balloted their members would choose Morgan 
(Shaw 2001: 43). Michael was then elected leader of the Welsh party and became First 
secretary in 1999, until a vote of no confidence was scheduled against him by his 
parliamentary party. He resigned the day before the vote, in February 2000. 
For the third time, the Welsh Labour party had to select a leader. Because it was 
an emergency procedure (the new party leader would then become Wales' new First 
secretary), the leader was elected by the Welsh Executive Committee (WEC). Rhodri 
Morgan stood unopposed and became Welsh Labour's third leader in two years. New 
rules have been established since then, and the new procedure stipulates that any new 
Labour leader would be elected through OMOV. Morgan had started to campaign in 
favour of OMOV already in October, but the WEC had rejected the change. 
The  eventual  accession  of  Rhodri  Morgan  to  the  position  of  First  minister 
illustrates the limitations of the centralised approach initially adopted by the London 
party. The heavy-handed backing of Michael eventually played against him: the party 
performed rather poorly in the 1999 Welsh election, he lacked the support of voters, 
party members, and increasingly of Assembly Members. Michael's proximity with the 
central party and his failure to use this proximity to Wales' advantage ended up being 
the source of his downfall. 
The central leadership has shown some signs of involvement in the selection of 
the party leader in both Scotland and Wales. In Scotland, it was more a matter of the 
interest of one party heavyweight and potential future party leader (Gordon Brown), 
and it did not lead to any particular clash. On the other hand, the central party's 
reluctance to see the Welsh party select a candidate who did not belong to the leading 
party  group  was  perceived  as  a  form  of  heavy-handed  involvement,  eventually 
backfired, with the accession of Morgan to the leadership and contributed to the new 
Labour  leadership's  image  as  'control  freaks'.  Because  the  regional  branches  are 
formally free to select their own leaders, the Labour party receives a score of 3 for this 
indicator. A 3 leaves open the possibility of central organs to try and influence the 
selection process via informal party channels. This is what the national leadership has 




Candidate selection for elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales 
Prior to the first regional elections, the NEC established a number of rules for the 
selection of candidates to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly. As part 
of this process, the Scottish and Welsh Executive Committees (respectively SEC and 
WEC) appointed selection panels that were to interview all the prospective candidates. 
This selection panel comprised 5 members of the NEC, 5 members of the Scottish or 
Welsh Executive Committees, 5 party members and 5 independent advisors with no 
voting  right.
39  Each  interviewing  sub-committee  of  3  to  4  people  also  included  a 
member of the NEC (interviews, February 2005). The panels established a list of 
approved candidates, which was subsequently put to the approval of the Scottish and 
Welsh Executive Committees. Constituency associations (CLPs) could choose their 
candidates from among these lists. In 2003, the CLPs could choose a candidate who 
was not on the approved list but her pre-selection would then require the consent of 
the regional party executive. CLPs were therefore strongly encouraged to make their 
choice from among the lists (Laffin, Taylor and Thomas 2003: 9). Another constraint 
was  placed  on  the  CLPs  in  order  to  increase  the  number  of  women  selected  as 
candidates. Gender parity was to be enforced through a 'twinning' of constituency 
parties so that each pair selected one male candidate and one female candidate (Brown 
1999).  
The selection process for the 1999 election was crucial, as the party had to select 
a large number of people at once. Accusation of political bias marred this process in 
Scotland. The Scottish panel has been accused of evicting those applicants who were 
not  'new  Labour'  enough.  The  chair  of  the  panel,  Rosemary  McKenna  was  a 
moderniser, as were a number of other members of the panel (Shaw 2001: 39). Some 
people, who felt they were not 'New Labour' enough, also dropped out of the process 
believing that they would not be selected (interview with Rosemary McKenna MP). If 
the selection process was established to produce a group of professional and high-
calibre  candidates,  it  was  also  aimed  at  selecting  candidates  who 'understood  the 
Labour government's objectives' and 'whose background would not embarrass the 
party'  (interview  with  Rosemary  McKenna  MP).  Indeed,  a  number  of  left-wing 
applicants did not make it to the list. The most famous case of a rejected application is 
that of Dennis Canavan, the sitting Labour MP for Falkirk West. Canavan went on to 
stand  as  an  independent  candidate  and  was  elected  to  the  Parliament  against  the 
official Labour candidate.  
In  the  end,  Scottish  CLPs  only  had  167  names  to  choose  from  (for  129 
candidates  to  file)  (Laffin,  Shaw  and  Taylor  2004:  6).  However,  in  spite  of  the 
factionalism that had characterised the Scottish Labour party in the past, most of its 
top figures were not altogether hostile to New Labour in the first place (Lynch and 
Birrell 2004: 188). Moreover, a number of left-wingers such as Cathy Jamieson and 
Malcolm Chisholm were included in the panel, and they both became members of the 
Scottish executive.  
In Wales, the selection process produced more or less the same results as in 
Scotland (exclusion of prominent local figures and left-wingers) but provoked less 
high profile protest. The main problem of the CLPs was of a different kind, as they 
tended to object to the 'twinning' of constituency parties established to achieve gender 
                                                 




balance. Overall, the central party did not expect many problems in Wales and did not 
oversee the process with the same attention as it did in Scotland (Shaw 2001: 43).  
Although the pre-selection of constituency candidates could be modelled after 
existing Westminster practices, the procedures for composing the regional party lists 
had to be established from scratch. A Welsh party officer acknowledged that the party 
'struggled with that [ranking candidates on the ballot paper]'. The same thing could be 
said in Scotland, where the SEC was made responsible for ranking candidates in the 
1999 elections. In 2003, the ranking was established by a vote of the party members, 
subject to the consent of the SEC, which could intervene to enforce gender-equality. 
In Wales, the 1999 list rankings were established by closed party meetings of delegates 
from the CLPs of each top-up area. Organised following a 'sort of conclave principle', 
that is, 'they were kind of locked in a room until they came out with an agreement', 
these  'consensus  meetings'  turned  out  to  be  quite  the  opposite  of  consensual,  as 
delegates fought over the candidates and their ranking (interview with a Welsh party 
officer). The difficulty of the process led to a change before the subsequent election. 
Ultimately, the WEC decided who got on the lists, ranking the candidates already 
selected  in  constituencies  and  adding  minority  candidates.  Eventually,  the  lack  of 
democracy of the process was fairly uncontroversial, as most people realised that the 
party had little chance of winning top-up seats. A new system is likely to be adopted 
for  the  next  election,  as  the  Richard  Commission  on  the  reform of  the  National 
Assembly proposed that constituency candidates should not be on the lists. It is likely 
that the new system will involve the direct participation of party members through 
postal ballot like in Scotland.  
Labour party statutes require that the NEC approves the lists established by the 
regional party, but there is no evidence of any problem arising at that stage of the 
selection process. This provision still makes a potential heavy-handed involvement of 
the national party possible and could also convince the regional parties to make sure 
that the candidates presented to London are likely to pass the confirmation stage.  
It seems, overall, that the attempts to influence the selection process were not 
repeated in 2003 and that the central party chose to give more leeway to its Scottish 
and  Welsh  branches  in  2003  (van  Biezen  and  Hopkin  2004).  This  may  be  as  a 
consequence of the protests that emerged after its interventions in 1999 and because 
of the new legitimacy of the Scottish and Welsh parties, gained through four years of 
regional government. The other reason may be found in the fact that the existing pool 
of potential candidates was already influenced by the central party, and the odds that 
the party was going to win many more seats in both regions were rather slim. In the 
end, it was also not in the interest of the central party to involve itself in the selection 
of new candidates in Scotland and Wales. Moreover, the heavy-handed involvement of 
the central party in 1999 had shown its limits, as it has not prevented the emergence of 
policy  divergence  between  the  Labour-led  UK  government  and  the  Labour-led 
devolved institutions (Parry 2002: 315-6). 
Because  of  the  requirement  that  the  NEC  should  give  its  approval  to  the 
regional candidate lists, the party receives a code of 2 for the selection of regional 
elections candidates.  
 
Making party policy for Scottish and Welsh elections 
The UK Partnership in Power document was adapted to the Scottish and Welsh Labour 
parties. Each region established a Policy Forum, thematic Policy Commissions and a 
Joint Policy Committee (JPC – composed of an equal number of members of the SEC  
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or WEC and Scottish or Welsh ministers). They are in charge of developing a two-year 
party rolling programme. Following Partnership in  Power, party members, CLPs and 
affiliated  organisations  must  be  consulted  extensively  on  policy  issues.  The  Policy 
commissions prepare draft policy documents, which are sent for discussion to the 
Policy Forum and Joint Policy Committee. The JPC must give its approval to the 
consultation  documents  and  then  forwards  them  for  discussion  to  the  CLPs  and 
affiliated  organisations  so  that  they  can  send  remarks  to  the  relevant  Policy 
Commission. On the basis thereof, the conference votes the party programme.  
Like for the state-wide party, the Scottish and Welsh conferences are officially 
the most important policy-making organs of the regional branches. However, like in 
the state-wide party, the conferences are rather constrained in their agenda, and the 
discussions are more controlled. The manifesto for regional elections is then drafted 
by the Joint Policy Committee on the basis of this programme voted by the regional 
conference. There is a rather important room for manoeuvre left to the JPC to adapt 
the party programme as voted by conference into an election manifesto.  
The  rules  of  Partnership  for  Power  are  nevertheless  quite  easily  bypassed.  For 
instance, in Scotland, the 1999 manifesto was in fact produced by a small elite group 
within the Scottish Labour party (Lynch and Birrell 2004: 183). Even in the Policy 
Forum framework, the regional party elites can leave their stamp through their strong 
presence  in  the  Policy  Commissions  and  in  the  regional  Joint  Policy  Committees 
(Laffin et al. 2003). Furthermore, in this whole process, the central party can make its 
influence felt through the presence of the Secretary of state in the SEC, WEC and the 
JPCs.  There  is,  however,  no  provision  for  direct  involvement  of  the  national 
leadership. The role of the NEC is fulfilled by the Scottish and Welsh Executive 
Committees and the programme voted by the Scottish and Welsh annual conferences. 
This,  evidently,  does  not  mean  that  the  regional  and  national  leaderships  do  not 
communicate  frequently  outside  official  intra-party  channels.  In  particular,  party 
leaders at both levels are also heads of government at their respective level.  
Again, a difference can be observed between 1999 and 2003. In 1999 the central 
party  clearly  involved  itself  in  the  policy-making  process  and  the  subsequent 
campaign, emphasising the party's 'New Labour' agenda and the threat posed by the 
SNP. On the other hand, in 2003, the regional parties were much more autonomous. 
In the meantime, McConnell had started to emphasise the party's 'Scottishness' and 
adopted  controversial  positions  on  tuition  fees  and  free  care  for  the  elderly,  and 
Morgan declared that there were 'clear red water' between London and Cardiff in their 
approach to public services, moving closer to Plaid Cymru's more socialist agenda 
(Hopkin and Bradbury 2006: 144).  
The regional branches make their own policies, even though the secretaries of 
state are involved in some regional party organs. Overall, the balance of responsibility 
lies in Scotland and Wales. As a result, the party receives a score of 3 for regional 
policy-making.  
 
Funding of the regional party branches 
Resources are shared across the various levels of the party. The party constitution 
states that all membership fees for each individual member shall be collected by, or on 
behalf of, the head office and then divided between head office, the relevant regional 
office, or the Scottish or Welsh office (as the case may be), and the relevant CLP. The 
division of the subscription fee goes as follows: two thirds for the head office and one 
third  for  the  CLP.  The  national  level  of  the  party  also  receives  donations  from  
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individual and corporate donors. Trade unions also contribute to the party's budget, 
although in a less massive scale than they used to. While they contributed to up to 
50% in the early 1990s, trade unions contribute today to approximately one third of 
the party's income. As Labour leads the UK, Scottish and Welsh governments, it is the 
party that receives the least public funding (only the policy development fund and 
Welsh funds).  
There is a clear disparity between the resources of the national party and those 
of the regional branches. The Scottish and Welsh parties are in competition with the 
national party over funding campaigns and appeals to the membership. The central 
party  receives  most  of  the  donations,  both  from  the  trade  unions  but  also  from 
companies and individual donors. Most of the campaign funding is centralised, mainly 
because of the way donors, and in particular the trade unions, give money to the party. 
As a result, the regional parties are highly dependent on the central party for their 
funding.  On  the  other  hand,  the  regional  parties  fund  their  regional  election 
campaigns themselves. They still receive support from the national party through extra 
personnel and funding. 
Table 5.1. Resources and income distribution in the Labour party (£) 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Total income  35,534,000  21,184,000  26,940,000  29,312,000  35,304,000 
Scottish Labour   663,980  352,622  858,547  318,609  523,523 
Wales Labour  304,899  309,952  478,523  279,691  - 
Total donations  12,111,681  11,126,340  14,652,822  15,818,808  21,724,167 
to national party  10,297,478  9,936,766  13,258,596  13,147,236  18,742,000 
to Scottish Labour  101,396  51,868  206,379  65,925  155,481 
to Wales Labour  43,230  45,320  85,889  51,301  92,726 
Share donations to 
central party 
85.0%  89.3%  90.5%  84.8%  86.3% 
Share trade union 
donations to 
central party 
87.0%  86.6%  85.0%  91.0%  84.8% 
Membership fees  3,399,000  3,093,000  3,3452,000  3,492,000  3,685,000 
In Scotland #  67,974  68,974  329,376  41,977  51,794 
In Wales #  29,437  30,873  161,226  86,177  - 
Public  subsidies 
(PDG) 
492,000  448,000  439,000  440,000  440,000 
Notes: # include affiliation fees and a contribution from the national party relating to fees paid 
by party members resident in the region and that was collected by the national party; PDG: 
Policy Development grant 
Sources: Labour Party (2003, 2005b, 2006); Scottish Labour Party (2003, 2004, 2006); Welsh 
Labour Party (2003, 2004) and Wales Labour Party (2005).  
The regional offices are staffed by people employed and paid by the UK Labour 
party. The Scottish regional party paid two members of staff in 2004 and three in 2005 
(Scottish Labour Party 2006) and the Welsh party none. With devolution, the regional 
parties have seen their staff number increase. This is somewhat a mixed blessing for 
the Scottish and Welsh parties. On the one hand, they gain more staff and more 
resources. On the other, these are employees of the state-wide party paid by the state-
wide party, and the general secretary of the Scottish and Welsh parties are selected by 
London. As a result, their loyalty can be shifting, not only with the electoral agenda 
but also because of the organic link with London. Moreover, the Scottish office of the 
party remains in Glasgow, while the Scottish Parliament is in Edinburgh. This may  
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help maintain and strengthen the divide between the party in central office in Scotland 
that depends on the UK party and the party in public office at the regional level. On 
the  other  hand,  in  Wales  they  are  all  in  Cardiff,  which  certainly  encourages  co-
operation between these two faces of the party.  
The regional party branches are therefore particularly dependent on the central 
party for their resources. As a Welsh party executive reported, 'the money has to be 
allocated out to priorities that the head office defines rather than giving the WLP a 
sum  of  money  and  saying  "get  on  with  it"'.  The  reasons  he  identified  for  this 
centralised party funding are the way donors still contributed mainly to the central 
party and modern campaign techniques.  
 
Conclusion 
The Labour party has become a catch-all party, with a centralised organisation for all 
state-wide  operations.  The  leadership  now  enjoys  considerable  freedom  in  the 
determination of party policy and has gained a large influence over the selection of 
political  personnel.  The party  has had  some  difficulties  to  adapt to  devolution. It 
found itself in a rather paradoxical situation: on the one hand, it introduced devolution 
to Scotland and Wales. On the other hand, once in power, it found it difficult to 
accept that the parties of Scotland and Wales would adopt different policies. Table 5.2 
recapitulates the codes given to the party. 
Table 5.2. Coding of the organisation of the Labour party   
  Scotland  Wales 
Involvement of regional party branches in the central party      
1. Selection the leader of the state-wide party  0  0 
2. Involvement of regional party branches in the central party 
executive 
0  0 
3. Selection of candidates for state-wide parliamentary elections  0  0 
4. Adoption of the manifesto for state-wide parliamentary 
elections 
1  1 
5. Amending the constitution of the state-wide party  0  0 
Sum involvement  1  1 
Autonomy of the regional party branches     
6. Organisational freedom of the regional party branches  2  2 
7. Selection of the regional party leaders  3  3 
8. Selection of candidates for regional elections  2  2 
9. Adoption of the manifesto for regional elections  3  3 
10. Funding of the regional party branches   1  1 
Sum autonomy  11  11 
Overall,  there  is  now  a  rather  clear  separation  between  the  levels  of  party 
organisation. The Scottish and Welsh party branches have very little input in the state-
wide  party.  This  may  partly  be  compensated  by  the  strong  Scottish  and  Welsh 
presence in the PLP. However, as interests and policy priorities change because of 
devolution, the interests of the Scottish and Welsh MPs on the one hand, and MSPs 
and AMs on the other, may come to diverge fundamentally. The Labour party initiated 
the devolution process by a strong involvement in the selection of the new political 
personnel in all the devolved bodies. However, once it started to backfire and when 
the party leadership were once again accused of being 'control freaks', they started to 
accept that devolution might go hand in hand with divergence. The Scottish and  
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Welsh parties nevertheless remain dependent on the London party for funding and 
personnel, and this is likely to be an important card in the hands of the national 
leadership, who can also oversee the selection of candidates.  
 
5.2. The Conservative party 
5.2.1. History and change in the Conservative party 
The Conservative party has without any doubt been the most successful political party 
of 20
th century British politics. When John Major was defeated in 1997, the party had 
been out of power for only 29 years since 1900 (Garner and Kelly 1998: 56). This is an 
even more considerable feat when we consider that this party, associated with wealth 
and privilege, has managed to survive and even benefit from the enfranchisement of 
the working-class, which did not at first seem to be natural Conservative constituency. 
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The Conservative party is the heir of the Tory party, one of the ruling parties of 
the 18
th and 19
th centuries. Its official name is the Conservative and Unionist Party, a 
legacy of the merger with the Liberal Unionist Party in 1912 as a result of the party's 
opposition  to  Home  Rule  and  the  independence  of  Ireland.  The  party  is  now 
commonly  called  the  Conservative  party,  but  the  term 'unionist'  was  still  used  in 
Scotland  until  1965,  where  the  Scottish  Unionist  party  was  the  face  of  the 
conservatism.  
In the 19
th century, the party was originally associated with the landed aristocracy 
and  its  core  values  were  tradition,  hierarchy, natural  inequalities  and  order.  These 
beliefs were shaken under Peel's government (1841-6): contrary to the interests of the 
landed gentry, Peel repealed the Corn Laws, which supported agricultural revenues by 
imposing import limits but increased the price of grain (Leach 1996: 108). As a result, 
Peel attracted a new and much needed electoral base to the party, the middle classes 
that believed in self-reliance (rather than state protection), individualism (instead of 
hierarchy) and thrift. As a result, the Conservatives came to represent the 'haves' of 
the country (Garner and Kelly 1998: 59). 
At the end of the 19
th century, Disraeli managed to open the party's appeal even 
wider with his brand of 'One nation' Conservatism. By emphasising state intervention 
and state provision of services to improve the condition of the poorest and at the 
same  time  strengthening  the  party's  patriotic  message  around  the  defence  of  the  
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institutions  and  the  empire,  Disraeli  managed  to  attract  a  new  working  class 
constituency to the Conservative party (Norton 1996: 76-7; Garner and Kelly 1998: 
60-1). This strategy transformed the Conservative party into the most working-class 
party in Britain until Second World War.  
The party consolidated its structure during the 19
th century, first by establishing 
central headquarters in order to coordinate candidates in 1852 and then by linking 
constituency associations and their membership throughout the country (Rasmussen 
1998: 1). The creation of the National Union of Conservatives and Constitutional 
Associations in 1867 was the first example of a national party organisation in Britain 
and  was  a  consequence  of  the  extension of  the franchise  in  that  same  year.  The 
National  Union  aimed  at  integrating  the  working  class  in  support  for  the  then 
government and organising the party on the ground. In 1870 the party's Central Office 
was created (Blake 1970: 2).  
 
Conservative party: contemporary organisation and principles 
Between 1945 and 1997, the Conservative party has been in power for a total of 35 
years. It has largely dominated British politics first shortly after Second World War 
(1951-64) and then during the Thatcher and Major premierships (1979-1997). These 
two periods stand in sharp contrast to one another. While the Conservative party 
contributed to the maintenance of the post-war consensus on the welfare state and 
Keynesian economic management in the 1950s and up to the 1970s, the second period 
was dominated by what was to be called Thatcherism, which is a mix of monetarist, 
pro-market economic policies, authoritarian social values and strong leadership style 
(Gamble 1994: Chapter 3; Norton 1993: 31-2). 
In 1997, the Conservative party became an English party without a single MP 
from  either  Scotland  or  Wales.  After  this  defeat  the  party  entered  a  period  of 
instability. The party changed leader three times between the 1997 and 2005. John 
Major resigned after the 1997 election and the parliamentary party elected William 
Hague,  a  young  MP  with  only  two-year  Cabinet  experience,  to  replace  him.  His 
leadership period has been rather harshly described as the party's 'most futile period in 
Opposition in the last one hundred years' (Collings and Seldon 2001: 60). The fact is 
that he failed to provide the party with a clear set of coherent policies and to establish 
himself as a potential prime minister. At the same time, the party publicly displayed its 
divisions  between  Eurosceptics  and  Europhiles,  Thatcherites  and  'wets',  social 
traditionalists and libertarians (Ashbee 2003: 45). As the 2001 election only brought 
one extra MP to the Conservative parliamentary group, Hague resigned. 
The leader elected under the new rule (see below) was Iain Duncan Smith, who 
was most famous for having been one of the rebels against John Major over Europe. 
He  adopted  some  themes  from  the  US  Republicans,  most  notably  the  notion  of 
'Compassionate Conservatism' but failed to seize on the governments' increasingly 
visible weaknesses. He then tried to position the party on the issue of social justice but 
this new strategy failed to produce any headway in the electorate (Norton 2006: 38). 
The  'quiet  man',  as  he  described  himself  in  his  2002  Conference  speech,  never 
managed to establish himself as an indisputable leader and failed to renew the party's 
electoral appeal. The parliamentary party did not leave him the time to be tested at the 
poll, and he lost a confidence vote in October 2003 (BBC News Online 29 October 
2003).  
Former Home Secretary Michael Howard then replaced Duncan Smith. Both 
Hague and Duncan Smith unsuccessfully followed the same strategy: they started by  
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presenting new policies but lurched to the right when these policies appeared not to 
produce the expected results in the polls (Watt 2003). Michael Howard failed to fare 
any  better  than  his  predecessors,  his  policies  sometimes  seemed  at  odds  with 
Conservative principles (opposition to the introduction of university tuition fees) or 
his previous positions (most notably on gay rights), and the party strategy changed 
from positive campaigning to a negative, tough form of opposition (Norton 2006: 41-
2; Seldon and Snowdon 2005: 729-31). Again, when the election approached and the 
party appeared to lag behind Labour in the polls, Howard veered to the right.  
The 2005 election marked a very limited progress for the Conservative party. 
They won 32 seats but only one seat in Scotland and three in Wales, and they failed to 
improve their share of the vote in the Midlands and the North of England. In many 
ways, Biffen's prediction made in 1974 has been confirmed: 
'Today the Conservative party no longer receives the support of MPs 
from Northern Ireland, its representation in Scotland is lower than at any 
time in this century and in England it has barely a Westminster toe-hold 
in the large industrial cities. There is a real danger that the Tories will 
become the middle class party of the English shires' (in Gamble 1994: 
92). 
The 20
th century has been described as the 'Conservative Century' (Seldon and Ball 
1994), but the start of the 21
st looks rather grim. However, the party has proved to be 
a survivor. It has often proved pragmatic on policy in order to increase its electoral 
potential. However, in order to return into power, the Conservative party will have to 
expand its electoral appeal beyond the limits of Southern and rural England. 
 
5.2.2. Organisation at the central level, state-wide party processes  
The  Conservative  and  Unionist  Party  underwent  a  wide-ranging  process  of  re-
organisation after Hague's accession to the leadership. The document that led to the 
reform, The Fresh Future, 'amounted to the most significant restructuring of the party's 
internal structure since the Maxwell Fyfe reforms of 1945' (Butler and Kavanagh 2002: 
42). The most crucial change was the unification of the party. The Conservative party 
did not exist as a legal entity until 1997. There were a National Union of Conservative 
Associations (the voluntary party), the parliamentary party and Conservative Central 
Office (Kelly 2003: 82), but the Conservative party had no legal existence. The reform 
of  the  Conservative  party  first  and  foremost  consisted  in  unifying  these  different 
branches under a single entity. The other aims of this reform were to democratise the 
party and encourage membership participation, which it has only managed to do to a 
very limited extent.  
In terms of territorial organisation, it maintained the special status of the Scottish 
Conservative  and  Unionist  party,  which  is  affiliated  to  the  Conservative  party, 
participates in UK-wide party processes but organises independently and manages its 
own  internal  processes.  In  Wales,  the  Fresh  Future  created  a  Welsh  organisation 
integrated in the Conservative party.  
 
Constitutional guarantee 
The constitution of the Conservative party does not describe in detail the division of 
powers  between  the  UK  party  and  its  Welsh  and  Scottish  branches.  The  only 
exception is to be found in schedule 6,  where it is  stated that the provisions for 
candidate selection for Westminster elections do not concern Scotland (Conservative  
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Party 1998a). The party constitution can be amended by the party's constitutional 
college, which comprises the members of the national convention (which is the body 
that  represents  the  voluntary  party  with  the  chairmen  of  all  the  constituency 
associations and the regional chairmen
40), the party's MPs and MEPs and members of 
the House of Lords (Schedule 9, Conservative Party 1998a). In theory, the UK party 
could decide the distribution of powers between the levels without the involvement 
and consent of the regional party branches. However, the constitution is relatively 
difficult to change: an amendment can be adopted if it is accepted by 66% of those 
voting  and  at  least  50%  of  those  eligible  to  vote.  For  provisions  regarding  the 
leadership, the board, ethics rules and changes to the constitution, a qualified majority 
of two-thirds of the members of the National Convention, two-thirds of MPs voting 
and 50% of those eligible to vote is required.  
The Scottish party has a special status in the overall party structure. Its voluntary 
organisation only affiliated to the National Union in 1976 but remained autonomous 
thereafter. The Fresh Future (Conservative Party 1998b) stated that the Scottish party's 
failure  to  return  any  MP  and  the  forthcoming  devolution  of  power  to  Scotland 
required that the Scottish party reformed its organisation following the organisational 
principles of the party in the rest of the UK. The constitution submits members of the 
Scottish Conservative party to its rules for the processes that relate to the participation 
of Scotland in the UK party. For the rest, Scottish party members are subject to the 
rules of the Scottish party, and the Scottish party can elaborate its own rules.  
There is no such provision for Wales, which is completely integrated in the UK 
party,  of  which  it  has  always  been  a  weak  element.  However,  the  Fresh  Future 
established  a  Welsh  Conservative  party  with  its  own  power  structure,  as  a 
consequence of the party's electoral weakness in the region and in anticipation of 
devolution. The constitution of the state-wide party does not contain any information 
as to how the Welsh party should be organised, and the Welsh party has developed its 
own structures and chosen its own procedures, which are however very similar to 
those of the state-wide party.  
The Conservative party therefore receives a score of 0 for the process of revision 
of  the constitution  and  a  code of  3  for  organisational  freedom (even though  the 
Scottish and Welsh branches have a different status within the party, both were free to 
organise as they wished). 
 
Selecting the party leader 
Originally, Conservative party leaders used to 'emerge' from among the parliamentary 
party. Until 1963, an informal process of consultation run by senior party figures led 
to the appointment of the leader by the parliamentary party (Punnett 1992: 27). In 
1965, the party adopted written rules for the selection of the leader after the selection 
of Lord Home caused controversy in all sections of the party (Punnett 1992: 41-9). 
Between 1965 and 1997, the parliamentary party was in charge of electing the party 
leader. Rules established in 1975 also provided for the possibility of a contest in the 
case of a vacancy or at the beginning of a parliamentary session. Initially, a contest 
could  occur  simply  if  a  challenger  emerged.  After  the  challenge  to  Thatcher's 
leadership, a new rule required that at least 10% of the parliamentary party should 
                                                 
40 The regional chairmen chair the party's organisational sub-units of England, Scotland and Wales.   
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support  any  challenger  (Punnett  1992:  54).  Successive  ballots  were  held  until  a 
candidate obtained the absolute majority and a 15% lead over the second candidate.  
In 1997, as part of the wider process of party reform, the Conservative party 
changed its procedure of leadership selection. The constitution states that the leader is 
elected  by  party  members.  The  presentation  of  candidates  to  the  party  is  the 
responsibility of the 1922 Committee (Conservative backbench MPs, together with 
frontbench MPs when the party is in opposition). This provision has been interpreted 
by  the  1922  Committee  and  the  party  executive  (the  Board)  as  a  right  of  the 
parliamentary party to select the candidates who are presented to the vote of party 
members.  
The new procedure was used for the first time in 2001 to replace William Hague, 
who resigned after the party's second consecutive defeat. The leadership campaign 
lasted a whole three months. The candidates reflected the various ideological strands 
of the party: Michael Portillo appealed to the party's neo-liberals and the so-called 
'damps' (the party's left wing, economically moderately statist, socially liberal and pro-
European); Ken Clarke represented the party's  'wets', that is, the economic statist, 
socially conservative and pro-European strand; David Davis and Iain Duncan Smith 
both represented the social conservative Thatcherite wing; and Michael Ancram, the 
party chairman, represented a consensus candidate (Norton 2006: 35-6).  
In the third ballot, Portillo was narrowly defeated (53 votes), and party members 
were left to chose between Duncan Smith (54 votes) and Clarke (59 votes). The two 
candidates  then  toured  the  country,  campaigning  to  attract  the  votes  of  party 
members. However, Clarke had little chance of winning in spite of his popularity 
among the electorate. His pro-Europe position made him unelectable: a large part of 
the rank and file disagreed with him, and his election could split the party very deeply. 
Duncan Smith therefore won with 61% of the votes (Norton 2006: 38).  
Duncan Smith failed to impress the electorate and opposition to his leadership 
rapidly mounted among some sections of the rank and file and the parliamentary 
party. Stuart Wheeler, a very important party donor, went public saying the leader had 
to  go  (Ahmed  2003).  A  vote  of  confidence  was  triggered  and  MPs  voted  on  29 
October 2003.
41 Duncan Smith had used the argument that a leadership battle would 
be too divisive to save his own leadership (Katz and Happold 2003). While it failed to 
save him, Tory MPs still listened to the argument. They all rallied behind Michael 
Howard,  whose  name  had  been  mentioned  as  a  potential  replacement  for  many 
months.  Ironically,  while  OMOV  had  been  introduced  in  the  selection  process, 
Conservative  MPs  returned  to  the  old  ballot-free  method  of  candidate  selection. 
Michael  Howard  'emerged'  from  among  the  parliamentary  party  as  the  consensus 
candidate (Kelly 2004: 401). As a result, they saved the party from another leadership 
campaign that would have publicly displayed the party's internal divisions once again. 
In the process, they deprived party members of their right to choose their leader, even 
though many may have been relieved to see an end to the infighting (Freeland 2003). 
The regional branches are at no point involved in this process. It is mainly in the 
hands of the British parliamentary party, in which Scotland and Wales are weakly 
present. As a result, the Conservative party is given a code of 0.  
 
                                                 
41 The party leader can only be removed after losing a vote of confidence of party MPs. A vote of 
confidence can be triggered by 15% of the parliamentary party. With 166 MPs, it meant that only 25 
members were needed.  
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The party's central executive: the Board 
The  reform  of  party  organisation  established  a  new  executive  body  in  charge  of 
managing the extra-parliamentary party. It counts at least 14 members, five directly 
elected by the National Conservative Convention (the Chairman of the NCC acts as 
deputy chairman of the Board), three directly appointed by the party leader (the party 
chairman, someone who acts deputy chairman and the treasurer), the elected chairman 
of the 1922 Committee, the Conservative leader in the House of Lords, the elected 
deputy chairman of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist party, the co-ordinating 
chairman  for  Wales,  the  elected  chairman  of  the  Conservative  Councillors 
Association, a senior member of staff of the party appointed by the chairman, and up 
to two additional members appointed by either the board or the leader (Conservative 
party 1998). The Board is in particular responsible for the management of the party 
with  regard  to party  organisation,  appointment  of  senior party  staff,  campaigning, 
fundraising  and  finance,  membership  and  the  maintenance  of  a  national  list  of 
candidates for England and Wales. 
Part of Hague's strategy to improve internal democracy and involve lower level 
activists into the party, 'the board was supposed to bring a bit more party democracy 
to party headquarters' (Kelly 2004: 401). However, none of the members of the Board 
is  actually  directly  elected by the  membership.  Moreover, the  Board  can  easily  be 
marginalised by the party leader. For instance Iain Duncan Smith appointed a number 
of party staff himself and created new positions, placing some of his allies in key 
positions  without  the  Board's  assent.  The  leader's  managerial  rule  for  manoeuvre 
therefore remains large in spite of the new rules. The role of the representatives of the 
Scottish and Welsh parties is therefore very limited. The party receives a score of 1 for 
the presence of one representative each for Scotland and Wales. 
 
Candidate selection for Westminster parliamentary elections 
Candidate selection has always been the key function of constituency organisations, 
and Hague's organisational reform has maintained the main characteristic of candidate 
selection  in  the  Conservative  party,  constituency-level  autonomy,  even  though  a 
central screening system was established.  
Since 1998, the party board appoints a Committee on Candidates responsible for 
establishing  and  maintaining  a  list  of  approved  candidates  for  Westminster 
parliamentary elections. Constituency associations in England and Wales must select 
their candidate from among this list. While this indeed implies a certain centralisation 
of the candidate selection process, McKenzie (1955: 250) reported that it was not 
uncommon for constituency chairmen to go to Conservative Central Office when a 
vacancy emerged. They would then inform Central Office about the type of candidate 
they were looking for and Central Office would in return provide support and suggest 
promising candidates.  
Constituency  selection  committees  make  a  shortlist  of  around  20  candidates 
from  which  three  are  selected  after  interviews.  These  three  candidates  are  then 
interviewed by the executive committee of the constituency association, which votes 
to put forward to the vote of party members at least two of them. Finally, a general 
meeting of the constituency association (meeting of the party members) is held and a 
vote taken to select the candidate.  
Candidate  selection  remains  principally  a  prerogative  of  the  constituency 
associations,  and  the  leadership  and  Central  Office  find  it  difficult  to  influence 
constituencies. Kelly (2004: 402-3) gives the example of former Foreign Secretary  
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Malcolm Rifkind as an illustration of the limited authority of the central party over 
candidate selection: supported by the central party, Rifkind applied for selection in the 
Windsor constituency and failed to even make it to the short-list. Central Office has 
also been unable to influence the composition of the parliamentary party and has 
often struggled to persuade constituency parties that they should be more open to 
young,  female  and  ethnic  minority  applicants.  For  instance,  at  the  same  time  as 
William Hague was declaring that he wanted to make the Conservative party more 
inclusive for women, not a single female candidate was selected in conservative-held 
seats where the sitting MP was retiring (Taylor 2003: 231). 
The selection procedure is similar in Scotland, with the exception that the list of 
approved candidates is established in Scotland. People who want to be considered as 
Conservative party candidate apply to the Scottish Candidates Board (which includes a 
chairman of the Candidates Board appointed by the Scottish Executive, the party 
chairman and two other members). They are then interviewed by three members of 
the candidates board and then, if approved, placed on a reference list for constituency 
associations  (interview  with  Mars  Goodman).  The  rest  of  the  procedure  at  the 
constituency level is similar to that for the rest of the UK. 
Because  of  the  asymmetry  of  the  process,  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  branches 
receive different codes: 3 for Scotland and 0 for Wales.  
 
Policy-making, making the manifesto for general elections 
Policy-making  in  the  Conservative  party  has  always  been  characterised  by  a  large 
degree of leadership autonomy. Little has changed since McKenzie (1955: 297) wrote 
that 'the Conservative Leader has sole ultimate responsibility for the formulation of 
policy and is not formally bound by the decisions of any organ of his party either 
inside or outside of Parliament'. The party constitution declares that 'the Leader shall 
determine the  political  direction of  the  Party having  regard  to the  views  of  Party 
Members and the Conservative Policy Forum' (Conservative party 1998).  
While other party organs are also involved in policy debates, the leader in under 
no obligation to follow the resolutions or policy papers debated and approved by the 
conference and the policy forum. As McKenzie (1955: 63) put it, 
'The leader also has exclusive responsibility for the formulation of party 
policy. He may consult whom he wishes; he may (and obviously does) 
pay attention to the resolutions passed by the various organs of the party, 
but he remains, (as the Maxwell Fyfe Committee put it in its review of 
the Conservative Party structure), "the main foundation and interpreter 
of policy"'. 
Before the 1998 party reform, party conferences were the only forums in which 
party members, via their constituency representatives, had a voice over party policy. 
However,  the  sheer  size  (in  1996  about  11,000  party  members  attended  the 
conference; Faucher-King 2005: 249) and format of Conservative party conferences 
limit  the  possibility  of  in-depth  policy  debate.  Party  conferences  have  remained 
relatively unchanged. Constituencies from all over the country can send up to seven 
representatives (the chairman, two deputy chairmen, the agent or secretary, and three 
representatives, of which one must be from a recognised organisation representation 
party  members  under  the  age  of  30).  Can  also  attend  current  and  former  Board  
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members, members of area management executives and area chairmen
42, MPs, MEPs, 
MSPs, AMs, Conservative peers, selected parliamentary candidates, candidates on the 
approved lists, representatives from recognised affiliated organisations and university 
branches, and leaders of the Conservative groups elected at the local level. Scottish 
and Welsh elected members can therefore attend but they are clearly outnumbered by 
representatives from England.  
Traditionally,  Conservative  party  conferences  have  been  considered  as  large 
rallies in which party members socialised, informally discussed policy and displayed 
support to their leaders. Unlike Labour conferences, Conservative conferences are not 
considered  as  policy-making  events  in  the  sense  that  party  activists  do  not  vote 
binding policy resolutions. McKenzie (1955: 66-7) nevertheless argues that the party 
leader cannot remain too isolated from the rest of the party because he owes his 
position to the parliamentary party and, to a lesser extent, the rank and file. As a result, 
Conservative leaders have to listen to the rest of the party to maintain their position. 
Kelly (1989) also argues that Conservative autumn party conferences, together with 
other conferences held throughout the year, represent an occasion for the leadership 
to listen to the opinions of the membership. While the conference's influence may not 
result from its constitutional status, it is nonetheless real and does have some informal 
impact over policy formulation.   
The  Fresh  Future  established  a  Conservative  Policy  Forum  (CPF)  designed  to 
provide party members with opportunities to participate in policy debates inside the 
party  in  a  structured  manner.  The  policy  forum  is  organised  into  policy-oriented 
discussion groups at the constituency level co-ordinated by a General Council, which 
commissions six 'discussion briefs' every year. In 2005 the party counted about 400 
such groups (interview with Scott Kelly). It is difficult to measure the participation in 
these groups, as there is a level of cross-membership. Constituencies can send reports 
to the director of the CPF, who then summarises the reports and send them to the 
Shadow  Cabinet.  Relevant  shadow  ministers  then  reply  to  the  constituencies  and 
would often include references to these submissions in their conference speeches. 
Kelly  (2001:  333-4)  reports  some  evidence  of  constituency  influence  via  CPF 
submissions.  
However, party leaders have remained strongly in control of the agenda. While 
Hague did use the CPF in some policy areas, he also made use of membership ballots 
to consolidate his position. He used a membership ballot at the very beginning of his 
leadership to reform the party. The question party members were asked was: 'Do you 
endorse William Hague as leader of the Conservative Party and support the principles 
of reform he has outlined?'. This 'back me or sack me' ballot resulted in a rather poor 
turnout (44%), with 80% of those returning their ballot papers in favour of the party 
reform. Party members were not, however, balloted on the precise reform but rather 
on a number of principles (unity, democracy, decentralisation, involvement, integrity 
and openness) highlighted by Hague in a speech in July 1997 (Kelly 1999: 28). In 1998, 
he  used  a  membership  ballot  on  party  policy  over  Europe.  However,  the  whole 
process  was  characterised  by  a  lack  of  any  real  internal  debate,  a  short  campaign 
period and an intensive campaign led by the leadership to muster support (Taylor 
2003: 236). The leadership's position (no entry in the EMU for the current parliament 
                                                 
42 England and Wales are divided in a number of areas, which have a co-ordinating role for finance, 
membership and campaigning, and provide constituency-level support.   
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and the next) was then adopted by 84.4% of those voting, with a 60% turnout. He 
organised a third ballot to have his pre-manifesto endorsed by the membership.   
All  these  mechanisms  still  remain  advisory,  and  the  leadership  keeps  a  large 
degree of autonomy in making policy and setting up the party's agenda. For instance, 
Iain Duncan Smith's promotion of 'compassionate conservatism' at the 2002 Spring 
Forum  was  not  preceded  by  any  form  of  consultation  and  was  the  product  of 
cogitations in the leaders' circle of advisers. Subsequent papers were also produced 
without consulting the party at large and without any reference to the work of the 
policy forum, which used to be consulted more under Hague's leadership (Kelly 2004: 
400). Under Howard, the policy forum remained relatively unused and policy was 
elaborated mainly by the leader's advisors. Hague's successors have been less eager to 
use the party's official policy-advisory organs and have had a more traditional vision of 
the role 'the popular organization of the Conservative party outside Parliament […] as a 
servant of the Party in Parliament' (McKenzie 1955: 147).  
The regional versions of the general election manifesto can be quite different as 
the Scottish version is written in Scotland and the Welsh version in London. The 
Welsh version of the general election manifesto is drafted by the UK party and the 
Welsh shadow secretary more in particular, with some input from the Welsh party. As 
a result, the Welsh general election manifesto tends to cover the UK agenda closely 
and  focuses  on  non-devolved  areas  (interview  with  David  Melding).  The  Scottish 
party  is  much  more  involved  in  the  elaboration  of  the  Scottish  general  election 
manifesto. In fact, the manifesto is made in Scotland, with the Scottish party adding its 
own policies on devolved mattes to the UK party's policies for reserved matters. As a 
result,  in  its  Scottish  version  the  UK  manifesto  is 'scotticised'  so  that  the  party 
describes what it would like to be done by the Scottish parliament and focuses on 
issues such as inter-governmental relations (interview with David McLetchie).  
Because of the existence of regional manifestos in which the regional parties 
have  a  significant  input,  the  Conservative  party  receives  a  code  of  1  for  the 
involvement  of  regional  party  branches  in  the  elaboration  of  the  general  election 
manifesto.  
 
5.2.3. Organisation in Scotland and Wales, powers and autonomy of the regional 
party branches 
The regional organisation of the Conservative party has not been studied in much 
detail. In his study of party organisation, what McKenzie described as the regional 
organisation was what corresponds to the area structure of the party. The two regional 
branches  started  the  devolution  era  from  two  very  different  positions:  while  the 
Scottish Conservative party has a long history of autonomy (and even independence 
until 1965), the Welsh Conservative party was a weak organisation with no previous 
experience of autonomy. A Conservative member of the National Assembly for Wales 
went as far as writing that under the Thatcher and Major periods, 'the Conservative 
Party in Wales became an utterly derivative entity without even the modest autonomy 
usually  given  to  a  branch  franchise'  (Melding  2005:  35-6).  A  Welsh  party  official 
declared that with devolution, 'the party moved beyond the status of a glorified region 
to that of a party proper'. Both however started with one thing in common: having 
lost all Westminster representation, they relied on the devolved bodies, which they 
opposed  in  the  first  place,  to  re-build  their  electoral  fortunes.  To  mark  this  new 




Selecting the Scottish and Welsh party leaders  
Constitutionally, there is only one leader in the Conservative party, the leader of the 
UK party. In Scotland, in practice, there is a party chairman appointed 'jointly by the 
Scottish Executive and the Leader of the Party' (Strathclyde Commission 1998) and a 
leader of the Conservative group in the Scottish Parliament.  
In 2004-2005, the party chairman was Peter Duncan, who was an MP between 
2001 and 2005. Peter Mundell replaced him in 2005. As the only Scottish Conservative 
MP of the parliamentary group, both have held the position of Shadow Secretary of 
State  for  Scotland.  The  first  leader  of  the  Conservative  group  in  the  Scottish 
Parliament,  David  McLetchie,  was  chairman  of  the  Scottish  Conservative  and 
Unionist Association, became leader of the party in the run-up to the first Scottish 
elections after the election. He was chosen to lead the campaign by MSPs and teh 
party  leadeship  and  was  asked  to  continue  as  leader  once  the  parliament  started 
working (interview with David McLetchie). After McLetchie resigned as leader of the 
Conservative  group  in  the  Scottish  Parliament  in  2005  over  allegations  over  his 
expenses claims, a leadership contest was triggered. Two candidates were expected to 
stand, Annabel Goldie, the deputy leader, and Murdo Fraser. Instead, they agreed to 
form a joint ticket, with Goldie as leader and Fraser as deputy leader.
43 As no other 
Conservative MSP stood against them, she automatically became leader, and the party 
did not organise a membership ballot.   
In Wales, the leader of the party group in the National Assembly is elected by 
ballot of party members for a term, and there is no procedure to de-select the leader. 
The first ballot was held in autumn 1998 and opposed Rod Richards to Nicholas 
Bourne, who was regarded as Hague's preferred candidate for the job.
44 The first won, 
led the campaign, and briefly led the Conservative Assembly group. He was forced to 
resign in August 1999 after allegations of assault on a young woman (Norton 2002: 
92).  Bourne  was  the  only  candidate  to  succeed  him  and  became  leader  of  the 
Conservative group shortly after. The Welsh Management Board is chaired by the 
chairman of the Welsh Conservative party. Unlike in Scotland where the chairman is 
appointed by the UK leader and the Scottish executive, the chairman of the Welsh 
Conservative party and his deputy are elected by the party's annual general meeting. 
Focusing on the choice of the leader of the parliamentary party, which is more 
powerful than the chairman, who has a more administrative role, the Scottish and 
Welsh Conservatives receive a score of 3. 
 
Selecting candidates for Scottish and Welsh elections  
The selection of candidates for Scottish and Welsh elections is a process managed at 
the  regional  level  following  rules  similar  to  those  used  by  the  UK  party  for 
Westminster elections. The Scottish Conservative party already used to select its own 
candidates for Westminster elections, but the Welsh party had to start from scratch. 
Both regions are free to select their own candidates and the UK party is not involved 
in the process.  
In Scotland, the Candidates' Board composed of four members of the Scottish 
party,  including  the  chairman,  is  in  charge  of  establishing  the  centralised  list  of 
                                                 
43 BBC News Online (2005) 'Goldie "ready to wield handbag"', 8 November 2005 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/4416194.stm  
44 BBC News Online (1999) 'Rod Richards: a Profile, 6 August 1999  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/413392.stm   
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approved candidates for Scottish Parliament election. Applicants have to fill in a form, 
in which they have to describe their experience and the competences that would make 
them  suitable  candidates,  as  well  as  references  and  details  on  their  character  and 
possible sources of embarrassment to the party.
45 They are then interviewed and, as 
most were motivated candidates, were placed on the list from which constituency 
associations can choose their candidates. If a constituency backed a candidate who 
was not on the list, this candidate would then be interviewed by the candidates board 
for approval. The support from a constituency association would be a good reason for 
the board to select the candidate.  
In Wales, the process was relatively informal in 1999. When someone expressed 
interest in being a candidate, her background was checked, she was interviewed in 
order  to  ensure  her  suitability  and  motivation.  The  process  was  kept  short  for  a 
number of reasons: first of all, the Welsh party structure was a new one, as the Welsh-
wide structure was created by the Fresh Future reforms. Second, the party had to recruit 
60  candidates  from  a  relatively  limited  pool  of  applicants.  It  was  particularly 
challenged when it came to selecting female candidates (interview with Paul Valerio). 
The Welsh party decided to adopt a more professional approach to candidate selection 
for the 2003 election, with a full written application and thorough interviewing of the 
candidates. Eventually, the party approves 73 people, including 18 women on the list. 
Constituency associations could then select a constituency candidate from among this 
list.  
In both Scotland and Wales, to appear on one of the party's lists, a candidate had 
to have been selected as a constituency candidate. The reason for this is to motivate 
the candidates, who are much more likely to be elected on the regional ballot than at 
the constituency level (interview with Paul Valerio). In 1999, the ranking of the Welsh 
lists  was  established  by  vote  of  those  members  who  attended  the  special  general 
meeting designed to introduce the candidates to party members. Due to protest from 
the base, the party extended the voting rights to all party members, and a postal ballot 
was organised. Candidates were ranked according to the number of votes they had 
received. The same method was used in Scotland for the 1999 and 2003 elections 
(interview with Mars Goodman).  
The Welsh and Scottish Conservatives are able to select their candidates for 
regional elections freely. They receive a score of 3 for this indicator. 
 
Policy-making for elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales 
Both regional parties are free to elaborate their own policy platforms for elections to 
the Scottish Parliament and Assembly elections. They follow the same logic as the UK 
party, with a strong policy role for the elected politicians and not formal role for the 
membership or other party groups.  
After its 1997 defeat in Scotland, the party launched its own review process. 
While  the  Strathclyde  Commission  reviewed  party  organisation,  the  Rifkind 
Commission  addressed  policy  issues.  After  over  400  meetings  were  held,  the 
commission produced a report 'Scotland's Future', in which it emphasised the Scottish 
party's need to adapt Conservative principles to the Scottish context (Seawright 2004: 
8-9).  Policy  is  made  by  the  conservative  group  in  the  Scottish  Parliament,  with  a 
strong dominance of the leader. Like at the UK level, there is a Scottish policy forum, 
                                                 
45 A copy of this form is available online on the party's website: 
http://www.scottishconservatives.com/pdfs/candidates_application_form_final.pdf   
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but respondents declared that it had not worked very well. The Scottish conference as 
well as the Scottish Council (Scottish equivalent of the Conservative Convention) has 
a consultative role over policy. However, the Scottish leader in the Scottish Parliament 
was keen to admit that the conference was more a showcase for the press than a 
policy-making body.  
The manifesto for election to the Scottish Parliament is drafted by the Scottish 
group, based on the party's past policy in the Scottish parliament and new proposals 
from  the  parliamentary  group.  The  draft  is  then  sent  for  consultation  to  the 
constituency  associations  and  their  members,  candidates  and  the  executive  of  the 
Scottish party. Goodman argued that little policy discussion actually took place during 
Scottish Board meetings due to lack of time and busy agendas. Policy on reserved 
areas would be taken from the UK party's line, but the Scottish party is free to adopt 
its own policies with regard to devolved areas.  
In Wales, the policy process is relatively similar. For the 1999 election, the UK 
leader William Hague appointed a number of spokespersons on different issues to 
develop policies for the future Welsh Assembly and consult with the wider party in 
Wales. The party manifesto was then drafted by the Welsh party leadership. The 2003 
manifesto was elaborated by the party's policy director (David Melding AM) based on 
documents produced by the party's Assembly spokespersons and under the authority 
of the party leader. Two conferences were then held, one in south Wales and one in 
North Wales, to provide an opportunity for party members to give their opinion on 
the draft. The official manifesto has to be approved by the Welsh Board before being 
presented to the UK party. Melding argued that 'there [was] something of a self-
constraint […] on the policy process' in terms of the extent of policy difference that 
the Welsh party allowed itself, but that there had not been any direct interference by 
the central party on the policy process. The national assembly manifesto is written in 
Wales, and the approval by the central party never proved problematic. At the same 
time, there is a feeling of belonging to the same party and recognition that high-profile 
divergence  with  England  might  work  at  the  benefit  of  political  opponents  and 
embarrass the UK party. 
Because  the  Welsh  party has  to  send the  manifesto  to  the  central  party  for 
approval, it receives a score of 2 while the Scottish party is given a score of 3. 
 
Party finance 
After having been the richest party in Britain for a very long time, the Conservative 
party  is  now  the  second  richest  after  Labour.  It  draws  most  of  its  income  from 
donations, from both individuals and corporations. The party receives a number of 
large donations from party members. For instance since 2001 party treasurer Stanley 
Kalms (Lord Kalms since 2004) has donated over £600,000 to the party. Just before 
the 2001 election Paul Getty donated £5 million and John Wheeler £2.5m. Public 
money represents the party's second source of income. However, between the 2001 
and 2005 elections, only one donation exceeded £1m and the party received close to 
30 donations between £250,000 and £500,000. 
The Scottish and Welsh Conservative parties are not accounting units registered 
with the Electoral Commission. It is therefore impossible to evaluate the distribution 
of resources. It seems however that it is rather centralised. Party funding in Scotland 
and Wales goes to the parliamentary party in the Scottish Parliament and the National 




Table 5.3. Conservative Party accounts, 2001-2005 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Income central party  31,222,000  23,294,000  13,619,000  22,264,000  24,227,000 
Total donations  21,457,000  12,172,000  7,647,000  13,336,000  13,574,000 
Membership fees  n.a.  713,000  689,000  803,000  843,000 
% of  total income  -  3.1  5.1  3.6  3.5 
Public funding (as reported in accounts) 
 Policy development grant   38,000  403,000  449,000  419,000  408,000 
Short money*  3,439,066  3,459,536  3,566,927  3,666,885  4,206,057 
Cranborne money*  227,597  390,555  402,662  413,131  426,351 
Scottish Parliament grant  n.a.  91,000  101,000  101,000  104,000 
% of total income  11.9  18.6  33.2  20.7  21.2 
* correspond to years 2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06. 
Sources: Conservative Party (2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006); Register of donations to political 
parties, http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk; Kelly (2006) 
The register of party donations of the Electoral Commission only reports two 
donations to the Scottish Conservative party in 2001, for an amount of £9,000 from 
the same individual and none to the Welsh party. Articles in The Scotsman in 2003 
however reported that most of the resources of the Scottish Conservatives came from 
the donations from a single Scottish businessman based in Monaco (MacDonell 2003a 
and 2003b). At the time of the article, it was reported that Irvine Laidlaw's donations 
(£37,000 a month) amounted to up to 80% of the party's income. This individual 
donor also contributed to the party's staff and equipment.  
The electoral weakness of both regional parties is also a problem in terms of 
fundraising. As a result, the UK party sometimes has to step in and provide funding 
for  electoral  campaigns.  While  the  Scottish  party  funds  itself  its  campaigns  for 
Holyrood  elections,  the  UK  party  occasionally  provides  some  help.  For  National 
Assembly elections, the Welsh party is also in charge of funding its own campaign, but 
the UK party also provides resources, mainly in terms of staff. The UK party also pays 
the  salaries  of  the  staff  of  area  campaign  directors  and  sends  money  for  the 
management  of  the  area  level  (interview  with  Raymond  Monbiot).  The  Welsh 
Conservatives  are  highly  dependent  on  the  UK  party  for  their  finances  and  lack 
resources to develop research at the Welsh level (interview with David Melding).  
Today, the party still has a staff of 13 in Edinburgh (plus 8 working for the 
parliamentary  party).  The  party's  accounts  report  that  the  party  employed  in  its 
regional offices 18 staff in 2001, 14 in 2002, 36 in 2003, 37 in 2004 and 44 in 2005. 
Most of the staff in Wales is paid by the UK party.  
Scotland appears to be a little more independent in terms of its resources and 
staff. As a result, the Scottish Conservatives receive a score of 2, while the Welsh 




With The Fresh Future, Hague created a national party overseen by a Board mainly 
composed of members appointed by the leader (only 5 of its 17 members are elected 
by  the  membership,  in  fact  the  National  Convention).  This  effectively  ended  the 
dichotomy between the party on the ground, Central Office and the parliamentary 
party. In effect, the Conservative party was created in 1998, as until then it was not a 
legally  recognised  entity  (Kelly  2003:  83).  The  reform  introduced  membership 
participation in the election of the party leader but did little to enhance membership  
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participation  and  actually  influence  overall.  In  practice,  the  reform  reduced  the 
previously extensive autonomy of the constituency associations and implied a greater 
centralisation of the party. 
Table 5.4. Coding of the organisation of the Conservative party 
  Scotland  Wales 
Involvement of regional party branches in the central party     
1. Selection the leader of the state-wide party  0  0 
2. Involvement of regional party branches in the central party 
executive  1  1 
3. Selection of candidates for state-wide parliamentary elections  3  0 
4. Adoption of the manifesto for state-wide parliamentary 
elections 
1  1 
5. Amending the constitution of the state-wide party  0  0 
Sum involvement  5  2 
Autonomy of the regional party branches      
6. Organisational freedom of the regional party branches  3  3 
7. Selection of the regional party leaders  3  3 
8. Selection of candidates for regional elections  3  3 
9. Adoption of the manifesto for regional elections  3  2 
10. Funding of the regional party branches   2  1 
Sum autonomy  14  12 
There is a clear asymmetry between the Scottish party, which is autonomous and 
affiliated to the UK party, and the Welsh party, which is a more recent entity and has 
more the status of a party branch. While they have the same nominal autonomy in 
terms  of  establishing  policy  and  selecting  their  leaders  and  candidates,  the  Welsh 
party's  room  for  manoeuvre  is  limited  by  the  lack  of  historical  experience  of 
autonomy,  a  lack  of  autonomous  resources  that  would  enable  it  to  develop  an 
autonomous  structure  and  staff,  a  majoritarian  culture  that tends to consider  that 
Wales is not so different from Wales, and a stronger reluctance to accept devolution.  
 
5.3. The Liberal Democrats 
5.3.1. From the Liberal Party to the Liberal Democrats 
Party formation 
The Liberal Democrats are the last, contemporary incarnation of the Liberal party, 
which was born in 1859 as the merger of the free trade Peelites, Whigs and Radicals. 
The  party  incarnated  the  new  middle  class  of  business  men  and  merchants  that 
emerged from the industrial revolution. The core beliefs of the party were individual 
liberty (civil and religious rights, opposition to arbitrary government) and free trade. 
Liberals believe in man's conscience and individual capacity to reason but not with the 
optimism of the socialists, as they distrust power, which they see as a corrupting force. 
As  a  result,  Liberals  want  government  authority  to  be  limited  by  constitutional 
constraints that would limit potential abuses of power and create 'checks and balances' 
(Heywood 1998: 41). In its early configuration, the party was a rather broad church, 
mainly  united  by  a  defence  of  non-conformism  against  the  established  Anglican 
Church (Curtice 1988: 94). The Liberal party represented the forces of change against 
the Conservatives' defence of tradition. 
At the end of the 19
th century, the party represented the new bourgeoisie and the  
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newly enfranchised sections of the urban working class. It adhered to a classical form 
of liberalism, which advocated a form of freedom that is often described as 'negative 
freedom',  that  is,  'freedom  from'  constraint.  This  belief  goes  together  with  the 
doctrine  of  the  'minimal  state'  both  with  regard  to  the  political  realm  and  the 
economy.  
With the rise of the working class and its progressive enfranchisement at the end 
of the 19
th century appeared a new 'branch' of liberalism. 'New' or 'social' liberalism 
recognised the need for government intervention in order to satisfy growing demands 
for social justice. The party tried to appeal to working class voters by being the party 
of freedom (in particular of religion and also freedom to work) and the party of cheap 
food, through their opposition to, and eventual abolition of, the Corn Laws.  
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As a number of trade unions were seeking political representation, the Liberal 
party  endorsed  some  union-sponsored  candidates,  in  particular  in  mining 
constituencies (Dutton 2004: 7). After the formation of the Labour Representation 
Committee  in  1900,  representatives  from  both parties  reached  a  secret  agreement 
whereby they would not contest the same seats. The Liberal party was then convinced 
that  it  could  integrate  the  working  class  in  its  ranks  and  absorb  the  trade  union 
movement in order to create a progressive coalition of the centre-left (Garner and 
Kelly 1998: 161). 
The party's organisational development started at the local level and culminated 
in 1877 with the establishment of the National Liberal Federation, which created a 
democratic system of representation and provided major powers to the party's annual 
conference.  This  extra-parliamentary  side  of  the  party  was  nevertheless  relatively 
powerless over the parliamentary wing, which predated the emergence of the party 
organisation and had its own organisation, the Liberal Central Association (Ball 1987: 
28-9). This dichotomy provided the parliamentary party with a great deal of autonomy 
over policy-making. On the other hand, the constituency associations were reluctant 
to follow the objectives of the parliamentary party, in particular with respect to the 
selection of working-class candidates (Ball 1987: 30-1).  
The years before the start of First World War were characterised by a growing 
social distance between the Liberal and Labour parties. As the Liberals failed to select 
sufficient number of working-class candidates, Labour was consolidating its support 
among the working-class electorate. At the 1918 general elections, the party came into 
third place after the Conservatives and Labour.   
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After a temporary reprieve in 1923 when the party re-united around the issue of 
free trade (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005: 19), the Liberal party entered a long-lasting 
crisis. Its last government participation is the wartime coalition cabinet between 1940 
and  1945.  While  the  Liberal  party  heavily  influenced  the  post-war  years  with  for 
instance the Beveridge report that inspired the creation of the National Health Service 
and the whole social security system, and John Maynard Keynes' impact on post-war 
economic  policies,  the  Liberal  party  kept  losing  votes  as  well  and  members  and 
organisational resources (Curtice 1988: 98). 
 
The Liberal Democrats: contemporary organisation and principles 
The Liberal's chance of a realignment of the left seemed to occur in 1981, when the 
'Gang of Four' defected from the Labour party to form the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP). Dissatisfied by the growing influence of the far left in the Labour party, Shirley 
Williams (former Labour MP and former Cabinet member), Roy Jenkins (former MP 
and Cabinet member, and then President of the European Commission) and MPs 
David Owen and Bill Rodgers tried to unite the social democratic wing of the party 
that was sidelined by the left-wing radicalisation of the Labour party. 28 Labour MPs 
and one Conservative MP joined the new party. 
From  the  beginning,  the  SDP  and  the  Liberal  party  co-operated  in  general 
elections, not contesting the same constituencies and proposing a common manifesto. 
After the 1983 and 1987 elections in which the SDP-Liberal Alliance performed well 
in terms of the vote (respectively 25.4 and 22.6% of the vote) but poorly in terms of 
seats (23 – 17 Liberals and 6 SPD – in 1983, and 22 – 17 Liberals and 5 SPD – in 
1987), the issue of a merger of the social liberals and social democrats was raised 
within both parties. David Owen, who had replaced Jenkins as leader of the SDP, was 
fiercely opposed to the merger, but a majority within the SDP was in favour of joining 
forces with the Liberals. Owen resigned as leader, leading a faction of anti-merger 
members with the intention of keeping the SDP to themselves.  
The merger negotiations lasted between late September 1987 and mid-January 
1988. After much acrimony that did little to improve the new party's image in the 
electorate, both parties agreed to a new constitution, a short policy document based 
on the 1987 election manifesto of the Alliance, and a new name, the Social and Liberal 
Democrats (SLD) (Crewe and King 1995: Chapter 21). This name was shortened to 
the Democrats in September 1988 and then changed to the Liberal Democrats in 1989 
(Steed 1996: 58). 
Former Liberal Paddy Ashdown was then elected leader of the new party. The 
party's immediate results were disappointing. While the Alliance recorded an average 
26.9% of voting intentions in Gallup polls during the whole 1983 legislature, the SLD 
polled a mere 11.7% between March 1988 and the 1992 election (Crew and King 
1995: 441). Confronted with SDP candidates wherever it stood, the SLD failed to 
impress in by-elections and came fourth in the European elections of the same year, 
behind the Green party (Dutton 2004: 269-70). However, the competition for third 
party  started  to  wane,  as  the  Green  party  had  disappeared  and  the  SDP  became 
increasingly  irrelevant.  The  party  started  to  fare  better  in  by-elections  and  local 
elections, and Ashdown affirmed himself as a charismatic leader for the new party.  
The party lost two seats in 1992. It was as usual disadvantaged by the electoral 
system, but also suffered from the process of policy change initiated by Neil Kinnock 
in the Labour party. Ashdown led the party until 1999. In the intervening years, he 
had been one of the strongest believers in a possible alliance with the Labour party.  
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This  collaboration  started  in  the  late  1980s  with  the  Scottish  Constitutional 
Convention but did not go further until Blair took the reins of the Labour party. 
Ashdown continued the party's collaboration with Labour in the Joint Consultative 
Committee  after  Labour's  1997  landslide,  mainly  to  discuss  constitutional  issues. 
However, after 1998 and the government's burial of the Jenkins report on the electoral 
system reform, the party started to question Ashdown's collaboration with Labour, 
and  while  the  JCC  remained  until  2001,  it  only  met  infrequently  (Russell  and 
Fieldhouse 2005: 40-3).  
Ashdown's  successor  was  a  former  member  of  the  SDP,  Charles  Kennedy. 
Kennedy's victory marked the end of the policy of collaboration with Labour, at least 
at the central level. During his leadership, the party saw its share of the votes increase 
to 18.3% of the votes in 2001 and 22% in 2005 and its number of seats increase from 
46 in 1997 to 52 in 2001 and 62 in 2005.  
Under the influence of Ashdown, the party moved toward a more pro-market 
economic policy in the early 1990s. The Liberal Democrats' message was articulated 
around 5 'E's: economy (less interventionist policies, independence of the Bank of 
England), environment, education (one of the most noticed policies of the party was 
its  proposal  to  increase  the  income  tax  in  order  to  finance  extra  investments  in 
education), electoral and constitutional reform, and support for the European Union 
(Brack 1996: 88-9). The party has since remained broadly faithful to these policies. 
Today, it remains rather left-leaning. Its belief in free-market economics is tempered 
by a perception that the market can achieve sub-optimal results at the individual level. 
These imperfections of the market should then be corrected by some level of state 
intervention.  The  Liberal  party  went  from  a 'negative'  definition  of  freedom  to  a 
'positive'  definition  of  freedom  ('freedom  to').  This  is  reflected  in  their  belief  in 
equality of opportunities, that is, that people cannot be free if poverty, sickness and 
unemployment hold them back.  
The Liberal Democrats kept the flame of liberalism burning in British politics 
and revived a party that seemed to be on the brink of electoral extinction in the 1950s 
and 1960s. If they have failed so far to recompose the left-of-centre in Westminster, 
they have achieved better results in Scotland and Wales, where they have managed to 
be coalition partners with Labour. Most notably, the Scottish Liberal Democrats have 
been in coalition with Labour since 1999.  
 
5.3.2. Organisation at the central level, state-wide party processes  
The  party  is  a  federation  of  the  Scottish  Liberal  Democrats,  the  Welsh  Liberal 
Democrats and the Liberal Democrats in England (called 'State Parties'). The Liberal 
Democrats inherited this federal structure from the Liberal Party (Curtice 1988: 104). 
At the time of the merger between the Liberal party and the SDP, Scottish Liberals 
advocated  the  permanence  of  the  federal  structure,  supported  by  their  Welsh 
counterparts (Ingle 1996: 114). The constitution of the 'federal party' declares that the 
'state parties' are sovereign and are entitled to exercise any power not reserved to the 
Federal party. In the terminology of the Liberal Democrats, 'regional parties' are sub-
divisions  of  the  state  parties  and  correspond  to  the  boundaries  of  former 
constituencies for European parliamentary elections (which have become top-up areas 
in Scotland and Wales). However, to remain consistent with the terms used for the 
description of the other parties, the word 'regional' will be used to refer to the Scottish 
and Welsh organisational units. Finally, the lower geographical unit of organisation is 
at  the  level  of  Westminster  constituencies  (called  'local  parties'  by  the  Liberal  
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Democrats). Their organisation and supervision is a competence of the regional party 
branches.  
The  party  expresses  a  commitment  to  a  number  of  organising  principles: 
decentralisation  and  principle  of  subsidiarity,  by  which  decisions  are  taken  at  the 
lowest  level  compatible  with  party  efficiency,  proportional  representation  in  party 




The  constitution  of  the  UK  Liberal  Democrats  stipulates  that  the  regional  party 
branches  are  responsible  for  any  power  not  attributed  to  the  federal  party  in the 
constitution. In its article 2, it lists the functions reserved to the UK party: policy in a 
number  of  areas,  the  party's  overall  strategy,  preparations  for  UK  and  European 
parliamentary  elections,  presentation  and  image  of  the  party  and  international 
relations.  The  constitution  describes  the  procedures  relative  to  UK-wide  party 
processes, such as the functioning of UK party organs, the election of the leader of 
the British party, the policy process for general elections, the selection of Westminster 
parliamentary  candidates  and  the  party's  relations  with  external  organisations.  The 
federal constitution can be amended by a vote of two thirds of the delegates voting at 
the federal conference. Any change in the respective powers of the UK and regional 
parties has to be accepted by the regional parties through their own procedures.  
The  regional  parties  in  Scotland  and  Wales  are  free  to  organise  and  are 
responsible  for  the  management  of  their  own  affairs.  As  a  result,  the  Liberal 
Democrats receive a score of 3 for the input of regional branches in the revision of 
the party constitution and a score of 3 for the organisational freedom of the regional 
branches.  
 
Selecting the party leader 
The  election  of  the  leader  of  the  Liberal  Democrats  is  a  rather  straightforward 
process.  An  election  is  called  after  the  resignation,  death  or  incapacitation of  the 
leader, if the leader requests an election or loses her seat in the House of Commons, in 
the case of a vote of no confidence by the House of Commons parliamentary party, at 
the petition of at least 75 constituency parties or one year after a general election if a 
leadership  elections  has  not  yet  taken  place.  Only  members  of  the  Commons 
parliamentary  party  supported  by  some  of  their  colleagues  and  at  least  200  party 
members from at least 20 local parties can be candidates.  
Like the leader of the SDP, the leader of the Liberal Democrats is elected by the 
party members (Punnett 1992: 140-6). The party is generally committed to electoral 
reform in the UK in order to replace the plurality rule by proportional representation. 
It has started by implementing PR in its own internal elections. The chosen formula 
for  all  intra-party  elections  is  single  transferable  vote  (STV).  Party  members  are 
consulted via postal ballot. 
As a result, there is no special role for the Celtic fringes, but there is no special 
role for any particular section of the party in the process. All party members, be they 
English, Welsh or Scottish, simple party member or Member of Parliament, have the 
same weight in the election of the party leader. The results have however been quite 
favourable  to  Scotland.  Charles  Kennedy,  the  party's  second  leader,  was  an  MP  
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representing a Scottish constituency, as was his deputy, Menzies Campbell.
46 However, 
a Scottish party officer recognised that having a Scottish leader in London did not 
always mean that the party understood better devolution and Scotland: 'the fact that 
the leader is Scottish can also create difficulties at times, when he [Charles Kennedy] 
seems to ignore the realities of Scottish politics', as has happened on a few occasions.  
The selection by party members is a way to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
leader from potential rivals and intermediate-level activists and increase the leader's 
autonomy (Punnett 1992: 147-8). A leader with a popular public image enjoys a rather 
high level of autonomy in terms of policy and strategy. Ashdown and Kennedy both 
benefited from a good image and were clearly the most famous faces of their party. As 
a result of media exposure and in a context where party leaders play a crucial role in 
parliamentary  debates,  the  party  leader  becomes  the  party  itself.  Such  dominance 
clearly translates into intra-party dominance over other members of the parliamentary 
party and party structures (Ingle 1996: 119).  
The method used to select the party leader means that there is no organised 
influence of the Scottish and Welsh parties over the process. As a result, the party 
receives a score of 0. 
 
The Federal Executive  
The Federal Executive (FE) is the most important party committee. It manages the 
party on a daily basis and is 'responsible for directing, co-ordinating and implementing 
the  work  of  the  Federal  party'  (Liberal  Democrats  2004).  It  comprises  the  party 
president
47, who is elected for two years by postal ballot of party members, three vice-
presidents (each is appointed from among its officers by a regional party branch), the 
party leader, two MPs, one peer, one MEP, two local councillors, one representative 
from each regional party branch, 15 members elected by the federal conference
48 and 
5 non-voting members (the Chief Whip, the chair of the Finance and Administration 
Committee – the FAC, the party treasurer, the chief executive of the federal party, a 
representative of the party staff and the chair of the Federal Policy Committee). Out 
of 29 members, the FE counts 6 representatives from the regional party branches 
(England, Scotland and Wales).  
The FE sets up the FAC, which is in charge of the finance and staff issues of the 
party. The FE has a potentially powerful power: it can conduct consultative ballots of 
party members on any issue it considers important enough in terms of the party's 
values and objectives or if it deems that the party's interests are at stake. It means that 
in theory the FE can try and overrule the party conference or even the Federal Policy 
Committee (FPC). Considering the implications the use of this power could have on 
the party's finance and cohesion, it is more a 'nuclear dissuasion' kind of power.  
Unlike  the  Conservative  and  Labour  parties,  the executive  committee of  the 
central  party  is  not  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  the  membership  list  and 
membership actions. It is the responsibility of each regional party branch to establish 
and maintain a register of party members. The FE has access to these lists, but it is a 
Joint  State  Membership  Committee  comprising  two  representatives  from  each 
                                                 
46 Campbell was elected leader in 2006.  
47 The party president has a rather administrative role within the party, as chair of a number of party 
organs, while the leader also has a political role and represents the party.  
48 The number of elected members has changed from 14 to 15. It must be equal to the number of 
members otherwise appointed or elected +1.  
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regional  branch  that  is  responsible  for  the  co-ordination  and  promotion  of  party 
membership. However, the Welsh party has delegated this function to the central 
party (interview with Stephen Smith). It is possible to join the party at the regional 
level and the membership card refers to the regional affiliation of the member.  
Both Scottish and Welsh party branches are always represented in state-wide 
party organs and they have two representatives each. The party receives a score of 1 
for the involvement of regional branches in the central executive. 
 
Candidate selection for Westminster general elections 
Like the other two parties, the Liberal Democrats provide for the selection of general 
election candidates by their constituency parties from a list of approved candidates 
established by a candidates committee. Unlike the Conservative and Labour parties, 
this process is a responsibility of the regional party branches in Scotland and Wales 
and  in  English  regions.  The  UK-wide  party  has  no  responsibility  over  candidate 
selection.  
Each  regional  party  establishes  a  candidates  committee that provides  lists  of 
approved  candidates  for  Parliamentary  and  European  Parliamentary  elections,  co-
ordinate and regulate the selection procedures and provide the adequate training to 
prospective  candidates.  The  state-wide  party's  constitution  provides  a  list  of 
considerations that should inspire the candidates committees in their selection, such as 
experience within the party, adherence to the party's values, gender balance and the 
representation of social diversity in the pool of approved candidates. In England, the 
party organises an 'approval day' in which all the prospective candidates come together 
and are evaluated by panels of four people. Candidates were tested on their knowledge 
of  party  policy,  their  campaigning  capacity  and  their  performance  in  a  press  test 
(interview with Jeremy Hargreaves). Candidate selection is the main function of an 
otherwise weak English party. The procedure was the same in Scotland and Wales, 
where  applicants  were  invited  to  a 'development  day',  where  they  were  evaluated 
before being placed on the list of approved candidates.   
The constitution also describes the selection process in great detail. Whereas the 
state  parties  can  approve  prospective  candidates  following  their  own  rules,  local 
parties have little room of manoeuvre over the actual selection process. The rules state 
that  the  local  parties  or  their  executive  committee  should  establish  a  short-list  of 
candidates that respects gender equality and the principle of representation of ethnic 
minorities. Local parties must then organise hustings meetings in which candidates can 
introduce themselves and party members can question them. A postal ballot of party 
members in each constituency then decides. Like for all party elections, the electoral 
system  is  STV.  They  have,  however,  complete  freedom  over  the  choice  of  their 
candidate,  and  there  is  no  final  approval  of  the  selected  candidates  by  either  the 
regional party or the UK party. 
In Scotland, the party was confronted to the problem of hiving to fill more 
positions than it had approved candidates. As a result, the 'best' seats, that is, the most 
winnable  ones,  had  the  'best'  candidates.  For  the  rest,  a  'licensing'  system  was 
established, by which local parties could select a candidate first and then have her 
approved  by  the  Scottish  Campaigns  and  Candidates  Committee  (interview  with 
Douglas Herbison).  
The exception to this procedure is in the case of a by-election. Because of the 
media attention that a by-election attracts, the Scottish party selects the candidate 
rather than the local party. In the words of a party official, 'no party trusts its local  
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party to just choose somebody local for something that they see as important as a by-
election'. 
Even though the selection is made by the local parties, the Scottish and Welsh 
parties  are  responsible  for  the  oversight  of  the  process  and  initial  vetting  of 
candidates. Moreover, the federal party is not involved in the process. As a result, the 
Liberal Democrats receive a score of 3 for this indicator.   
 
Policy-making for general elections 
The Liberal Democrats have two policy-making bodies: the Federal Policy Committee 
(FPC) and the conference. The FPC is composed of the party leader, one MP elected 
by Liberal Democrat Ps, one MP from an English constituency, one MP representing 
a Scottish constituency and one MP from Wales, one Liberal peer, one MEP, the party 
president,  three  local  councillors,  one  representative  of  each  regional  party  and 
members elected by the annual conference so that they outnumber the members listed 
above by one. 
The party tries to find a form of balance between internal party democracy and 
leadership  autonomy,  and  its  organisation  'combines  leadership  authority  with 
substantial rank and file checks' (McKee 1994: 1006). The conference is the supreme 
policy-making organ of the party. The FPC is in charge of researching and developing 
policies,  setting  up  working  groups,  presenting  policy  proposals  to  the  annual 
conference and making the party manifesto. The leader is also an important source of 
policy proposals (Brack 1996: 97). The majority of the policy proposals debated at the 
conference come from the FPC, so the power of conference is quite limited in that 
respect (Garner and Kelly 1998: 176). 'As such, it is possibly the most influential body 
within the party' (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005: 58). There have nevertheless been 
cases of policy proposals being rejected by the conference (Brack 1996: 99).  
The manifesto is built from conference motions and policy papers elaborated by 
the FPC and official parliamentary spokespersons (Liberal Democrats equivalent of 
shadow ministers). The 'timetable means that […] some policy-making and 'updating' 
have to be done by the FPC' (interview with Matthew Taylor). The FPC presents a 
pre-manifesto draft for approval to the conference in the year preceding a general 
election. Tensions can nevertheless arise between the need to have policies that have 
been democratically elaborated and accepted by the party and the party's need to react 
quickly to current events or changes (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005: 59).  
The Scottish and Welsh parties have a limited role in the elaboration of UK 
policy, even though 'it is always ensured that there are Scottish and Welsh people 
around the table' (interview with Jeremy Hargreaves). The main area of discussion is 
actually about what is devolved and what is not, rather than about policy. There seems 
to be a trend toward a growing distance, reported by several respondents, between the 
UK and regional levels. The regions have their own policy-making organs and their 
own  conference  for  devolved  issues.  As  a  result,  decreasing  numbers  of  party 
members from Wales and Scotland attend the UK conference (interviews with Jenny 
Randerson).  In  the  end,  most  of  the  discussions  happen  either  at  staff  level  or 
between the leaders. Informal links are especially important in Scotland, as the leader 
and deputy leader are Scottish. However, policy discussions have mainly to do with 
the distribution of competences and making sure that the UK manifesto does not 
clash with what has been done by the Scottish Liberal Democrats in their governing 
coalition with Labour. Scottish and Welsh parties are consulted on the wording of  
138 
 
specific sections so as to avoid embarrassment as the party may have different policies 
in Holyrood. 
The Scottish and Welsh manifestos for general elections are elaborated by the 
Scottish and Welsh parties. Long before devolution, the party had separate Scottish 
and Welsh general election manifestos, which covered a wide range of issues that the 
party considered as the areas of competence that Wales would have in a federal UK 
(Deacon 1998: 476). Because 'the federal party has to make sure that the manifestos 
are  compatible',  Scottish  and  Welsh  manifestos  are  released  a  little  after  the  UK 
manifesto  (interview  with  Matthew  Taylor).  For devolved  issues,  the  Scottish  and 
Welsh parties are free to elaborate their own policies. In both parties, a regional policy 
committee is responsible for drawing up the manifesto. As a party official said, 'no 
one from the federal party has the right to come and tell the Welsh party that they 
should put in their manifesto.' The distinction between the areas of competence of 
Westminster and the devolved bodies is reflected in the composition of the regional 
manifestos:  
'The Welsh party would take more or less word for word federal party 
policies on Westminster issues. And then they would add on their own 
the Wales-relevant policies. The Welsh party would make clear what they 
would do if they were in control of Welsh Assembly'. 
A  very  similar  argument  was  made  in  Scotland,  where  the  situation  is  further 
complicated by the party's coalition with Labour and the policy record of the coalition: 
'The federal party has devised a number of lead lines about the campaign. 
These  are  things  like  abolition  of  council  tax,  abolition  tuition  fees, 
provision of free personal care, more police on the beat, etc. most of 
which […] are lines which had a great deal to do with what we've actually 
done in Scotland. They don't match our headline. The trouble is that if 
Charles Kennedy gives interviews about the manifesto on television and 
says  things  about  what  they're  going  to  do  about  tuition  fees,  free 
personal care, it doesn't quite fit the Scottish position. He's going to be 
very careful to say 'as we've already done in Scotland' […]. There are 
difficulties there, in presentational terms, which we're struggling with, to 
be quite honest' (interview with Robert Brown). 
However, the Liberal Democrats are really conscious of these difficulties and 
they have been quite careful to stress these differences. They have also little qualms 
about the reality of devolution meaning that the party in Scotland or Wales can adopt 
its own policies. In addition to this acceptance of diversity, the party is characterised 
by a good degree of representation of the Scottish and Welsh parties in the state-wide 
party's decisional organs. However, the evidence shows that the Scottish and Welsh 
parties  contribute  relatively  little  to  the  debates  of  the  state-wide  party,  except to 
remind the state-wide party of the limits of its competences. Moreover, Scottish and 
Welsh activists tend to be less interested in the federal party, as 'the centre of gravity 
of Welsh politics has shifted to Cardiff', and Edinburgh for Scotland (interview with 
Rob Humphreys).  
The input of the regional branches in the elaboration of the state-wide manifesto 
is limited to a number of informal meetings and the presence of Scottish and Welsh 
representatives in central party organs such as the Federal Policy Committee. They 
have a larger room for manoeuvre with respect to the elaboration of the Scottish and 
Welsh manifestos for general elections. As a result, the party is given a score of 1 for 




5.3.3. Organisation in Scotland and Wales, powers and autonomy of the regional 
party branches 
Within the organisation of the Liberal Democrats, the Welsh and Scottish Liberal 
Democrats are autonomous 'state' parties that are free to organise and whose activities 
are not overseen by the central party.  
 
Selecting the Scottish and Welsh party leaders 
Like for the UK party, the leaders of the Scottish and Welsh parties are elected by 
postal ballot of all party members in each region.  
In Scotland, the party constitution requires that the party leader should be a 
member of the Scottish Parliament and the deputy leader a member of the House of 
Commons representing a Scottish constituency. The threshold of participation in the 
contest is very low, as the support of only one of their peers is necessary to obtain 
nomination. The  leader  (and  her  deputy)  is  then elected  by  postal  ballot of  party 
members. As is the rule with the Liberal Democrats, the electoral system is single 
transferable vote. The leader is 'responsible for the political direction of the party and 
for promoting its cause in Scotland', while the deputy has a co-ordination role, liaising 
between Scotland and London. Finally, the party president, who is also elected by the 
party members, has a more administrative role and is described in the Scottish party's 
constitution  as  the  'guardian  of  the  Constitution'.  The  position  of  leader  of  the 
Scottish Liberal Democrats is now crucial, as Jim Wallace and then Nichol Stephen 
(since 2005) have been deputy First minister of Scotland. As a result, Jim Wallace has 
held the position of First minister on several occasions, in replacement of Donald 
Dewar and then Henry McLeish.  
In Wales, the leader does not have a deputy, but there are two different leaders: a 
party leader and a leader in the National Assembly for Wales. Both are elected by 
postal ballot of party members, from among the Welsh party's MPs, AMs or MEPs 
for the former and from among AMs for the latter. To obtain nomination, a candidate 
for the party leadership must gain the support of one member of either Houses of 
Parliament and thirty party members from at least 6 constituencies. For the leader in 
the National Assembly, a candidate needs the support of one Assembly Member and 
30 party members, with at least 5 party members by region.  
At the moment, the party leader, Lembit Öpik, is an MP. There is therefore a 
separation of competences between Öpik, who speaks for the party as a whole and is 
'the public face of the party', and Michael German, the leader of the Liberal Democrat 
group in the National Assembly, who speaks for devolved matters. In this respect, the 
party president's role has increased with devolution, as it serves a role of mediation 
and  co-ordination.  The  president  cannot  be  an  elected  official  (MP,  peer,  AM  or 
MEP)  and  represents  the  voluntary  party  (interview  with  Rob  Humphreys).  It  is 
certainly convenient for the party to have an MP as leader because of the particular 
difficulty of addressing an electorate that relies mostly on English-UK media. It would 
therefore be difficult for German to gain access to UK media, in particular as the 
Liberal Democrats came only in third position in the last election.  
The Liberal Democrats have not had the same issues as the Labour party with 
regard to the choice of the Scottish and Welsh party leaders. On the contrary, the 
central party has let its regional branches chose its leaders without intervening in the 




Candidate selection for elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales 
Just  like  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  parties  are  free  to  select  their  Westminster 
parliamentary candidates, they can select their candidates for elections to the Scottish 
Parliament and Welsh Assembly without any interference from the UK party.  
In Scotland, like for Westminster elections, there is a two-tier process whereby 
winnable seats are attributed to candidates who have gone through the centralised 
approval process overseen by the Scottish Campaigns and Candidates Committee, and 
candidates for more hopeless seats can be selected locally before being vetted by the 
Scottish  party.  The  list  of  approved  candidates  is  established  after  prospective 
candidates  have  gone  through  a  'development  day'.  Overall,  40  candidates  were 
approved out of 43 or 44 applicants (interview with Derek Barrie). Any party member 
leaving in Scotland can apply. 
Regional lists were made of people who were on the list of approved candidates 
and people who had applied to a constituency in the region or to the region itself. 
Party members in each region were asked to vote in order to establish the order of the 
candidates on the list.  
In Wales, the selection of candidates for constituency seats is also very close to 
that for Westminster parliamentary elections, with one exception: candidates have to 
live in Wales. The party uses the same criteria and the same list is used for both 
elections. The party organises 'development days', during which the political awareness 
of  prospective  candidates,  their  policy  knowledge  and  media  'compatibility'  are 
evaluated. Additional training can be required before candidates can be fully approved 
(interview with Jenny Randerson).  
The  elaboration  of  the  regional  lists  is  overseen  by  regional  committees 
consisting  of  representatives  of  the  constituencies  in  each  region.  After  several 
hustings meetings, a ballot of party members in the region is organised either at the 
hustings or by postal ballot. People are placed on the list in the order in which they 
come out after the vote. 
The Liberal Democrats have a completely autonomous process of selection of 
their candidates for Scottish and Welsh elections and they receive a score of 3.  
 
Making party policy for Scottish and Welsh elections 
In  both  regions,  it  is  the  regional  policy  committee  that  is  responsible  for  the 
elaboration of the election manifesto. These policy committees set up policy groups, 
which lead consultations and produce policy papers, which are then presented to the 
conference for approval. The conference is for the Liberal Democrats an important 
policy-making organ of the party. As Jenny Randerson put it, 'they are not just shop-
windows by any means'. The manifestos are elaborated by the Welsh and Scottish 
Policy  Committees  on  the  basis  of  the  policies  adopted  by  their  respective 
conferences. 
However, the need to be reactive to political events means that AMs and MSPs 
have  an  important  role  in  policy-making.  In  such  a  case,  AMs  co-ordinate  their 
response with the Welsh Policy Committee. With devolution, the role of the Scottish 
Executive Committee (SEC) is also less political and more administrative, as the policy 
centre  of  the  party  has  shifted  to  the  Scottish  Policy  Committee  (SPC)  and  the 
Scottish parliamentary party (interview with Derek Barrie). In particular in the context 
of the coalition with Labour, the MSPs become important sources of policy expertise, 
and the convener of the SPC regularly meets with the Deputy First minister.   
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The central party has a role in the process in the sense that the commitments of 
the UK party in terms of budget and finance have an impact on the finance of the 
regions. The Liberal Democrats are careful to stress the link between the UK financial 
commitments  and  the  resources  that  will  be  made  available  to  the  regions.  Even 
though they would like to see the current financial aspect of devolution reformed, 
their regional manifestos use the UK framework to finance their proposals in Scotland 
and Wales (interview with Jenny Randerson). In this way, Welsh MPs are consulted on 
the  Welsh  elections  manifesto,  mainly  over  financial  issues  (interview  with  Roger 
Williams). Robert Brown reports that liaison with Scottish MPs is sometimes difficult 
because they are more focused on Westminster issues, but the issue of finance is one 
where the levels tend to co-operate. Overall, the regional parties 'don't really pay much 
attention  to  what  the  English  party  is  doing.  We're  a  federal  party.  That's  what 
federalism means' (interview with Rob Humphreys). 
The Liberal Democrats of all levels emphasise the fact that they share the same 
principles  but  that  differences  can  happen  because  of  different  circumstances.  As 
Randerson  puts  it,  'in  most  areas,  Welsh  policies are  different  but  not  dissimilar' 
because there is a lot that is relevant in Wales but is not in England and vice versa. 
This might lead to limited policy differences. For instance, the Welsh party 'is less 
inclined  'to  support  private  sector  involvement  in  the  NHS  than  the  UK  party 
(interview  with  Rob  Humphreys).  The  same  added  that 'the  Welsh  party  is  quite 
fiercely protective of its own policies'.  
The Liberal Democrats receive a score of 3 for this indicator because of the 
independence of the Scottish and Welsh parties in the making of regional policy and 
the elaboration of their manifestos for regional elections. 
 
Party finance 
Table 5.5 below shows that there is, like for the Labour and Conservative parties, a 
clear disparity between the resources of the central party and those of the Scottish and 
Welsh parties. The table also shows that the majority of donations go to the federal 
party. The exception is 2001, when a large share of the donations went directly to the 
local parties for constituency-level campaigning.  
The main sources of income of the Scottish and Welsh parties are membership 
fees,  policy  development  funding  from  the  central  party  and  donations  from  the 
party's elected representatives. After the PEERA introduced the Policy Development 
Fund, the regional parties negotiated the distribution of this fund with the central 
party (interview with Rob Humphreys). 
Before devolution, the Welsh Liberal Democrats did not have a budget (Deacon 
1998:  476).  They  started  the  devolution  period  with  policies  elaborated  by  an 
influential conference and a highly motivated group of activists and members of the 
Welsh Policy Committee (Deacon 1998: 477). It initially relied heavily on the central 
party  for  its  resources  and  has  since  managed  to  raise  some  money  for  its  own 
activities. The Scottish Liberal Democrats ceased to be eligible for public funding 
from the Scottish Parliament after the 2003 election because its number of ministers 
increased above the one fifth of the parliamentary group ratio of eligibility. It now 
counts 5 ministers from a group of 17 MSPs. For regional elections, the central party 






Table 5.5. Resources and income distribution in the Liberal Democrats (£) 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Income central party  5,033,286  3,694,525  4,096,280  5,060,121  8,582,035 
Income Scottish LD  n.a.  253,360  485,206#  314,181  360,469 
Income Welsh LD  96,913  139,204  335,750  175,280  187,111 
Membership fees           
Central party  589,699  680,032  680,170  709,539  768,450 
Scotland   n.a.  108,558  163,532  137,961  138,359 
Wales   42,814  48,067  49,313  49,004  93,394* 
Total donations  2,689,245  1,019,506  1,406,176  2,099,818  5,443,036 
To central party  684,112  521,759  574,652  1,134,431  3,848,243 
Scotland   n.a.  26,100  139,039  54,940  50,420 
Wales   15,020  8,866  10,235  59,192  21,087 
Share  donations  to  central 
party  25.4%  51.2%  40.9%  54.0%  70.7% 
Public funding       
Policy development grant   253,890  456,333  445,317  427,804  422,050 
Short money§  1,155,583  1,174,410  1,210,901  1,244,855  1,536,220 
Cranborne money§  68,278  195,000  201,045  206,272  212,873 
Scottish Parliament assistance§  68,224  n.a.  9,677  0  0 
Policy development grant received from central party 
Scotland  n.a.  18,859  32,537†  25,011  27,608 
Wales  8,053  25,405  32,795  21,677  39,492° 
# includes income of the Scottish Liberal Democrats Parliamentary group income (£73,273 in 
2003 -  £38,764 of public funding). The  accounts  of the SLD parliamentary  group of  the 
subsequent years were not available.  
*  Together  with  income  from  research  services,  AM  and  MP  donations,  donations  and 
appeals 
§ correspond to years 2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06. 
† includes £5,769 of PDF money for the Scottish LD Parliamentary Group. 
° includes a grant from the federal party ('Policy officer development'). 
Sources:  http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk;  Liberal  Democrats  (2002,  2004,  2006); 
Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  (2004,  2005,  2006);  Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  Parliamentary 
Group (2004) and Welsh Liberal Democrats (2003, 2005, 2006). 
The Scottish and Welsh parties found extra resources in 2003 for the funding of 
their election campaigns. This is most evident for the Scottish party, which managed 
to  significantly  increase  its  income  from  donations.  However, none of  the parties 
receive donations from big donors or trade unions, and they both count together 
donations and appeals to the membership. This probably distorts the picture, as the 
Electoral  Commission's  register  of  donations  reports  only  two  donations  from 
individuals for that year, for a total of over £9,000. The donations reported to the 
Electoral Commission by the Welsh party are nearly exclusively from the party's AMs.  
The number of staff of the Scottish party has increased from 7 to 9 since 2002, 
while 6 people work for the Welsh party (albeit in 2005 4 of them worked part-time). 
One of the Welsh party's members of staff is paid by the central party to assist the 
party' policy development. The party also provides technical assistance, for instance by 
maintaining the Welsh party website. 
The  Liberal  Democrats  receive  a  score  of  1  for  the  funding  of  its  regional 
branches because of their rather limited resources and the fact that the state-wide 





The Liberal Democrats gives complete autonomy to their Scottish and Welsh regional 
branches.  The  party  at  the  central  level  is  characterised  by  'an  absence  of  the 
centralised  structures  of  the  SDP,  while  similarly  improving  on  the  ill-disciplined 
organisation  of  the  old  Liberal  party'  (McKee  1994:  1006).  The  autonomy  of  the 
regional  branches  has  led  to  some  level  of  policy  divergence,  often based  on  the 
particular needs of the region rather than on a divergence in principles. For instance 
Rob  Humphreys  declared that 'philosophically,  it  would  be  wrong  to  say  we  [the 
Welsh Liberal Democrats] are a completely separate party from London. We share the 
same positions in life about liberalism, social justice and so on, so we're never going to 
depart'.  
Table 5.6. Coding of the organisation of the Liberal Democrats  
  Scotland  Wales 
Involvement of regional party branches in the central party     
1. Selection the leader of the state-wide party  0  0 
2. Involvement of regional party branches in the central party 
executive  1  1 
3. Selection of candidates for state-wide parliamentary elections  3  3 
4. Adoption of the manifesto for state-wide parliamentary 
elections 
1  1 
5. Amending the constitution of the state-wide party  3  3 
Sum involvement  8  8 
Autonomy of the regional party branches      
6. Organisational freedom of the regional party branches  3  3 
7. Selection of the regional party leaders  3  3 
8. Selection of candidates for regional elections  3  3 
9. Adoption of the manifesto for regional elections  3  3 
10. Funding of the regional party branches   1  1 
Sum autonomy  13  13 
Overall, while there are organs to co-ordinate party activities and the Scottish 
and Welsh parties are integrated in central party organs, the attendance of Scottish and 
Welsh members of the central organs is often low (Deacon 1998 provides the example 
of Wales). A number of respondents reported that there was now 'a certain distance' 
between England on the one hand, and Scotland and Wales on the other.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the organisation of the three British state-wide parties. It 
appears that all three have taken devolution into account to diverse degrees and with 
various levels of facility.  
As the party that most supports devolution and that would even favour a federal 
United Kingdom, the Liberal Democrats are the party that has granted the highest 
level of autonomy to both its Scottish and Welsh branches. It had adopted a 'federal' 
form of organisation even before devolution as a part of its Liberal heritage. The 
Scottish and Welsh Liberal Democrats are free to organise, choose their leaders and 
candidates and elaborate their own policies without the intervention of the central 
party. Divergence is considered as an inevitable consequence of devolution which the 
party has  to  accept  and  adapt  to.  The  level  of  vertical  integration  of  the party  is 
relatively limited. While the Scottish and Welsh parties are integrated in central party  
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organs, both regions and their members now tend to focus more on the regional level 
and participate less in the activities of the state-wide party. 
The Conservative party clearly has an asymmetrical organisation. The Scottish 
Conservative  party  has  a  long  history  of  autonomy  from  the  UK  party  and  has 
remained a more autonomous entity within the Conservative party than its Welsh 
counterpart. The Welsh party was created when it appeared that a Welsh Assembly 
would be created. The feeling of a separate identity is less pronounced there than in 
Scotland, and the Welsh party is more dependent on the UK party than the Scottish 
one, in particular with regard to its funding. Respondents recognised that divergence 
would be possible, in particular because of the opposition status of the party, and 
some divergence between the central party and the Scottish and Welsh parties has 
occurred (Fabre et al. 2006: 22). This has rarely led to high-profile disagreement, and 
the central  leadership  has remained relatively  outside  of  Scottish  and  Welsh  party 
disputes.  
Finally, the Labour party has been the party that has had most difficulty adapting 
to devolution despite being the party that has devolved power to Scotland and Wales. 
The central party has involved itself in the selection of candidates and party leaders to 
control the devolution process and limit the potential for policy divergence. This has 
produced  mixed  results.  While  it  has  indeed  been  influential  in  the  selection  of 
candidates in Scotland, it was eventually unsuccessful in its attempts to control the 
leadership selection process in Wales. It has also failed to prevent policy divergence, 
and the Welsh party in particular has been eager to prove its Welsh distinctiveness. 
Finally, these attempts to controlled processes that were supposed to be left to the 
choice of the regional parties led to internal disputes that harmed the party's image 
and strengthened New Labour's image as 'control freaks'. More recent developments 
show that the central party is now much less involved in the affairs of the Scottish and 






CHAPTER 6.   THE ESTADO DE LAS 






This chapter looks at regionalisation in Spain, with first a historical overview and a 
focus on the autonomous communities of Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia. 
The first section looks at the formation of the Spanish state, the transition towards 
democracy,  the  ensuing  process  of  regionalisation  and  the  debates  around  the 
territorial  structure  of  the  state.  The  second  section  describes  the  various  party 
systems in which these state-wide parties compete: the Spanish party system and the 
Catalan, Basque and Galician party systems. It will focus on the evolution of the vote 
for state-wide parties since 1977 in the Spanish and regional elections of these three 
autonomous  communities  and  will  discuss  whether  regional  elections  can  be 
characterised as second-order elections or whether they are elections in their own 
right, with their own stakes and patterns of voting.  
 
6.1. Decentralisation in Spain 
6.1.1. The long road toward democracy and decentralisation 
State formation, the dominance of centralism in 19th- and 20th-century Spain and the Republican 
experiment 
Spain was formed by the progressive Reconquest of the territory from the Moors. 
During the period that spanned over eight centuries, a number of regions developed 
separately and acquired their own social norms, laws and institutions. For instance, 
Catalonia  was  able  to  have  its  own  institutions,  developed  and  codified  its  own 
language  and  established  itself  as  an  economic  and  political  power  centre  and 
developed its own local government (Moxon-Browne 1989: 47). Whereas the Basque 
country never experienced this form of political unity, its provinces developed their 
own institutions and acquired special rights (fueros) (Lecours 2001b: 216-7). Finally, 
Galicia did not experience similar levels of self-government. The Junta del Reino de 
Galicia, created in 1528, had very limited powers and cannot be considered as a real 
organ of government and representation (de la Granja, Beramendi and Anguerra 2001: 
40-1). 
Even  after  the  unification  of  the  country  in  1469,  Spain  remained  a  'loose 
arrangement  of  multiple  semi-autonomous  areas'  until  the  17
th  century  (Lecours 
2001b: 216). Regions, provinces and municipalities were allowed to retain their codes 
of law and special rights. The Spanish monarchy did not initially develop centralised 
institutions and adopted instead a rather confederal structure (Payne 1991: 479). This 
changed under Philip V (who ruled between 1700 and 1746). He and his successors 
tried to emulate the French centralised administrative system but failed to undermine 




Most  of  the  19
th  and  20
th  centuries  were  characterised  by  centralism  and 
authoritarianism  (Aja  2001:  229-30).  Payne  (1991:  480-1)  argues  that  Spanish 
nationalism is a relatively late invention and that instead a 'Spanish ideology' based on 
the defence of Catholicism 'served as the ideological and functional equivalent of a 
kind of nationalism in the pre-modern and pre-national era'. The Spanish national 
identity was later strengthened by the common opposition to the Napoleonic invasion 
(de la Granja, Beramendi and Anguerra 2001: 16-7). Navarre, the Basque provinces 
and Catalonia are the regions where this opposition to the centralisation of the state 
was  the  most  pronounced.  The  19
th  century  saw  the  development  of  various 
movements  of  opposition  to  the  centralisation  of  the  state  and  the  political 
mobilisation of peripheral identities. This mobilisation was stronger in Catalonia and 
the Basque country than in Galicia, where regionalism took a more culturalist turn and 
was less socially valued. These forms of regionalism were to remain unsuccessful for 
most  of  the  20
th  century,  which  was  characterised  by  different  attempts  to  resist 
external influences on the Spanish polity and to quash the moderate liberal movement 
that was born during the 19
th century, in particular during the Franco dictatorship 
(1939-1975) (Di Febo and Juliá 2003: 35, 54-6). 
The Second Republic was in this respect an exception. The Republic adopted a 
regionalised  structure,  albeit  with  some  limits  to  regional  self-government  (de  la 
Granja, Beramendi and Anguera 2001: 113-6). The issue of the type of organisation of 
the Republic was already being debated when Macià (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) 
proclaimed Catalonia as a republic within the Spanish federal republic. This forced the 
debate  on  the  organisation  of  the  state  to  move  forward,  but  the  new  Republic 
curtailed the autonomist ambitions of ERC, and the Spanish parliament adopted a 
watered-down  version  of  the  Statute  of  autonomy  approved  in  Catalonia  (de  la 
Granja, Beramendi and Anguera 2001: 124-7). In the Basque country, the contents of 
the Statute proved more controversial and the debate in the Basque country and then 
in Madrid lasted until 1936. The Statute of autonomy was finally approved in October 
1936.  The  region  enjoyed  a  brief  but  successful  period  of  self-government  until 
March-April  1937,  when  the  Francoist  forces  attacked  the  region  (de  la  Granja, 
Beramendi and Anguera 2001: 147-9, 152-4). Galicia followed a similar trajectory: its 
initial Statute of autonomy was approved in 1932 but it was only finally approved in 
June  1936.  The  start  of  the  Civil  War  prevented  its  adoption  by  the  Spanish 
Parliament (de la Granja, Beramendi and Anguera 2001: 161-3). Other regions also 
initiated a process of elaboration of their Statute of autonomy. Whereas these efforts 
were unsuccessful in the Balearic Islands and Aragon, Andalusia, Castile and Valencia 
were all waiting for the Spanish Parliament to approve their Statutes when the Civil 
War started (Núñez Seixas 1999: 109-11, de la Granja, Beramendi and Anguera 2001: 
117-22).  
The Franco regime imposed a centralised system of government and actively 
promoted a unitary conception of the Spanish state and identity ('hispanidad') based on 
Catholicism, a common language (Castilian), Spanish culture and traditionalism (Di 
Febo and Juliá 2003: 29). This Spanish nationalism led to brutal attempts to harmonise 
the national culture, prohibited the expression of regional identities and enforced a 
strong repression against regionalist movements. This repression extended to regional 
languages and dialects and non-Castilian cultural practices and manifestations (de la 
Granja, Beramendi and Anguera 2001: 165-6; Moreno 1997: 75).  
This repression of regional movements and identities produced opposite results 
to those expected by the regime. Instead of weakening their strength after the exile of 
the most prominent nationalist figures and the prohibition of regional traditions and  
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practices, it transformed regional identities into forms of resistance to the dictatorship, 
so that regionalism became more radical and spread to regions where it was previously 
weak  (de  la  Granja,  Beramendi  and  Anguera  2001:  167;  Moreno  1997:  76-7). 
Eventually, the Spanish identity was  identified with the authoritarian regime while 
regionalism was assimilated to the defence of liberties and the struggle for democracy 
(Lecours 2001b: 220). 
 
Democratic transition and the establishment of the Estado de las Autonomías 
After the death of Franco, Spain had to engage in a process of democratic transition 
and adopt a new constitution. The transition came from within the system, under the 
impulsion of the king Juan Carlos, who was chosen by Franco to succeed him, and his 
Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, and under the pressure of society (Linz and Stepan 
1996: 88). Spain is a case of 'regime-initiated' transition, called ruptura pactada because it 
resulted from an agreement between the elites of the old regime and the opposition. 
In order to avoid the revolutionary pattern of the Portuguese transition to democracy, 
the  Spanish  transition  was  negotiated  between  the  Francoist  elites  and  the  main 
opposition parties (Magone 16-7). The outcome was the constitution adopted in 1978 
and the creation of a decentralised parliamentary monarchy. In spite of the strong 
popular support in favour of political change, the transition process was very much 
elite-driven, with a special emphasis on consensus and party control (Holliday 2002: 
251).   
The  organisation  of  the  state  was  one  of  the  most  important  issues  of  the 
transition. Linz and Stepan (1996: 99-107) argue that Spain's resolution of its problems 
of  'stateness'  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  its  successful  democratic  transition  and 
consolidation. The transition process occurred in a context of popular mobilisation in 
favour of democracy and decentralisation, and renewed nationalism in Catalonia and 
the Basque country, where ETA's violence was escalating.
49 Adopted by referendum in 
1978,  the  constitution  was  nevertheless  rejected  or  ignored  by  a  majority  of  the 
Basque  electorate  (Conversi  1997:  145).  While  70.24%  of  those  who  cast  a ballot 
voted in favour of the text, abstention reached 55.35% of the electorate.  
The constitution does not define the new democratic state as either federal or 
unitary. It recognises the 'indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation' while at the same 
time acknowledging that Spain is made up of 'nationalities and regions' that had a 
special  'right  to  autonomy'  (Article  2,  Constitution).  The  regions,  or  autonomous 
communities  (Comunidades  Autónomas),  were  to  achieve  autonomy  through  bilateral 
negotiations of their statute with the central government. It was decided to create 
autonomous communities all over the country rather than just satisfy the demands 
from Catalonia and the Basque country (Guibernau 2006: 62).  
The Constitution provided for two routes to autonomy, a 'fast' route for the 
'historic nationalities' (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) through Article 151, 
and another 'slow' route for the other regions (via the article 143). The fast route 
allowed the three historic nationalities to achieve full autonomy relatively rapidly and 
by approval of their statutes of autonomy by referendum. In contrast, Article 143 
provided  that  the  other  regions,  should  they  wish  to  establish  themselves  as 
autonomous communities, would first have a more limited autonomy through statutes 
                                                 
49 Linz and Stepan (1996: 99) mention that while ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Euskadi and Freedom) 
had killed 43 people between the moment of its creation in 1960 and Franco's death, it caused 65 
deaths in 1978, 87 in 1979 and 96 in 1980.  
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that  needed  to  be  approved  both  by  the  Cortes  (the  Spanish  Parliament)  and  the 
population of the region through a referendum (Gibbons 1999: 18).  
By 1981, four autonomous communities had been established through Article 
151 (Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia, although the latter is not 
considered as a historical nationality but used the mechanisms of art. 151 to force the 
adoption a more favourable statute). The other regions obtained statutes with fewer 
powers through Article 143 (Magone 2004: 118-9).  
The status, powers and autonomy of the Spanish autonomous communities are 
guaranteed by Article 2 and Title VIII of the constitution. Moreover, the statutes of 
autonomy have a secondary constitutional nature, which mean that they cannot be 
amended by a simple law by either central or regional government, but also that they 
prevail over central and regional laws (Aja 2001: 234). They can only be changed by 
procedures determined by the statutes themselves and after a referendum within the 
community.  
 
6.1.2. Institutional organisation of the State of the Autonomies 
Distribution of competences between central and regional government  
The constitution does not provide clear, undisputable criteria of separation of powers 
between  central  and  regional  governments  (Pérez  Moreno  1980:  30).  Instead, 
regionalisation  is  an  open  process  of  asymmetrical  regional  government  with  an 
arbitrating role for the Constitutional Tribunal (Moreno 2001: 61). The Constitution 
provides a list of powers that are exclusive to the central government, leaving residual 
powers (i.e., those that are not listed in a region's statute of autonomy) to the central 
government  except  in  five  regions  (Watts  1999:  30,  126).  The  shared  areas  of 
competence  are  quite  numerous  (Fossas  1999:  13),  as  the  Spanish  parliament  can 
develop  central  framework  legislation  in  any  policy  area.  The  competences of  the 
autonomous communities are to be found in the statutes of autonomy, as each statute 
was  elaborated  by  the  region  and  agreed  with  the  central  government.  The 
autonomous communities have generally included in their statutes all the competences 
that they were able to claim, but in some cases a region refused to be responsible over 
a particular field or 'forgot' a competence (Aja 2003: 122). 
The regions that acceded to autonomy via the 'fast route' (Catalonia, the Basque 
country,  Galicia,  Navarre,  Andalusia)  were  given  a  larger  range  of  competences, 
important transfers of services and corresponding financial resources via article 149 of 
the constitution. The other autonomous communities were to comply with article 148 
of the constitution, which lists the competences that can be regionalised and provides 
that this  represents  a maximum  for  at  least  five  years  after the  adoption of  their 
statutes. This difference between two categories of regions derives from the principle 
of 'differential facts' (hechos diferenciales) based on a combination of historical, ethnic 
and institutional factors, that differentiate the three historic nationalities and Navarre 
from the other Spanish regions (Moreno 2001: 94; Aja 2003: 172). On the one hand, 
these regions are aware of their distinctiveness and consider it as an  argument in 
favour of a 'preferential' treatment that gives them more powers and resources, and on 
the  other  hand,  developments  in  Andalusia  and  the  higher  status  of  the  historic 
nationalities provides incentives for the other regions to demand their own statutes of 
autonomy and obtain the largest possible degree of autonomy, following the principle 
of 'comparative grievance' (Moreno 2001: 97). Via its ability to transfer legislative and 
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*  Special  cases  that  require  the  agreement  of  both  central  and  regional  governments 
(denomination of origin), or that can be exercised by both levels indistinctly (culture).  
** Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and the Valencian Community.  
*** Some aspects of civil law are exclusive regional competences in the communities that had 
their own civil law tradition before the Civil war: Aragon, the Balearic Islands, the Basque 
Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre and the Valencian Community.  
**** The communities of the Basque country, Catalonia, Galicia and Navarre were allowed to 
establish their own police forces.  
Source: adapted from Aja 2003: 129-131.  
Parliament granted the Canaries and the Valencian Community such powers that they 
achieved a level of self-government comparable to that of the most powerful regions 
in 1983 (Morata 2001: 124). 
Early on, the Spanish government tried to limit the open-ended nature of this 
process of regionalisation and reduce the asymmetry between the regions. After the 
1981 attempted coup by some elements of the military, the government tried to bring  
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order  to  and  limit  the  regionalisation  process  by  introducing  the  Basic  Law  of 
Harmonisation of the Autonomous Process (Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso 
Autonómico, LOAPA) in 1982. It was designed to harmonise the statutes of autonomy 
but also to limit the autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque country (Conversi 1997: 
146). The autonomous communities mobilised against the text and presented a request 
against it to the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional), which declared that 14 of 
its 38 articles were unconstitutional (Magone 2004: 120), and the law was eventually 
abandoned.  
The expression 'café para todos' (coffee for everyone) refers to the preference for 
institutional symmetry between the regions. It is often used as a derogatory term by 
nationalist movements from the historic nationalities to reject the symmetry between 
all the regions and re-emphasise their entitlement to a special status because of their 
'differential  facts'.  The  1990s  represented  a  new  phase  in  the  reduction  of  the 
asymmetry between regions. After 10 years of practice, the 'slow route' autonomous 
communities that had not already benefited from any transfer of competence started 
to demand more powers. In 1992, the PSOE and the PP reached an agreement to 
increase the level of competence of 10 communities in a uniform manner and bring 
their  level  of  autonomy closer to  that  of  the  'fast  route'  communities  (Basic  Law 
9/1992  over  the  transfer  of  competences  to  the  autonomous  communities  that 
acceded to autonomy via article 143). In 1993 these autonomous communities gained 
responsibility over, among other things, the functions relative to the management of 
education at all levels, including the transfers of the necessary staff and resources, 
social services and the environment (Morata 2001: 137). This reform established quasi-
total symmetry in the Estado de las Autonomías, except in the areas that relate directly to 
'differential facts' such as language, foral rights and insularity (Soto 2005: 299).  
After the 1996 general elections, the Partido Popular found itself in the same 
position as the PSOE three years earlier. In need of the support of nationalist parties, 
and  with  a  pivotal  role  for Convergència  i  Unió,  the  PP  conceded  new  transfers  of 
powers to the autonomous communities: assignment of 30% of the income tax to all 
regions  in  function  of  their  level  of  competence  and  resources,  transfers  of 
competence  with  regard  to  employment  and  ports,  and  new  policing  powers  for 
Catalonia  (Morata  2001:  140-1).  Eventually,  education  and  health  also  became 
responsibilities of the autonomous communities (Magone 2004: 120).  
As a result, the original asymmetry of the system has been considerably reduced 
(Moreno 2001: 64-5; Morata 2001: 143-4). The seventeen autonomous communities 
are  responsible  for  agriculture,  education,  health  policy,  regional  economic 
development, culture and research, among other things. However, the bilateral nature 
of the negotiation of the statutes of autonomy means that each statute is unique and 
each region has its own list of powers.  
Aja (2003: 127-31) makes  a distinction between four types of distribution of 
competence: competences exclusive to the state (central government), competences 
exclusive  to the  autonomous  communities,  concurrent  competences (the  state  can 
enact framework or general legislation and the autonomous communities can pass 
secondary legislation and have the executive competence), and shared competences 
(the  state  passes  legislation  and  the  autonomous  communities  execute  national 
legislation)  (Table  6.1).  However,  there  remain  some  grey  areas,  in  particular  in 
relation  to  the  degree  of  detail  compatible  with  the  exercise  of  the  central 
government's competence to enact framework legislation, or with regard to the central 
government's ability to regulate in order to ensure the equality of treatment of all 





The Spanish regions have a very limited input in central decision-making. The upper 
chamber  of  the  Cortes,  the  Senate  (Senado),  is  only  partly  a  chamber  of  territorial 
representation. The bulk of the Senadores are elected at the provincial level,
50 and the 
autonomous  communities  appoint  51  out  of  the  259  members  of  the  Senate. 
Intergovernmental relations generally take the shape of thematic conferences (sectoral 
conferences),  in  which  the  advisers  or  regional  ministers  (Consejeros),  of  the  various 
autonomous  communities  meet  with  the  corresponding  Spanish  minister  (Law 
12/1983 on the Autonomous Process, art. 4). The scope of these conferences was 
extended by the 1992 autonomic pacts. However, thematic conferences meet only 
irregularly, and they seem to be rather disregarded by ministers (Magone 2004: 121) as 
well as by the historic communities, which prefer to deal with the central government 
through bilateral relations (Roller 2002; Grau i Creus 2000). This lack of 'shared rule' 
has contributed to a conflictive approach to central-regional relationships and the use 
of unilateral demands as a bargaining strategy (Máiz 1999: 179). 
Given  this  limited  regional  input  in  central  decision-making,  the  central 
government has frequently engaged in specifying central laws beyond what the regions 
deemed  acceptable  (Börzel  2002:  94).  Conversely,  the  regions  have  sometimes 
implemented central legislation as they saw fit. This led to quite numerous conflicts, in 
which  the  Constitutional  Court  has  often  played  a  crucial  role  in  clarifying  the 
respective areas of competence of the state and autonomous communities (Grau i 
Creus 2005: 266).  
 
The territorial distributon of resources 
In parallel to the increased competences of the Spanish autonomous communities, 
their  share  of  public  expenditures  has  considerably  increased  as  well.  Today  the 
expenditures of  the  autonomous  communities  represent  over  a  third  of  all  public 
expenditures (see table 6.2 below).  
Table 6.2. Territorial distribution of public expenditures (%) 
  1979  1984  1987  1990  1996  1999  2002  2005 
Central government  90.0  75.6  72.6  67.5  65.5  61.3  51.0  51.2 
Autonomous communities  —  12.2  14.6  19.2  22.6  26.0  32.5  36.0 
Local authorities  10.0  12.1  12.8  13.3  11.9  12.7  16.5  12.8 
Sources: Morata 2001: 131; Swenden 2006: 109; Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 2006. 
Two systems of regional finance coexist within the Spanish system: on the one 
hand, the Basque provinces (Alava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa) and Navarre are able to 
fix and levy most of their own taxes. They then send a share of their fiscal revenues to 
the central government to compensate for its services and contribute to the solidarity 
fund.  The  Basque  provinces  also  send  part  of  their  revenues  to  the  Basque 
government to finance its services and the tasks it performs (Aja 2001: 235). Every 
five years, the government and the regions negotiate an agreement with each region 
(called the concierto autonómico) that stipulates the amount of money attributed to the 
Spanish government in compensation for the services it provides (Gunther, Montero 
                                                 
50  The  provinces  are  one  level  below  the  Autonomous  Communities,  except  in  the  case  of  the 
uniprovincial regions: Principality of Asturias, Cantabria, Madrid Community, Murcia Region, Navarre, 
La Rioja, and the Balearic Islands.   
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and Botella 2004: 298). The foral regime provides the two autonomous communities 
with sensibly more funds than the common regime. 
On the other hand, the general regime gives the central government the ability to 
raise  the  majority  of  taxes  and  then  redistribute  part  of  these  revenues  to  the 
autonomous communities for the funding of their competences (Aja 2003: 135). The 
autonomous communities draw their finance from three sources: revenues raised in 
the region, share of the central state resources and transfers from the solidarity funds 
(Aja 2001: 235-7). The 1993 reform of the financial arrangement allocated 15% of 
income tax to autonomous communities in order to reduce the discrepancy between 
the communities' capacity to spend and their capacity to raise their own resources 
following the principle of fiscal co-responsibility (Soto 2005: 299-300).  
Table 6.3. Sources of income of the autonomous communities of the general regime 
(2002) (%) 
  Income 
tax 









Andalusia   13.5  17.2  11.6  9.0  48.6  0.2  100 
Aragon   21.3  18.7  13.8  13.1  32.6  0.5  100 
Asturias   19.4  19.6  11.1  10.9  38.3  0.7  100 
Balearic Islands  26.9  49.1  21.1  13.9  -12.8  1.8  100 
Canary Islands  16.3  0.0  1.4  11.0  71.3  0.0  100 
Cantabria   17.6  17.6  11.8  9.1  43.9  0.0  100 
Castile and Leon  15.6  16.5  130  9.5  44.6  0.8  100 
Castile-La Mancha  12.3  14.6  14.8  7.2  51.0  0.2  100 
Catalonia  29.6  22.1  14.9  16.0  17.0  0.3  100 
Valencian C.  20.9  21.3  15.6  15.0  27.2  0.0  100 
Extremadura   9.2  12.8  9.2  5.5  62.7  0.6  100 
Galicia   14.4  16.3  10.7  8.3  49.5  0.7  100 
Madrid   41.1  25.7  15.5  21.5  -3.7  0.0  100 
Murcia   15.8  18.9  16.2  8.3  40.8  0.0  100 
La Rioja   18.9  16.7  11.8  10.4  41.3  0.9  100 
Average    21.5  19.1  13.0  12.5  33.5  0.3  100 
Source: Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell and Herero Alcalde 2005: 579. 
Some  indirect  tax  income  has  been  partially  or  totally  assigned  to  the 
autonomous  communities,  and  the  regions  are  also  able  to  regulate  these  taxes: 
inheritance tax, succession and donation tax, VAT, taxes on fuel and electricity. Other 
tax  transfers  were  established  to  cover  the  costs  of  services  provided  by  the 
autonomous  communities  on  the  basis  of  their  needs  and  a  number  of  socio-
demographic  indicators  (López  Guerra  2003b:  363-4).  The  system  is  now 
unconditional,  partly  based  on  the  regionalised  collection  of  indirect  taxes  (Ruiz-
Huerta Carbonell and Herero Alcalde 2005: 559). Overall, the bulk of the regions' 
revenues come from central-state revenue transfers. The 2001 reform has nevertheless 
contributed to increasing the share of autonomously raised resources. 
The common system of regional finance remains a debated issue, in particular in 
the  communities  that  are net  contributors to the  system  such  as  Catalonia  (Ruiz-
Huerta Carbonell and Herero Alcalde 2005: 557). On the one hand, net contributors 
such as Catalonia, Madrid, the Balearic Islands and the Valencian Community use the 
fact that they provide more to the community than they receive to demand more fiscal 
responsibilities. On the other, the regions that receive more than they contribute to 
the system object to any reform and emphasise the importance of the principle of 
inter-territorial  solidarity,  which  help  finance  basic  services  in  the  poorer  regions  
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(Sánchez 2004).  
 
Overall, the Spanish regions enjoy considerable legislative and executive powers, 
but one of the main obstacles against calling Spain a federal state is its 'lack of any 
effective mechanism for collegiate representation of the autonomous communities' 
(Heywood 1995: 162). As mentioned earlier, the Spanish Senate has not yet been 
reformed  so  as  to  operate  as  a  chamber  of  representation  of  the  autonomous 
communities (on the model of the German Bundesrat), nor is there a highly developed 
web of intergovernmental conferences. Nevertheless, the constitutional debate is far 
from over: on the one hand, Senate reform is on the agenda of the current socialist 
government, which however lacks a majority to reform the constitution in this sense; 
on the other, both the Basque Country and Catalonia demand more autonomy and a 
reform of their statutes.  
 
6.2. The Spanish party systems 
This section describes the Spanish party systems and compares the party system for 
state-wide  parliamentary  elections  to  regional  elections  in  Catalonia,  the  Basque 
country  and  Galicia.  It  considers  the  impact  of  regionalisation  on  electoral  party 
competition  in  these  autonomous  communities,  using  the  second-order-election 
framework. The proliferation of regionally-based parties, often regionalist parties, is a 
first consequence of the downward decentralisation of power. This is most obvious in 
two of the regions studied here, Catalonia and the Basque country, while regionalism 
is weaker in Galicia.  
 
6.2.1. The Spanish party system 
One  of  the  most  remarkable  achievements  of  modern-day  Spain  has  been  the 
consolidation  of  the  democratic  institutions  established  after  almost  40  years  of 
authoritarian rule. This stability has also rapidly become a feature of the party system, 
in spite of some predictions that expected Spain to revert to some form of polarised 
pluralism (Linz 1967: 2000-1; Sartori 2005: 146).  
The Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies) is the lower chamber of the 
legislature. The electoral system for its election is proportional representation with the 
d'Hondt method of seats distribution, combined with a legal threshold of 3% at the 
constituency level. The electoral constituencies are the provinces, except in the cities 
of  Ceuta  and  Melilla,  where  members  of  Congress  are  elected  in  single-member 
districts with the plurality rule. The electoral law was designed by Suárez in 1978 with 
the aim of initiating the return to democracy but also to ensure the continuing support 
of  the  autocratic  regime  for the  reform  process.  The  Francoist elites,  and  former 
Franco  minister  Manuel  Fraga  Iribarne  in  particular,  had  a  preference  for  a 
majoritarian electoral system, from which they believed they would benefit, while the 
democratic  opposition  advocated  a  proportional  system.  As  a  result,  Suárez's 
compromise  solution  was  a  proportional  system with  majoritarian  results  (Hopkin 
2005: 376). Another reason for choosing an electoral system that tends to benefit the 
largest  parties  is  the  past  experience  of  instability  and  polarised  pluralism  of  the 






Table 6.4. District magnitudes and effective thresholds in elections to the Congress 
of Deputies, 2000 
District 
magnitude 
Effective threshold  Frequency 
(number of districts) 
Seats allocated in districts 
of that magnitude 
1  37.5  2  2 
3  12.5  9  27 
4  10  9  36 
5  8.3  9  45 
6  7.1  5  30 
7  6.25  5  35 
8  5.6  3  24 
9  5  4  36 
10  4.5  1  10 
11  4.2  1  11 
12  3.8  1  12 
16  2.9  1  16 
31  1.6  1  31 
35  1.4  1  35 
Total   —  52  350 
Source: Hopkin 2005: 379; effective threshold: own calculation.  
In  practice,  the  electoral  system  has  a  high  effective  threshold.  District 
magnitude varies between 2 and 35, with a mean district magnitude of 6.73 (Hopkin 
2005: 379). Table 6.4 shows that only three provinces have an effective threshold 
below the legal threshold. On the other hand, 44 provinces have an effective threshold 
above 5%, of which 20 are above 10%. These thresholds have had two consequences: 
the reduction of the effective number of parties, both in terms of votes and in terms 
of  seats,  and  the  domination  of  two  state-wide  parties.  However,  the 
disproportionality of the electoral system has diminished over time (table 6.5). Several 
periods  can  be  distinguished  since  the  country's  transition  to  democracy:  a  first, 
founding period with the 1977 and 1979 elections; a second period characterised by a 
domination of the socialist party; and a third period of partisan realignment and of 
normalisation of the right, with two minority governments, led by the PSOE first and 
then the PP, and a PP majority government, until the 2004 election that brought the 
PSOE back into power in dramatic circumstances (Linz and Montero 1999; Colomer 
2005; Torcal and Rico 2005). 
It is generally considered that the Spanish transition lasted until 1982. During 
that time, institutions and political parties were established and three elections were 
held. The Spanish Workers' Party PSOE was legalised on 17 February 1977 and the 
PCE (Spanish Communist Party) on 9 April 1977, just before the first parliamentary 
election that took place on 15 June 1977 (Soto 2005: 81, 83; Gunther, Sani and Shabad 
1986:  44-50).  The  1977  and  1979  elections  were won by  Suárez's  UCD,  with the 
socialist party in second place. The new party system mainly consisted of new political 
formations: only four of the 33 parties that gained representation in 1977 had won 
seats in the 1936 parliament: the PCE, the PSOE, the Basque nationalists of the PNV 
and the Catalan republicans of ERC. 
The originality of the Spanish party system is its absence of any real 'succession' 
party like the communist parties in Eastern Europe, for instance. This is in particular 
due to the fact that in the eve of the first election, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez 
dissolved the official party and transferred its assets to the state. Moreover, the right 
became represented by the moderates of the UCD (Unión del Centro Democrático) led by 
Suárez and the Alianza Popular (AP), which accepted the new democratic regime. As  
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a result, the extreme-right was very fragmented and remained weak (Linz and Montero 
1999: 4-5). The Alianza Popular did include elements of the old regime, but it lost its 
most reactionary and extreme-right-wing members early on, when party founder and 
former Franco minister Manuel Fraga decided that the AP should be a centre-right 
party and accepted the constitution and the new democratic regime (Gunther 1986: 
36). 
Table 6.5. General election results since 1977 
  UCD/CDS  PSOE  AP/PP  PCE/IU  Other 




















SWP  ENEP ENPP  D 
1977  34.5  166 
(47.4)  29.3  118 
(33.7)  8.2  16 
(4.6)  9.3  20 
(5.7)  18.7  30 
(8.6)  63.8  4.47  2.89  10.68 
1979  34.8  168 
(48.0)  30.4  121 
(34.6)  6.1  10 
(2.9)  10.7  23 
(6.6)  18.0  28 
(7.9)  65.2  4.32  2.81  10.62 
1982  9.6  13 
(3.7)  48.1  202 
(57.7)  26.4  107 
(30.6)  4.0  4 
(1.1)  11.9  24 
(6.9)  74.5  3.23  2.33  8.31 
1986  9.2  19 
(5.4)  44.1  184 
(52.6)  26.0  105 
(30.0)  4.6  7 
(2.0)  16.1  35 
(10.0)  70.1  3.63  2.68  7.53 
1989  7.9  14 
(4.0)  39.6  175 
(50.0)  25.8  107 
(30.6)  9.1  17 
(4.9)  17.6  37 
(10.7)  65.4  4.15  2.85  9.14 
1993  1.8  –  38.8  159 
(45.4)  34.8  141 
(40.3)  9.6  18 
(5.1)  15  32 
(9.2)  73.6  3.52  2.67  7.04 
1996  –  –  37.6  141 
(40.3)  38.8  156 
(44.6)  10.5  21 
(6.0)  13.1  32 
(9.2)  76.4  3.27  2.72  5.57 
2000  –  –  34.2  125 
(35.7)  44.5  183 
(52.3)  5.5  8 
(2.3)  15.8  34 
(9.7)  78.7  3.12  2.48  6.10 
2004  –  –  42.6  164 
(46.9)  37.7  148 
(42.3)  5.0  5 
(1.4)  14.7  33 
(9.4)  80.3  3.05  2.50  5.13 
Notes: The results of the PSOE include those of the PSC-PSOE; '% votes' stands for 'share of 
the votes'; 'SWP' stands for the combined share of the vote of the two largest state-wide 
parties (UCD+PSOE in 1977 and 1979, PSOE+AP/PP since 1982). 
Source: Ministerio del Interior http://www.elecciones.mir.es  
The AP replaced the UCD on the right in the 1982 election.
51 The electoral 
'earthquake' produced by this election brought the socialist party into power with an 
absolute majority of the seats in Congress. The failure of the UCD was the result of a 
combination of factors: internal tensions within the party and disputes between its 
various 'barons', process of moderation of the PSOE and abandonment of its Marxist 
rhetoric, and improved image of the leaders of the PSOE and the AP (Gunther 1986; 
Hopkin 1999). This election also marked the start of the decline of the Communist 
party and the domination of the PSOE on the left. The union of the PCE with other 
left-wing  and  green  movements  to  form  Izquierda  Unida  (IU)  in  1986  led  to  a 
temporary  improvement  of  the  party's  results.  However,  because  of  the  electoral 
system, its share of the seats in the Congress generally amounts to half their share of 
the vote or less.  
After the 1989 election, the AP underwent a process of reform and a change in 
its leadership in order to overcome 'el techo de Fraga' (Fraga's ceiling), that is, Fraga's 
inability to lead the party beyond a certain threshold that would enable it to gain 
executive office. After three consecutive elections in which the AP had won 25% of 
the vote and under the leadership of José María Aznar, the Partido Popular (PP), the 
                                                 
51 For more information on the rise and fall of the UCD, see Hopkin 1999.  
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PP  become  a  serious  contender  in  1993,  forcing  the  PSOE  into  a  minority 
government (Magone 2004: 92; García Guereta 2001: 134-62). 
In  1993  and  1996,  first  the  PSOE  and  then  the  PP  formed  minority 
governments. In both cases, regionalist and nationalist parties played a central role in 
supporting the government. Table 6.5 shows that regionalist and nationalist parties, 
which  form  the  'other'  category,  have  controlled  around  10%  of  the  seats  in 
parliament since the mid-1980s, and figure 6.1 below shows the number of seats of 
the  most  important  non-state-wide  parties.  Parties  like  the  Catalan  CiU  and  the 
Canarian  Coalición  Canaria  have  managed  to  exchange  government  support  for 
transfers of competence and resources for their respective regions.  
Figure 6.1. Number of seats of non-state-wide ethnoregionalist parties in state-wide 






















In this respect, the effective number of parties can be misleading. Instead of 
having a third party, as the ENEP suggests, the Spanish party system is a party system 
with  two  parties  that  are  able  to  form  government  and  a  constellation  of  smaller 
parties,  which  can  become  relevant  parties  with  coalition  or  blackmail  potential 
(Sartori 2005) when none of the large state-wide parties manage to win the absolute 
majority  in  the  Congress.  The  regionalist  parties  that  have  managed  to  gain 
representation in the Congress of Deputies are mainly from Catalonia (CiU and ERC), 
the Basque country (the PNV and Herri Batasuna), Galicia and the Canary Islands. In 
spite of the rather large number of parties represented in the Congress of Deputies, 
the effects of the party system and the concentration of the vote for third-parties 
means  that  Spain  qualifies  as  a  case  of  two-partism,  as  it  generally  follows  the 
mechanics of two-party systems (Sartori 2005: 164-70). 
The  following  section  looks  into  details  at  the  party  systems  for  regional 
elections in three of these regions: Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia, and 
compare the patterns of voting and party systems of the regions to those of the rest of 
the country. The three historic nationalities based their argument in favour of a special 
status within the Estado de las Autonomías on their differential facts, which have also 
often  served  as  a  basis  for  the  creation  and  electoral  support  for  regionalist  or 
nationalist parties. These are therefore likely to create more specific party systems and 




6.2.2. Are autonomous elections second-order elections? 
This section addresses the issue of the status of autonomous elections as first- or 
second-order  elections.  To  this  purpose,  it  looks  at  the  position  of  autonomous 
elections in the overall electoral framework, evaluates turnout levels in different types 
of elections and compares patterns of voting for regional elections. In a first time, it 
compares  national  trends  and  compares  the  historic  nationalities  with  the  other 
regions, and then it looks at the three regions in turn. 
 
Catalan, Basque and Galician elections in the general context of regional elections 
Table 6.6 compiles the dates of autonomous elections in two categories of regions: the 
four autonomous communities established via Art. 151, which are allowed to fix the 
timing of their elections within the limit of four-year legislatures, and the 13 other 
autonomous communities, which hold their election on the same day. Catalonia, the 
Basque Country and Galicia are the only regions where autonomous elections do not 
coincide with an election in another region or at another level (as is the case for 
Andalusia in 4 out of 7 autonomous elections).  
Table 6.6. Dates of state-wide and regional elections 
  Election dates 
State-wide   01.03.79 28.10.82  22.06.86  29.10.89  06.06.93  03.03.96  12.03.00  14.03.04 
13 ACs    08.05.83 10.06.87* 26.05.91  28.05.95 13.06.99* 25.05.03   
Basque country 09.03.80 26.02.84  30.11.86  28.10.90  23.10.94  25.10.98  15.05.01   
Catalonia  20.03.80 29.04.84  29.05.88  15.03.92  19.11.95  17.10.99  26.11.03   
Galicia  20.10.81 24.11.85    19.12.89  17.10.93  19.10.97  17.10.01  19.06.05 
Andalusia  23.05.82    22.06.86  23.06.90  12.06.94  03.03.96  12.03.00  14.03.04 
Notes: are not included the Basque election that took place on 15 April 2005 and the Catalan 
election of 1st November 2006; * Concurrent with European parliamentary elections.  
Source: Pallarés and Keating 2006: 104. 
Most elections to the Basque parliament have occurred around the mid-term 
point of the state-wide election cycle. The theory assumes that they are likely to be 
considered as mid-term elections and therefore be important for the state-wide parties. 
The last 3 Catalan elections have been within one year to a few months before the 
state-wide election. This may contribute to a greater national attention to the Catalan 
contest and a certain level of nationalisation of the election. Finally, in Galicia, the first 
two  regional  elections  have  taken  place  in  the  year  before  the  elections  to  the 
Congress of Deputies, the next two occurred just after, and the other ones over a year 
after  the  state-wide  election.  We  would  expect  the  early  elections  to  have  been 
influenced by their proximity with the state-wide elections, and therefore to be rather 
nationalised, while the other ones should be less influenced by national considerations. 
Table 6.7 below shows that turnout in regional elections has been lower than 
turnout in state-wide parliamentary elections but higher than in European elections, 
which  are  the  classic  second-order  election  (Reif  and  Schmidt  1980).  It  therefore 
places  regional  elections  in  a  somewhat  intermediary  situation.  The  lower  turnout 
supports  the  second-order  thesis  and  places  regional  elections  in  the  category  of 
elections  with  a  lower  intensity than  state-wide  elections. Arguments  according to 
which turnout might be encouraged by higher levels of regional autonomy or higher 
levels of regionalism are not confirmed: turnout in the 13 autonomous communities 
that  hold  their  election  on  the  same  day  is  higher  than  in  the  three  historic 
nationalities. The nationalisation of the stakes may therefore increase turnout. The  
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exceptions are the 1998 and 2000 elections in the Basque country, where turnout has 
steadily increased over time, suggesting that the stakes have become more important 
for  Basque  voters.  The  same  trend  can  be  observed  in  Galicia,  a  region  where 
participation is traditionally low but where turnout has increased significantly. This 
may  confirm  the  expectation  that  Galician  regional  elections  have  become  more 
important and less dependent on national considerations. In Catalonia, the average 
turnout for regional elections is 60.8% against 73.0% for state-wide elections.   
Table 6.7. Turnout in general, regional and European elections in Spain, 1977-2004 
Sources:  Ministerio  del  Interior  http://elecciones.mir.es;  Archivo  Histórico  Electoral, 
Presidencia  de  la  Generalitat  Valenciana  http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.html 
(Argos). 
With regard to the performance of national government and opposition parties 
in regional elections, table 6.8 shows that when it was  in government, the PSOE 
generally  performed  better  in  state-wide  than  in  regional  elections,  and  the  same 
applies to the PP between 1996 and 2003. On the other hand, non-state-wide parties 
always have better scores in regional elections, in which they are more likely to make a 
real difference and even, in many instances, participate in government. Contrary to the 
second-order hypothesis, national opposition parties do not systematically perform 
better  in  regional  elections  (Pallarés  and  Keating  2003:  247),  in  particular  in  the 
regions with a strong regionalist party. The 1995 autonomous elections fit the second-
order thesis: as a precursory sign of the general election that took place a year later, the 
PP increased its share of the vote and appeared as the great winner of the poll.  
However,  there  has  not  been  any  general  tendency  to  consider  autonomous 
elections as a trial test for national elections, and the state-wide parties have rarely 
used autonomous elections to advance their interests nationally, preferring instead to 
focus on regional issues. This is probably in part due to the absence of a territorial 
chamber of representation on the model of the Bundesrat, which implies that the link 
  Basque 
Country 
Catalonia  Galicia  Andalusia  13 AC  Spain 
1977 G  77.2  79.5  60.7  78.5  80.5  78.3 
1979 G  66.0  67.6  49.2  68.6  71.6  68.4 
1980-3 A  59.8 (1980)  61.4 (1980)  46.3 (1981)  66.2 (1982)  69.1 (1983)  — 
1982 G  79.3  80.8  63.7  78.5  81.6  80.0 
1984-5 A  68.5 (1984)  64.3 (1984)  57.4 (1985)  —  —  — 
1986 G  67.6  69.0  57.9  70.8  72.1  70.5 
1986 A  69.6  —  —  70.7  —  — 
1987 E  67.1  68.4  57.1  65.7  71.1  68.5 
1987-9 A  —  59.4 (1988)  59.5 (1989)  —  71.6 (1987)  — 
1989 E  58.5  51.5  42.7  52.8  56.6  54.7 
1989 G  66.9  67.6  60.1  69.3  71.3  69.7 
1990-3 A  61.0 (1990)  54.9 (1992)  64.2 (1993)  55.3 (1990)  66.1 (1991)  — 
1993 G  69.7  75.4  69.6  76.2  77.8  76.4 
1994 E  52.3  51.9  50.3  67.2  59.8  59.1 
1994-5 A  59.7 (1994)  63.6 (1995)  —  67.3 (1994)  72.3 (1995)  — 
1996 G  71.5  76.5  71.4  78.0  78.1  77.4 
1996-9 A  70.0 (1998)  59.2 (1999)  62.5 (1997)  78.1 (1996)  66.7 (1999)  — 
1999 E  64.5  54.8  60.8  63.6  66.0  63.1 
2000 G  63.8  64.0  65.0  68.8  70.4  68.7 
2000-4 A  79.0 (2001)  62.5 (2003)  60.2 (2001)  68.7 (2000)  70.6 (2003)  — 
2004 G  75.0  76.0  71.0  74.7  76.0  75.7  
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between regional and state-wide politics is rather limited (Pallarés and Keating 2003: 
248). 
Table 6.8. Summary of electoral results in state-wide and regional elections, 1982-
2003. 
  AP/PP  UCD/CDS  PSOE  PCE/IU  NSWPs 
GEN-82  25.6  9.8  47.2  4.0  9.1 
AUT-83  25.5  5.3  43.4  5.8  16.9 
GEN-86  25.6  9.1  43.4  4.6  11.4 
AUT-87  22.6  9.3  36.6  7.7  18.4 
GEN-89  25.6  7.8  39.3  9.0  12.3 
AUT-91  26.4  3.5  38.0  7.8  20.2 
GEN-93  34.6  1.7  38.6  9.5  12.4 
AUT-95  37.2  0.2  30.5  11.7  17.8 
GEN-96  38.6  0.0  37.4  10.5  11.2 
AUT-99  36.6  0.1  35.4  6.6  17.8 
GEN-00  44.2  0.1  33.9  5.4  12.6 
AUT-03  41.6  0.1  34.6  5.7  21.0 
Note: NSWPs: non-state-wide parties. 
Sources: Pallarés and Keating 2006: 107; for 2003, own compilation from Argos and Oñate 
2004. 
Table 6.9 provides some electoral indicators for all the autonomous communities 
for the 1999 and 2003 elections. The 1999 elections took place 9 months before the 
election that gave the PP the absolute majority and the 2003 elections occurred 10 
months  before  the  2004  state-wide  election  that  returned  a  PSOE  minority 
government. If the second-order hypothesis was to be confirmed, we should see the 
governing party sanctioned and opposition and small parties gain regions. The table 
assesses this point by looking at changes in governing coalitions in the regions.   
The table shows that there has been no overall rejection of the governing party 
(PP)  between  1999  and  2003.  On  the  contrary,  after  the  1999  election,  the  PP 
controlled 9 autonomous communities, either alone or in coalition, and it only lost 
one  region  in  2003  (Cantabria)  and  gained  one  (the  Balearic  Islands).  The  2003 
election did not record any significant improvement for the PSOE, which failed to 
win any of the regions that the PP held with an absolute majority. The close proximity 
between  state-wide  and  regional  elections  may  explain  the  good  results  of  the 
governing party, as it tends to nationalise the stakes of regional elections and provide 
state-wide parties with a sort of test election. These results are consistent with the 
'Dinkel curve', which shows that the results of national governing party display an 
inverted bell curve over the course of a legislature. At the end of the cycle, the results 
in regional elections tend to recover and be close to those of the following state-wide 
election.  
The overall picture is one in which a majority of regions have a party system that 
closely resembles the national party system, with a two-party configuration and a high 
concentration  of  the  vote  for  the  two  state-wide  parties.  In  addition,  these  party 
systems  often  include  small,  often regionalist  or nationalist parties,  which become 
especially significant when none of the state-wide parties has achieved the overall 
majority  of  the  seats  (Ocaña  and  Oñate  2000:  206).  Unlike  at  the  national  level, 






Table 6.9. The party systems of the Spanish regions (1999 and 2003 elections) 
  ENEP  ENPP  % of votes  




  1999  2003  1999  2003  1999  2003  1999  2003  1999-2003  change 
Castile la 
Mancha   2.2  2.1  2.0  1.9  95.2  95.8  —  —  PSOE  no 
Extremadura   2.4  2.1  2.2  2.1  89.5  91.6  —  —  PSOE  no 
Murcia  2.4  2.3  2.0  2.0  90.0  92.1  —  —  PP  no 
Madrid Com.  2.4  2.5  2.3  2.3  89.4  88.4  —  —  PP  no 
La Rioja  2.4  2.6  2.2  2.2  88.5  88.4  5.9  6.9  PP  no 
Castile and Leon  2.6  2.7  2.1  2.1  85.9  87.2  5.2  5.1  PP  no 
Galicia*  2.6  2.8  2.4  2.5  72.6  74.7  25.1  23.0  PP  no 
Valencian Com.  2.8  2.8  2.2  2.2  83.0  84.4  9.4  7.8  PP  no 
Asturias  2.9  3.0  2.5  2.4  79.5  81.5  9.9  4.8  PSOE  PSOE-IU 
Andalusia 2000  3.0  2.9  2.6  2.4  78.7  83.4  6.7  7.5  PSOE-PA  no 
Cantabria  3.1  3.2  2.6  2.7  77.5  74.0  17.0  19.7  PP-PRC  PRC-
PSOE 
Catalonia  3.1  4.2  2.8  3.9  47.8  55.5  46.8  37.0  CiU  PSC-ERC-
ICV 
Canary Islands  3.3  3.8  3.0  3.3  52.0  56.8  37.5  33.3  CC-PP  no 
Aragon  3.5  3.7  3.1  3.3  70.5  70.2  24.8  25.4  PSOE-
PAR  no 
Balearic Islands   3.6  3.6  3.4  3.1  71.7  70.5  19.4  15.7  PSOE-
PSM-IU  PP 
Navarre  4.0  4.1  3.6  3.0  63.2***  64.2***  28.6  15.4  UPN  UPN-
CDN 
Basque Country**  5.2  3.6  5.0  3.4  37.7  41.0  55.6  52.8  PNV-EA  PNV-EA-
IU 
Average  3.0  3.1  2.7  2.6  74.9  76.5  17.2  15.0  —  — 
Spain  1996-2000   3.3  3.1  2.7  2.5  76.4  78.7  11.1  11.9  PP min  PP maj 
Notes: * Elections in Galicia took place in 1997 and 2001.  
** Elections in the Basque country took place in 1998 and 2001. 
*** includes the UPN (Unión del Pueblo Navarro), which is in an electoral coalition with the PP. 
Sources:  own  compilation  from  Argos;  ENEP  and  ENPP  1999  elections  from  Ocaña  and 
Oñate 2000.   
In this respect, Galicia fits into the mainstream category, with a low number of 
parties and over 70% of the votes for the PP and the PSOE. However, unlike the 
other region of this group, Galicia is in fifth and fourth positions in terms of support 
for regionalist parties. Catalonia and the Basque Country display a higher level of 
fragmentation of their party systems and a much higher proportion of the vote in 
favour of several regionalist and nationalist parties. Their government includes non-
state-wide regionalist parties, either alone (in the Basque Country and in Catalonia 
between  1999  and  2003)  or  in  coalition  with  other  parties  (the  PSC-PSOE  is  in 
coalition with a nationalist party and a regionalist party). 
 
Regional elections in Catalonia 
The Catalan party system displays a number of characteristics that distinguish it from 
the Spanish party system: strong ethnoregionalist parties, comparative weakness of the 
state-wide parties and especially of the Partido Popular, and a high number of parties.  
The ethnoregionalist party Convergència i Unió (CiU) has received the highest share 
of the vote in every autonomous election except the 2003 election. In 1999, it only fell 
into second place because the PSC entered an electoral coalition with Ciutadans pel 
Canvi (Citizens for Change), a federalist, left-wing civic platform created that same  
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year, and Initiative for Catalonia-Green (ICV), a left-wing green party. Catalans vote 
more for regionalist and nationalist parties in regional elections than in state-wide 
elections: the combined share of the vote of the state-wide parties has remained 10 to 
15 points below its value for state-wide elections in spite of its steady increase (see 
appendix 5 Table 1 for the results of state-wide parliamentary elections in Catalonia). 
Only in 2003 did a coalition of the PSC, ICV and the nationalist ERC managed to 
push CiU out of government.  
Table 6.10. Autonomous elections in Catalonia, 1980-2003 
     UCD/CDS  PSC-
PSOE 
AP/PP  PSUC/IC  CiU  ERC 
  Votes Seats 
(%) Votes Seats 
(%) Votes Seats 
(%) Votes Seats 
(%) Votes Seats 
(%) Votes Seats 
(%) 
SWP ENEP ENPP  D  ID 
1980* 10.7  18 
(13.3) 22.6  33 
(24.4) 2.4**  0  18.9  25 
(18.5) 28.0  43 
(31.9)  9.0  14 
(10.4)  35.7  5.5  4.5  4.7  17.4 
1984  —  —  30.3  41 
(30.4)  7.7  11 
(8.1)  5.6  6 
(4.4)  47.0  72 
(53.3)  4.4  5 
(3.7)  38.0  3.1  2.6  5.3  24.5 
1988  3.8  3 
(2.2)  30.0  42 
(31.1)  5.4  6 
(4.4)  7.8  9 
(6.7)  46.0  69 
(51.1)  4.2  6 
(4.4)  39.2  3.3  2.7  4.4  13.2 
1992  0.9  0  27.9  40 
(29.6)  6.0  7 
(5.2)  6.6  7 
(5.2)  46.7  70 
(51.9)  8.1  11 
(8.2)  34.8  3.3  2.7  4.7  19.6 
1995  —  —  25.1  34 
(25.2) 13.2  17 
(12.6)  9.8  11 
(8.1)  41.4  60 
(44.4)  9.6  13 
(9.6)  38.3  3.8  3.4  2.8  19.5 
1999  —  —  38.2#  52 
(38.5)  9.6  12 
(8.9)  2.5  3 
(2.2)  38.1  56 
(41.5)  8.8  12 
(8.9)  47.8  3.9  3.7  5.0  15.6 
2003  —  —  31.4  42 
(31.1) 12.0  15 
(11.1)  7.4  9 
(6.7)  31.2  46 
(34.1) 16.7  23 
(17.0)  43.4  4.2  3.9  2.5  12.1 
Notes: 'votes' stands for 'share of the votes'; 'SWP' refers to the combined share of the vote of 
the three state-wide parties with government experience (UCD/CDS+PSC-PSOE+AP/PP). 
* are not included two seats (2.7% of the vote) for the Partido Socialista Andaluz (PSA).  
**Alianza Popular/ Solidaritat Catalana 
# In coalition with Ciutadans pel Canvi in Barcelona and with Ciutadans pel Canvi and ICV-Verds 
in all the other constituencies.  
Sources: Argos http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.htm 
The Catalan party system has more actors than the Spanish party system because 
of  the  rather  low  disproportionality  of  the  electoral  system  and  the  strength  of 
regionalist parties in the region. State-wide parliamentary elections in Catalonia have 
displayed very stable results since 1977. The combined share of the vote for state-wide 
parties has mostly been between 50 and 60% (the vote for the PSC-PSOE is included 
in  the  count  of  state-wide  parties,  as  it  is  related  with  the  PSOE).  The  PSC  has 
systematically been the party with the largest share of the vote, followed by CiU. The 
PP, in contrast, is particularly weak. While its share of the vote has increased over 
time, it has managed to attract over 20% of the votes only once. The party system 
displays a higher level of fragmentation than the Spanish party system. The results of 
state-wide parliamentary elections in Catalonia show a large degree of differentiation 
from state-wide voting patterns, as evidenced by the high value of the Lee index.  
In regional elections, the combined share of the vote for state-wide parties has 
been 10 to 15 points below its value for state-wide elections, but the gap between 
regionalist and state-wide parties has decreased steadily over time. This increase in the 
vote share of state-wide parties, visible in the value of the index of dissimilarity, means 
that Catalan voters tend to vote more and more similarly in state-wide and regional 
elections. However, the Catalan electorate vote more for regionalist parties in elections 
to the Catalan parliament. Nationalist-regionalist parties (CiU and Esquerra Republicana  
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de Catalunya) have attracted between 20 and 35% of the votes in state-wide elections. 
In recent years, the vote for CiU has tended to decline slightly while the vote for ERC 
has increased. This trend is less remarkable in autonomous elections, where the vote 
for ERC has only soared in the last election.  
CiU is a federation of the Christian-democratic Unió Democràtica de Catalunya and 
the social-democratic Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (Culla 1989 and 1990). On 
the other hand, ERC is a left-wing nationalist party that has a long history that goes 
back to the 2
nd Republic, when Esquerra Republicana played a major role and its 
leader Lluís Companys became President of the Generalitat (1933-1940). ERC has a 
more extreme regionalist position than CiU and is in favour of the independence of 
Catalonia.  
Table 6.11. Feeling of Catalan national identity, 1992-2005 (%) 
  1992  1996  1998  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Only Spanish  20.0  13.3  13.0  10.5  11.5  8.5  12.6  8.0 
More Spanish than Catalan  8.1  5.7  7.6  11.4  7.8  4.1  6.1  9.0 
As Spanish as Catalan   34.8  46.6  43.1  44.4  42.2  40.9  28.3  40.0 
More Catalan than Spanish   19.8  19.6  23.4  18.7  22.9  27.2  25.8  25.0 
Only Catalan   15.0  12.8  11.5  13.5  13.1  16.4  14.7  12.0 
d.k/n.a.  2..3  2.0  0.4  1.4  2.6  2.8  2.6  7.0 
Sources:  CIS  1992  (2033)  and  1998  (2286);  ICPS  1997  (for  1996);  Observatorio  Político 
Autonómico 2006 (2001-05). 
Vote  for  regionalist  parties  is  supported  by  a  strong  identification  with  the 
region's  culture  and  identity.  The  table  above  shows  that  the  proportion  of 
respondents who identify mainly with the Spanish identity has substantially decreased, 
while the share of those who feel more Catalan or exclusively Catalan has increased 
slightly. In the year of the last Catalan election, this last category represented over 43% 
of the respondents. The Catalan nationalist parties therefore have an important pool 
of potential voters, while a Spanish party that identifies – and is identified - mainly 
with Spain, as is the case of the PP, has a narrow base of support in terms of identity 
politics.  
 
Regional elections in the Basque Country 
The Basque country is a very special region of Spain. As we saw earlier, it has a long 
history of regional rights, its own language, the experience of self-government during 
the Second Republic and a nationalist movement that organised politically at the end 
of the 19
th century. During Franco's dictatorship the Basque movement took a radical 
turn. ETA (Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom) was created in 
1959 by the young generation of Basque nationalists out of frustration against the 
repression  and  what  they  perceived  as  the  apathy  of  the  traditional  nationalist 
movement and the PNV. As it developed and attempted to gain new recruits, ETA 
adopted a Marxist ideology in order to facilitate the inclusion of members from a non-
Basque background (Conversi 1997: 89-98). The late 1960s marked the beginning of 
the  armed  struggle.  ETA's  most  spectacular  action  is  the  1973  assassination  of 
Admiral Carrero Blanco, who was expected to succeed Franco after his death. A cycle 
of action-repression between the police and the branches of ETA characterised the 
last years of the regime (Conversi 1997: 98-108).  
The return to democracy did not solve the problems of the Basque country. In 
particular, the new political system lacked legitimacy in the region, as the constitution 
failed to gain a majority of the votes in the referendum. The continuing political  
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violence in the Basque country 30 years after Franco's death and the strong network 
of political and social organisations that surround ETA have had a polarising effect of 
the region's political system and represent a clear limit on the consolidation of the 
institutions in the region, which in this respect stands in sharp contrast with the rest of 
the country (Pérez Nievas 2002; Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004: 186-7). 
Table 6.12. Autonomous elections in the Basque country 
Source: Argos http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.htm  
The Basque party system is characterised by a clear domination of the nationalist 
parties. The PNV has received the highest share of the vote in every regional election 
and in all but one Spanish parliamentary election (see appendix 5 tables 2 for the 
results of Spanish parliamentary elections in the Basque country). Table 6.13 below 
shows that the share of the vote for state-wide parties is rather low, even though the 
last two elections demonstrate a clear increase in the vote for these parties, mainly due 
to the increase in the vote for PP.  
Table 6.13. Electoral indicators, Basque elections, 1980-2001 
  SWP  ENEP  ENPP  D  ID 
1980  27.1  4.8  4.0  4.1  18.3 
1984  32.1  3.8  3.5  2.7  10.8 
1986  30.1  5.8  5.2  3.4  16.85 
1990  28.4  5.7  5.3  2.8  10.1 
1994  30.8  5.7  5.7  3.1  9.55 
1998  37.0  5.4  5.0  2.9  9.35 
2001  40.5  3.6  3.4  2.5  13.35 
Notes: 'SWP' refers to the combined share of the vote of the three state-wide parties with 
government experience (UCD/CDS+PSC-PSOE+AP/PP). 
With the exception of the first regional election, in which the political branch of 
ETA, Herri Batasuna (HB), came second, it is always the party in power in Madrid that 
has received the second highest share of the vote. Hence, between 1984 and 1994, the 
PSE-EE was the second party, followed by the political branch of ETA. In the 1998 
and 2001 elections, the PP came into second position. In the meantime, the share of 
the vote for the PSOE remained constant. As a result, the share of the vote for state-
wide  parties  increased.  Similar  patterns  of  voting  are  observable  in  Spanish 
parliamentary elections in the region. As a result, the value of the index of dissimilarity 
is relatively low. The Lee index, which evaluates the deviation between regional and 
state-wide voting patterns in state-wide parliamentary elections, however shows high 
values (see appendix 5 table 3).  
  UCD/CDS PSE-PSOE  AP/PP  PCE/IU  PNV  HB/EH  EE  EA  others 


















1980  8.5  6 
(10.0)  14.2  9 
(15.0)  4.7  2 
(3.3)  4.0  1 
(1.7)  38.1  25 
(41.7)  16.6  11 
(18.3)  9.8  6 
(10.0)  -  -  4.1  0 
1984  -  -  23.1  19 
(25.3)  9.4  6 
(8.0)  1.4  0  42.0  32 
(42.7)  14.7  11 
(15.7)  8.0  7 
(9.3)  -  -  1.4  0 
1986  3.5  2 
(2.7)  22.1  19 
(25.3)  4.9  2 
(2.7)  0.6  0  23.7  17 
(22.7)  17.5  13 
(17.3)  10.9  9 
(12.0)  15.8  13 
(17.3)  1.0  0 
1990  0.7  0  19.9  16 
(21.3)  8.2  6 
(8.0)  1.4  0  28.5  22 
(29.3)  18.3  13 
(17.3)  7.8  6 
(8.0)  11.4  9 
(12.0)  3.8  3 
(4.0) 
1994  -  -  17.1  12 
(16.0)  14.4  11 
(15.7)  9.2  6 
(8.0)  29.8  22 
(29.3)  16.3  11 
(15.7)  -  -  10.3  8 
(10.7)  2.9  5 
(6.7) 
1998  -  -  17.6  14 
(18.7)  20.1  16 
(21.3)  5.7  2 
(2.7)  28.0  21 
(28.0)  17.9  14 
(18.7)  -  -  8.7  6 
(8.0)  2.0  2 
(2.7) 
2001  -  -  17.9  13 
(17.3)  23.1  19 
(25.3)  5.6  3 
(4.0)  42.7  33 
(44.0)  10.1  7 
(9.3)  -  -  -  -  0.6  0  
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The party system is also characterised by a rather large number of parties, both at 
the electoral level as in terms of parties with elected representatives, partly because of 
the  low  disproportionality  of  the  electoral  system.  The  number  of  parties  has 
nevertheless diminished, as the moderate left-wing nationalist party EE (Euskadiko 
Ezkerra) merged with the PSE to form the PSE-EE, and EA (Eusko Alkartasuna), 
which  was  formed  by  former  lehendakari  (president  of  Basque  autonomous 
community) Carlos Garaicoetxea as a splinter party from the PNV in 1986 (Gunther, 
Montero and Botella 2004: 187), entered an electoral coalition with the PNV. Finally, 
in the last election the Union Alavesa failed to return any member in the regional 
parliament. The 2001 election also marks a sharp decline in the vote for Batasuna. 
However, the illegalisation of Batasuna did not have immediate effect in the region, as 
the PNV government refused to respect the 2002 Ley de Partidos (Law on Political 
Parties) that facilitated the ban of Batasuna and its associated organisations.  
The vote for nationalist parties is supported by the strong level of identification 
with the Basque identity. Basque nationalist parties can draw support from those who 
feel exclusively Basque and those who feel more Basque than Spanish. This represents 
a considerable reserve of votes for nationalist parties. In the mid-1990s, the level of 
identification with the Spanish/ Castilian identity has dropped significantly (in 1979, 
this figure was 37%), and Basque residents who feel only Spanish today represent a 
very small fraction of the population (Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004: 184-5). 
The share of respondents who declare that they feel equally Spanish and Basque has 
remained stable at around a third of the population, and the share of people who feel 
exclusively Basque has increased by 12 points to represent a third of all respondents. 
This distribution of the feelings of regional identity means that a party is unlikely to 
draw a lot of support by emphasising its Spanish identity. 
Table 6.14. Feelings of regional/national identity in the Basque country 
  1992  1996  1998  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Only Spanish  9.0  6  4.9  3.6  4.7  5.5  5.8  2.8 
More Spanish than Basque  8.5  5  3.3  6.3  6.4  5.7  5.8  5.6 
As Spanish as Basque   34.5  30  38.0  36.8  36.0  34.5  32.4  32.5 
More Basque than Spanish   19.8  25  24.6  27.4  19.3  23.4  18.7  22.3 
Only Basque   20.1  29  24.1  19.8  25.2  27.1  33.4  32.2 
d.k./n.a.  8.2  5  1.9  6.1  8.4  3.8  3.9  4.7 
Sources:  CIS  1992  (2040),  1998  (2286);  Euskobarómetro  (for  1996);  Observatorio  Político 
Autonómico 2006 (2001-05). 
The state-wide parties, which tend to be associated with Spain and the central 
government, compete for a smaller share of the electorate. Over time, their share of 
the vote has nevertheless increased. It is in particular the share of the vote of the PP 
that has increased while the vote for the PNV was decreasing. As a result, under the 
influence of the new leadership and the new lehendakari Juan José Ibarretxe, the PNV 
abandoned its coalition with the PSE and its moderate nationalist stances. Instead, it 
radicalised its position at the end of the 1990s, coming closer to the position of the 
Basque 'liberation movement' (close to ETA) in order to woo Batasuna voters in the 
2000  general  election  and  beyond.  The  Estella/Lizarra  Pact  (1998),  concluded 
between  all  the  nationalist  parties,  was  part  of  this  radicalisation  of  the  Basque 
nationalists. It proposed that ETA violence should end with the settlement of the 
institutional  question,  the  domination  of  nationalist  political  forces,  the 
marginalisation of state-wide parties, the dissociation from the Spanish government, 
and the implementation of a strategy designed to push the Basque country toward  
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independence. The political translation of this pact is the 2002 Plan Ibarretxe, which 
proposed to transform the Basque country into an 'associated free state' with Spain 
(Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004: 190-1 and 309-10).  
 
Regional elections in Galicia 
Galicia  is  the  third  region  that  was  awarded  the  status  of  historic  nationality  and 
therefore  granted  special  autonomous  rights.  Unlike  the  other  two  historic 
nationalities, Galicia had no previous experience of regional self-government. There 
were  other  obstacles  to  the  construction  of  a  strong  nationalist  movement  in  the 
region: historically, Galician elites, having managed to gain positions in the central 
administration and other public bodies, had effectively adopted the Castilian culture, 
while the bulk of the population consisted of poor peasants under the influence of 
local notables and a conservative clergy. As a result, the region lacked self-sufficient 
Galician  elites  that  could  have  contributed  to  building  a  Galician  identity  against 
Madrid's centralism and that could have mobilised the population against the centre 
on the basis of identity or comparative grievances (Gunther, Montero and Botella 
2004: 41).  
The region's cultural traditions and language have nevertheless remained very 
strong. At the time of the transition, Galego was the most widely spoken of all the 
regional languages, with nearly 90% of Galicians declaring in a survey that they could 
speak the language (Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004: 178). This translates into 
very low levels of exclusive or predominant identification with the Spanish culture. A 
majority of the population feels equally Galician and Spanish, and the size of this 
category  has  increased  over  time.  Identification  with  the  Galician  culture  tends 
however  to  be  moderate  rather  than  exclusive,  and  the  proportion  of  Galician 
residents who declare that they feel more Galician or only Galician has decreased a 
little since the early 1990s (Table 6.15). 
Table 6.15. Feelings of regional/national identity in Galicia 
  1992  1996  1998  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Only Spanish  6.6  13  6.3  4.9  3.8  3.2  3.9  3.8 
More Spanish than Galician  6.1  5.4  4.5  5.8  6.3  4.3  3.3 
As Galician as Spanish   53.5 
44* 
47.1  59.7  58.0  57.6  64.6  65.8 
More Galician than Spanish   24.7  30.3  20.5  23.4  27.1  22.2  20.9 
Only Galician  7.0 
43* 
8.7  6.5  6.9  4.8  3.8  5.3 
d.k./n.a.  2.1  1  1.3  3.9  2.2  1.0  1.2  0.8 
* collapsed categories 
Sources: CIS 1992 (2036), 1998 (2286); Moral 1998: 40 (for 1996); OPA 2006 (2001-2005).  
The Galician party system is characterised by an undisputable domination of the 
centre-right. The UCD was rapidly replaced by the Alianza Popular/Partido Popular. 
The AP/PP governed the region throughout the whole period under investigation. 
Similarly, the centre-right has systematically returned the highest number of members 
of the Congreso and in the Galician Parliament, and an absolute majority of the seats 
in  both  houses  since  1989.  The  PSdeG-PSOE  came  into  second  place  in  every 
election to the Spanish parliament and in all Galician election until 1997. That year and 
in 2001, the BNG replaced the socialist party as the second party in terms of votes.  
The Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG) is a moderate left-wing nationalist party. In 
the  late  1990S,  it  brought together  most of the nationalist  groups  and  signed the 
Declaration  of  Barcelona  with  the  PNV  and  CiU  in  1998,  that  advocated  the 
collaboration between nationalists in order to ensure a confederal-type of reform of  
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the Estado de Autonomías (Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004: 312). The nationalists 
peaked in 1997 with 25% of the votes. 
Table 6.16. Autonomous elections in Galicia, 1981-2001 
  UCD/CDS  PSdeG  AP/PP  PCG/EU  BNG  PSG-EG  CG 
  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%) Votes Seats 
(%) 
ENEP ENPP  D  ID 
1981  27.3  24 
(33.8) 20.9  16 
(22.5)  30.5  26 
(36.6)  2.9  1 
(1.4)  6.3  3 
(4.2)  3.3  1 
(1.4)  _  _  4.8  3.3  7.9  22.1 
1985  3.3  _  28.9  22 
(31.0)  41.2  34 
(47.9)  0.8  _  4.2  1 
(1.4)  5.7  3 
(4.2)  13.0  11 
(15.5)  3.8  2.9  6.8  13.45 
1989  2.9  _  32.8  28 
(37.3)  44.2  38 
(50.7)  1.5  _  8.0  5 
(6.7)  3.8  2 
(2.7)  3.7  2 
(2.7)  3.3  2.5  6.7  9.85 
1993  _  _  23.9  19 
(25.3)  52.6  43 
(57.3)  3.1  _  18.5  13 
(17.3)  _  _  0.4  _  2.8  2.4  4.7  15.95 
1997  _  _  19.7  15* 
(20.0)  52.9  42 
(56.0)  0.9  _  25.1  18 
(24.0)  0.9  _  _  _  2.7  2.4  3.1  16.8 
2001  _  _  22.2  17 
(22.7)  52.5  41 
(54.6)  0.7  _  23.0  17 
(22.7)  0.7  _  _  _  2.8  2.5  2.6  5.35 
Notes: * includes two seats from EU/EG-Os Verdes (in coalition with PSOE). 
Source: Argos http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.html  
The success of ethnoregionalist parties is also limited by the attitude of the PP in 
the region. Led by Manuel Fraga, who ruled the region since his retreat from national 
politics  in  1989,  the  party  adopted  a  pro-regionalist  stance  that  they  describe  as 
Galeguismo and that they distinguish from nationalism by its loyalty toward the Spanish 
state. While the party was initially reluctant to accept the Estado de las Autonomías, its 
successes at the regional level, and in particular in Galicia, at a time when the PSOE 
dominated Spanish politics convinced the AP and then the PP that decentralisation 
could  have  some  advantages.  In  Galicia,  the  party  encouraged  regional  culture, 
promoted  the  full  development  of  the  statute  of  autonomy,  and  encouraged  the 
extension of the region's competence.  
Like in Catalonia and the Basque country, voting patterns in state-wide elections 
in  Galicia  vary  more  with  respect  to  voting  in  state-wide  elections  in  the  whole 
country than in comparison with elections to the Galician Parliament. Also like in the 
other two regions, Galician voters tend to vote more for regionalist parties in elections 
to the  regional  parliament  than  in  state-wide  parliamentary  elections.  The  level  of 
support for regionalist parties, and in particular for the BNG in the last decade, is the 
main distinguishing feature between state-wide and regional elections, as the results 
for state-wide parties do not follow the pattern of variation assumed by the second-
order election theory.  
 
6.3.  Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the territorial cleavage has played an important role in the 
formation  of  the  Spanish  state  and  in  the  construction  of  the  contemporary 
democratic system. The establishment of the Estado de las Autonomías, which provides 
the Spanish regions with a considerable level of autonomy compared to most of their 
European  counterparts,  has  also  contributed  to  creating  separate  arenas  of  party 
competition. The high level of autonomy of Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia 
suggests that the regional branches of the state-wide parties in these regions should be 
quite autonomous. Because the Basque country enjoys more autonomy than the other 
two regions, we can also expect the Basque branch of the PP and the PSOE to be 
more  autonomous  than  the  Catalan  and  Galician  branches.  However,  the  rather 
important number of shared and concurrent competences, as well as the capacity of  
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eth central government to legislate over any issue may strengthen the central level of 
party  organisation  at  the  expense  of  the  regional  branches.  The  top-down 
management of the transition may also have contributed to the development of a 
strong  central  organisation  before  the  emergence  of  regional  elites  and  therefore 
strengthened central control over the party’s development at the regional level. 
Party competition at the regional level is influenced by two opposite trends: the 
nationalisation  of  the  stakes  and  role  of  the  state-wide  parties  in  creating  a  link 
between the two levels, and the strength of peripheral nationalist and ethnoregionalist 
parties, which creates centrifugal tendencies and produces a set of distinctive issues 
and stakes for regional elections. Most regions follow the first logic, in which state-
wide parties dominate the regional political arena. Smaller ethnoregionalist parties may 
be present but they generally contribute only marginally to modifying the regional 
debate and differentiating the autonomous political system. Galicia is such a regional 
party system: the AP/PP has dominated the region, forming government after each 
election  except  the  last  and  the  strength  of  the  regionalist  movement  has  never 
exceeded 25% of the votes. On the other hand, in regions like Catalonia and the 
Basque  country,  non-state-wide  nationalist  parties  dominate  the  party  system  and 
consistently  form  government,  albeit  sometimes  in  combination  with  state-wide 
parties, as is currently the case in Catalonia. This means that patterns of voting tend to 
be more constant in Galicia, but also that they tend to be closer to the national pattern 
of voting than in the other two regions. 
These  characteristics  mean  that  political  parties  are  more  likely  to  be 
decentralised in the regions where the political trends differentiate the regional arena 
from the Spanish patterns of voting. We should expect the regional party branches of 
the PP and the PSOE to be more autonomous in the Basque country and Catalonia 
than in Galicia. Terrorism in the Basque country and the importance of this issue in 
state-wide politics may nevertheless contribute to a greater involvement of the central 
parties in this region. The next chapter will describe the territorial organisation of 
these two parties, focusing on the organisation of the central level and the regional 






CHAPTER 7.  ORGANISATION OF THE SPANISH 





This chapter looks at the organisation of the two main state-wide parties in Spain, the 
Spanish socialist party PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and the conservative 
Partido Popular (PP). These two parties have monopolised government positions at 
the central level since 1982 and have governed most of the autonomous communities 
either alone or in coalition since their creation.  
Political  parties  have  played  a  crucial  role  in  facilitating  the  transition  to 
democracy, and the resulting institutions strongly favour them (Holliday 2002: 251). 
The constitution recognises their role in the new democracy as instruments of political 
participation.
52  Other  constitutional  provisions  strengthen  political  parties.  For 
instance, the closed-list PR electoral system clearly favours political parties rather than 
their candidates. Within the Congress of Deputies, parliamentary groups play a very 
important role at the expense of individual members (Blanco Valdés 1990: 130-5). 
Parties  were  also  granted  significant  powers  of  patronage  through  public 
appointments, and 'many core institutions of government have been colonized and are 
substantially  controlled  by  parties'  (Holliday  2002:  248).  In  recognition  of  their 
inherent  weakness  after  40  years  of  dictatorship and  of  the  role  they  play  in  the 
democratic system, political parties were granted generous public funding and large-
scale free access to the media during election campaigns (Aja 2001: 248). 
Public party funding is the main source of party finance in Spain. Parties receive 
public  subsidies  for  the  exercise  of  their  ordinary  activities,  for  the  support  of 
parliamentary groups and for election campaigns for all types of elections (Congress, 
Senate, autonomous, provincial and local elections). The computation of the amount 
of the subsidies is based on the parties' number of seats and votes (Blanco Valdés 
1990: 193-6; Álvarez Conde 2005: 374-400; Holgado González 2003). As a result, the 
system, and in particular the public subsidy for ordinary activities, favours the largest 
parties (Blanco Valdés 1990: 198). Initially designed to compensate for the weakness 
of the parties and their membership, the extensive provision of public subsidies to 
political  parties  has contributed  to  entrenching  the  position  of  the  main  political 
parties and maintaining them in a situation of dependence on public money.  
The Spanish political parties have also had to adapt to the development of the 
State of the Autonomies (Estado de las Autonomías). The first section of this chapter will 
look  at  how  the  socialist  PSOE  has  organised  its  central  organs  and  its  regional 
branches. The second part studies the organisation of the Partido Popular.  
 
 
                                                 
52 'Los partidos políticos expresan el pluralismo político, concurren a la formación y manifestación de la 
voluntad  popular  y  son  instrumentos  fundamentales  para  la  participación  política'  (art.  6  Spanish 
Constitution).   
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7.1. The Socialist Workers' Party, Partido  Socialista  Obrero  Español 
(PSOE) 
7.1.1. History and change in the PSOE  
Party formation and reformation at the end of the Franco dictatorship 
The  PSOE  was  created  in  1879  by  Pablo  Iglesias.  Under  his  influence,  the  party 
rapidly consolidated, and it can be said that it had an early institutionalisation in the 
sense that the party's main goal became to maintain its organisation rather than defend 
a strict Marxist ideology (Magone 2004:  94-5). This became a necessity under the 
regimes that ruled Spain at the end of the 19
th century and the beginning of the 20
th 
century. The party achieved its first success with the advent of the Second Republic, 
but the Civil War put a rapid end to this period. 
The Franco dictatorship all but wiped out the party's organisation. After the Civil 
War, most of the socialist leadership was either in exile or jailed in Spain, with some of 
the most prominent leaders shot without trial by the Francoist troops. In the last years 
of  the  dictatorship,  the  party  only  counted  a  few  thousands  members  and  was 
organised locally in barely half of the provinces (Gunther, Montero and Botella 2005: 
243).  
While in the 1960s the party was dominated by the party in exile, the 1970s were 
characterised by a leadership change. A group of young party leaders from Andalusia 
led  by  Felipe  González,  a  young  lawyer  from  Seville,  started  to  criticize  Llopis' 
leadership from exile. The October 1974 congress held in Suresnes (France) (XIII 
congress in exile) marked a generational change in the party when Felipe González 
took over its reins. Even before its official legalisation 1976, the PSOE managed to 
organise  its  XXVII  congress  in  Madrid.  The  party  adopted  a  formally  federal 
organisation and set up the Federal Congress, the Federal Executive Committee and 
the Federal Commission.  
González, aided by Alfonso Guerra, inherited a very week organisation, which 
counted 2,548 members in 1974 and a mere 9,141 in 1976 (Soto 2005: 80). The party 
initially  benefited  from  a  strong  support  from  the  Socialist  International  and  the 
German SDP in particular (Romero Salvadó 1999: 174). With the start of the process 
of democratisation and the rapid organisation of elections, the party had to focus on 
organising  the  party to  compete  in  the  1977  elections. The  re-organisation  of the 
PSOE was mainly conducted from the centre and through the incorporation of the 
other socialist groups. The central control over the establishment of provincial party 
branches facilitated the centralisation of power within the party. The González-Guerra 
alliance intended to build a cohesive, disciplined party (Soto 2005: 81). The regional 
branches  were  also  set  up  from  the  centre,  once  the  provincial  branches  were 
organised  to  fight  state-wide  parliamentary  elections.  This  pattern  of  centralised 
formation  in  the  absence  of  organised  local  and  regional  elites  facilitated  central 
control over the regional party branches (Méndez Lago 2000: 136-7; Méndez Lago 
2005: 171-2).   
The process of national integration of all the socialist federations however failed 
in Catalonia, where an independent PSC (Catalan Socialist Party) was formed in 1978. 
The new party, under the name PSC-PSOE, integrated all the socialist groups of the 
region to promote a socialist and Catalanist agenda. Historically, the PSOE has always 
had  problems  in  Catalonia,  where  it  faced  the  opposition  of  a  strong  anarchist 
movement and the growth of the nationalism (Gillespie 1989; Roller and van Houten 
2003: 10). By allowing the formation of a separate party in the region, the PSOE  
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hoped  to  counterbalance  these  two  political  traditions  and  increase  its  chances of 
electoral success. The PSC is linked to the PSOE via the 1978 Unity protocol ('Protocol 
d'unitat de la FSC (PSOE), PSC-C i PSC-R en el Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-
PSOE)'). The protocol states that the PSC-PSOE is sovereign for its organisation and 
policies within Catalonia. It joins forces with the PSOE to coordinate national policies 
and campaigns. To that effect, it sends representatives to the Federal Congress and the 
Federal Executive Commission of the PSOE.  
The programme adopted by the PSOE in 1976 defined the party as a 'class party' 
and as a 'democratic, Marxist, mass party'. The party positioned itself clearly on the 
left of the political spectrum in order to counter the Communist party, which was then 
stronger  and  better  organised.  As  a  sign  of  the  importance  of  the  working-class 
movement in the PSOE, party members were required to affiliate to the trade union 
UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores, General Workers' Union) (van Biezen 2003: 90). In 
the first democratic elections, the PSOE became the main opposition party and the 
leading party on the left.  
In order to expand its potential electorate and win the next general election, 
González wanted to move the party to the centre. Such was his  aim at the 1979 
congress. The party rejected this move, but González presented his resignation in 
opposition to the Marxist orientation of the party. His dominance over the party was 
such  that  he  was  re-elected  at  the  extraordinary  congress  that  followed,  and  the 
congress endorsed his strategy of political moderation. In the interim period between 
his  resignation  and  the  extraordinary  congress,  Alfonso  Guerra  implemented  a 
number of organisational reforms that strengthened the power of the leadership and 
facilitated central control over the composition of the congress and over the votes of 
regional  and  provincial  delegations  (Méndez  Lago  2005:  173-5).  The  1979 
extraordinary congress has been described as the PSOE's own 'Bad Godesberg', in the 
sense  that  it  marked  the  party's  transformation  into  a  more  pragmatic  party,  its 
departure from Marxist references and its adherence to social-democratic principles 
(Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004: 244). 
 
Contemporary organisation and principles 
Between 1982 and 1996, the PSOE formed the Spanish government. For the first 11 
years (until the 1993 election), it governed with an absolute majority of the seats in 
Congress. Throughout the 1980s, the party acted as an electoral machine at the service 
of the government. González led the government while Guerra controlled the party 
organisation. Méndez (2005: 179) argues that 'from end of the 1970s and during the 
1980s internal control and discipline prevailed over any other organisational concern'. 
Control  from  the  centre  was  facilitated  by  'the  large  attributions  of  the  Federal 
Executive Commission, the majoritarian electoral system in internal elections to the 
party congress, and the proportional system with closed lists for general elections' 
(Maravall 1992: 14). The party rapidly transformed Spanish society, adopting market-
friendly economic policies and implementing a strict programme of structural reforms 
in order to ensure Spain's entry into the European Community and eventually  its 
membership in the European single currency zone (Gibbons 1999: 47; Méndez Lago 
2005: 177). 
The  1990s  were  characterised  by  internal  division  between  two  groups,  the 
renovadores and the guerristas. The first group sought to increase intra-party democracy 
while the other insisted on keeping a strong central hold on the party organisation as 
had been done by Alfonso Guerra since the party's refoundation. In policy terms, the  
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former were social democrats and the latter supported and more social and populist 
agenda (Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004: 246). While Guerra won the debate in 
the 1990 congress, the internal struggle continued and the party focused inward on its 
divisions  instead  of  focusing  outward,  on  maintaining  or  improving  its  electoral 
potential (Méndez Lago 2005: 183-6). The stability of the party was ensured by the 
increasing participation of the party's regional 'barons' in central party affairs. Those 
regional leaders, often presidents of autonomous communities, acted as referees to 
keep the party running during this dispute. In return, they obtained a certain level of 
party decentralisation (Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004: 245).  
The last González government (1993-96) was a difficult period for the party. 
Placed in a minority position in parliament, it needed the support of nationalist parties, 
and in particular CiU. Moreover, the party faced a series of difficulties that led to its 
eventual defeat in 1996: corruption scandals and the GAL case
53; tensions between the 
PSOE and the trade union UGT, facilitated by the end of the end of the compulsory 
double membership between the PSOE and the UGT in 1990; and internal tensions 
over economic and social policy (Gibbons 1999: 46; Méndez Lago 2005: 190). 
After  the  party  lost  the  1996  state-wide  election,  the  PSOE  changed  leader. 
González  supported  Joaquín  Almunia,  a  key  member  of  the  renovadores,  as  his 
successor. In practice chosen by a handful of party grandees, Almunia decided to 
introduce primary elections for the selection of the party's candidate to the post of 
Prime minister (President). To his surprise and that of most party leaders, Almunia 
lost the primary election to Catalan left-winger Josep Borrell. The party then entered a 
period  of  double  leadership,  and  strong  tensions  between  Almunia  and  Borrell 
emerged rapidly. Again, regional barons played a role as intermediaries and 'referees' in 
this internal conflict (Méndez Lago 2005: 188). Borrell was forced to resign in 1999 
after a corruption scandal involving people close to him. Almunia became the party's 
candidate but failed to appeal to the electorate, which was also confused by the last-
minute decision to collaborate with Izquierda Unida (reformed communists). 
This second defeat precipitated a change in the party's leadership. Almunia stood 
down and a challenger, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, won against José Bono, the 
president of Castile La Mancha and preferred candidate of the party leadership and 
regional barons. The new leader adopted a strategy of 'constructive opposition' over 
terrorism and the reform of the judiciary and of 'frontal opposition' over social issues 
such as education and the Iraq war (Méndez Lago 2006: 432).  
Under Zapatero's leadership, the PSOE has put an end to the internal disputes 
and focused instead on its electoral strategy. It has emphasised its social democratic 
agenda and social policies, on housing, education, women's rights and the rights of 
homosexual  couples  to  marry  and  adopt.  In  economic  terms,  relatively  little  has 
changed, as the PSOE focuses on economic stability and compliance with European 
single currency criteria. The party has become more decentralised in its practice, and 
the new leader consulted regional leaders more often, in particular via the Territorial 
Council. Institutional reform also became part of the party's programme, with pledges 
to reform the Senate to transform it into a real chamber of regional representation and 
to facilitate the revision of the statutes of autonomy of those regions that wished to do 
so (PSOE 2004).  
                                                 
53 The GAL were the Grupos Anti-terroristas de Liberación (Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups), a group 




This new strategy was nevertheless insufficient to improve the party's electoral 
prospects. In the run-up to the 2004 elections, opinion polls predicted victory for the 
Popular Party. The Al-Qaeda bombings in Madrid three days before the poll changed 
the situation. In the two days that followed, controversies rose over the government's 
handling of the information regarding the perpetrators of the attacks and its insistence 
to  blame  ETA  while  some  evidence  seemed  to  point  in  the  direction of  Islamist 
terrorism, seemingly leading to an increase in participation that benefited the PSOE 
(Méndez Lago 2005: 190-1; Torcal and Rico 2005). Rather unexpectedly, the PSOE 
won the election and Zapatero became prime minister.  
 
7.1.2. Organisation at the central level, central party processes 
The PSOE defines itself as a 'federal' party, with a central organisation and regional 
federations throughout the country. Lower party echelons include provincial and local 
party branches. In Catalonia, the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya PSC-PSOE replaces 
the  PSOE.  It  is  an  independent  party  affiliated  to  the  PSOE. The  PSC  presents 
candidates in Catalonia for state-wide and regional parliamentary elections and the 
PSOE does not contest seats in the region. Through its affiliation to the PSOE, the 
PSC sends representatives in the central organs of the PSOE and PSC members of the 
Congress of Deputies participate in the PSOE parliamentary group. Table 7.1 below 
presents a schematic view of the central organisation of the PSOE (called federal by 
the party). 
Figure 7.1. Organigram, organisation of the PSOE at the central level 
Source: own elaboration from the statutes of the PSOE, 2000.  
 
Constitutional guarantee 
The party's statutes are debated and approved by the Federal Congress, which includes 
a minority of regional representatives. Proposals for change generally emanate from 
the federal executive rather than from lower party echelons. The PSOE thus receives a 
score of 1 for the indicator of revision of the constitution. The statutes of the regional 
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n.45) reports that this control is however quite unsystematic. Moreover, article 17 of 
the statutes of the state-wide party stipulate that the regional federations must include 
a  congress,  a  regional  committee  and  an  executive  commission  (PSOE  2000).  In 
practice, most regional branches mimic the national (federal) structure in their own 
organisation.  This  gives  PSOE  party  branches  a  score  of  1  for  the  indicator  of 
organisational freedom. The exception here is the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC). Its 
organisation is not subject to any external constraint, as it is an independent political 
party. It nevertheless accommodates for the selection of representatives to the federal 
organs of the PSOE. As a result, it has a score of 1 for revision of the constitution and 
4 for organisational freedom. 
 
Selecting the party leader 
The PSOE has a secretary-general and a president. In practice, the secretary-general is 
the highest personal representative of the party. The position of party president is a 
rather honorific title. Unlike the president of the PP, the secretary-general is not an 
office in itself but a member of the Federal Executive Committee (FEC). The FEC is 
elected by the federal congress via a list-based system of proportional representation. 
The federal congress is composed of provincial representatives. Until 1990, provincial 
delegates  tended,  however,  to  vote  together  with  the  delegates  from  the  same 
autonomous community via their block vote. The block vote allowed provincial and 
regional leaders to control all the votes from their area. This was however a period in 
the  history  of  the  party  when  the  centre,  under  Guerra's  control,  had  a  strong 
influence over provincial and regional levels (Gillespie 1989: 323-4). Since the 1994 
congress, the FEC is elected by secret ballot of all the congress delegates (Méndez-
Lago 2000: 118-9). 
The party has known three secretaries-general since the return to democracy. 
Felipe González was secretary-general between 1974 and 1997. Since the extraordinary 
federal congress of 1979, he added a deputy secretary-general. Alfonso Guerra held 
that position until the change of leadership in 1997. Guerra controlled the party's 
organisation while González was Prime minister and focused on government activities 
(Méndez-Lago 2005: 184). At the 1997 congress, after the party's defeat in the 1996 
election, González unexpectedly announced in his opening speech that he would not 
seek re-selection as secretary-general and suggested Joaquín Almunia as a replacement. 
Almunia had been a minister in several of González's governments and was a key 
figure of the renovadores.  
The issue of leadership was complicated by the introduction of primaries for the 
selection of the party's candidate to the position of prime minister. Almunia had been 
selected as secretary-general by the party elite. Election in a primary would provide 
him  with  a  legitimacy  that  he  lacked.  The  primary  produced  a  shock  result,  with 
Almunia coming second to Josep Borrell, a left-winger from the PSC. The margin 
(55% to 44%) was clear and the party entered a period of double leadership, with clear 
tensions between the two leaders increased by the party elites' hostility towards Borrell 
and his lack of any official position within the party apparatus other than that of 
candidate (Hopkin 2001: 355). These tensions, together with the waves of a corruption 
scandal that involved some people close to him pushed Borrell to resign less than a 
year after the primaries, and Almunia stood as the party's prime ministerial candidate 
in the 2000 election (Méndez-Lago 2005: 187). 
This new defeat led to Almunia's resignation. The 2000 federal congress counted 
four  candidates:  José  Bono,  one  of  the  major  regional  'barons'  of  the  party  and  
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president  of  Castile-La  Mancha  since  1983;  Rosa  Díez,  a  Basque  MEP;  Matilde 
Fernández, former minister for Social Affairs and guerrista candidate; and José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapataro, a simple backbencher since 1986, close to Nueva Vía, and little 
known within and outside of the party. Supported was by the party elite and regional 
barons, Bono was the clear favourite. In contrast, Zapatero appeared as a candidate 
that represented generational renewal rather than the continuation of the González era 
(see López Alba 2002: Chapter 13). Eventually, Zapatero won with a narrow lead (414 
votes against 405 to Bono). In the run-up to the 2004 election, Zapatero declared that 
he would stand as candidate to the prime ministerial position, and no one else from 
the party proposed an alternative candidature. As a result, the party did not have to 
organise a primary election. 
The  introduction  of  primaries  and  the  empowerment  of  individual  congress 
delegates have reduced the influence of regional barons over the process. While they 
played a role in the consolidation of the González-Guerra leadership and then in the 
support for Almunia in the 1997 congress, Borrell's victory in the 1998 primaries and 
Zapatero's election in 2000 have demonstrated that the vote of individual members 
and  individual  delegates  could  produce  results  opposite  to  the  preferences  of  the 
party's national and regional leaderships. As a result, the party receives a score of 1 for 
the role of regional branches in the selection of the party leader. The regions are 
represented in the congress and regional leaders can have some leverage over the 
votes of their delegation, even though the introduction of the personal vote certainly 
diminishes their control over individual delegates. 
 
The party executive 
The PSOE has two executive organs: the Federal Committee (Comité Federal), which is 
defined in the party's statutes as the most important party organ between congresses, 
and the Federal Executive Commission (FEC), which is the organ that executes the 
decisions taken by other party bodies and leads the party on a more day-to-day basis.  
The Federal Committee is composed of the FEC, 49 members elected by the 
federal congress, the general secretaries of the regional party branches, a number of 
regional delegates which depends of the number of provinces and party members in 
each  autonomous  community,  and  the  coordinators  of  the  'sectoral'  organisations 
(thematic  groups).  Its  official  functions  are  to  define  the  party's  policies  and  its 
coalition strategies, supervise the statutes of the regional sub-units, control the action 
of the FEC, ratify candidate lists, designate the party's prime ministerial candidate and 
approve the party budget (art.35 of the federal statutes 2000). In practice, the Federal 
Committee has less influence than the statutes formally give it. It meets only three 
times a year and is a less cohesive organ than the FEC. It generally lacks the power to 
set the agenda and in practice ratifies the decisions of the FEC (Méndez Lago 2000: 
124-5). 
The real decision-making arm of the party is the FEC (Magone 2004: 98-9). The 
Federal Executive Commission is elected by the federal congress via a majoritarian, 
list-based  electoral  system.  In  practice,  the  election  of  the  Federal  Executive 
Commission has never been a competitive process. Only one list is presented by the 
party  leader,  and  delegates  can  only  register  their  discontent  via  abstention  or 
blank/spoilt vote (Méndez-Lago 2000: 116). For instance, after Zapatero was elected 
as  secretary-general  in  2000,  no  other  list  was  presented.  The  defeated  leadership 
candidates did not present alternative lists. Instead, rounds of negotiation started in 
order  to  create  an  executive  commission  that  reflected  Zapatero's  victory  and  
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therefore included some of his supporters, such as Miguel Blanco as secretary for 
organisation, but also included people who had supported the other candidates (with 
the exception of Rosa Díez) and reflected some geographic balance (López Alba 2002: 
Chapter 14).  
The FEC takes the most important decisions that affect the party and organises 
its daily life. While the position of president is simply honorific, the secretary-general 
is the most important position. During most the González leadership, most of the 
political decisions where taken by the leader and at government level, with Guerra 
making the liaison between the government and the party. When Guerra was forced to 
resign from the government following a corruption scandal involving his brother, this 
link  between  the  party  in  public  office  and  the  party  in  central  office  was  partly 
severed. This was further strengthened by the adoption in 1984 of a rule that made 
holding an elective office incompatible with a position as secretary within the FEC. 
Only the president, secretary-general and deputy secretary-general are exempted from 
this rule. In practice, the FEC has often included members of government, as party 
secretaries were promoted to executive office (Méndez-Lago 2000: 128-9). After 1997 
and during the party's period in opposition, the FEC regained a more important role 
in  the  decision-making  process  of  the  party,  and  the  role  and  importance  of  the 
secretary-general became more limited by formal  party structures (van Biezen and 
Hopkin 2005: 113). 
The level of involvement of regional leaders in the FEC has varied over time. 
The PSC has historically always had a representative sitting on the FEC. The number 
of regional representatives has increased over time, as the number of representatives 
of regional party branches and presidents of regional governments in the FEC rose in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Regional 'barons' increased their presence in the FEC 
as a result of the increasing weakness of the leadership. They played a stabilising role 
in the party, arbitrating disputes, in particular during the period of double leadership 
by Almunia-Borrell. In return, they gained more autonomy at the regional level and 
increased their leverage at the centre. Méndez Lago (2006: 426) shows that in 1994 the 
FEC included 13 regional representatives. This number was reduced to 4 in 1997, but 
again Zapatero's first FEC included 7 heads of regional federations and 3 autonomous 
presidents. This trend was reversed in the following congress, in July 2004, after the 
PSOE's  victory  in  the  general  elections.  Zapatero  deliberately  chose  to  limit  the 
number of regional 'barons' in the FEC, arguing that they could influence the central 
party via the Consejo Territorial (Territorial Council). After 2004, two strong 'barons' 
remained in the FEC: Manuel Chávez from Andalusia and Juan Carlos Rodríguez 
Ibarra from Extremadura. In addition, the PSC kept a representative in the FEC (José 
Montilla, who was then a member of the Spanish cabinet). For a regions Galicia and 
the Basque country, with lower levels of membership and no regional office-holders, it 
is difficult to have as much weight as very strong federations such as Andalusia and 
Catalonia. 
Established in 1995, the Territorial Council includes the general secretaries of all 
the  regional  federations  and  the  socialist  presidents  of  autonomous  communities 
(article 48). It is a consultative organ that discusses mainly the party's policy with 
regard to the State of Autonomies. It has gained visibility during the party's opposition 
period but has receded since the party has returned to power, meeting more irregularly 
than previously (Méndez Lago 2006: 427-8).  
The federal executive always includes a number of regional representatives, often 
important leaders in their own autonomous community. Because of the large number 
of autonomous communities and of the necessary limited size of the federal executive,  
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it  cannot  include  one  member  for  each  autonomous  community.  However,  the 
presence  of  regional  leaders  and  the  past  influence  of  regional  'barons'  in  the 
stabilisation  of  the  party  contribute  to  giving  a  score  of  1  to  the  PSOE  for  the 
indicator of the involvement of its regional branches in the state-wide executive.  
 
Candidate selection for elections to the Congreso de los Diputados 
The selection of candidates for state-wide elections is a centralised process, with rules 
elaborated  by  the  Federal  Committee  and  very  much  controlled  by  the  national 
leadership in spite of its formally bottom-up nature (van Biezen 2003: 100). 
The candidate lists are in a first step elaborated at the provincial level, which 
coincides with the constituency level for general elections, from suggestions made by 
the local parties. Each provincial executive committee, or the executive of the regional 
branch in the case of a uniprovincial autonomous community, elaborates a list of 
candidates,  which must  be  formally  approved by the  provincial  committee  (which 
includes representatives from all the local parties  of the province). The provincial 
executive  committees  can  set  up  provincial  lists  commissions  to  coordinate  the 
candidate selection process and discuss with the local party branches. Each list must 
include  as  many  candidates  as  seats  to  fill  in  the  constituency  and  three  to  five 
substitutes (article 57 Normativa Reguladora de los Cargos Públicos 2004). Moreover, no 
gender shall represent more than 60% of the candidates (art. 30 of the same rulebook).  
Provincial committees then send their candidate lists to the regional committee 
of their autonomous community party and to the Federal Lists Commission (CLF, 
Comisión de Listas Federal). The regional committees can send a report expressing their 
opinion  on the  lists  and  making  their  own  recommendations to  the  Federal  Lists 
Commission.  The  role  of  the  regional  branches  is  however  limited  and  their 
recommendations non-binding In Galicia however, the provincial level only makes 
proposals  to  the  regional  executive,  when  then  liaise  with  the  federal  party.  The 
Galician National Lists Commission (CNL) reviews the provincial lists, alternates male 
and female candidates on the lists and ensures that the different comarcas (local areas) 
are represented on the list. The Ejecutiva Nacional and then the National Committee 
must approve these lists before sending them to the federal party (interview with 
Francisco Carro Garrote).  
The  CLF  (Federal  Lists  Commission)  is  the  general  coordinating  organ 
responsible for the elaboration of candidate lists for all elections. It is composed of 
members designated by the CEF and members of the Federal Committee. The CLF 
elaborates the lists and proposes them to the approval of the Federal Committee. The 
lists try to find a balance between gender criteria, the representation of the various 
parts of the province and the inclusion of independents and experts, which is quite 
common in Spain. While the statutes describe candidate selection as a bottom-up 
process, a lot of informal discussion occurs between the provincial and central levels 
in order to ensure a level of 'co-decision' (interview with Óscar López Águeda). The 
federal party can change the lists presented to it, modify the order of candidates on the 
lists and add people that had not been proposed by the provincial or regional parties. 
In the Basque Country and Galicia, the CFL has used its capacity to modify the lists in 
order to implement the criteria of gender parity (interviews with Arantxa Mendizábal 
Gorostiaga  and  Ricardo  Varela  Sánchez).  This  ability  to  change  the  lists  is  also 
particularly important when the PSOE presents joint lists together with another party, 
as it did with the Green party in 2004 (interview with Óscar López Águeda).  
The lists must eventually obtain the approval of the Federal Committee. This  
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means that the federal party has a veto power over the provincial lists for elections to 
the Congress. In practice, the level of central control over the composition of the list 
has varied over time (Méndez-Lago 2000: 139), with stronger central control during 
the period of González-Guerra leadership. The possibility of a central veto and the 
existence of informal channels of communication mean that the federal party can 
influence the composition of the provincial lists without appearing to intervene too 
directly. Overall, the lists established by the provincial parties can be changed at many 
stages, so that the final lists have little in common with the initial proposal (Méndez 
Lago 1998: 195). The regional party branches have in comparison a more limited 
influence  over  the  selection  of  parliamentary  candidates.  Some  respondents  noted 
however that the regional federations had gained more influence in the process in 
latter  years.  In  Galicia,  Francisco  Cerviño  González  described  the  process  of  list 
formation as one of 'co-management', as the weight of the federation has become 
more important.  
In contrast, the PSC can choose its own candidates. The party's Consell Nacional 
(the Catalan equivalent of the Federal Committee) appoints 20 people to form an 
Electoral Commission, which elaborates the lists of candidates in coordination with 
the local parties, in a way that is very close to the method used in the PSOE and 
following  similar  criteria  of  gender  parity,  balance  between  the  various  areas  of 
Catalonia and renewal (interview with José Zaragoza). The Consell Nacional must finally 
approve the lists presented by the Electoral Commission. Because of the PSC member 
of the Congress of Deputies integrate the PSOE parliamentary group, a certain level 
of influence from the PSOE can be expected to occur, but it remains informal. 
The situation is asymmetric, with on the one hand the PSC, which is free to 
select its candidates (score of 3 because of the link with the PSOE), and on the other 
the remaining autonomous communities, in which the regional branches have only a 
limited input (score of 1). 
 
Policy-making for state-wide parliamentary elections 
The PSOE manifesto for general elections applies to the 16 autonomous communities 
where it presents candidates. The general party policy of the PSOE is defined by the 
federal party congress, which debates a 'framework policy paper' (ponencia marco). Until 
1984 the policy-making process of the congress was a bottom-up process, with the 
local parties making policy proposals that were discussed by upper echelons up to the 
congress. This process subsequently became a lot more controlled by the centre, with 
draft policy proposals elaborated by the Federal Executive Commission and then sent 
to the local parties for their consideration (interview with Óscar López Águeda). Local 
parties can propose amendments that are voted upon at their provincial congress. 
Successful amendments can then be discussed by the federal congress, after approval 
by the congress organising committee (Méndez Lago 2000: 114-5).  
However, the influence of the congress is relatively limited, in particular because 
congresses occur only once during the term of the legislature, every three to four 
years.  Congresses  moreover  tend  to  focus  on  leadership  concerns,  through  the 
election of the secretary-general and the Federal Executive Commission. In addition, 
the influence of the leadership is such that local parties are often 'disinclined to upset 
party policy as laid down by the centre' (Moxon-Browne 1989: 32). Even though the 
control of the leadership over the rest of the party is less strong today than during the 
years of González-Guerra leadership, the influence of party members and local parties 
remains limited.  
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The party has itself acknowledged that even its permanent sectoral organisations 
(thematic working groups) have been relatively deficient in their role as organs of 
bottom-up policy formation (Méndez, Morales and Ramiro 2004: 185-6). As a result, 
the PSOE organises political conferences that debate policy and provide the party 
with general policy guidelines. Created in 2000, two such political conferences have 
taken place in the run-up to the 2004 election. The first one took place in 2001 to 
present the party's new image and leadership and to launch the party's policy process 
in view of elaborating the programme. This led to the formation of hundreds of small 
policy  groups.  These  groups  made  proposals  that  were  then  discussed  in  sectoral 
conferences.  In  January  2004  a  second  political  conference  was  held  in  order  to 
present  the  leadership  and  to  adopt  the  election  manifesto  (interview  with  Óscar 
López Águeda).  
The central party also organises meetings of regional executive secretaries over 
particular policy issues in order to involve the various parts of the party in the central 
decision-making  process  and  coordinate  party  policy  throughout  the  country 
(interview with Isabel Celaá Diéguez). Moreover, the Territorial Council is included in 
the  elaboration  of  the  party's  autonomous  policy.  For  instance  prior  to  the  2004 
elections,  the  Territorial  Council's  Santillana  del  Mar  Pact  'determined  the  party's 
position' on the State of the Autonomies and defined the 'criteria of acceptability' of 
statutory  reforms  and  the  limits  of  the  process  of  federalisation  (interview  with 
Agustín Baeza Díaz-Moreno).  
The  elaboration  of  the  party  manifesto  is  a  rather  elite-driven  process.  The 
party's executive organs appoint thematic working groups that include members of 
Parliament, people with government experience or special expertise. These groups 
meet with a large number of people in order to make the policy-making process as 
inclusive as possible (interview with Teresa Cunillera i Mestres). The final decision 
over which policy proposals to include is in the hands of the federal executive. For the 
2004 elections, the leader of the socialist group in parliament, Jesús Caldera, was in 
charge of co-ordinating the elaboration of the manifesto. Occasionally, if the party still 
has some time before the election, some sessions will be organised at the local level in 
order  to  explain  the  party  programme.  These,  however,  are  mainly  top-down 
information sessions and lower party echelons or individual members have little say 
over what is included in the manifesto.  
In Catalonia, the PSC produces its own manifesto, with no official oversight or 
influence from the PSOE. However, the unity protocol between the PSOE and the 
PSC stipulates that the parties coordinate their efforts to campaign at the state-wide 
level. This necessary coordination, combined with the joint PSC-PSOE parliamentary 
group  in  the  Spanish  lower  chamber,  contributes  to  increasing  the  convergence 
between the two parties. As a result, the programme of the PSOE is likely to have 
some influence over the PSC election manifesto. In addition, the link with the PSOE 
is seen as an advantage by a large portion of the PSC electorate in state-wide elections, 
as a large share of PSC voters have origins outside of Catalonia (Pallarés and Font 
1994; Mercadé 1990). As a result, the parties have little  interests in diverging too 
much. The PSC is however much more federalist than the PSOE (interview with 
Agustín Baeza Díaz-Moreno) 
To reflect the increasing informal role of regional leaders and the necessity to co-
ordinate between the levels through the Territorial Council but also through regular 
meetings between central and regional executive secretaries, the PSOE is given a score 
of 1. The PSC, on the other hand, elaborates its own programme, albeit with some 




7.1.3. Organisation in the autonomous communities, power and autonomy of the 
regional party branches 
The regional branches in the Basque Country and Galicia are 'federaciones de nacionalidad' 
(national  federations)  as  opposed  to  regional  federations  in  the  autonomous 
communities that are not historic nationalities. The organisation of the regional or 
national federations is very similar to that of the federal party, with two executive 
organs, including a small working executive headed by a secretary-general, a regional 
congress that elects the members of this executive and adopts policy statements. The 
regional federations are subject to the same rules that apply in the federal party, in 
particular with regard to internal voting procedures and gender parity.  
 
Selecting regional party leaders 
Regional party leaders (secretaries-general) are selected in the same way as the federal 
secretary-general: the secretary-general is elected by the regional congress and then 
forms  his  executive,  which  is  also  voted  in  by  the  congress.  There  is  no  formal 
intervention of the federal party in the process. Whereas it is not uncommon to read 
in the press that Ferraz (the name of the street where the PSOE has its headquarters 
in Madrid) has a preferred candidate, central interventions in the selection of regional 
candidates in the historic nationalities are rare.  
Regional  congresses  must  occur  not  longer  than  60  days  after  the  federal 
congress  (additional  amendment  2,  Federal  Statutes  of  the  PSOE).  Méndez  Lago 
(2000) observes that the timing of congresses throughout the party (first the federal 
congress, then the regional congresses and finally the provincial congresses) facilitates 
the reproduction of the federal balance of power at the lower party echelons. As a 
result, regional leaders tend to be from the same wing or 'tendency' as the national 
leaders.  
In Galicia, Emilio Pérez Touriño has been the party's secretary-general since 
1998, when he replaced Francisco Váldez, who resigned after the party's defeat in the 
October regional elections. The federal party's involvement in the election of a new 
secretary-general was limited to trying to limit the divisions and the number of lists 
competing in the regional congress. Failing to obtain an agreement between Pérez 
Touriño and Miguel Cortizo, it acted as a simple observer of the process and accepted 
Pérez Touriño's victory (Obelleiro 1998). Touriño was then selected by the PSdeG as 
candidate for the presidency of the Xunta de Galicia in 2000 and 2004. On both 
occasions, his candidacy was not contested, and in the absence of another candidate, 
the party decided not to hold primaries (El Mundo 2000b; Marín 2004). 
In  the  Basque  country,  the  party's  situation  is  always  a  little  more  difficult 
because  of  the  terrorist  threat  and  the  constant  interest  from  the  centre  to  what 
happens in this region. Historically, Basque party leaders have often come from the 
trade  union  movement  (interview  with  Joana  Madrigal  Jímenez).  Over  the  period 
under investigation, the PSE-EE has had two secretaries-general. Nicolas Redondo 
Terreros was elected by the Basque congress with 58% of the votes of the delegates in 
October  1997.  He  was  later  selected  as  candidate  for  the  position  of lehendakari 
(president of the Basque government) in a primary against Rosa Díez, with the open 
support  of  the  central  party  (de  la  Calle  1998;  Izarra  1998).  During  his  time  as 
secretary-general of the PSE-EE-PSOE, Redondo supported a strong anti-nationalist 
position and led the party's rapprochement with the PP. He was supported in this  
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strategy by Rodríguez Zapatero amidst divisions within the party over this strategy 
(Lazaro 2001).  
He was reconducted as secretary-general by the Basque congress in November 
2000 with a narrow score of 51%. Because of the narrow victory, he decided that 
primaries should be held to determine who would be the party's candidate to the 
presidency of the autonomous community, but his candidacy was uncontested and he 
automatically became the party's official candidate (Iturri and Urtasun 2000; El Mundo 
2000c). Redondo resigned from the leadership after the 2001 election, which marked 
the failure of the anti-nationalist strategy. He was also protesting against the support 
of the PSE-EE in Biscay (Vizcaya) to the PNV-led local government over the budget 
of the province (Curruchaga 2001). 
An extraordinary congress was held in April 2002. As in Galicia, the central 
party,  via  its  secretary  for  organisation  José  Blanco,  a  Basque  member  of  the 
Congreso, intervened in order to limit the number of lists presented to the delegates. 
The provisional executive that was established after Redondo's resignation and the 
Federal  executive  reached  an  agreement  so  that  only  two  people  could  become 
secretary-general of the PSE-EE: Javier Rojo or Patxi López, who was the leader of 
the Biscayan PSE that facilitated the adoption of the budget of the province. Blanco 
subsequently met with the three provincial leaders to urge them to reach an agreement 
before the congress, so that only the candidate who could muster the largest support 
within the party would become candidate and present a list, while the other would 
back down (Sanchez 2002). Patxi López came out with the largest level of support, 
and Rojo did not present a list to the congress. López became secretary-general of the 
PSE-EE with 57% of the votes. While his election signified a  shift in the party's 
strategy, Blanco expressed his support to the new leader, showing that the central 
party had no problem with López (Urtasun and Iturri 2002).  
In Catalonia, the PSC selects its own leader. The first secretary (primer secretario) is 
elected by the congress of the PSC, and the choice of the PCS's candidate to the 
Presidency of the autonomous community is ratified by the Consell Nacional (National 
council),  its  executive  body.  The  party  may  eventually  organise  primaries  for  the 
selection of the candidate to the Generalitat (Catalan government). The organic link 
between the PSOE and the PSC however means that the POSE has an interest in the 
personality and political inclinations of the Catalan party leader. There may therefore 
be some level of influence from the PSOE, in order to make sure that the leader of 
eth PSC is compatible with the PSOE leadership.  
For the 1999 Catalan elections, the PSC chose Pasqual Maragall, the charismatic 
former  mayor  of  Barcelona,  as  its  candidate  against  the  CiU  president  of  the 
Generalitat Jordi Pujol. Whereas Maragall was the only candidate, the party decided 
that it should still hold primaries (Nogue 1999). The primaries were open to all, party 
members, supporters (simpatizantes) and simple voters, and provided Maragall with an 
opportunity to start campaigning around Catalonia (Maragit 1999). He became party 
president in 2000. Maragall stood for a more regionalist agenda than his state-wide 
counterpart Josep Borrell, another Catalan. In 2003, Maragall was returned as the PSC 
candidate to the Generalitat, and he led the party to victory, forming a governing 
coalition  between  the  PSC,  EUiA  (former  communists  and  Greens)  and  ERC 
(republican left).  
 In all three cases, the influence of the central party is quite limited. Whereas it 
was perhaps possible in the early days of decentralisation, it is today more difficult for 
the central party to impose a candidate. In most cases, the interventions of the central 
party  were  limited  to  trying  to  control  the  level  of  fragmentation  of  the  party  
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branches by limiting the number of lists presented in congress. Even so, it has not 
always succeeded in pushing contenders not to stand or to co-operate and present 
joint lists. In Catalonia, the PSOE has little ability to control who is elected and can 
only try to  influence  from  afar.  In  Maragall's  case,  the  PSOE  was  not  apparently 
involved in the selection process. The PSOE in Galicia and the Basque Country and 
the PSC receive a score of 3.  
 
Selecting candidates for autonomous elections 
The Federal Committee is responsible for ratifying the lists of candidates that are 
presented before it by the Federal Lists Commission for all types of elections. As a 
result,  the  Federal  Committee  also  plays  a  role  in  the  selection  of  regional 
parliamentary candidates. The whole process is formally very similar to the one used 
for the selection of candidates to the Congress of Deputies. The only difference is the 
formal involvement of the regional level in the process. 
The first stage of the selection process is identical to the one for state-wide 
elections: the provincial parties elaborate a draft list of candidates from proposals 
made by the local parties. They then send these lists to the regional party branches. 
Regional  committees  can  set  up  a  list  commission  (Comisión  Regional  de  Listas)  to 
coordinate the selection and ranking of the candidates on the lists. In consultation 
with  the  chair  of  the  party's  regional  parliamentary  group,  the  Regional  Lists 
Commission  submits  a  list  for  each  constituency to  the  approval  of  the  Regional 
Committee.  
The regional federations then send their lists to the Federal Lists Commission, 
which has the power to modify the lists, in consultation with the secretary-general of 
the  regional  federation  and  a  representative  from  the  Provincial  Executive 
Commission.  The  lists  of  candidates  to  autonomous  elections  must  finally  be 
approved by the Federal Committee. Again, the federal party has a veto power over 
candidate lists (interview with Óscar López Águeda). In practice regional federations 
seem to be rather free to select the candidates for regional elections. Galician and 
Basque respondents declared that the federal executive did not change the lists that 
the  regional  federation  sent  to  it,  except  to  implement  criteria  of  gender  parity 
(interview  with  Ricardo  Varela  Sánchez).  Joana  Madrigal,  member  of  the  Basque 
Parliament, explained that the list for Basque elections in her province (Álava) was 
mainly made by the provincial executive from proposals emanating from lower party 
echelons, and that the upper echelons of the party then accepted the list as it was. 
Likewise,  Francisco  Cerviño  González  reported  that  the  Galician  federation  had 
become more autonomous in the 1990s and that the central party did not intervene in 
the candidate selection process. However, the veto power of the federal party certainly 
represents a strong incentive for regional federations not to choose candidates that are 
likely to be rejected by the federal executive.  
Again, the federal party has no formal influence over the selection of candidates 
for election to the Catalan parliament, as the PSC is a separate party. The method and 
criteria of elaboration are nevertheless similar to the ones used in the PSOE, with 
initial proposals made by lower party echelons and the final lists adopted by the PSC 
leadership (interview with Carme Figueras i Siñol). The absence of veto power from 
the central party certainly provides the Catalan party with a larger freedom than that 
enjoyed by the regional branches of the PSOE, but again some informal influence may 
still occur.   
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The PSOE in Galicia and the Basque Country receives a score of 2 because the 
central party retains a veto power, and the PSC has a score of 3 because it has a larger 
room for manoeuvre.  
 
Policy-making for autonomous elections 
The  Federal  Committee  is  responsible  for  'coordinating  and ratifying  the  electoral 
programmes  of  each  regional  branch  with  the  federal  programme'  (art.5  Statutes 
2000). For the 13 autonomous communities that hold their elections on the same day 
(and together with municipal elections), the PSOE drafts a framework programme 
(programa  marco),  which  must  inspire  the  manifestos  elaborated  by  the  regional 
federations. The programmes for autonomous elections in the Basque country, Galicia 
and Catalonia are not influenced by this framework programme, as elections in these 
autonomous  communities  take  place  on  a  different  date  (and  in  most  cases  in  a 
different year).  
Catalonia again is a special case, as the PSC makes its own programme without 
any  official  oversight  from  the  Spanish  PSOE.  Its  level  of  independence  from 
pressures from the PSOE has varied considerably over time. Throughout the 1980s, 
the PSOE was in power in Madrid while the PSC failed to win Catalan elections. The 
PSC fared better in state-wide than in regional elections, with an electorate mainly 
composed of immigrants from other parts of Spain and their descendants. As a result, 
this electorate was attracted mainly by the PSC's link with the PSOE and was rather 
unsympathetic to Catalan nationalism. Moreover, with a number of ministers in the 
Spanish  government  and  a  common  parliamentary  group  with  the  PSOE  in  the 
Cortes, the PSC found it difficult to present the image of an independent party (Roller 
and van Houten 2003: 12). The integration of the PSC within the PSOE forced the 
Catalan party to moderate its calls for greater decentralisation (McRoberts 2001: 88), 
as the PSOE was rejecting any further decentralisation. 
In the 1990s, factional divisions and the leadership crisis in Madrid, as well as 
leadership change in Catalonia, changed the relationship between the PSOE and the 
PSC. The last years of the González government were characterised by an increased 
focus on controlling the damage at the centre, and the departure of Alfonso Guerra 
loosened the grip of the central party on the peripheries. At the same time, the PSC 
adopted a more Catalan profile, declaring in its 1996 congress that it was in favour of 
some  form  of  federalism  within  the  framework  of  the  State  of  the  Autonomies 
(McRoberts 2001: 88). The choice of former Barcelona mayor Pasqual Maragall as 
candidate to the Generalitat of the PSC also contributed to the shift in the PSC's 
strategy and its greater autonomy vis-à-vis the PSOE.  
At the same time, a large share of the PSC's electorate values the link between 
the PSC and the PSOE (interview with Josep María Sala). The Catalan party therefore 
finds some electoral advantage in remaining politically close to the positions of the 
PSOE and has to strike a balance between having its own identity based on history, 
institutions and language (interview with Teresa Cunillera i Mestres) and being linked 
to the PSOE. This balance still has to be struck by the PSC, which has the final 
authority to adopt policies for Catalonia. Finally, the presence of representatives of the 
PSC in central party organs of the PSOE ensures that there is a common ground 
between the two parties. 
The programme for autonomous elections in the other two regions must be 
approved by the federal executive, and there is a strong level of co-ordination between 
the  central  and  regional  levels  during  the  elaboration  of the  regional  programmes  
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(interview with Agustín Baeza Díaz-Moreno). In Galicia and the Basque Country, the 
regional  federations  nevertheless  have  considerable  autonomy  to  adapt  the  party's 
strategy to the local context, but they have to remain 'loyal' to the general positions of 
the party and cannot be different from the central party line. Instead, it is more a 
matter of adaptation of the Spanish position to the regional context (interview with 
Lentxu Rubial Cachorro). Moreover, the regional federations have to follow the party 
line  as  defined  by  the  federal  party  on  issues  that  have  a  national  importance 
(interview with Francisco Cerviño González). 
Interviews in Galicia showed that the federation enjoyed a rather large degree of 
autonomy  to  elaborate  their  own  programme  and  that  'there  was  no  effective 
supervision'  (interview  with  Francisco  Carro  Garrote).  The  Galician  federation 
elaborates  its  own  programme  based  on  the  works  of  regional  thematic  working 
groups, which include experts, interested party members and members of the Galician 
parliament. The manifesto is then submitted to the approval of the Galician National 
Executive Committee.  
Overall,  the  party  adheres  to  the  policies  of  the  federal  party  on  issues  of 
national  relevance  and  adapts  the  socialist  message  to  the  economic,  social  and 
political situation of Galicia. The Galician federation enjoys a rather large degree of 
freedom with respect to Galician themes (interview with Carlos Pajares Vales). After a 
period in which the PSdeG-PSOE supported a rather centralist position in the 1990s, 
which resulted in poor electoral results and a transfer of votes from the PSdeG to the 
nationalist party BNG, the party, under Touriño's leadership, has adopted a more 
accommodative position toward regionalism (interview with Francisco Carro Garrote). 
While some respondents believed that the manifesto for regional elections was not 
sent  to  the  federal  party,  the  secretary  for  organisation  Ricardo  Varela  Sánchez 
confirmed that it was indeed sent to the central party, but that there had not been any 
problem  at  that  level.  This  certainly  results  from  the  conjunction  of  the  more 
accommodative  position of  the  central  party  vis-à-vis  regional  differences  and the 
strong common ground between the levels.  
The  situation  is  relatively  similar  in  the  Basque  country.  The  manifesto  for 
regional elections is elaborated in a similar way by the Basque party. Whereas 'it is 
hardly the case that the PSOE intervenes in Basque affairs' (interview with Isabel 
Celaá Diéguez), it is also true that the most controversial issues in the Basque country, 
terrorism and the future of Euskadi in Spain, are mainly matters decided at the central 
level.  Moreover,  these  issues  have  tended  to  be  kept  outside  the  normal  political 
debate through the Anti-terrorism Pact between the PP and the PSOE, through which 
the parties pledged not to make any political gains from terrorism.
54  
This particular situation of the Basque socialists has also led the federal party to 
give some leeway to its Basque branch. Relations were sometimes a little difficult 
when Nicolas Redondo was secretary-general of the PSE. However, even though the 
policy  of  co-operation  with  the  PP  was  not  well  understood  in  Madrid  and 
contradicted the PSOE's state-wide strategy of opposition, the federal party respected 
the  position  of  the  PSE  (interview  with  Arantza  Mendizábal  Gorostiaga).  Today, 
                                                 
54 This has not stopped the PSOE from criticising the PP government when it felt that the government 
was making partisan use of the pact or threatened civil liberties (see Mata 2005: 104, n. 41). Likewise, 
the PP in opposition has often criticised the treatment of terrorism by Zapatero's government and 





relations with Patxi López are easier, and there is more common ground between the 
central and Basque parties.  
The Basque programme is elaborated by the Basque party, with a large autonomy 
over  day-to-day  topics  that  affect  particularly  the  Basque  country  and  a  broad 
consensus with the state-wide party over issues of terrorism, territorial organisation 
and  reform  of  the  state,  but  also  management  of  the  economy  and  social  issues. 
Overall,  the  federal  party  does  not  have  to  intervene  in  Basque  affairs  over  the 
regional programme because there are not really any differences between the central 
and Basque parties. Any discrepancy comes from the context and specificities of the 
region, such as the population, the state of the economy, and the specific competences 
of the Basque autonomous community compared to the other regions (interview with 
Lentxu Rubial Cachorro). Isabel Celaá Diéguez declared that overall, there was 'a basic 
understanding within the party over most issues'.  
As an independent party, the PSC chooses its own policies. The PSOE has no 
formal power to control the content of the PSC manifestos for autonomous elections, 
but  the  organic  link  between  the  PSOE  and  the  PSC  means  that  PSOE  policies 
influence the programme of the PSC. As a result, the PSC receives a score of 3. In 
contrast, the Basque and Galician regional branches receive a score of 2 because the 




The accounts presented by the PSOE to the Tribunal de Cuentas, the organ in charge of 
controlling  the  financial  statements  of  all  registered  political  parties,  include  the 
accounts of all the party levels down to the provincial level, plus those of some local 
branches  (comarcas)  in  the  Valencian  Community,  and  the  accounts  of  the 
parliamentary groups in the Cortes and the autonomous assemblies. Subsidies received 
at the local level and electoral subsidies (for all types of elections) are not included in 
the  resources  of  the  party.  The  data  disaggregating  the  resources  by  autonomous 
community are unavailable, as are the transfers of money within the party and between 
levels. It is therefore difficult to evaluate the respective resources of the central party 
and of the regional federations and to evaluate who controls what because of the 
limited reliability of the information (Méndez Lago 2000: 138).  
Table 7.1 below illustrates the dependence of the PSOE on public funding. Over 
60%  of  the  party's  income  comes  from  electoral  subsidies.  In  comparison, 
membership fees represent a mere 10% of the party's resources. More than half of the 
subsidies received by the party correspond to the state subsidy for ordinary activities 
and the activities of the parliamentary groups in the Cortes. In addition, the table 
shows that the income of the federal party accounts for approximately one half of the 
total income of the party.  
The membership fee is paid at the local level (agrupación local). This level keeps a 
portion of this fee and then sends the rest to the regional federation, which does the 
same and sends the remainder to the federal party. The amount listed as 'membership 
fees' does not actually correspond to the sum raised across the party because the 
accounts presented to the Tribunal de Cuentas do not include the accounts of the 
local branches.  
In  addition  to  the  funds  presented  in  the  table  above,  the  PSOE  receives 
substantial electoral subsidies. The federal party receives and distributes the subsidies 
received for general and local elections. Via the Federal Executive Commission, it also  
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distributes a share of the subsidy for ordinary activities to the regional branches in 
function of the number of members in each.  
Table 7.1. Resources of the PSOE, 1999-2003 
  1999*  2000*  2001  2002  2003 
Total income  48,129,049.32 46,235,861.19 51,715,376.76  54,545,401.29 56,873,287.15 
Total donations and fees 
(members and office 
holders) 
6,262,546.13  6,737,345.69  8,174,605.66  9,809,914.27  11,324,315.72 
of which membership fees  3,643,813.22  3,674,784.58  4,719,445.58  5,634,702.12  6,475,195.81 
as % of income      7.6  8.00  9.1  10.3  11.4 
Non-electoral subsidies  32,463,730.43 32,088,386.59 32,726,309.00  33,889,962.65 36,676,297.65 
as % of income  67.5  69.4  63.3  62.1  64.5 
Electoral subsidies#  22,081,566.86 15,586,030.53  3,664,381.70  669,985.69  15,831,473.25 
Income of national party   26,554,765.65 23,862,991.54 27,175,810.80  n.a.  n.a. 
of which subsidies  18,335,790.25 17,608,377.21 17,678,662.54  17,678,661.51 18,604,820.81 
Subsidies to parliamentary 
groups in regional 
assemblies 
10,214,322.71 11,018,099.17 11,630,003.50  12,441,245.42 13,210,788.63 
Electoral subsidies for 
elections to regional 
assemblies 
3,509,073.72  3,458,311.01  2,072,774.77  1,084,404.76  4,123,159.06 
Non-electoral subsidy 
from the Basque 
government 
547,923.35  657,508.02  647,197.26  641,168.23  702,319.00 
* To facilitate the comparison, amounts in pesetas have been converted into euros, with the 
official conversion rate of 166.386 Ptas for 1 euro. 
# not  included  in  the  total  income  of  the  party  declared  to  the  party  to  the  Tribunal  de 
Cuentas.  
n.a.: not available 
Source: Tribunal de Cuentas 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006. 
The  regional  branches  moreover  receive  subsidies  for  their  participation  in 
regional elections as well as ordinary subsidies from the regional institutions. These 
subsidies  are  given  directly  to  the  regional  branches.  As  a  result,  the  regional 
federations of the PSOE receive regular funding for their ordinary activities as well as 
to support the activities of their parliamentary groups. They are able to finance their 
own campaigns for regional elections. This is facilitated by the fact that autonomous 
institutions provide, like the state-wide government, advances on the basis of their 
results  in  the  previous  elections.  The  federal  party  can  nevertheless  supervise  the 
finances of lower party echelons via the Comisión Revisora de Cuentas (Title 5, PSOE 
2000). 
While the central party has tried to exercise a certain level of control over the 
finances of its regional branches, in particular after a number of financial scandals, it 
has generally been quite unable to maintain such control. As a result, it can be said 
that the party is quite decentralised with respect to its distribution of resources. The 
public funding of party activities is in this respect the main source of the financial 
autonomy of the PSOE's regional branches. The central party provides some financial 
support to the regional federations (interview with Óscar López Águeda), but it is 
difficult to evaluate the actual scale of this assistance. The party therefore receives a 
score of 2 for the indicator of financial autonomy. 
The PSC is a registered political party and it presents its own accounts to the 
electoral  commission.  Its  resources  also  provide  mainly  from  public  funding.  The 
Catalan Parliament provides the party with subsidies for its parliamentary group, and 
the  Catalan  government is  responsible  for  providing  the  parties  with  an  electoral  
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subsidy.  In  addition,  the  PSC  receives  a  non-electoral  subsidy  from  the  Spanish 
government and a grant for its membership to the PSOE parliamentary group in the 
Congress. The table below details its sources of income. 
Table 7.2. Resources of the PSC-PSOE, 1999-2003 
  1999*  2000*  2001  2002  2003 
Total income  8,504,792.83  8,117,236.32  9,044,011.26  9,388,576.78 12,064,768.98 
Income of NEC  6,126,615.62  6,356,713.10  6,581,913.65  7,073,096.49  n.a. 
Membership fees NEC  211,368.44  218,291.20  219,978.84  204,393.60  n.a. 
Permanent subsidy 
(central government) 
3,315,726.98  2,974,700.46  2,931,089.66  2,931,089.51  2,931,089.51 
Subsidy to parliamentary 
group in Catalan 
parliament 
1,017,777.72  2,314,313.15  2,761,733.84  3,376,051.02  3,645,939.41 
Subsidies as % of income 
NEC 
70.7  83.2  86.5  89.2  67.7# 
* To facilitate the comparison, amounts in pesetas have been converted into euros, with the 
official conversion rate of 166.386 Ptas for 1 euro. 
n.a.: not available; # subsidies as percentage of total income of the PSC. 
Source: Tribunal de Cuentas 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006. 
The only financial link between the PSOE and the PSC relates to the subsidy for 
the  PSC  members  of  Congress.  The  PSOE  returns  a  portion  of  its  subsidy  for 
parliamentary activities in the Congreso to the PSC, as the members of PSC belong to 
the PSOE parliamentary group. The sum of this financial devolution was only made 
available for the year 1999. That year, the PSC received   36,060.73. In spite of this 
financial link rendered necessary by the existence of a common parliamentary group, 
the PSC is financially autonomous from the PSOE because it is a separate registered 
party. As a result, it receives a score of 4. 
 
Conclusion  
The PSOE has undergone a slow process of federalisation of its organisation. Many 
respondents noted that this shift in the federalisation of the party coincided with the 
strengthening of the State of the Autonomies and that the party now embraced a more 
federal  conception  of  its  organisation.  For  instance,  Francisco  Cerviño  González 
noted that the federal party used to be much more 'Jacobin' in the 1980s, when it 
tended to dictate to the peripheries, but that the consolidation of the State of the 
Autonomies  has  strengthened  the  autonomy  of  the  regional  federations.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  1990s,  with  the  consolidation  of  the  State  of  the  Autonomies, 
regional  party  leaders  started  to  have  more  autonomy  and  local  resources  that 
strengthened their power autonomously from the federal party.  
Table  7.3  beloz  represents  the organisation  of  the  PSOE  at  the  end of  our 
investigation.  Overall,  the  regional  branches  of  the  state-wide  party  are  weakly 
involved  in  the  central  party  in  spite  of  the  creation  of  the  Territorial  Council. 
Regional branches have played a crucial role at some point of the party's history, but 
their presence  at  the  centre  has recently  diminished  to  leave  more  control  to the 
federal leadership. The federal party enjoys a rather important degree of autonomy in 
the  elaboration  of  the  programme  and  controls  the  selection  of  parliamentary 
candidates. The regional branches have nevertheless gained a rather important level of 




Table 7.3. Coding for the organisation of the PSOE and PSC 
  Basque 
Country 
Galicia  Catalonia 
Involvement of regional party branches in the central party       
1. Selection the leader of the state-wide party  1  1  1 
2. Involvement of regional party branches in the central party 
executive 
1  1  1 
3. Selection of candidates for state-wide parliamentary elections  1  1  3 
4. Adoption of the manifesto for state-wide parliamentary 
elections 
1  1  3 
5. Amending the constitution of the state-wide party  1  1  1 
Sum involvement  5  5  9 
Autonomy of the regional party branches        
6. Organisational freedom of the regional party branches  1  1  4 
7. Selection of the regional party leaders  3  3  3 
8. Selection of candidates for regional elections  2  2  3 
9. Adoption of the manifesto for regional elections  2  2  3 
10. Funding of the regional party branches   2  2  4 
Sum autonomy   10  10  17 
 
7.2. The Popular Party, Partido Popular (PP)  
The following section will first relate the formation and recent history of the Partido 
Popular  since  its  formation  as Alianza  Popular  in  1976.  It  will  then  describe  the 
organisation  of  the  PP  for  state-wide  party  processes  and  in  the  autonomous 
communities  of  Catalonia,  the  Basque  Country  and  Galicia.  The  code  for  each 
indicator is presented in order to evaluate the degree of involvement of regional party 
branches in the central party and their autonomy at the regional level. 
 
7.2.1. History and change in the Partido Popular  
Party formation 
The Alianza Popular (AP), the ancestor of the Partido Popular (PP), was created in 
1976 by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, who had been Minister for Propaganda and Tourism 
under Franco (1962-69) and Interior Minister in Arias Navarro's post-Franco cabinet 
(1975-76). Fraga theorised the project of 'pseudo-reformism' adopted by Arias, which 
aimed at creating a limited democracy that would combine part of the institutions of 
the  old  autocratic  system  with  elements  of  democratic  reform  (Soto  2005:  54). 
However, this project failed and lost the king's support. Suárez then replaced Arias as 
Prime minister and started the process of democratic transition.  
The Alianza Popular was founded as the federation of seven political formations 
that were often mere political vehicles for the ambitions of former Francoist ministers. 
The party expected to win a majority of the vote in the 1977 election, basing its 
expectations on a number of pre-electoral surveys and a misconception of where the 
centre  of  the  political  spectrum  lay  (Gunther,  Sani  and  Shabad  1986:  102-3).  Its 
association  with  the  Franco  regime,  as  well  as  its  initial  qualms  about  the  new 
constitution and its hostility towards regionalisation meant that the AP only achieved 
limited support in the first elections of the democratic period and was considered by 
the electorate as too far from the political centre (Gunther 1986: 50; Gunther, Sani 
and Shabad 1986: 102-7). The AP was 'unable to overcome its lack of democratic 
legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate' (Montero 1988: 145).   
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Whereas Fraga wanted to create a centre-right catch-all party, AP was in fact a 
party of notables based on traditional clientelistic networks. In terms of policy, the 
party remained traditionally conservative, with values that were increasingly at odds 
with the rapid pace of change in post-Franco Spanish society (Montero 1998: 145). 
Partly thanks to Fraga's participation in the drafting of the constitution, AP eventually 
accepted  the  new  system,  even  though  it  was  broadly  against  the  Estado  de  las 
Autonomías. The most extreme elements of the party rejected the constitution and 
protested against AP's acceptance of the new system by leaving the party (Gunther, 
Sani and Shabad 1986: 196-7).   
While the departure of the extreme-right wing of the party initially weakened AP, 
it eventually allowed the party to adopt a more moderate profile and stay clear of any 
reference to the Franco regime. Present in the 1979 election under the name Coalición 
Demócrata, the party started to reform its policies and adopt a more classical centre-
right position, replacing its defence of neo-corporatism by a more classic adherence to 
neo-liberal principles (Gunther 1986: 36-7; Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 199-201). 
The formation of Coalición Demócrata was nevertheless marred with conflicts between 
AP and its new partners, in particular over candidate lists and organisation. AP already 
had a well developed organisation at the provincial level, while the other parties were 
often rather weakly organised. Eventually, AP did not benefit from the alliance, as its 
new  partners  lacked  organisation  and  networks  to  facilitate  the  party's  electoral 
growth, and the coalition lost 7 seats. 
The  1979  defeat  of  the  Democratic  Coalition,  through  which  AP  aimed  at 
attracting centrist voters, represented a shock for the party. AP left the coalition and 
decided  to  stand  alone  in  future  elections,  reshape  its  organisation  into  a  single, 
presidentialised  party  under  Fraga's  leadership,  and  position  itself  as  a  democratic 
right-wing party. In the 1982 election, the AP, in coalition with a splinter group from 
the UCD and small regional parties, came into second place after the PSOE but failed 
to attract the whole electorate that had deserted the Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD). 
The emergence of centre-right regionalist parties in regions such as Catalonia and the 
Basque  country  also  limited  the  potential  progress  of  a  nationally  organised 
conservative party (Frain and Wiarda 1998: 202). 
After another defeat in 1986, Fraga resigned as leader, and Senator Hernández 
Mancha was elected at a special congress in 1987. Support for the party however failed 
to  increase  and  opposition  to  the  new  leader  mounted  inside  the  party,  until  he 
resigned at the end of 1988. In January 1989, the ninth party congress led to Fraga's 
temporary  return  as  party  leader  and  a  reorganisation  of  the  party  that  reduced 
membership  power  and  increased  leadership  control  and  internal  party  cohesion 
(García-Guereta Rodríguez 2001: 163-5; Balfour 2005: 148-9). The party was renamed 
Partido  Popular  and  included  UCD  members  and  other  moderate  right-wing 
movements,  thereby  coalescing  all  the  democratic  branches  of  the  centre-right, 
conservatives,  liberals,  Christian  democrats,  monarchists,  etc.  After  Fraga  won  the 
Galician  regional  elections  and  became  President  of  the  regional  government,  he 
supported José María Aznar, the then president of the region Castile and Leon, to 
replace him as party leader. 
 
Partido Popular: contemporary organisation and principles 
What came to be known as 'Fraga's ceiling' (el techo de Fraga), that is, Fraga's inability to 
win over 25% of the votes and therefore to transform AP into a credible government 
party  (García-Guereta  2001:  135),  was  not  broken  in  the  1989  election,  but  the  
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PSOE's majority was reduced to one seat. Under Aznar's leadership, the party sought 
to occupy the centre-right of the political spectrum that had been left vacant by the 
collapse of the UCD, and adopted a moderate profile designed to place the party in a 
position to win office and replace the PSOE as Spain's main party. At the same time, 
Aznar strengthened the centralisation of the party's structure and increased the party's 
internal cohesion and discipline (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006: 401). Aznar also 
managed to use the increasing number of scandals affecting the PSOE to the PP's 
advantage. This strategy was soon rewarded with success, albeit a limited one, as the 
PP  managed  to  force  the  PSOE  into  a  minority  government  in  1993  (Frain  and 
Wiarda 1998: 202-3). 
The  PP  managed  to  form  a  minority  government  after  the  1996  general 
elections, benefiting from the votes of regionalist parties to support its government, 
just like the PSOE had done in the previous legislature. The party won the absolute 
majority of the seats in the Congreso in the 2000 election. During its first term in 
office,  the  need  to  maintain  the  parliamentary  support  of  Basque  and  Catalan 
nationalist parties and to win over centrist voters encouraged the party to adopt a 
moderate stance. In exchange for the support of parties such as CiU and the PNV, the 
government transferred more competences and tax revenues to regional governments. 
In  economic  terms,  the  government  adopted  a  neo-liberal  agenda,  complete  with 
privatisations and deregulations. A more conservative programme was carried out in 
the domains of education and health (Balfour 2005: 154-6). After the party's 2000 
victory, government policy shifted to the right, with stronger stances on immigration, 
a controversial school reform making religious education compulsory, and a more 
uncompromising attitude toward peripheral nationalisms with the development of the 
notion  of  'constitutional  patriotism',  which  involved  a  sometimes  exaggerated 
portraying of peripheral nationalisms and endorsed a more traditional form of Spanish 
nationalism (Balfour 2005: 158-9; Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006: 413). 
The  way  the  party  has  dealt  with  Franco's  legacy  and  the  dictatorship  has 
sometimes been more ambiguous. Montero and Linz (1999: 4) describe the PP as a 
'conservative party committed to the democratic constitution without fully rejecting 
the past'. This reluctance to address the recent past was again illustrated by the PP's 
refusal to condemn the civil war (until 2002) and the Franco dictatorship, as well as 
their  protests  against  the  removal  of  Francoist  street  names  and  symbols  (Nuñez 
Seixas  2005:  124).  In  addition,  soon  after  the  PP  won  the  2000  election,  the 
government awarded the Francisco Franco Foundation a very substantial subsidy as 
part of the funding for NGOs. 
Aznar had declared that he would step down at the end of his second term. As a 
result, during part of the second term, speculations about his succession were focusing 
the attention of a number of party grandees and the media. Aznar chose his successor 
himself and he chose Mariano Rajoy Brey, a Galician who started in the Galician 
parliament. He was even briefly deputy president of the Xunta de Galicia (1986-7). He 
integrated the party executive at the moment of the formation of the PP. He entered 
the  Spanish  parliament  in  1989  and  led  the  1996  and  2000  victorious  election 
campaigns  that  had  brought  the  party  into  government  He  participated  in  every 
cabinet  since  1996,  first  as  minister  for  public  administrations,  then  as  education 
minister, minister for the presidency (co-ordinating role of the Cabinet, government 
spokesperson and any other role that the president of the government may assign to 
the function) and interior minister. After the 2000 election he also became deputy 
president of the government.  
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The  PP  was  in  shock  after  its  defeat  in  the  2004  elections.  Opinion  polls 
predicted a victory for the PP, and the party felt robbed by what they perceive as the 
PSOE's campaign following the terrorist attacks. The personality of Rajoy as Aznar's 
appointed successor and the feeling of being a victim rather than a party defeated after 
a  normal  electoral  process  mean  that  the  party  is  unlikely  to  change  either 
organisationally or programmatically in the close future. The party has indeed adopted 
a posture of frontal opposition to the government led by Rodríguez Zapatero on 
issues such as gay marriage and institutional reforms. 
 
7.2.2. Organisation at the central level, central party processes 
The  Partido  Popular  defines  itself  as  a  national  party  with  a  'regionalised  and 
decentralised organisation' (Partido Popular 2002, Art. 17). The party is present in 
every region except in Navarra, where the UPN (Unión del Pueblo Navarro) stands for 
national and regional elections for the PP since 1990. The figure below schematically 
presents the organisation of the central level or organisation of the PP based on the 
party constitution and maps the relations between the main party organs. Lower party 
echelons have the same organisation, with the same organs adapted at their level and 
with the same sort of relationships. 
 
Constitutional guarantee 
The statutes of the state-wide party can be modified by the national congress, after 
proposal  by  the  national  executive  committee.  As  a  result,  the  balance  of  power 
between  territorial  units  is  by  statute  highly  dependent  on  the  central  party.  The 
statutes of the PP are rather prescriptive. While article 20 of the national statutes (PP 
2002)  stipulates  that  the  territorial  sub-units  elaborate  their  own  rulebooks  and 
organise their own working rules, the statutes describe the general articulation of the 
party, stipulate the organisation and the type of organs that should be created at each 
Figure 7.2. Organigram, national organisation of the PP 
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territorial level (regional and provincial), and the responsibility of each organ. As a 
result,  the  regional  units  have  no  discretion  about  their  organisation.  The  party 
therefore receives a score of 1 for both indicators of revision of the party constitution 
and organisational autonomy of the regional branches. 
 
Selecting the party leader 
The  party  leader,  called  President  in  the  Partido  Popular,  is  elected  by  the  party 
National Congress, which is composed of delegates from the provincial party units. 
The number of delegates from each province is decided by the Junta Directiva Nacional 
(national steering committee, JDN) on the basis of each province's number of party 
members  and  past  electoral  results.  In  fact,  the  choice of the  party president  can 
coincide  with  the  choice  of  a  candidate  for  the  position  of  President  of  the 
government, which is appointed by the JDN, in which regional party presidents and 
PP  presidents  of  autonomous  communities  sit  alongside  members  of  the  Comité 
Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN) and members of parliament. Since the party's transformation 
from AP to PP, it has changed leader only twice.  
In 1989, Fraga had announced that his return to the party leadership would only 
be temporary. Fraga consulted the younger generation of party officials and came to 
the conclusion that from among those most likely to succeed him, Aznar was the 
candidate who would garner the most support. After Fraga announced his choice, 
Aznar's  nomination  was  ratified  by  the  CEN  and  then  formally  approved  by  the 
national steering committee (JDN) (García-Guereta Rodríguez 2001: 166-7). 
In 1994, Aznar announced that he would stand down as party leader after two 
terms if he won the 1996 elections, and he kept to his word (Iglesias 2003: 14). After a 
long period of rumours and predictions, he decided that Mariano Rajoy should be the 
one to replace him. Iglesias (2003: 22-3) recalls how the leaders conducted talks with a 
large number of party grandees. A peculiar anecdote is that on the eve of announcing 
the name of the candidate to his succession, Aznar called a number of the party's most 
prominent figures, asking for their support but withholding the name of his chosen 
candidate. A reunion of the National Executive Committee (CEN) was called after the 
summer of 2003 for the purpose of endorsing Rajoy as the party's candidate to the 
Moncloa and secretary-general. Aznar's choice was approved by the party's national 
executive; and Rajoy later became secretary-general of the PP and finally President at 
the 15
th Congress of the party in October 2004. Aznar's succession followed a similar 
pattern to the one that had prevailed over his selection by Manual Fraga in 1989.  
In practice, the choice of the party president has been the sole prerogative of the 
leader, and the role of the party's executive organs has been to formally endorse this 
choice. As both examples show, this is a very centralised process in which there is no 
room for internal party democracy, even though the leader's choice is not made in 
complete isolation but resulted from his own observations and discussions with party 
'grandees'. The PP receives a score of 0 for the level of involvement of the regional 
branches in the selection of the leader.  
 
The central party executive 
The  most  important  executive  organ  of  the  party  is  the Comité  Ejecutivo  Nacional 




55,  the  president  and  the  secretary-general,  party  leaders  in  the  Congress, 
Senate and European Parliament, PP presidents of autonomous communities, regional 
party presidents, the presidents of the National Electoral Committee, the National 
Committee  on  Rights  and  Guarantees  and  Nuevas  Generaciones,  the  party's  youth 
organisation, deputy secretaries-general and executive secretaries, two representatives 
of the party abroad, and up to five members appointed by the leaders.  
The CEN is responsible for the general coordination of the party, defining the 
overall party strategy and the general political line of the political action of the various 
PP  groups  around  the  country,  appointing  the  leaders  of  the  party's  various 
parliamentary groups (portavoces), the secretary-general and deputy secretaries-general 
and  executive  secretaries,  among  others,  resolve  conflicts  of  competence  between 
territorial  units,  and  elaborating  electoral  programmes  and  pre-programmes  and 
planning the campaigns.  
In addition to the CEN, the national steering committee (JDN) also meets at 
least every four months. It is a larger organ that includes the members of the CEN, all 
the party's elected officials in the Congress, Senate and European Parliament, regional 
and provincial presidents, PP presidents and portavoces of autonomous communities, 
presidents  of  local  communities  and  mayors  of  provincial  and  regional  capitals, 
numerous representatives from the party's youth movement, government ministers 
and  European  commissioner,  as  the  case  may  be.  The  JDN  holds  the  executive 
committee into account and designates the party's candidate to the presidency of the 
government.  
In  practice,  the  CEN  is  largely  dominated  by  the  leader,  who  cannot  only 
appoint five additional members but who is also able to replace some of the elected 
members and cumulates the positions of leader of the parliamentary groups in the 
Congress, Senate and European Parliament. Moreover, the 35 members elected at the 
congress are chosen from a closed list elaborated by the party president. In the past 
congresses of  the  PP,  only  one  list  was  presented  to  the  congress.  The  president 
moreover  appoints  the  party's  executive  secretaries  and  secretaries,  who  form  the 
smaller, working executive of the party (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006: 408). As a 
result, the party leader has considerable influence over the executive (van Biezen and 
Hopkin 2005: 112). However, regional party presidents and presidents of autonomous 
communities represent approximately a third of the CEN. As a result, the PP receives 
a score of 2 for the indicator of participation in the central executive. 
 
Candidate selection for elections to the Congreso de los Diputados 
The process of candidate selection for elections to the Congress of Deputies is, in 
spite of the statutes' provisions, a very centralised process. According to the party 
statutes, provincial electoral committees (Comité Electoral Provincial) are responsible for 
the elaboration of candidate lists, which they then propose for approval to the national 
electoral committee. Electoral committees are composed of 8 members appointed by 
the executive committee of each level, as well as one additional member from Nuevas 
Generaciones.  For  instance,  the  members  of  the  national  electoral  committee  are 
appointed by the national executive committee, and the national executive of Nuevas 
Generaciones also appoints one representative to the national electoral committee.   
                                                 
55 In the 1996 statutes, the CEN included 20 members.  
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The composition of the lists does not follow any sort of rule and is the result of 
elite  decisions.  The  composition  of  the  lists  generally  reflects  some  sort  of 
geographical balance to ensure that no part of the province absolutely dominates the 
list and the central party 'suggests [gender] parity' (interview with Juan Carlos Vera 
Pro) but does not impose it. Like the PSOE, the PP tends to include non-members in 
its lists in order to suggest 'openness'. These 'civil society' candidates can sometimes 
be imposed from above. The national party also tends to defend sitting members of 
parliament. A member of the national executive estimated that the turnover on the 
lists  was  around  40%  between  two  elections.  Ultimately,  the  National  Electoral 
Committee has the last word on the composition of the lists (interview with Gabriel 
Elorriaga Pisarik). 
In  practice,  provincial  committees  receive  pressures  from  both  regional  and 
national  levels  to  influence  the  selection  of  candidates  and  the  ranking  of  these 
candidates on the list. The lists established by the provincial parties are in particular 
the object of discussions between the provincial branches and the central party, so 
that  in  the  end,  the  list  sent  to  the  central  party  for  approval  has  already  been 
scrutinised by the national electoral committee (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006: 
21). For instance, the Catalan PP suffered from the pressures of the national party 
over the composition of lists for the 2000 election. The exclusion of former Catalan 
party president Vidal-Quadras by the central party produced a number of dissensions. 
In the end, the Catalan provincial parties decided not to enter into conflict with the 
national party, and the Barcelona branch sent to the central party a list that followed 
the criteria imposed by the centre. However, it added an annex that criticised this list 
(Rusiñol 2000).  
Through informal discussions over the composition of the lists the party avoids 
open crises and facilitates central party control. Most of these conflicts remain hidden 
by the party, as provincial parties generally yield to the central party's wishes before 
the final stage of official transmission of the lists (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2005). 
As a result, the central party can in the end say that it has approved the lists sent to it 
by the provincial parties and use this as a sign that there is no disagreement within the 
party. The PP receives a score of 1 for the involvement of the regional branches in the 
selection of candidates to the parliament.  
 
Policy-making for state-wide parliamentary election 
A number of party organs at the national level are nominally involved in the policy-
making process that leads to the elaboration of the party manifesto for elections to the 
Congress of Deputies. In practice, policy is determined at the top of the party by the 
president and a group of people that surrounds him. 
The congress is 'the party's supreme organ' (art. 25 of the party statutes) and is 
responsible for shaping its basic policy principles and adopting any policy document 
that it may deem useful (art. 29). In practice, little policy is discussed during the party 
congress. Instead, the main issues at stake in PP congresses are the election of the 
executive and other party offices. It is the Junta Directiva Nacional, which counts up 
to 600 members and includes provincial and regional representatives, that approves 
the motions and issues that will be debated during the congress, upon proposals made 
by the national executive. This means that the national executive committee by and 
large controls the agenda of the congress, and policy is only a side issue in party 
congresses.   
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The national steering committee (JDN), which meets at least three times a year, 
also discusses policy and election programmes. Its wide-ranging composition means 
that it is a place where the various levels of the party can interact and where the 
leadership  can  take  the  pulse  of  the  party  on  the  ground  and  of  the  regional 
organisations. It is the national executive committee (CEN) and the president that are 
given the most important policy role in the party statutes, as the CEN is in charge of 
defining the party's political line and its programmes, while the president co-ordinates 
the party's political action and approves any political declaration made in its name.  
In addition, the national convention is a consultative organ that meets every year 
to discuss policy proposed by the party executive. It includes all the members of the 
JDN,  members  of  autonomous  parliaments,  PP  members  of  autonomous 
governments, presidents or group leaders of local assemblies, mayors or group leaders 
of councils of cities with a population in excess of 15,000. It discusses the outline and 
the  broad  issues  of  the  state-wide  programme  (interview  with  Gabriel  Elorriaga 
Pisarik). 
Day-to-day political activities and the main political decisions are discussed in 
non-official  'reuniones  de  maitines'  (matins  reunions).  These  regular  meetings  gather 
around the leader a number of party grandees to discuss the most important issues 
that the party has to deal with. Josep Piqué, the president of the Catalan PP, is part of 
this group of people. His presence, along with that of Madrid Mayor Ruiz-Gallardón, 
has nevertheless less to do with his weight as regional leader than with the importance 
of  Catalan  politics  for  the  national  party  (Astudillo  and  García-Guereta  2005).  It 
should also be noted that both were important members of the central party before 
turning  to  respectively  regional  and  local  politics.  However,  Catalan  respondents 
considered that participation  in  such  meetings  could  be  an  occasion  for  Piqué  to 
express the point of view of the Catalan PP. 
The party  manifesto  itself  is  produced  by  the  secretary  for programmes  and 
studies,  who  is  chosen  by  the  president.  This  position  was  occupied  by  Gabriel 
Elorriaga in the last general election. The secretary coordinates various thematic study 
groups, which include members of parliament and chosen civil society representatives 
(interview with Juan Carlos Vera Pro). A small group of 8 to 10 people around the 
secretary elaborates the programme on the basis if the conclusions of the thematic 
groups, impulsions given by the president and proposals from members of Parliament 
(Méndez, Morales and Ramiro 2004: 185). The FAES (Fundación para el Análisis y los 
Estudios Sociales), a think-tank created in 2002 as a result of the fusion of a number of 
conservative groups, also contributed to the thinking that went behind the elaboration 
of the elaboration of the manifesto (interview with Gabriel Elorriaga Pisarik).
56  
There  is  no  formal  inclusion  of  regional  party  presidents  or  presidents  of 
autonomous communities other than their presence in formal party organs such as the 
CEN and the national steering committee. The PP is given a score of 1.  
 
7.2.3. Organisation in the autonomous communities, power and autonomy of the 
regional party branches 
Regional party branches have replicated the organisation of the central party at the 
regional  level,  following  similar  rules  and  procedures  for the  selection of  regional 
                                                 
56 José María Aznar has been president of the FAES since 2004.  
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leaders  and  election  candidates  and  for  the  elaboration  of  the  programmes  for 
autonomous elections.  
 
Selecting regional party leaders 
Party  statutes  declare  that  regional  party  leaders  (presidents)  are  selected  by  the 
regional congresses and that they do so autonomously. Over the course of the history 
of the PP, however, the involvement of the centre in the selection of regional leaders 
has  been  apparent. In particular,  the  leadership  change  at the  centre  in  1989  was 
followed by a number of changes at the regional (and provincial) level (Betanzo 2005). 
The central party intervenes in particular in order to avoid internal divisions in the 
regional parties (interview with José Luís Ayllón Manso). As a result, the role of the 
central party in this process is generally to iron out difficulties and prevent the public 
exposure of internal divisions before the regional congress (interview with Juan Carlos 
Vera Pro).  
For instance, Jaime Mayor Oreja was imposed by Aznar in the Basque Country 
because he had a more centrist profile. This, however, did not go down very well with 
some  sections  of  AP,  which  nevertheless  had  to  accept  the  new  regional  leader 
(interviews with Fernando Maura Barandiarán and José Eugenio Azpiroz Villar). After 
Mayor  was  appointed  as  Home  Secretary  by  Aznar  in  1996,  a  new  leader,  Carlos 
Iturgaíz was chosen by the leadership to replace him. Mayor led the party's campaign 
in the 2001 Basque elections, but the PP-PSOE project of non-nationalist alternative 
failed to attract more votes than the nationalist parties. For the 2005 election and after 
the 2004 defeat in general elections, the party felt that it needed a new leader. To leave 
room for a new leader, both Mayor and Iturgaiz stood as candidates for European 
elections in 2004.  
The choice of the new leader was not a straightforward choice, as the Basque PP 
was divided between two candidates: Loyola de Palacio, former Spanish minister and 
European Commissioner at the time, backed by the national leadership, and María San 
Gil, the leader of the PP in Guipuzcoa and leader of the PP group in the San Sebastian 
city council, seen by Mayor as his natural successor. Iturgaiz led a series of discussions 
with a number of party officials with the intention of presenting a single candidate for 
endorsement by the congress (Alonzo and de la Hoz 2004). The new leader, María San 
Gil, was chosen by a small group of people in the PP-PV (Mayor, Iturgáiz and the 
secretary-general  of  the  Basque  PP)  on  the  basis  of  her  moderate  profile,  local 
implantation in San Sebastian and her leadership capacities (interview with Fernando 
Maura). This choice was then presented to the congress of the PP-PV, and 88% of the 
delegates approved her candidacy (ABC 6 November 2004). Respondents say that the 
central party did not intervene in the process, even though it was certainly consulted 
and kept in the loop as discussions were going on. However, the choice of the new 
leader had to be acceptable to the central party, as the CEN approves the candidates 
to the presidency of autonomous communities. In fact, even though it supported de 
Palacio, the national party was not opposed to San Gil, who had been a member of 
the national executive committee since 1999, and accepted her not to embarrass the 
Basque party and give the impression that Madrid was dictating what the Basque PP 
had to do (Alonso and de la Hoz 2004).  
The central party's interventions in the life of regional party branches are better 
exemplified by the change in leadership in Catalonia that followed the 1996 general 
election. The then leader of the Catalan PP was Alejo (Aleix) Vidal-Quadras, who 
stood  for  the  more  'Castellan'  vision  of  Spain  that  alienated  part  of  the  Catalan  
196 
 
electorate but at the same time presided over an increase in the party's share of the 
vote in the region. When the national party needed the support of Convergència i 
Unió for its minority government, Vidal-Quadras was replaced by Alberto Fernández, 
who  was  seen  as  more  'Catalan-compatible'  and  represented  a  more  moderate 
opposition to Catalan nationalism (Marín 2006; Pallarés 2000: 710)). In the words of a 
respondent, Alberto Fernández was 'appointed and fired [in 2002] by Madrid'. Alberto 
Fernández was replaced by Josep Piqué, who moved from the national to the Catalan 
political scene. Again, this new leader was backed by the central party and represented 
the continuity in the party's Catalan strategy (Yanque 2003).  
The issue of regional leadership selection was not really an issue on Galicia until 
2005. After the party's reorganisation in 1989, Manuel Fraga retreated back to Galicia. 
He led the party to victory in the region and led the party until he organised his 
succession for the 2005 election (Blanco 2003). Fraga's personality, his status as party 
founder and honorary president, and his role in the selection of Aznar as party leader 
means that the Galician PP has had a rather special status within the party. On the one 
hand, Fraga understands the party's ethos of discipline and cohesion that he himself 
contributed creating. On the other hand, it would have been difficult for the central 
party, and even for Aznar, to overtly criticise Fraga's leadership of the party in Galicia 
and try and impose decisions on the party's former leader. In fact, the issue of Fraga's 
succession has been more or less on the agenda since 1993. It has however always 
been believed that Fraga would choose his successor himself, following the example 
set by Aznar for his own succession (interview with Jesús Carlos Palmou Lorenzo).   
The  PP  shows  significant  levels  of  involvement  of  the  central  party  in  the 
selection  of  regional  leaders.  Galicia  is  a  special  case  because  it  has  not  had  any 
leadership  change  between  1989  and  2005.
57  In  Catalonia,  the  choice  of  regional 
leaders  has  been  dictated  by  the  needs  of  the  national  leadership.  In  the  Basque 
Country, the regional party seems to have had more autonomy in the selection of its 
last leader. The need for approval of candidates to regional presidencies by the central 
party however ensures that regional party branches are unlikely to select candidates 
that are not to the central party's liking. In addition, like in the PSOE, the central party 
tends to intervene when there is no agreement on a candidate in the region and to 
prevent internal disputes (interview with Carlos María de Urquijo de Valdivielso). The 
regional branches of the PP receive a score of 1.  
 
Selecting candidates for autonomous elections  
The party rules state that regional electoral committees establish the lists of candidates 
for  elections  to  regional  parliaments  and  that  the  national  electoral  committee 
approves  the  lists  they  send.  Provincial  parties  can  propose  names  for  the 
consideration of their regional party, but it is the responsibility of the regional parties 
to propose the candidate lists. Again, the central party plays a role in the process, as it 
must give its approval to the lists and pays careful attention to the choice of the 
candidate to the presidency of the autonomous community and to the top positions 
on the lists.  
In Galicia, each province proposes a list of candidates. The regional direction, in 
collaboration with Fraga, then adapts these lists, with a number of criteria in mind: 
territorial  balance  to  ensure  that  all  the  areas  of  the  province  ('comarcas')  are 
                                                 
57 Fraga's successor, Alberto Núñez Feijoo, was elected in 2006.   
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represented;  gender  balance,  albeit  not  to  the point  of  absolute  parity;  and  social 
diversity  to  include  candidates  from  'all  the  sectors  of the  social-economic  life  of 
Galicia' (interview with Jesús Carlos Palmou Lorenzo). Palmou also declared that it 
was the regional electoral committee that approved the final composition of the lists, 
emphasising the regional autonomy in the process.  
In Catalonia, the list of candidates is generally the responsibility of the regional 
party branch, save for the candidates in first positions, and in particular for the party's 
candidate  to  the  presidency  of  the  Catalan  government.  The  National  Electoral 
Committee must give its approval to the choice of the head of list (interview with 
Santiago Rodríguez i Serra). Santiago Rodríguez and Joan López also emphasised the 
crucial role of the Catalan party leader Josep Piqué in the drafting of the lists. In the 
Basque country, the regional party establishes the candidate lists, and the provincial 
parties can make suggestions, which are in no way binding for the regional executive. 
Carlos María de Urquijo Valdivielso, who sits on the Regional Electoral Committee in 
charge of making the lists, reported that he could not remember a single case where 
the national party would have changed a list for regional elections.  
In contrast, other regions and the national leadership mentioned the role of the 
central party in the vetting of candidate lists for autonomous elections. Again, like for 
national elections, there is a 'dialogue' between the national and regional levels and the 
central party can suggest and veto candidates (interview with Juan Carlos Vera Pro). 
This dialogue allows the central party to influence the selection process during the 
elaboration  of  the  lists,  which  then  allows  the  national  party  to  claim  unity  and 
agreement between party levels (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2005). However, the 
central party is certainly more interested in the selection of the head of the lists and a 
number of people in eligible positions rather than in the detailed composition of the 
lists.  The  central  party  is  overall  quite  involved  in  the  selection of  candidates  for 
regional elections and the PP is given a score of 1 for this indicator. 
 
Policy-making for autonomous elections 
Making  manifestos  for  regional  elections  is  a  responsibility  of  the  regional  party 
branches, but as for candidate selection, the national executive must give its approval 
to these manifestos. The party's secretary for studies and programmes oversees the 
elaboration of all the party's election programmes, including for those for autonomous 
elections (interview with Juan Carlos Vera Pro). The impulse to co-ordinate is higher 
in the 13 autonomous communities that celebrate their elections on the same day. For 
these elections, the national party produces a 'framework programme' that includes the 
party's proposals for autonomous and local elections. The regional party branches 
elaborate their  own programmes  but need the  approval  of  the national  executive. 
Because Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia hold their elections separately, 
they do not have to follow the framework programme, but their election manifestos 
also have to be approved by the national executive to make sure that they do not 
contradict the state-wide programme (interview with Juan Carlos Vera Pro).  
García-Guereta (2001: 380) describes the ability of regional party branches to 
make their manifestos as a 'combination of autonomy to determine party policy at the 
regional level and obligation to follow instructions from the central party'. Regional 
party branches have nevertheless gained more autonomy in recent times to adapt the 
national party line to the regional context (García-Guereta 2001: 383). At the same 
time, the party's secretary for organisation Juan Carlos Vera Pro confirmed that a 
strong level of co-ordination ensured that the manifestos for regional elections did not  
198 
 
contradict the national programme. Relations with the regional branches take place 
during regular meetings with regional party presidents but also with regional working 
groups and the people in charge of preparing the regional manifestos (interview with 
Juan Carlos Vera Pro). Overall, the party distinguished between two types of issues: 
those that only affect the region and have no repercussion on the rest of Spain, which 
can be left to the regional branches to determine, and issues that affect the rest of the 
country, for which a position must be adopted in co-ordination with the national party 
(interview José Luis Ayllón Manso). In practice, it means adopting the position of the 
central party.  
This  contradiction  between  the  discourse  of  autonomy  of  the  regional  party 
branches and the necessities of party cohesion became obvious in some interviews. 
José Luís Ayllón Manso argued for instance that 'the national leadership [did] not 
intervene in decisions at the regional level, except when these issues [could] affect 
national  issues'.  He  added,  however,  that  co-ordination  between  the  central  and 
regional levels was necessary because the PP was a party that had the same discourse 
all over Spain ('un partido que dice todo lo mismo'). This is illustrated by the creation, 
prior to the 1999 Catalan election, of an ad hoc organ to coordinate party strategies 
between the national direction and the PPC, including key members of the national 
and Catalan executives (El País 24 February 1999). 
The  regional  parties  mimic  the  organisation  of  the  national  party  and  copy 
another of its traits, specifically its presidentialism (interview with Rafael Luna). As a 
result, policy is not debated in detail during party congresses (interview with Joan 
López). For instance, in Catalonia, the change in party strategy at the end of the 1990s 
was accompanied in the 9
th congress of the PPC by the vote of motions that endorsed 
more nationalist themes, such as the definition of Catalonia as a 'country', to support 
the new leadership (El Mundo 2000a). However, the following congress in 2002 did 
not discuss policy beyond the re-iteration of the policies adopted by the 2000 congress 
(Rusiñol 2002). The bulk of the party's policies are adopted by the executive, under 
the impulse of the leader of the PPC. In 2003, the strategy of the PPC focused on 
attracting the moderate, centrist and Catalanist vote, with the idea of attracting part of 
the most moderate and least nationalist part of the CiU electorate (Marín 2006). This 
change of strategy owed a lot to the Catalan leader Josep Piqué, who continued the 
policy change started by Alberto Fernández but contrasts with Vidal-Quadras's more 
centralist  and  anti-nationalist  policy  stances  (interview  with  Santiago  Rodríguez  i 
Serra). This change in the strategy of the PPC was however made possible by the 
central party, which could therefore benefit from the parliamentary support by CiU.  
The PPC wields a relatively modest weight in the PP because it represents a 
small part of the country, with two provinces where it has no elected members of 
congress (Lleida and Girona), a relatively low number of party members and a weak 
local anchorage, in particular in the two provinces mentioned above (interviews with 
Joan  López  and  Rafael  Luna).  Some  respondents  consider  that  this  weakness 
conditions the type of relationships that the PPC has with the national party and the 
fact that the national direction tends to intervene in regional party affairs. In policy 
terms, it is more a matter of 'nuances' rather than differences that exist between the 
central and regional levels (interview  with Xavier García Albiol). José Luis Ayllón 
Manso added that his experience as secretary for studies and formation of the PPC 
showed that only four or five issues could be problematic and that such issues would 
be  discussed  with  the  central  party  before  the  final  submission  of  the  regional 
manifesto to Madrid.  
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The same can be said of the PP in the Basque Country (PP-PV). The Basque 
party also displays  a rather high dependence on the national party. The particular 
situation of the autonomous community, with the terrorist threats to the organisation 
and its members, certainly plays a crucial role in the relationship with the centre and 
partly explains the weakness of the regional branch. The formation of the regional 
branch was also rather difficult: the AP had a provincial structure but no overarching 
regional organisation. The creation of this regional structure was initially resisted by 
the provincial leaders. The first priority of the new leadership supported by Madrid 
was then to 'create a regional dynamics in order to correct the excessive provincialism 
that plagued PP' (interview with Fernando Maura Barandiarán). In addition, the party's 
'difficulty of identification' in the electorate has contributed to the tutelage ('tutela') of 
the PP-PV by Madrid (interview with José Eugenio Azpiroz). The importance of the 
region in the national political debate, with the issues of constitutional reform and 
terrorism, also means that the national party tends to focus quite strongly on the 
Basque situation. This then leads to a stronger level of supervision from the centre.  
The Basque manifesto is elaborated under the supervision of a small group of 
people, generally from the regional executive and chosen by the regional president. 
They consult with various sectors within and outside the party and use interventions 
by members of the Basque parliament and other party documents drafted by thematic 
working groups (interview with Carlos María de Urquijo Valdivielso). In a regional 
manifesto, the number of potentially contentious issues remains limited and the party 
can  adapt  to  the  Basque  context,  in  particular  with  regard  to  finance  and  social 
services (interview with Fernando Maura Barandiarán). However, Basque respondents 
stressed the importance of remaining close to the line established by the central party. 
The PPdeG has enjoyed a higher level of autonomy in the way it has managed its 
affairs as a results of the combination of factors. First, the PP has traditionally been 
strong in the region, so the national leadership has not had to get involved in order to 
improve  the  party's  results  or  compensate  for  its  organisational  weakness  as  in 
Catalonia. Second, Manuel Fraga has played a very important role in building the party 
as a whole and in the region. In Galicia, he managed to provide the party with a 
positive image of defender of the region's culture and identity. Fraga  was able to 
develop  a  distinctly  Galician  identity  for  the  PPdeG  (interview  with  Jesús  Carlos 
Palmou Lorenzo). The experience of power in the region and the PPdeG's continuous 
electoral success has certainly contributed to strengthening its autonomy. Against the 
more centralist position of the PP, the Galician PP has managed to foster its own 
identity, based on a moderate support for regional identity, culture and language.  
Third, Fraga has at the same time refrained from diverging too much from the 
national  party  line,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  issue  of  the Estado  de  las 
Autonomías. As president of the Xunta, Fraga has contributed to strengthening the 
autonomy of the region and supported the principle of subsidiarity in the relations 
between autonomous communities and the state (Núñez Seixas 2005: 128-9). In this 
domain, he has often advocated a more regionalist position than the national party. 
Finally, the PPdeG has since 1999 reverted to a more conciliatory position towards the 
central party. Prior to 1999, the Galician secretary-general was in favour of a higher 
level of autonomy for the Galician party branch, advocating a maximalist position that 
would have reduced the level of co-operation with the central party. Since 1999 and 
the change of secretary-general, the PPdeG has renewed its links with the central party 
and enjoys good relations with the national leadership while maintaining its own brand 
of centre-right 'Galeguism' (interview with Jesús Carlos Palmou Lorenzo).   
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Even though the rules are the same for all the regional branches, there is a 
certain discrepancy between Galicia on the one hand and Catalonia and the Basque 
Country  on  the  other.  Catalonia  and  the  Basque  Country  are  the  autonomous 
communities 'where the PP has the lowest level of support' (interview with Rafael 
Luna). This resulted in a lower level of influence within the party and a low level of 
autonomy. In comparison, Galicia has managed to gain some autonomy within the 
party and has used its resources as a government party to increase its autonomy vis-à-
vis the national party.  
There  is  nevertheless  a  strong  emphasis  on  political  cohesion.  This  is  also 
perceived  as  a  strategic  imperative  for  the  PP.  As  José  Luis  Ayllón  Manso  said, 
'divergence within the PSOE is not perceived by society in the same way as divergence 
in the PP' (interview). As a result, there is a greater pressure for the party to ensure 
that it has as little divergence as possible. In another occasion, Xavier García Albiol 
stressed that the PP was 'the only party that [said] the same all over Spain' (interview). 
This point was emphasised by a large number of respondents. As a result, the party 
receives a score of 1 for the indicator of policy autonomy of the regional branches in 
Catalonia and in the Basque country, and a score of 2 in Galicia.  
 
Party finance 
Like the PSOE, the PP includes in the records presented to the Tribunal de Cuentas 
the accounts of the central party, its regional and provincial branches and some local 
branches. The data is not disaggregated by autonomous community, and it is difficult 
to  evaluate  the  transfers  of  resources  between  levels  and  how  much  funding  the 
regional branches receive. Unlike the PSOE, the PP includes electoral subsidies in its 
resources.  
Table 7.4 below details the income of the PP as a whole and of the central party. 
It also adds the subsidies received by the party at the regional level. The income of the 
national party represents approximately one half of the total income of the party. 
Some variations can be observed in 2000, with an increase in the resources of the 
national party, mainly due to higher electoral subsidies for the state-wide elections.  
Astudillo and García-Guereta (2005) describe the finance of the PP as extremely 
centralised. Party statutes stipulate that the accounts of all the territorial units have to 
be approved by the president and secretary-general (Art. 46, PP 1996; Art. 52, PP 
2000). Moreover, the national party, via its National Executive Committee, can decide 
the contribution of territorial units to the resources of the state-wide party in order to 
ensure a fair distribution of resources across the party (art. 51.3, PP 2000). For the 
first  time  in  2005,  the  Catalan  PP  presented  its  own  separate  accounts,  with  the 
approval of the central party (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2005). Accounts for that 
year have not been reviewed by the Tribunal de Cuentas yet and are not available.  
Direct public funding provides the regional branches with some level of financial 
autonomy,  as  regional  governments  subsidise  parliamentary  groups.  However,  this 
money is not ring-fenced and transfers from the parliamentary party to the party in 
public office are common, even though financial statements as they are presented by 
the Tribunal de Cuentas do not give any indication as to the extent of intra-party 
movements of funds. Fernando Maura Barandiarán reported that the Basque party 
was relatively autonomous for ordinary activities, with resources from membership 
fees, surplus from the direct public funding of the parliamentary group in the Basque 




Table 7.4. Resources of the Partido Popular, 1999-2003 
  1999*  2000*  2001  2002  2003 
Total income  74,473,016.50 75,274,030.78 63,351,433.82 61,828,610.77 92,657,911.74 
Total donations and fees 
(members and office 
holders) 
10,420,435.04 10,368,324.64 11,910,860.70 11,668,424.43 13,023,914.85 
of which fees  6,671,203.17  7,341,443.60  8,684,624.18  8,629,743.41  8,843,676.53 
as % of income  9.0  9.8  13.7  14.0  9.5 
Non-electoral subsidies  40,369,726.86 45,022,896.93 48,042,481.58 49,056,605.47 63,261,457.82 
Electoral subsidies  23,079,501.24 18,815,821.16  2,633,076.60  0.00  17,508,298.26 
Subsidies as % of income  85.2  84.8  76.3  79.3  87.2 
Income of national party  40,495,271.59 45,499,254.46 29,010,012.67 29,014,174.97  n.a. 
of which subsidies#  39,863,380.12 44,119,020.93 27,530,768.02 27,530,766.45  n.a. 
Subsidies to autonomous 
parliamentary groups 
12,643,012.39 12,434,737.10 13,519,783.94 14,516,447.63 15,368,881.05 
Electoral subsidies for 
autonomous elections 
5,532,711.89  622,395.11  2,633,076.60  1,084,404.76  12,153,288.54 
Non-electoral subsidy 
from the Basque 
government 
626,618.39  751,939.66  822,773.00  863,379.59  945,723.00 
Extraordinary subsidy 
from the Catalan 
Parliament  
n.a.  55,059.04  401,801.04  403,501.02  574,001.48 
* To facilitate the comparison, amounts in pesetas have been converted into euros, with the 
official conversion rate of 166.386 Ptas for 1 euro. 
# includes subsidies to the party and to its parliamentary group.  
° advance payment for elections to the parliament of Andalusia.  
Source: Tribunal de Cuentas 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006. 
He added that 'the Basque party negotiate[d] with the central party the money 
that the PP [would] advance for Basque elections'. Top-down transfers occur when 
regional  branches  need  some  support.  For  instance,  the  PP-PV  (Basque  Country) 
receives  some  support  from  the  national  party  (interview  with  Gabriel  Elorriaga 
Pisarik).  
Because the party centralises some of the resources and because the central party 
sometimes supports regional branches, the PP receives a score of 1 for the variable 
measuring the financial autonomy of regional party branches.  
 
Conclusion  
The Partido Popular is a recent party that has managed to become successful and 
become the hegemonic state-wide party on the right. It is a very centralised party 
dominated by its leader. The influence of regional party branches and their leaders at 
the centre is very limited, as the formal role of central party organs is often reduced to 
rubber-stamping  the  decisions  taken  by  the  party  leadership.  In  this  respect,  the 
growing power of the country's autonomous communities has not allowed the party's 
regional branches to gain more power at the centre. 
At the same time, their power in the regional arena is often relatively limited. The 
central party intervenes in the selection of regional leaders and candidates to regional 
elections. The PP has in particular shown a great deal of interest in the leadership of 
the Catalan and Basque parties. In terms of party policy, the PP emphasises policy 
cohesion and stresses the importance of having the same message in all the regions. 
The only margin that the regional branches have is to emphasise different issues in  
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different regions. The party however tends to ensure that the regional branches follow 
the party line on most issues. This leads to the party having a comparable image 
throughout the country. Galicia is the only one of the three regions investigated here 
that has managed to adopt a slightly different profile.  
At the same time, their power in the regional arena is often relatively limited. The 
central party intervenes in the selection of regional leaders and candidates to regional 
elections. The PP has in particular shown a great deal of interest in the leadership of 
the Catalan and Basque parties. In terms of party policy, the PP emphasises policy 
cohesion and stresses the importance of having the same message in all the regions. 
The only margin that the regional branches have is to emphasise different issues in 
different regions. The party however tends to ensure that the regional branches follow 
the party line on most issues. This leads to the party having a comparable image 
throughout the country. Galicia is the only one of the three regions investigated here 
that has managed to adopt a slightly different profile.  
Table 7.5. Coding for the organisation of the PP 
  Basque 
Country 
Galicia  Catalonia  
Involvement of regional party branches in the central party       
1. Selection the leader of the state-wide party  0  0  0 
2. Involvement of regional party branches in the central party 
executive 
2  2  2 
3. Selection of candidates for state-wide parliamentary elections  1  1  1 
4. Adoption of the manifesto for state-wide parliamentary 
elections 
1  1  1 
5. Amending the constitution of the state-wide party  1  1  1 
Sum involvement  5  5  5 
Autonomy of the regional party branches        
6. Organisational freedom of the regional party branches  1  1  1 
7. Selection of the regional party leaders  1  1  1 
8. Selection of candidates for regional elections  1  1  1 
9. Adoption of the manifesto for regional elections  1  2  1 
10. Funding of the regional party branches   1  1  1 
Sum autonomy  5  6  5 
By and large, the party has only been marginally affected by the federalisation of 
Spain. The centralised and presidentialist nature of the party was retained and has 
efficiently managed to curb the potential aspirations of regional party branches to have 
more autonomy. Whereas respondents from the regional branches of the PP observed 
that the regions had now a little more autonomy than they used to, the extent to which 
they can adapt their own political strategies and policies remain very limited.  
 
7.3. Conclusion  
The Spanish state-wide parties are relatively centralised, and the central leadership of 
both the PP and the PSOE retain formal powers to intervene in regional party affairs. 
The  centralisation  of  party  organisation  was  facilitated  by  the  pattern  of  party 
formation of these two parties, which were created (or re-created, in the case of eth 
PSOE) from the centre. Van Biezen and Hopkin (2005: 11) observe that both parties 
proclaim to be decentralised parties but that 'in many cases[...], the autonomy of lower 
echelons is effectively negated by stipulating that their decisions, on financial matters, 
or the  selection  of candidates  for  sub-national  public  office,  for  example,  actually 
require the approval of the national party leadership'. This is especially true for the  
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PP, which is the party that makes the most extensive use of its ability to control its 
regional branches because of its emphasis on party cohesion and programmatic unity. 
The central leadership has managed to control the development of regional elites and 
to contain the potential for divergence created by regional party competition.  
The PSOE has been more affected by the transformation of the Spanish state. 
The regional leaders have used the weaknesses of the central leadership to gain more 
autonomy at the regional level but also more influence at the centre. The ability to 
influence  the  centre  however  seems  dependent  on  the  strength  of  the  national 
leadership. When the PSOE was in opposition, their influence at the centre was more 
extensive. Since the PSOE is in government, the part yin public office and the leader 
have regained more autonomy, and the newly instituted Territorial Council has met 
less  frequently.  The  regional  federations  have  however  remained  relatively  free  to 
select their candidates and programmes as they saw fit. The veto power of the centre 
certainly remains a powerful incentive to stay close to the party line, and the central 
party intervenes in case of conflict in the regional federations. While the party's slogan, 
'la  España  plural'  (Plural  Spain),  reflects  the  party's  acceptance of  Spain's  regional 
differences, the organisation of the party now allows its regional federations to reflect 






CHAPTER 8.  THE ORGANISATION OF STATE-WIDE 





This chapter compares the organisation of the state-wide parties in Spain and in the 
UK and then assesses the hypotheses of the framework presented in chapter 2 in the 
light of the cases presented in the chapters 4 to 7. It shows that the effects of the 
institutional environment and the type of regionalised arrangement are mediated by 
internal  party  factors  such  as  the  incumbency  position  of  state-wide  and  regional 
leaders and the pattern of party formation. Electoral considerations are also important. 
The nationalisation or regionalisation of elections and their stakes influences the type 
of response that the parties have adopted. With few exceptions, the state-wide parties 
have only changed the balance of power between central and regional levels when the 
central leadership considered that it could increase the party's electoral prospects or 
increase  the  redistributive  resources  of  the  party  via  access  to  office  and  the 
advantages that come with it. 
 
8.1. Party organisation in Spain and the UK 
The vertical organisation of state-wide parties and the relationship between the central 
and  regional  levels  of  organisation  of  these  parties  consist  of  two  elements:  the 
integration of the regional branches in the decision-making processes and organs at 
the centre of the state-wide party and the autonomy of the regional party branches in 
the management of regional affairs. These two dimensions are observed here in turn. 
Table 8.1 below compiles the codes given to the organisation of the three British and 
two  Spanish  state-wide  parties  studied  here  and  shows  that  a  variety  of  forms  of 
organisation can be found.  
 
8.1.1. Integration of the regional branches in the central party 
Overall, all the parties involve their regional branches in central decision-making to 
only a limited extent. In most cases, the central party has retained full responsibility 
over  state-wide  election processes  (candidate  selection  and policy-making)  and  the 
regional branches are only weakly integrated in central decision-making organs. The 
level of integration of regional branches in the central party is more constant in Spain 
than in the UK, where there is a higher level of variation between the parties (see 
figure 8.1).  
 
The British state-wide parties 
The Liberal Democrats are the party with the highest score for the involvement of 
regional party branches in the central party (see table 8.1 and figure 8.1 below). This is 
mainly due to the fact that the Scottish and Welsh Liberal Democrats select the party's 
candidates for state-wide elections and can veto any change to the party constitution 
that  would  affect  their  competences.  In  sharp  contrast,  the  Labour  party  barely 
includes its regional branches in central-decision making: they are not represented in  
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the National Executive Committee, do not participate in the selection of the party 
leader and of candidates for Westminster elections, and they have no say over reforms 
of the party constitution. The organisation of the Conservative party is asymmetrical. 
The Scottish and Welsh Conservatives both have a limited representation in the party 
executive and no role in the selection of the leader or in amending the constitution. 
Unlike the Welsh party, the Scottish Conservatives can select the party's candidates for 
state-wide general elections. They retained this function after the independent Scottish 
Unionist  party  integrated  the  UK  Conservative  party  in  1965.  The  poor  electoral 
performances  of  the  Scottish  Conservatives  mean  however  that  they  cannot 
compensate their low level of representation in central party organs by their share of 
the Conservative parliamentary party in Westminster. 
Table 8.1. Codes for the vertical dimension of the organisation of the British and 






Democrats  PSOE  PP   
Sco.  Wal.  Sco.  Wal.  Sco.  Wal.  BC  Cat.  Gal.  BC  Cat.  Gal. 
1. Selection of the 
party leader 
0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0 
2. Involvement of 
regional branches in 
central executive  




0  0  3  0  3  3  1  3  1  1  1  1 
4. Adoption of 
manifesto, state-wide 
elections  
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  1 
5. Amending the 
party constitution   0  0  0  0  3  3  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Involvement of regional 
party branches in the 
central party 
1  1  5  2  8  8  5  9  5  5  5  5 
6. Organisation of 
regional party 
branches 
2  2  3  3  3  3  1  4  1  1  1  1 
7. Selection of 
regional party leaders 




2  2  3  3  3  3  2  3  2  1  1  1 
9. Adoption of 
manifesto, regional 
elections 




1  1  2  1  1  1  2  4  2  1  1  1 
Autonomy of regional 
party branches  
11  11  14  12  13  13  10  17  10  5  5  6 
All three parties receive one point for the participation of their regional branches 
in the making of manifestos for general elections because of the existence of regional 
manifestos. These manifestos have a rather ambiguous role and a limited impact on  
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the campaign as a whole. Their function is to address directly the Scottish and Welsh 
electorates and to fit the proposals of the state-wide manifestos in the context of 
devolution. They tend to reproduce the policies included in the state-wide manifestos 
and to explain how these policies would affect the region. The regional branches also 
include proposals specifically for Scotland and Wales over devolved issues, as not 
mentioning devolved issue would leave education, healthcare and other crucial issues 
such as law and order out the election campaign. These proposals are however in no 
way constraining for the state-wide parties. The innovations included in the Scottish 
and Welsh manifestos for state-wide elections are therefore only marginally important 
in the campaign, which remain dominated by state-wide (and therefore often English) 
concerns.  
Figure 8.1. Scores of the regional branches on the two dimensions of multi-level 
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The  regions  can  be  represented  in  state-wide  party  conferences  via  their 
constituencies, but the Scottish and Welsh delegations are always outnumbered by the 
English  representation  because  of  the  number  of  constituency of  each  region.  In 
addition, party conferences – in particular in the Labour and Conservative parties – 
have  a  limited  role  in  the  determination  of  party  policy.  Finally,  the  presence  of 
Scottish  and  Welsh  conference  delegates  has  diminished  over  time,  as  British 
conferences mainly discuss English issues. 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats count a number of Scots and a more limited 
number of Welsh people in top party positions, starting with their leaders. These high 
ranking party officials however own their position to the state-wide party and their 
election to the Westminster parliament. They are therefore more likely to represent the 
state-wide party and defend its interests over those of the regional branches. Gordon 
Brown is a case in point: as a high ranking Scottish member of the UK government, 
he keeps close tabs on the evolution of the situation in Scotland and tries to maintain 
his influence over the Scottish Labour party in order to ensure that the Scottish party 
remains close to his positions. 
 
The Spanish state-wide parties 
The PSOE and PP have the same level of integration of their party branches (see 
Figure 8.1), but with rather different effects. The PSC-PSOE is a special case: as a 
separate party federated to the PSOE, it chooses its own candidates for state-wide  
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elections, develops its own programme for Spanish parliamentary elections and adopts 
its own constitutional rules. At the same time, the PSC is involved  in the central 
decision-making organs and processes of the PSOE, with representatives in the PSOE 
congress and in its executive organs. This means that the PSC is far from immune 
from attempts by the Spanish socialist party to influence the course of Catalan politics 
and the choice of PSC leaders and policies. It is, however, much more autonomous 
than the party branches of the PSOE (see figure 8.1 above). 
In the PSOE, regular regional party branches are weakly integrated in the central 
party. They have a role in all of the party's state-wide processes and organs, but their 
level  of  input  is limited.  The  introduction  of  individual  secret  ballot  in  the  party 
congress  has  reduced  the  ability  of  regional  leaders  to influence  the  votes  of  the 
delegates and hence the choice of the party leader. Regional federations have a limited 
input in the formulation of state-wide policy (except over institutional matters) and 
only a consultative role over the selection of candidates for elections to the Congress 
of Deputies.  
The most crucial point of influence of the regional party branches in the central 
party is the party executive. In the Federal Executive Committee, powerful regional 
party  leaders  can  affect  the  whole  party.  Their  level  of  influence  has  varied 
considerably over time. A form of zero-sum game is being played between the state-
wide and regional leaderships, so that every equilibrium sees the influence of state-
wide or regional actors increase at the expense of the other (Ordeshook 1986: 144). 
During the first period of PSOE government ion the 1980s-early 1990s, the central 
leadership controlled the whole party apparatus and regional party branches had little 
influence at the centre. The power of regional leaders at the centre has been greatest in 
the  second  half  of  the  1990s,  when  the  state-wide  leadership  was  weak  and 
disorganised. The reinforcement of the central leadership after Rodríguez Zapatero's 
election as secretary-general has led to a retreat of the regional leaders from the centre 
stage of the party. Some regional leaders such as Manuel Chávez (Andalusia) and José 
Bono (Castile-La Mancha) are still influential at the central level, where they have used 
their regional prestige to become President of the PSOE for the former and Minister 
of Defence for the latter.  
Meanwhile, regional party leaders, whether they are regional secretaries-general 
or  presidents  of  an  autonomous  community,  have  gained  an  official  role  in  the 
definition of the party's policy on the State of the Autonomies via the Territorial 
Council. The creation of this council has been a somewhat mixed blessing for the 
regional branches: it represents an improvement in their role at the centre, as they 
have a genuine role in the formulation of state-wide policy, but it has also served as an 
excuse for the central leadership to limit the presence of regional leaders in the FEC.  
The regional branches of the PP are well integrated in the central party executive, 
but their role is rather limited. Regional leaders included in the central executive have 
not had the same role as the regional barons of the PSOE. The presidentialised nature 
of the Partido Popular means that the party president is powerful enough to set his 
own  agenda  and  is  relatively  immune  from  external  pressures.  The  presence  of 
regional leaders in the National Executive Committee has mainly served as a way to 
integrate the peripheries in the state-wide party and ensure that their leaders shared the 
same interests and message as the central party.  
Overall, the regional branches tend to have a limited level of involvement in all 
three British parties. In all three parties their influence at the central level is very 
limited, even when the parties have regional representatives in central party organs. In 
general, these regional representatives account for only a small fraction of the whole  
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body, but it also seems that the Scottish and Welsh members of the executive or 
conference delegates feel like these organs have little impact on them, as they mainly 
deal with English matters. The regional branches of the Spanish state-wide parties are 
somewhat more integrated in central party organs. This integration at the centre may 
serve to increase party cohesion and remind the regional branches that they belong to 
a larger whole to which they are expected to remain loyal. 
 
8.1.2. Autonomy of the regional party branches 
Figure 8.1 shows that the level of autonomy of the regional branches of the British 
parties is relatively similar in the three parties. In contrast, there is a much greater 
degree of variation between the PP and the PSOE but also within the PSOE. The PP 
is the most centralised party, while the PSC has a great deal of autonomy from the 
PSOE.  
 
The British state-wide parties 
The three state-wide parties have relatively similar formal forms of organisation in 
Scotland and Wales, but the actual levels of autonomy of the regional branches can 
vary. The Labour party is the party that has been the most involved in regional party 
affairs. The central party has limited constitutional powers to intervene at the regional 
level, but the secretaries of state for Scotland and Wales (or shadow secretaries, when 
the Labour party returns to the opposition benches) are quite involved in the life of 
the regional party branches. Their presence in the regional executives and in the policy 
commissions  responsible  for  drafting  election  manifestos  allows  them  to  serve  as 
brokers between the central and regional levels, but also as vectors of the influence of 
the central party in Scotland and Wales. 
The  central  party  (the  leadership,  often  via  the  NEC)  has  paid  a  particular 
attention  to  the  selection  of  party  leaders  and  candidates  for  the  1999  regional 
elections. By making sure that a majority of candidates to regional elections were from 
the same ideological group as the central leadership, the leadership of the state-wide 
party tried to make sure that the Scottish and Welsh parties would adopt similar policy 
platforms and refrain from diverging from state-wide party policies. The central party 
particularly intervened in the selection of the party leader in Wales, where it initially 
managed  to  prevent  the  election  of  Rhodri  Morgan  as  regional  party  leader.  In 
Scotland, the issue of leadership was less problematic, but the central party tried to 
control  the  selection  of  candidates  by  influencing  the  composition  of  the  panel 
interviewing  prospective  candidates.  These  cases  of  blatant  intervention  from  the 
centre were quite widely publicised and caused some uproar within the party and bad 
publicity outside the party. The central party seems to have been less involved in 2003, 
but it is true that candidate selection was not as crucial a point as in 1999, when the 
party had to produce an initial pool of candidates to fill all the positions. With regards 
to  their  electoral  platforms,  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  parties  have  been  rather 
autonomous,  but  they  have  shown  limited  levels  of  divergence  in  their  policies 
(Hopkin and Bradbury 2006). 
In contrast, the other two parties have left their regional branches more free to 
organise  and  run  their  own  affairs.  The  Liberal  Democrats  have  for  instance 
completely adapted to devolution, in practice allowing the Scottish and Welsh Liberal 
Democrats to exercise powers that were only theoretical until then. The party adopted 
a federal organisation at the moment of the merger of the SDP with the Liberal party, 
even though the British state was still centralised. The Scottish and Welsh regional  
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branches  can  select  their  candidates  and  elaborate  their  manifestos  for  regional 
elections without any direct central intervention.  
The  Conservative  party  was  initially  opposed  to  devolution.  Yet,  it  rapidly 
adapted its organisation to the new structure of party competition. The central party 
has left its regional branches in Scotland and Wales a large degree of autonomy to 
select their leaders and candidates and to develop their own election manifestos. The 
Scottish party has more autonomy than the Welsh party, which is organisationally 
weaker and was only recently created. In spite of their organisational autonomy, the 
Scottish and Welsh branches of both parties have remained relatively close to the 
party line set out by the state-wide party (Bradbury 2006: 230-5).  
The regional branches of the three parties are all rather dependent on the central 
party for their resources. Whereas the parliamentary groups in the Scottish Parliament 
and the Welsh Assembly receive public subsidies, the parties in central office are quite 
under-funded. They tend to compete for the same donors against the central party and 
constituency associations. As state-wide general elections remain the core electoral 
level for a majority of donors, the Scottish and Welsh branches receive only a limited 
number of private donations. As a result, they tend to rely on transfers from the 
central party or occasional support in terms of staff during regional elections.  
 
The Spanish state-wide parties 
The Partido Popular is clearly an outlier, with a very strong involvement of the central 
party in regional party affairs. This is the corollary of the logic that pushes the PP to 
consider the involvement of the regional branches in the central decision-making as a 
way to ensure party cohesion and integration of the peripheries. This emphasis on 
party cohesion is reflected in the low level of autonomy of the regional party branches. 
The central party leadership is reluctant to see the regional branches depart from the 
party line and exert a relatively strong control over their strategies and selection of 
political  personnel.  The  central  party  tends  to  intervene  in  all  aspects  of  party 
organisation and the regional branches have only a limited margin for manoeuvre 
when it comes to choosing their leader, their candidates for regional elections and for 
drafting the manifestos for regional elections. The regional branches have to refer to 
the central party for all their decisions and the central party has a veto power over the 
acts  taken  by  the  regional  branches.  Overall,  the  central  party  intervenes  at  the 
regional level to make sure that the party remains cohesive, therefore encouraging the 
selection of leaders and candidates who belong to the same party faction or group and 
making sure that the manifestos for regional elections reflect the policies of the state-
wide party. The central party has also managed to remain in control of the finance of 
the regional  branches,  even  as  they receive  important  amounts of public  funding. 
Regional branches are often in need of financial support from the central party, in 
particular for regional elections.  
The Galician PP has had a slightly greater level of autonomy during the period of 
Fraga's  leadership  of  the  PPdeG.  This  autonomy  may  not  last  in  the  post-Fraga 
period,  in particular  with  a  Galician  party  leader  in  Madrid.  In  Catalonia  and  the 
Basque country, the central party tends to intervene in order to make sure that the 
potential for divergence in these regions does not interfere with the party's message in 
the rest of the country. In Catalonia, in particular, the central party has been very 
much involved in the selection of party leaders in order to accommodate the strategy 
of the PPC to the needs of the national party.  
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The autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE has increased over time. 
During the period that spanned between the democratic transition and the party's loss 
of its majority in the Spanish parliament, the federal (central) party, under the dual 
leadership of Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra, controlled the peripheries and 
managed  to  influence  the  various  regional  federations.  Guerra's  tight  grip  on  the 
party's organisation enabled the central party to make sure that the regional elites did 
not interfere with the PSOE's overall strategy or contradict its message. After 1993, 
with  the  increasing  tensions  between  the  so-called  renovadores  and  guerristas  at  the 
national  level,  the  central  leadership  turned  its  attention  away  from  the  regional 
federations and focused instead on factional divisions among the national elite.
58   
The autonomy gained by the regional elites was strengthened by two factors: 
holding power for a certain period of time at the head of an autonomous community 
provided some regional federations with a strong power base and a strong level of 
democratic legitimacy, and the central party was weakened by the double pressure of 
poor electoral results and factional divisions. Regional 'barons' were integrated in the 
federal executive to act as referees in the national party and used this newly acquired 
leverage  to  increase  their  autonomy  at  the  regional  level.  This  situation  however 
mainly  benefited  non-historic  nationalities.  The  leaders  of  the  Galician  federation 
(PSdeG) have not benefited from office rewards, as they have been in the opposition 
for the whole period, while the Basque PSE-PSOE has been in coalition with the 
nationalists of the PNV between 1986 and 1998. PSOE strongholds have mainly been 
in non-historic nationalities, such as Andalusia, Extremadura and Castile-la Mancha. 
In these regions, the leaders (respectively José Bono, Manuel Chávez González and 
Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra) have ruled their respective regions for long period of 
time and have become important players in the federal party. 
After  the  election  of  Rodríguez  Zapatero  as  secretary-general  in  2000,  the 
regional branches have retained their autonomy. Attempts to influence regional party 
branches have been rather rare, partly because those efforts could be fruitless and give 
the image of a divided party that cannot control its peripheries. Mostly, the federal 
party tends to limit its interventions into regional affairs to trying to prevent internal 
divisions  and  ensuring  that  regional  congresses  are  run  smoothly.
59  Regional 
federations  moreover  benefit  from  a  substantial  level  of  control  over  the  public 
subsidies they receive.  
The PSC is again in a special situation. It is officially a separate party, but it 
remains organically linked to the PSOE, through its presence in central party organs 
such as the Federal Executive Committee and the Territorial Council, but also through 
the common parliamentary group in the Spanish parliament. As a result, there are 
points of convergence between the PSC and the PSOE, and the PSOE can influence 
the PSC on political issues. The unity protocol that formed the PSC states that 'the 
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE) is fully sovereign over those areas of 
competence that the socialists of Catalonia suggested for the political organisation of 
                                                 
58 Tensions between renovadores and guerristas also affected the party federations. Some regional leaders 
such as José Bono, while associated with the party's old elite, maintained their position in the party 
thanks to a timely change of allegiance in favour of the renovadores. 
59 Recent developments that fall outside the time period of this dissertation have shown that the PSOE 
in government was again trying to influence regional politics. The federal executive recently prevented 
the Navarre socialists from forming a coalition with Izquierda Unida and the Basque party Nafarroa Bai 
(see 'El PSOE ordena a los socialistas navarros que faciliten a UPN el gobierno foral', El País 4 August 
2007).   
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our  country,  in  agreement  with  the  constitutional  framework  approved  in  the 
programme of the socialists of the whole state [Spain]' (art. 4, Protocol d'unitat 1978, 
author's translation). As a result, some sort of formal or informal agreement between 
the Spanish and Catalan parties becomes necessary in order to coordinate campaigns 
and facilitate party convergence in the parliamentary group. The Spanish party has 
mainly focused its interventions in Catalonia on leadership selection and party policy, 
two  crucial  elements  for  the  convergence  between  the  parties.  The  PSC  has 
nevertheless gained in autonomy in the 1990s like the regional branches of the PSOE 
and also thanks to Pasqual Maragall’s leadership.
60 
Figure  8.1  shows  that  a  majority  of  party  branches  are  clustered  together 
between 10 and 15. The PP consistently limits the autonomy of its regional branches 
and controls the selection of regional leaders, candidates and party programmes. The 
PSC, thanks to its status as a federated entity of the PSOE, has more autonomy than 
regular  PSOE  regional  branches,  albeit  less  that  the  statutes  of  the  party  would 
suggest. The official independence of the PSC is limited by the need to co-operate 
with the PSOE and informal pressures from the PSOE in order to ensure a minimal 
level of programmatic cohesion between the parties. 
 
8.2. Assessing the hypotheses 
This section evaluates the impact of the various independent variables on the vertical 
organisation of the British and Spanish state-wide parties. To what extent does the 
environment,  and  in  particular  the  institutional  environment,  influence  the 
organisation of the state-wide parties? What is the impact of electoral factors such as 
the electoral system, the electoral cycle and the nationalisation or denationalisation of 
regional elections on party organisation? How do internal party factors influence the 
party's  adaptation  to  external  changes?  These  are  some  of the  questions  that  this 
section tries to answer. 
 
8.2.1. Party organisation and type of regionalised arrangement  
Historical evolution of state institutions and forms of regional party organisation 
The  way  a  federation or  regionalised  arrangement  came  into  being  is  expected  to 
affect the organisation of central and regional competences in the state but also the 
organisation of state-wide parties. In chapter 2, two types of state-building processes 
were  distinguished:  'federalism  by  decentralisation'  and  'federalism  by  aggregation'. 
Each was expected to influence the degree of autonomy of the regional branches, so 
that the first state-building process would encourage the formation of centralised party 
structures  and  the  second  would  facilitate  the persistence  of  autonomous  regional 
party branches in a decentralised party system. 
Spain and the UK have very distinct historical experiences. The UK integrated 
the  home  nations  (England,  Scotland,  Wales  and  Northern  Ireland)  under  the 
authority  of the  Queen  and  the  Westminster parliament, but there  was  never  any 
deliberate attempt to quash regional identities or build a British identity that would 
unite  the  various  parts  of  the  Union.  Scotland  retained  its  justice  and  education 
systems, and the specificity of Scotland was strengthened by the existence of a form of 
administrative devolution via the Scottish Office. Because of its more limited historical 
                                                 
60 In 2006, the PSOE, in agreement with the PSC, encouraged the replacement of Pasqual Maragall by 
José Montilla, the secretary-general of the PSC, as candidate to the presidency of the Generalitat.  
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experience  of  self-government,  Wales  was  more  integrated  in  the  British  state 
structure.  Yet,  its  regional  identity  remained  strong,  in  great  part  because  of  the 
persistent use of the Welsh language. The state-wide parties created some level of 
regional party administration, with party office in Scotland and Wales, even though 
these regions did not have any government. The exception is the Welsh Conservatives, 
who  were  completely  integrated  in  the  English  party.  This  reflects  the  general 
orientation  of  Conservative  voters  in  Wales,  who  opposed  devolution,  are 
concentrated in the border area with England and have a very limited sense of regional 
identity. 
In Spain on the other hand, the 19
th and 20
th centuries were mainly characterised 
by  attempts  to  build  a  centralised  state  and  create  a  Spanish  nation.  The  Franco 
dictatorship was a culmination of these attempts: it created a strong centralised state in 
which Spanish nationalism was encouraged and expressions of regional identity were 
repressed. This is in this context that political parties were created at the start of the 
process of democratic transition. The circumstances of the transition, with the need to 
organise for state-wide elections first in a context of weak party organisations and low 
figures  of  party  membership,  facilitated  the  centralisation  of  party  structures,  and 
regional party structures were only created later, in the run-up to the first regional 
elections. However, the early formation of the state during the Reconquista and the 
subsequent type of decentralised government facilitated the persistence of regional 
differences and permitted the existence of regional specificities that remain important 
to this day and constitute grounds for the State of the Autonomies and demands of 
further decentralisation by ethnoregionalist parties. It is often in the most distinct 
regions that the regional party branches have the highest degree of autonomy or where 
the will to diverge is the greatest.  
The  pattern  formation  of  the  regionalised  system  has  in  both  countries 
influenced the original organisation of the parties. Whereas the vertical organisation of 
the state-wide parties may have changed at a later stage under the influence of other 
factors,  the  cases  of  Spain  and  the  UK  show  that  the  historical  development  of 
regionalism does indeed influence the formation of state-wide parties. Moreover, early 
regional differences tend to persist over time in the fabric of the institutional system 
but also in the organisation of the state-wide parties. 
 
Effect of regionalism and decentralisation on party structures 
The type of distribution of competences between the central and regional levels of 
government is also expected to influence the organisation of state-wide parties. All 
things being equal, an integrative form of decentralisation is expected to limit the 
range  of  independent  competences  of  regional  party  branches  and  to  encourage 
cooperation between party levels through the participation of regional party branches 
in central party organs. In contrast, in a dual system, regional branches are expected to 
be  highly  autonomous  and  have  limited  stakes  in  the  central  decision-making 
processes  of  the  state-wide  party.  With  regard  to  the  scope  of  regionalised 
competences, a positive correlation is expected between the scope of competences of 
regional  governments  and  the  scope  of  autonomous  powers of  the regional  party 
branches.  
Institutional asymmetry is also expected to be reflected in the organisation of the 
state-wide  parties.  It  is  therefore  possible  to  find  regional  branches  with  more 
autonomy or with a better representation at the centre than others, and the regional 
branches in the most autonomous regions are likely to be more powerful than the  
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regional  branches  in  less  powerful  regions.  If  it  is  the  type  of  distribution  of 
competences between the centre and the regions that is asymmetrical, we expect the 
relations  between  the  centre  and  the  regions  within  state-wide  parties  to  vary 
according to the hypotheses presented above.  
Devolution in the UK was imposed from above, albeit under the pressure of 
ethno-regionalist parties. A parliament with exclusive powers of primary legislation 
over a rather large range of areas was created in Scotland. The National Assembly for 
Wales had a more limited scope of powers and only enjoyed powers of secondary 
legislation. This means that devolution has taken an integrative form in Wales and a 
dual form in Scotland (see figure 8.2 above). In spite of these differences, Wales is not 
more integrated in central decision-making than Scotland. In fact, intergovernmental 
relations are quite limited and taken the form of inter-executive meetings and bilateral 
relations between ministers (Swenden 2006: 202-3). 
Figure 8.2. Type of federalism and scope of regional powers in Spain and the UK 
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We expect this asymmetry to be reflected in the organisation of the regional 
branches of state-wide parties. The Scottish branches of the British state-wide parties 
should  therefore  be  more  powerful  than the  Welsh  branches because  of the  dual 
nature of devolution in Scotland and because the Scottish Parliament has exclusive 
competence over a larger range of competences. The dual form that devolution has 
taken in Scotland means that the Scottish branches should be relatively free in the 
management of regional party affairs. In addition, they should have a limited level of 
involvement  in  central  party  organs  and  decision-making.  In  contrast,  the  Welsh 
branches are expected to be less powerful at the regional level and more integrated in 
central decision-making. The lack of historical experience of self-government means 
that Welsh party structures were likely to be relatively weak prior to devolution.  
The  Conservative  party  is  the  only  British  party  to  display  some  form  of 
asymmetrical organisation, while the Scottish and Welsh branches of the Labour party 
and the Liberal Democrats have similar powers and the same level of involvement in 
central  decision-making.  The  dual  or  integrative  character  of  the  institutional 
arrangement does not influence the level of involvement of regional branches in state-
wide  party  organs.  All  the  parties  only  allow  a  limited  representation  of  regional 
interests at the central level and Wales does not enjoy a privileged position within the 
central decision-making organs of any of the parties. In the case of the Conservative 
party, it is actually quite the opposite that occurs, as its Scottish branch can select its 
candidates for general elections while the Welsh candidates are selected by the central 
party.   
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We see rather large degrees of variation in the level of autonomy of the regional 
branches  of  these  state-wide  parties.  Overall,  in  spite  of  their  relative  financial 
weakness, the regional branches of the British parties are relatively autonomous from 
the central party. The multi-level organisation of the British parties corresponds more 
to the organisation expected for a symmetrical dual system and ignores the specificity 
of  Wales.
61  The  limited  involvement of  the  regional  branches  in the central  party 
mirrors the institutional arrangement as well as the previous practice of government of 
the  union,  in  which  Scottish  and  Welsh  interests  and  representatives  were  only 
marginally included in the running of government.  
In Spain, the three historical nationalities have a comparable level of autonomy. 
Their regional governments have legislative and executive competence over a large 
range of policy areas. The distribution of legislative competences between central and 
regional levels of government is however rather unclear and there is quite a large 
degree of shared competence. A number of areas of competence are shared, with the 
centre  in  charge  of  the  legislation  and  the  regions  of  the  execution,  and  the 
constitution  allows  the  central  government  to  establish  framework  legislation  (Aja 
2003: 127-9). Through this framework legislation, the centre can actually restrict the 
legislative  competence  of  the  regions  by  choosing  to  adopt  quite  detailed  legal 
frameworks. With the exception of finance, the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia 
have quite similar levels of self-government, with some exceptions due to historical 
specificities in each region (see figure 8.2 above). Regional governments are feebly 
integrated in central decision-making, as intergovernmental relations are quite weakly 
developed,  the  Senate  is  not  a  real  chamber  of  regional  representation,  sectoral 
conferences  occur  irregularly  and  the  bulk  of  intergovernmental  relations  occur 
through bilateral relations. 
The type of distribution of powers and the large degree of regional autonomy 
enjoyed by these three autonomous communities mean that the regional branches of 
the PP and the PSOE in the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia should be quite 
powerful  at  the  regional  level,  but  poorly  integrated  in  central  decision-making. 
Because there is still a level of shared competence between the state and the regions 
and because the existence of framework legislation mitigates the dual character of the 
Spanish  regional  arrangement,  we  can  expect  a  certain  level  of central  oversight.  
Finally, the state-wide parties should be organised in similar ways in the three regions 
because they have very similar levels of self-government. 
The only element of asymmetry in the organisation of the Spanish parties is the 
bifurcation  of  the  PSOE  in  Catalonia.  The  Basque  and  Galician  branches  of  the 
PSOE have the same form of organisation as the other regional PSOE branches. The 
PP is also organised symmetrically throughout the country (with the exception of 
Navarre,  where  it  has  contracted  an  electoral  agreement  with  the Unión  del  Pueblo 
Navarro). The Basque, Galician and Catalan branches have the same level of regional 
autonomy and the same representation in central party organs. 
Both  Spanish  parties  are  organised  in  relatively  similar  ways,  with  a  level  of 
autonomy of their regional branches lower than expected. The Partido Popular is the 
most centralised of the two parties. The party as a whole adheres to the idea that its 
credibility rests on its ability to maintain a coherent image and message. As a result, 
the central leadership oversees the decisions taken by the regional branches, intervenes 
                                                 
61 The evolution of the statute of Wales in a dual way after the Government of Wales Act 2006 means 
that the current organisation of the British parties now fits the hypotheses better.  
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in regional affairs when it sees fit and retains a veto power over candidate selection 
and regional manifestos. While the regional branches are included in central party 
organs, their role is rather limited and the autonomy of the central leadership is in no 
way constrained by their presence.  
The PSOE is officially a federal party and is more decentralised than the PP. In 
practice, it is much more centralised than the party statutes would suggest. The central 
party retains a veto power over the decisions of the regional branches, in particular 
candidate selection and the making of manifestos for regional elections. The regional 
party branches and the PSC officially have the same role in central party organs. The 
existence of the Territorial Council however allows the regional branches to affect the 
party's institutional policy, even though it can also be used as a way to limit the input 
of regional leaders in the rest of the central party.  
Overall, it is quite difficult to predict the organisation of state-wide parties from 
the organisation of the state. The type (dual or integrative) and scope of federalism do 
not seem to make a difference with respect to the degree of autonomy of the regional 
branches or their integration in central decision-making. Institutional asymmetry is 
rarely reflected in the organisation of the parties. All the parties have had to react to 
the institutional decentralisation of power and have adopted a structure with regional 
entities, but the level of autonomy of these regional sub-units rarely matches that of 
their respective regional governments. Regional party branches are relatively weakly 
integrated in central decision-making, suggesting that functional rather than territorial 
criteria prevail over the selection of conference delegates and members of the central 
executive. The regional branches of the British parties tend to be more autonomous 
than those of the Spanish parties, even though the British Labour party has displayed 
strong centralising tendencies. Even in the most decentralised parties, the principle of 
adherence to a single message and the belief in common political principles tend to 
limit the actual scope of intra-party divergence.  
 
8.2.2. Impact of regional politics and regional differentiation  
Regional identity and ethnoregionalist parties as challenges to the state-wide parties 
In these two countries, state-wide parties compete against ethnoregionalist or minority 
nationalist  parties  in  regional  elections.  These  regionally-based  parties  represent 
important threats to the established state-wide parties thanks to high levels of regional 
identification among the voting population and proportional electoral systems.  
Chapter  4  has  shown  that  nationalism  and  feelings  of  regional  identity  have 
historically been higher in Scotland than in Wales. Likewise, the Scottish National 
Party has always attracted larger shares of the electorate in state-wide elections than 
Plaid  Cymru.  Both  parties  have  won  only  small  numbers  of  seats  in  state-wide 
parliamentary elections because of the plurality electoral system and the small size of 
their electoral bases compared to the English electorate. In contrast, regional elections 
have represented clear opportunities for the SNP and PC to become key political 
players,  as  the  electoral  system  for  these  elections  (compensatory  mixed  system) 
increases their chances of winning seats.  
The parties that are in the most direct competition with the SNP and PC are the 
Labour party and the Liberal Democrats, as the two ethnoregionalist parties are on the 
centre-left side of the political spectrum. These parties distinguish themselves from 
one another by their position on regionalism, with Labour the least regionalist and the 
SNP and PC the most regionalist parties. The Labour party and the Liberal Democrats 
are therefore the parties that are most likely to increase the level of autonomy of their  
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regional branches in order to adapt the party's message and image to the regional 
contexts. The evidence shows that the Liberal Democrats are the most decentralised 
party and that the Scottish and Welsh Liberal Democrats have been rather free to 
develop their own electoral strategies. In contrast, the Labour party has chosen to 
compete against ethnoregionalist parties by emphasising the advantages of voting for a 
state-wide party that rules the UK with a coherent message throughout the country. 
The example of the Labour party shows that there is more than one possible answer 
to the threat posed by ethnoregionalist parties and that parties can choose to increase 
their  cohesion  and  emphasise  the  advantages  of  integrated  parties  instead  of 
empowering their regional branches and increasing the risks of intra-party divergence.  
The importance of the territorial cleavage in the political arenas of Catalonia, 
Galicia  and  the  Basque  country  varies  across  the  regions.  It  is  of  paramount 
importance in the Basque country, where the issues of terrorism and the status of the 
autonomous community within Spain dominate political debates. Ethnoregionalist and 
minority nationalist parties have scored between 60 and 70% of the votes in regional 
elections, and the Basque country has been ruled by the Basque nationalist party PNV 
either  alone  or  in  coalition  without  interruption  since  1979.  The  scores  of  the 
nationalist parties have been supported by strong levels of regional identification in 
the  electorate.  In  Catalonia,  regional  identification  and  electoral  support  for 
ethnoregionalist parties are also high. The issue is however less polarised than in the 
Basque country, with a higher proportion of the population with a dual identity. The 
region was governed by the nationalist party CiU between 1980 and 2004. A coalition 
of Catalonia-based parties led by the PSC governs the region since 2004.  
Galicia is a region with a strong regional culture and a strong sense of identity, 
but only a small minority feels exclusively Spanish or Galician. Between 80 and 90% 
of  the  population  considers  itself  Galician and  Spanish.  This  strong  level  of  dual 
identity may explain the more limited success of ethnoregionalist parties in Galicia. 
The region has been governed by the PP for all but 3 years, between 1987 and 1990, 
when a coalition between the socialist PSdeG-PSOE and the ethnoregionalist parties 
Coalición Galega and the Partido Nacionalista Galego pushed the then Coalición Popular 
(later  PP) out  of power. Manuel  Fraga,  the  founder  of the  Partido  Popular,  then 
governed the Xunta (regional government) without interruption between 1990 and 
2005. 
The three regions therefore display quite different characteristics and different 
levels  of  support  for  minority  nationalist  or  ethno-regionalist  parties.  We  would 
therefore expect the Catalan and Basque party branches to be more autonomous. This 
is only the case in Catalonia for the PSOE. The Basque and Galician party branches 
have no special status in either the PSOE or the PP. Instead, the PP and, to a lower 
extent, the PSOE tend to focus on maintaining unified strategies rather than allowing 
their regions to develop different policies and compete against ethnoregionalist parties 
on their turf. Like Labour, they tend to place a premium on party unity. This is even 
more the case in the PP. The PSOE has to a certain extent come to accept regional 
diversity and the potential for policy divergence that comes with it. 
 
Electoral systems and party centralisation 
Two  types  of  effects  of  electoral  systems  were  hypothesised  in  chapter  2.  First, 
electoral  systems  can  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  centralisation  of  political  parties 
through their impact on candidate selection. Following Duverger (1976), list-based PR 
systems are expected to facilitate the centralisation of candidate selection procedures,  
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while single-member constituency systems are expected to enhance the autonomy of 
constituency-level party organisations. The case of the Spanish parties confirms this 
hypothesis. The central executives of both PP and PSOE control candidate selection 
for  state-wide  and  regional  elections.  Even  though  the  level  of  control  over  the 
making of lists for regional elections may be lower than for state-wide elections (in 
particular in the PSOE), central party executives have retained a veto power over lists 
of  candidates  and  over  the  choice  of  candidates  to  the  position  of  autonomous 
community president. 
In the UK, the situation is more complex because different electoral systems are 
used in state-wide and regional elections: single-member plurality rule for the former 
and a mixed system for the latter. Whereas Duverger's hypothesis held true at the time 
of his writing, the 1990s have seen an increasing centralisation of candidate selection 
for Westminster elections via the development of candidate panels and pre-approval 
procedures. Constituency associations consequently lost part of their autonomy to the 
benefit of the central party for Labour and the Conservatives and of the regional party 
branches of the Liberal Democrats. For regional elections, the mixed system combines 
constituency  candidates  and  regional  lists.  The  same  principle  of  panels  and  pre-
selection was used by all the parties. Only in the Labour party did the central party 
intervene to oversee the procedure and vet candidates deemed incompatible with the 
new Labour party line. In addition, the National Executive Committee of the Labour 
party must give its approval to the regional lists. In contrast, the Conservative party 
and the Liberal Democrats have empowered their regional branches for the selection 
of  regional  political  personnel  and  candidates.  Only  the  Labour  party  confirms 
Duverger's  centralisation  hypothesis,  while  the  Conservative  party  and  the  Liberal 
Democrats demonstrate that the coordination necessary to the elaboration of party 
lists can occur at the regional level.  
The  second  possible  effect  of  electoral  systems  on  party  organisation  is  an 
indirect one: proportional electoral systems facilitate the representation of small to 
medium-sized parties and increase the competitiveness of elections. If a proportional 
electoral system is used for regional elections, state-wide parties are likely to face the 
competition of a larger number of parties than with a less proportional system. In the 
cases of the regions selected in this study, it means that ethnoregionalist parties are 
more likely to win seats and to represent a threat to the electoral position of state-wide 
parties. 
In both countries, ethnoregionalist parties find it easier to gain seats in regional 
parliament than in the Spanish and British parliaments. In Catalonia and the Basque 
country, they have ruled for most of the democratic period, relegating the state-wide 
parties in the opposition. Galicia has been mainly rules by the PP, but the BNG has 
pushed the PSOE into third position 1997 and had the same number of seats as the 
PSdeG in 2001. Occasionally, state-wide parties have provided ethnoregionalist parties 
in  government  with  parliamentary  support.  At  the  central  level,  the  opposite 
(ethnoregionalist  parties  supporting  a  government  led  by  a  state-wide  party)  has 
occurred during the minority governments of González (1993-96) and Aznar (1996-
2000). The SNP and Plaid Cymru have never played such a role in the UK, where 
minority governments have been very rare in the post-WW2 period. Whereas neither 
the SNP nor PC has gained enough seats to rule their respective regions in the 1999 
and 2003 elections, the electoral system has forced the Labour party to form coalition 
governments with the Liberal Democrats in Scotland and Wales (only between 2000 
and 2003). As a result, regional elections in the present cases present state-wide parties 
with stronger regional competitors.   
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There is no single party response to this challenge posed by ethnoregionalist 
parties.  Evidence  shows  that  the  parties  have  adopted  different  organisational 
strategies to face the competition of these parties. This means that the effects of the 
electoral  system  and  the  party  system  on  the  organisation  of  political  parties  are 
mediated by other factors, particular factors directly related to the parties themselves. 
 
Effects of voting patterns and electoral cycles on party organisation 
The  position  and  status  of  regional  elections  within  the  electoral  cycle  was  also 
expected to play a role in the way state-wide parties consider the impact that regional 
elections have on their electoral strategy. When regional elections are second-order 
elections, the interconnection between central and regional elections is likely to induce 
central party authorities to try and retain some level of control over regional party 
branches  in  order  to  minimise  the  potential  damage  to  the  party's  image.  These 
conditions  are  best  fulfilled  when  the  electoral  cycle  links  national  and  regional 
elections  (close  proximity,  vertical  or  horizontal  simultaneity),  when  the  stakes  of 
regional elections are low (Chhibber and Kollman 2004), when the region displays low 
levels of territorial identification (Jeffery and Hough 2003; Pallarés and Keating 2003), 
and/or when the results of regional elections affect central decision-making, as in 
integrative federations with a second chamber of territorial representation (Scharpf 
1995). On the other hand, when regional elections are more self-standing, regional 
party  branches  are  more  likely  to  enjoy  a  large  degree  of  autonomy.  A  regional 
elections is more important when its results are not affected and do not affect state-
wide politics,  when the stakes of the election are high (the regions has legislative 
capacity over a large range of competences), and/or when the region benefits from 
strong levels of identification.  
The evidence presented in chapter 4 has shown that Scottish and Welsh elections 
were neither completely second-order elections nor first-order elections. Scottish and 
Welsh  voters  tend  to  vote  on  regional  issues  and  consider  that  their  regional 
institutions should have more influence over the way their region is run. On the other 
hand, voters consider that their regional institutions do not have as much power as 
they  wish  they  did  and  then  consider  the  Westminster  parliament  as  the  most 
influential  institution.  This  lower  intensity  of  the  stakes  of  Scottish  and  Welsh 
elections is reflected by rather low levels of turnout. Turnout levels, as well as the wish 
to see the regional institution become more influential, are higher in Scotland than in 
Wales.  Whereas  Scottish  and  Welsh  elections occur  on the  same  day, there  is  no 
evidence that the horizontal simultaneity has led to a nationalisation of the stakes of 
these elections. Campaigns were run mostly on regional issues, with occasional visits 
from UK party leaders, and a very low level of interest from the UK media. As a 
result,  in  spite  of the  low  turnout,  Scottish  and Welsh  elections  tend to be  quite 
important by themselves and have little impact on national politics. 
This  absence  of  nationalisation  of  regional  elections  and  the  stakes  of  these 
elections  suggest  that  state-wide  political  parties  should  adapt  to  the  regionalised 
structure  of  Britain  and  provide  their  Scottish  and  Welsh  branches  with  rather 
important levels of autonomy. The fact that Scottish elections seem more crucial than 
Welsh elections, as evidenced by higher turnout rates and higher stakes in the election, 
suggests that Scottish party branches should have more autonomy than Welsh party 
branches. As we have already seen, this is only the case in the Conservative party. The 
other two parties have a symmetrical form of organisation. The regionalisation of 
politics has led the state-wide parties to adapt to the new electoral context, albeit in  
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different ways, with the Liberal Democrats the most decentralised party and Labour 
the most centralised.  
In Spain, there is a tendency for parties governing at the state level to fall back in 
autonomous elections. Contrary to the expectations of the second-order thesis (Reif 
and Schmidt 1980), state-level opposition parties do not always benefit from the poor 
results of the governing party, and the share of the vote of non-state-wide parties 
tends to increase in regional elections. There is also a variety of regional party systems: 
party systems that systematically diverge from the state-wide party system (such as the 
Basque Country), autonomous communities where voting patterns are similar in state-
wide  and  regional  elections  (Galicia,  for  instance,  but  also  the  autonomous 
communities  without  ethnoregionalist  parties  such  as  Murcia,  Madrid,  Castile-la 
Mancha, Extremadura), and autonomous communities where voters vote differently in 
state-wide and regional elections (Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, the Canaries) (Pallarés 
1994; Pallarés and Keating 2006). Overall, Catalonia and the Basque Country are the 
regions  where  voting  patterns  tend  to  diverge  the  most  from  state-wide  voting 
patterns. 
As we have already seen, the asymmetry is only visible in the organisation of the 
socialist party in Catalonia. The PP has in contrast kept a strong level of control over 
its Catalan branch in order to make sure that the PPC supported the strategic choices 
of the central party. The Galician branches of both PP and PSOE are not especially 
autonomous, which can be explained by the important level of similarity in patterns of 
voting between regional and state-wide elections. The Basque branches of the PP and 
the PSOE are in fact quite supervised by their respective central organs. This can be 
explained by the issue of terrorism, which affects the whole country and not simply 
the Basque country. The results of elections in this autonomous community, the tone 
of the campaign adopted by the PNV and the level of support for both the PNV and 
the political wing of ETA are important for the state-wide parties and national politics 
because they condition the type of relationship that the central government will have 
with the Basque country. State-wide parties do not want to be seen as too soft on the 
issue of terrorism and what is perceived as extreme Basque nationalism. As a result, 
the stakes of Basque elections exceed the borders of the region, which explain why the 
Basque party branches are not more autonomous.  
Overall, the regional elections studied here are quite self-standing, being neither 
completely second-order nor first-order elections. Spanish regional elections are more 
important for the state-wide parties and for state-wide electoral politics than Scottish 
and Welsh elections. This higher connection between the electoral arenas is reflected 
in the organisation of the parties: the central party is more involved in regional party 
affairs,  be  it  the  selection  of  regional  political  personnel  or  the  development  of 
regional party programmes, in Spain than in the UK. The exception in the UK is the 
Labour party, but the stakes have been higher for this party because of its position as 
incumbent at the central level. The electoral cycle is important only in combination in 
with other factors that facilitate the nationalisation of regional elections, such as the 
influence of regional politics on state-wide politics, as in Spain. On the other hand, the 
horizontal simultaneity of Scottish and Welsh elections has not contributed to the 
nationalisation  of  the  stakes  of  these  elections  because  they  have  not  particularly 
interested  England  and  do  not  affect  the  government  of  the  Union.  As  a  result, 
regional politics are less important for the state-wide parties, which have fewer reasons 
to get involved in regional politics and can afford to give more autonomy to their 





The importance of incumbency 
The multi-level organisation of state-wide parties in Spain and in the UK shows the 
importance of holding government position at the central and/or regional level in the 
relations between the central and regional levels of party organisation. In the UK, the 
party in power at the central level (Labour) has tried to retain as much control as 
possible over the policy orientation of its party branches. Likewise, the federal organs 
of the PSOE had a much tighter grip over their regional branches when the party 
governed Spain than during the opposition period that started in 1996. Between 1989 
and  1996,  the  PP  endeavoured  to  become  a  governing  party  and  focused  on 
maintaining party cohesion. The centralisation of power at the centre was seen as an 
essential  element  of  the  party's  strategy  and  the  goals  of  the  central  party  took 
precedence over those of the regional branches. The same logic applied once the party 
won office in Madrid in 1996.  
Opposition  parties  tend  to  place  less  emphasis  on  party  cohesion  and  can 
actually benefit from adapting their message to specific regional contexts. The media 
tend  to  focus on opposition parties  less  than on  the  party or  coalition  of parties 
governing at the centre. Moreover, if the regional branches of an opposition party 
adopt policies that diverge from the central party line, they only contract policy plans 
and proposals. In contrast, when the regional branches of a governing party diverge 
from the central party, they contradict government policy. As a result, the costs of 
intra-party variations are not as high for opposition parties as for governing parties.  
In addition, parties in opposition at the central level may hold office in some 
regions. This has been the case of the PP between 1989 and 1996, of the PSOE 
between 1996 and 2004 and of the Liberal Democrats since 1999. Holding executive 
office provides regional leaders with some leverage within the party and a level of 
authority that may make them less susceptible to yield to the pressures of the centre. 
Occasionally, they may use these resources to increase their influence at the central 
level.  
This has particularly been the case with PSOE regional leaders  who became 
presidents of autonomous communities, such as Manuel Chávez in Andalusia and José 
Bono  in  Castile-La  Mancha.  The  situation  was  quite  different  in  the  historic 
nationalities, where the PSOE has mainly been in opposition, except for brief periods 
at the creation of the autonomous communities in the Basque Country and Galicia. 
The Basque and Galician federations did not have the same weight in the central party 
as for instance the big Andalusian federation. The Catalan socialists have a special 
status in the party which grants them representation at the centre and autonomy at the 
regional level but they have generally followed the policies of the PSOE when it was 
in  power  in  Madrid.  Incumbency  and  the  personal  prestige  of  Manuel  Fraga  can 
explain why the Galician branch of the PP has managed to adopt a slightly distinct 
profile and adopt more regionalist, or Galicianist (from 'Galeguismo', which the PP 
opposes to nationalism as a way to promote Galicia within the Spanish community), 
policies. 
In the UK, the Scottish and Welsh branches of the parties in opposition in 
London were able to select their leaders and candidates for regional elections and the 
central parties did not play any significant role in the making of election manifestos. In 
spite of these significant levels of autonomous decision-making authority, the regional 
branches nevertheless adopted policy positions that were very close to those of the 
central parties (Fabre et al. 2006).  
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Between 1997 and 2005, the Conservative party has been in a situation of crisis, 
with three different leaders in eight years, and the main concern of the central party 
has  been  to  reorganise  and  develop  new  policies  to  regain  power  in  London.  In 
contrast, the central party has paid relatively scant attention to the electoral situation in 
Scotland and Wales. The Conservative party is very weak in the Celtic fringes and the 
Scottish and Welsh Conservatives could hardly do worse in regional elections than in 
the 1997 state-wide general election, when the Conservative party failed to return a 
single  MP  from  either region.  The  electoral  system  also  facilitated  the  election of 
Conservative candidates to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. As a 
result, the Scottish and Welsh Conservatives performed rather well, even though they 
were never in a position to gain executive office, while the state-wide party lost three 
consecutive general elections.  
In 2003, the Liberal Democrats were in a situation where their Scottish and 
Welsh branches were in coalition with the Labour party, with a possible renewal of 
these coalitions after the elections. The Scottish and Welsh branches therefore had 
some autonomous power resources and a distinct political agenda adapted to their 
government experience. Central party authorities were moreover sympathetic to the 
goals of the regional branches and were supportive of their efforts without trying to 
intervene or encourage uniformity.  
 
Incumbency  seems  to  be  the  most  significant  political-electoral  factor  that 
influences the relations between the central and regional levels of party organisation. 
In particular, holding executive positions at the central level allows state-wide parties 
to  wield  more  influence  over  their  regional  branches  and  prevent  them  from 
interfering in central party affairs. In contrast, when regional branches of a state-wide 
opposition party hold office, they can gain autonomy and even increase their influence 
at  the  centre.  The  presence  of  ethnoregionalist  parties  and  the  strength  of  the 
challenge  they  can  pose  to  state-wide  parties  may  facilitate  party  adaptation  and 
divergence, but the territorial strategy of state-wide parties tends to be conditioned by 
the  electoral  considerations  of  the  central  party,  in  particular  when  it  holds 
governmental power, as evidenced by the cases of the Spanish parties and the Labour 
party.  
 
8.2.3. Party types and regional organisation 
The importance of patters of party formation and the durability of organisational practices 
It is widely accepted that the way political parties were formed tends to constrain their 
options  for  change  (Panebianco  1988;  van  Biezen  2003).  Existing  forms  of  party 
organisation create power structures and organisational habits that can be hard to 
change. It can also be difficult to deprive some groups of people or party sectors of 
powers they exercise in order to empower another group of party actors. As a result, 
change can be complicated and may only happen when the party and its leadership 
feel that organisational inertia could hinder the achievement of party goals.  
The organisation of the state-wide parties in both countries demonstrates the 
importance of the organisation adopted at the moment of party formation and the 
resilience of organisational practices. The Spanish parties are a case in point: their level 
of  centralisation  was  facilitated  by  the  way  they  were  formed  (Field  2004).  The 
transition  process  forced  the  parties  to  rapidly  create  the  structures  necessary  to 
compete in state-wide elections. They started by creating central and provincial levels 
of  organisation.  Their  regional  level  was  created  later,  after  the  central  party  was  
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already  in  control  of  the  whole  party  organisation.  The  parties  were  moreover 
relatively weak organisations on the ground. As a result, the regional levels did not 
represent strong power bases for regional politicians. The central level of state-wide 
parties therefore managed to control the development of the regional branches and 
retain control over regional electoral processes, the selection of leaders and candidates 
and the policy platforms presented by the regional branches.  
The presidentialised structure of the PP, which it inherited from the organisation 
of the Alianza Popular, prevented the later emergence of strong regional leaders able 
to contest the influence of the central party in regional affairs. The presidential nature 
of the organisation of the PP also restricts the role of regional representatives in state-
wide party organs. Likewise, the regional party branches are reluctant to challenge the 
leader or central party policy, as it would undermine the leader's authority and the 
cohesion of the party. One of few exceptions is Manuel Fraga, who created a strong 
leadership in Galicia and was relatively immune from central interventions, partly also 
because  he  knew  which  limits  not  to  cross.  His  case  is  however  relatively 
unrepresentative, as Fraga was the PP's founder and its first leader. The central party 
of the PSOE resisted the increased autonomy of its regional branches but its weakness 
in the 1990s prevented it from controlling closely the regional federations. Once the 
regional branches managed to increase their level of autonomy, it became difficult for 
the central party to deprive them of powers they had once exercised.  
Another sign of the lasting influence of previous organisational forms is the 
asymmetry between the Scottish and Welsh branches of the Conservative party. Until 
1965, the Scottish Conservative party was a completely separate party from the UK 
Conservatives. Even after their integration in the UK party, the Scottish Conservatives 
retained  their  own  organisation  and  the  Scottish  Conservative  Union  (extra-
parliamentary  party)  remained  separate  from the rest  of  the  UK  party.  While  the 
Scottish  party  followed  the  policy  determined  by  the  British  party,  the  Scottish 
Conservatives managed their own organisation and selected their own candidates for 
Westminster elections. No such organisation existed in Wales, which was run from the 
party's London headquarters and did not have a special status within the party.  
The central level of the Labour party has also retained the ability to appoint 
regional members of staff and administrators. For instance, the secretaries-general of 
the  Scottish  and  Welsh  Labour  parties  are  appointed  by  the  National  Executive 
Committee.  This  certainly  facilitates  the  capacity  of  the  central  party  to  influence 
regional  decision-making.  In  addition,  the  party  has  maintained  its  Scottish 
headquarters  in  Glasgow,  which  means  that  the  administrative  and  parliamentary 
branches of the Scottish Labour party are in different cities, making it easier for the 
central party to keep influencing the Scottish party in central office. In addition, the 
organisation of the central party and the influence of the trade unions limit the ability 
of regional party branches to influence the central level. In particular, the organisation 
of the conference and the electoral college for the election of the leader and deputy 
leader  restrict  the  possible  influence  of  Scottish  and  Welsh  constituencies  and 
members.  
Finally, the Liberal Democrats have adopted the federal structure of the Liberal 
party and have granted a high level of autonomy to their regional branches since their 
creation.  The  existence  of  a  level  of  organisation  before  devolution  provided  the 
Scottish and Welsh branches with an experience of self-management but also meant 




Party models and regional organisation 
The form of party organisation and the relative importance of the three faces of party 
organisation can also have an influence on the ability of the regional branches to act 
autonomously  and  influence  central  decision-making.  Chapter  2  presented  some 
tentative links between existing party types and the ability of such parties to grant 
some autonomous decision-making authority to their regional branches. The Spanish 
and British parties clearly have different types of organisation: the Spanish parties are 
closer  to  the  cartel  party model,  while  the  British  parties  have  remained  catch-all 
parties.   
The Spanish parties are formally dominated by the party in central office. The 
autonomy of the parliamentary party of both the PP and the PSOE is restricted by 
party rules. Over the years, the party in central office has strengthened its grip over the 
party in public office (van Biezen 2000: 400-1).  There is however a high level of 
overlap in the composition of the party in public office and the party executive. While 
the PP was  in government in the 1990s, over  80% of the national executive was 
composed of members of the state-wide government or state-wide parliament. During 
the  same  period,  over  a  half  of  the  PSOE  federal  executive  was  composed  of 
members of the Spanish Cortes (van Biezen 2000: 402-3). While the party was in 
power  at  the  central  level,  the  FEC  also  included  members  of  the  Spanish 
government,  such  as  the  secretary-general  and  his  deputy.  In  addition,  the  rule 
preventing  public  office-holders  (except  the  secretary-general  and  the  deputy 
secretary-general)  from  holding  a  seat  in  the  federal  executive  was  bypassed  on  a 
number of occasions, when members of the executive were promoted to government 
positions (Méndez Lago 2000: 130-1). In both parties, the most important positions 
(in the PP the president, the secretary-general and the secretary for organisation; in the 
PSOE  the  secretary-general,  the  deputy  secretary-general  and  the  secretary  for 
organisation) are occupied by members of the Cortes or of the Spanish government. 
By  occupying  a  large  number  of  positions  within  the  central  executive,  the 
parliamentary branches of the Spanish state-wide parties have therefore managed to 
increase  their  power  within  the  existing  rules  of  the  parties,  which  were  initially 
designed to constrain them.  
The parliamentary branches of the three British state-wide parties also dominate 
the  party  organisation.  They  are  able  to  make  their  own  rules  and  are  financially 
independent from the rest of the party thanks to public subsidies directed to the 
parliamentary groups rather than the central party offices. The party in central office is 
moreover dominated by public office-holders or, failing that, members of parliament 
(Webb 1994). Party leaders have also gained a significant level of autonomy from the 
rest of the party. The Conservative party leader has always been quite autonomous 
from the pressures of the rest of the party, as long as he was able to win elections for 
the party. Labour leaders have sometimes been subject to larger levels of scrutiny 
from other party sectors but were often helped by the trade unions, which supported 
them in order to maintain party unity and ensure that the party. Even though he may 
be more subject to the scrutiny of the party conference and other party executive 
commissions,  the  leader  of  the  Liberal  Democrats  can  also  enjoy  a  high  level  of 
autonomy, provided he has the support of the parliamentary party. 
The party on the ground has seen its role change in a majority of parties. PP 
party  members  can  participate  at  the  local  level  and  serve  as  a  pool  of  potential 
candidates, but their direct role in the party is and has remained very limited. In the 
1990s, the PSOE and the PSC started to involve their members more directly in the  
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choice  of  candidates  for  public  office,  such  as  the  candidate  for  election  to  the 
position of Prime minister, president of an autonomous community or a local office. 
This trend of membership empowerment has been stronger in the UK, where party 
members are consulted for the selection of parliamentary candidates and party leaders, 
and, occasionally, to settle intra-party issues (like  the membership ballots over the 
issue of changing Clause IV of the Labour party constitution in 1994, see Shaw 1996: 
199-200, or over William Hague's re-organisation of the Conservative party in 1997).  
There is a well-documented paradox to membership empowerment: membership 
ballots encourage an atomistic conception of party members as opposed to organised 
membership  in  local  party  sections.  Membership  ballots  marginalise  meso-level 
activists, who are supposed to be more extreme and active, and the leadership can 
address directly party members and have a better control over the type of information 
that party members have access to (Seyd 1999; Mair 1997: 113-4). As a result, the party 
leadership becomes more autonomous within the party organisation because it can 
claim a mandate from the membership and has weakened the power of party activists 
in the process.  
The type of resources that the Spanish and British parties rely on clearly places 
them in different party types. The Spanish parties receive large amounts of public 
subsidies  that  constitute  the  quasi-totality  of  their  resources.  In  contrast,  British 
political  parties  receive  limited  amounts  of  public  funding,  relying  instead  on 
donations and, to a lesser extent, membership fees. In the case of the Labour party, 
ancillary organisations such as trade unions still contribute to an important share of 
the party's resources.  
In spite of their closeness to the cartel-party model, the Spanish parties have not 
adopted  a  stratarchical  form  of  organisation.  Mair  (1994:  17) wrote  that  in  cartel 
parties 'it may also be the case that mutual autonomy will develop to a degree in which 
the  local  party  will  become  essentially  unconcerned  about  any  real  input  into the 
national party (and vice versa), and will devote itself primarily to politics at the local 
level'. The Spanish parties demonstrate that upper party echelons remain very much 
concerned with regional party affairs and that the regional branches are also concerned 
with central party affairs.  
The catch-all model did not take into account the vertical dimension of party 
organisation. The cases of the three British state-wide parties show a great deal of 
variety in the parties' ability and willingness to include their regional branches at the 
centre and give them autonomy at the regional level. Overall, party models do not 
wield much explanatory value.  
 
Party organisation, ideology and position on devolution 
The form of territorial organisation and the degree to which each party does (or does 
not) control its regional party branches can also be related to each party's stand on 
devolution and decentralisation. A party's position on decentralisation or its vision of 
the ideal form of state organisation may have an impact on the organisation itself. The 
party's position on this issue itself can be traced back to the ideological roots and 
history, and its organisation is expected to be decentralised when it is  strongly in 
favour of decentralisation. Conversely, parties opposed to, or moderately in favour of, 
decentralisation are expected to be less decentralised. It is however rather difficult to 
'label' the parties, as they may have been subject to different ideological influences 
throughout their history. There may also be differences between the official label or 
party family of a party and its policies once it is in power.   
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The  Liberal  Democrats  are  in  favour  of  a  federal  United  Kingdom.  While 
remaining attached to the Union, they are in favour of granting more autonomy to all 
the  constituent parts of  the  UK,  including  the  English  regions.  The  fact  that the 
Liberal  Democrats  are  in  favour  of  decentralisation  and  even  federalism  is  a 
consequence  of  the  Liberal  creed.  The  historical  circumstances  of  the  birth  of 
liberalism in the UK engrained in the Liberal movement a strong distrust of power 
and a preference for decentralisation. They therefore believe that power should be 
dispersed throughout society, in particular at the regional level, via some decentralised 
or federal arrangement.  
As  an  organisation,  the  Liberal  Democrats  have  a  'federal'  structure,  and  its 
component parts are exclusively responsible over such areas as policy formulation for 
matters  relevant  to  their  level  and  candidate  selection.  Moreover,  the  party 
constitution bases its organisation on a hypothetical federal organisation of the state. 
Its article 5.1 declares that the 'Federal Party shall determine the policy of the Party in 
those areas which light reasonably be expected to fall within the remit of the federal 
institutions  in the  context  of  a  federal  United  Kingdom'.  The organisation of  the 
Liberal Democrats is actually a good indicator of the organisation the party aspires to 
for the UK.  
In comparison, Labour is in favour of devolution but is also strongly attached to 
the Union. In particular, Labour saw devolution as a way to save the Union in the face 
of  growing  electoral  support  for  the  Scottish  National  Party  and  Plaid  Cymru. 
Unionism  is  therefore  very  important  in  the  Labour  Party.  Even  in  Scotland, 
devolution did not make the unanimity among party members and MPs. Moreover, 
the party's motives for first advocating and then implementing devolution in Scotland 
and Wales are complex. On the one hand, devolution has a long tradition in the party, 
with its founder Keir Hardie advocating Home Rule, James Callaghan's government 
organising the first referendums on the issue in Scotland and Wales in 1979, and John 
Smith (Blair's predecessor) involving the party in the Constitutional Convention on 
devolution along with the Liberal Democrats and representatives of civil society. On 
the other hand, New Labour has developed its own discourse on the history and 
beliefs of the party without much deference to tradition. There may therefore be other 
factors that can explain the party's commitment to devolution. Part of the explanation 
may come from the liberal influence on the party in its early days and another on the 
party's participation in the constitutional convention. In addition, the devolution of 
power to Scotland and Wales can be seen as an opportunistic strategy. Scotland and 
Wales  are  (for  now)  Labour  strongholds,  and  during  the  long  Thatcher-Major 
premiership period, both nations have consistently given the majority of their votes to 
the Labour party. Devolution is therefore a way to make sure that the party has some 
resources and a power base when it out of power in at the UK level.  
In organisational terms, Labour considers itself as a unified party and interviews 
have  shown  that  it  rejects  the  idea  that  its  Scottish  and  Welsh  branches  are 
independent  entities.  In  the  same  way,  the  regional  branches  tend  to  consider 
themselves as parts of a larger whole. Moreover, while the Scottish and Welsh parties 
have on paper a rather large level of autonomy over the management of regional 
issues, attempts by the central party to intervene in Scottish or Welsh affairs are now 
well  documented.  Finally,  the  state-wide  party  is  very  much  in  charge  of  the 
management  of  British  electoral  politics  (policy-making  process  and  candidate 
selection), and the regional branches do not have any influence over these matters. 
The Conservative party also defines itself as a unionist party and it campaigned 
against  devolution  in  Scotland  and  Wales.  The  party  has  however  adapted to  the  
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situation and now accepts the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for 
Wales. However, it rejects devolution in England and is divided over the issue of 
changes  to  the  devolution  settlements.    The  state-wide  party  is  not  particularly 
concerned by the issue but tends to reject any change to the situation. In Scotland and 
Wales,  some  Conservatives  think  however  that  some  adaptations  are  necessary: 
alignment  of  the  competences  of  the  Welsh  Assembly  to  those  of  the  Scottish 
Parliament, financial powers to the Scottish and Welsh institutions so that regional 
governments would be responsible for the money they spend. The party has now 
chosen to focus its criticisms against the Scottish and Welsh governments rather than 
on devolution itself.  
After  its  1997  defeat  in  the  UK  general  elections,  the  Conservative  party 
underwent a process of reorganisation, which led to William Hague's Fresh Future and 
the reform of the party structure. The party's new organisation took devolution into 
account, thereby leaving the Scottish and Welsh parties a large room for manoeuvre to 
select their candidates and elaborate their policies. The extent of the autonomy of the 
Scottish  and  Welsh  Conservatives  can  however  depend on  the  will  of  the  British 
leader to let them exercise their prerogatives. As a result of this reorganisation of the 
party and in a context in which the central party focused on rebuilding its state-wide 
appeal,  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  Conservatives  have  until  now  enjoyed  a  rather 
considerable level of autonomy. 
In Spain, the PSOE was in favour of a federal organisation for Spain at the 
moment of the democratic transition, but it had to compromise with the country's 
other  political  forces  in  order  to  reach  an  agreement  over  the  new  Spanish 
constitution. The party supported the development of the statutes of autonomy and is 
today  open  to  discussions  on  the  reform  of  some  of  them.  However,  the  party 
remains committed to the territorial integrity of the country, rejects separatism, and is 
eager to see all the autonomous communities have similar – albeit not identical – 
powers rather than have some regions with a special treatment and more powers than 
others.  
This duality is also visible in the organisation of the party. Nominally, the PSOE 
has a federal structure. In practice, as we have seen, the party is more centralised and 
the central party still intervenes in regional affairs. With the exception of the Partit des 
Socialistes  de  Catalunya  (PSC-PSOE), the  PSOE has  a  symmetrical  structure  and  its 
regional federations have the same powers and are controlled by the central party in 
similar ways. 
Finally, the Partido Popular has now accepted the State of the Autonomies. Heir 
to the Franco regime, which rejected regional autonomy and repressed expressions of 
regional identity, the PP wants to maintain the institutional status quo established at 
the moment of the democratic transition. The party is very careful to stress that any 
further change in the statutes of autonomy should not undermine the existence and 
integrity of the country and places a particular emphasis on the Basque situation. As a 
result, the party has been very much opposed to reforming the statutes of autonomy 
and keeps a close eye on Zapatero's plans to reform some statutes of autonomy. The 
organisation of the PP is very centralised. The autonomous community level exists for 
practical  reasons  and  the  regional  branches  have  some  competences  for  regional 
elections. The regional party branches are subject to a strong level of central oversight 
and their decisions must be approved by central party organs.  
Overall, we find that party ideology is a rather good predictor of the vertical 
organisation  of  state-wide  parties.  The  most  pro-devolution  party  (the  Liberal  
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Democrats) is the most decentralised, and the party that is the least favourable to 
decentralisation (the PP) is the most centralised.  
 
Party finance and the distribution of resources across levels in state-wide parties 
Modes of party funding and the way public subsidies are distributed can affect the 
level of financial autonomy of the regional branches of state-wide parties. If state-wide 
elections remain the core level of electoral activity, private donations are likely to go 
directly to the central party and regional party branches may find it difficult to find 
resources from private donors. The level of allocation of party subsidies can also 
influence the degree of centralisation of state-wide parties.  
In  the  UK,  where  state  funding  is  relatively limited  and  is  quasi-exclusively 
directed to parliamentary groups, central and regional party offices must find private 
resources for their ordinary and campaign activities. Donations to the three British 
state-wide parties are mainly directed to central offices or local party organisations to 
support  constituency  campaign  efforts.  In  contrast,  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  party 
branches receive very limited amounts of donations. Instead, they rely more heavily on 
public  funding.  Public  subsidies  are  however  limited  to  the  funding  of  the 
parliamentary groups in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Regional 
party offices are therefore rather under-funded and depend on the central party for 
assistance and staff.  
The  regional  branches  of  the  Spanish  state-wide  parties  are  rather  more 
financially autonomous thanks to generous amounts of public subsidies for ordinary 
and campaign activities at the regional level. Provided by the regional governments 
and regional assemblies, these subsidies support both regional parliamentary groups 
and regional party offices. While the British legislation prevents central offices from 
using subsidies granted to parliamentary groups, the Spanish parties divert part of the 
funding given to parliamentary groups to fund their ordinary party activities. This 
takes place at both central and regional levels. Transfers from elected officials to party 
offices  also  occur  via  compulsory  contributions  by  members  of  parliament  and 
regional assemblies to the parties. The central parties of the PP and the PSOE have 
tried to control those important resources received at the regional level. The PP has 
been more successful than the PSOE in controlling the allocation and use of the 
resources of its regional branches.  
This relative financial autonomy of the regional branches of the Spanish parties 
has not, however, provided them with higher levels of independence. On the contrary, 
on average, the Spanish parties are more centralised than the British parties. The level 




Overall, most of the parties have a regionalised form of organisation, with some level 
of  regional  autonomy  and  a  degree  of  interconnection  between  the  central  and 
regional levels of organisation. This interconnection means that we do not find any 
form of stratarchical organisation, as the regional branches are represented in central 
decision-making  and  central  party  organs  keep  some  oversight  over  or  ability  to 
intervene in regional party affairs. The Liberal Democrats are the only party that can 
be described as having a federal form of organisation, as its regional branches are free 
to select their candidates and leaders and to develop their own policy platforms.   
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The  British  state-wide  parties  are  characterised  by  low  (Labour  and  the 
Conservatives) to moderate (for the Liberal Democrats) levels of integration of their 
Scottish and Welsh branches in central decision-making and moderate to high levels 
of  autonomy  of  their  regional  branches.  The  British  parties  tend  to  be  more 
decentralised than the Spanish parties and they gave some level of autonomy to their 
regional branches faster than the Spanish parties.  
The  regional  branches of  the  Spanish  parties  have  a  limited  input  in  central 
decision-making and low (PP) to moderate (PSOE) levels of autonomy. The PSC is an 
outlier in the PSOE, with a larger level of autonomy from the federal party than any 
of the PSOE regional branches. While the PP and PSOE originally had similar levels 
of centralisation, the current level of autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE 
is closer to that of the British parties than to that of the Partido Popular. 
The low level of integration of the regional party branches in central decision-
making reflects a willingness of central party leaderships to retain their autonomy and 
be unconstrained by regional leaders but also a dominance of functional rather than 
territorial criteria in the composition of central decision-making organs. In the UK, 
the  representation  and  participation  of  Scottish  and  Welsh  leaders  is  further 
complicated by the demographic dominance of England, the absence of devolution in 
England and what has become known as 'the West Lothian question', that is, the 
participation of Scottish and Welsh MPs in decisions that affect the government of 
England while the English cannot affect decisions in Scotland and Wales. 
All the parties have had to react and adapt their organisation to the creation of 
multi-level institutions and the emergence of a regional level of politics. The detailed 
hypotheses on the role of the type and scope of decentralisation were not confirmed. 
Regionalism and decentralisation have an impact of party organisation in the sense 
that they forced the state-wide parties to adopt a multi-level organisation. Electoral 
considerations and the incumbency status of the central and regional party levels play 
an important role in the way state-wide parties have responded to the development of 
regional institutions. Electoral factors (electoral system, electoral cycle, nationalisation 
of regional elections, strength of regionalism and ethnoregionalist parties) work better 
in combination than individually to explain party change. It is when they contribute 
together towards either the nationalisation or the denationalisation of voting patterns 
and electoral stakes that electoral factors influence the vertical organisation of state-
wide political parties.  
Patterns of party formation and the type of organisation that the parties had at 
the  moment  of  devolution  affect  the  ability  of  the  parties  to  adapt  to  the 
regionalisation  of  institutions  and elections.  Party  ideology  and  party  positions on 
regionalisation  are  often mirrored  in  the  organisation  of the  parties.  Finally,  party 
leaders  at  both  levels,  in  particular  incumbent  leaders)  are  crucial  factors  that 
contribute towards an explanation of the way parties respond to the challenges of 
regionalisation and to the level of centralisation or regional autonomy. Indeed, it is 
through the actions of party leaders that party organisations change or on the contrary 
that organisational forms are maintained while environmental factors change. On the 
one hand, central aprty leaders seem to prefer to maintain a certain level of control 
over lower party echelons in order to ensure the ideological coherence of the party. 
On the other, regional party leaders, in paticular when they are in office or when the 
regional party system differs from the stte-wide party system, prefer a certain level of 
autonomous decision-making. The outocme of thsi power struggle is the main trigger 






CONCLUSION: PATTERNS OF PARTY 






This dissertation has investigated an oft-overlooked aspect of party organisation: the 
vertical  dimension  of  party  organisation  in  multi-level  countries,  that  is,  the 
relationship  between  central  and  regional  levels  of  organisation.  It  has  tried  to 
elaborate  a  general  framework  of  analysis,  bringing  together  elements  from  the 
tradition  of  comparative  federalism  and  elements  from  the  literature  on  party 
organisation. To compensate for the rather deterministic expectations of the federalist 
literature, they were integrated into a larger framework of party change that took into 
account the influence of environmental and institutional settings, of the structure of 
electoral competition and intra-party factors. Finally, the ability of political parties to 
change and adapt to changes in their environment was expected to be mediated by the 
pattern of party formation and the natural reluctance of political parties and their 
leaders to change. All these factors were described in order to assess their impact of 
party organisation and party change.  
To  test  this  framework  and  research  how  parties  changed  to  accommodate 
multi-level settings, the organisation of state-wide political parties in Spain and in the 
UK was compared. Ten party processes were described in order to evaluate the level 
of participation of regional party branches in central decision-making and the level of 
autonomy of the regional branches in the management of regional affairs. The in-
depth nature of this analysis of party organisation meant that only a limited number of 
cases could be studied. Whereas it is possible to extrapolate from the cases of the 
Galician, Catalan and Basque party branches to the whole of Spain, it is difficult to 
extrapolate to other countries from only two countries. 
This  dissertation  has  however  demonstrated  a  number  of  points:  party 
decentralisation is not something that comes naturally to most state-wide parties and 
the  decentralisation  of  power  to  regional  governments  has  led  to  a  variety  of 
organisation  responses  from  the  parties;  the  integration  of  territorial interests  in 
central decision-making can be a problematic issue, as functional cleavages remain 
dominant; and party change is a complex phenomenon in which a variety of factors 
play a role. 
 
The difficulty of party decentralisation 
The cases presented here show that a majority of state-wide parties have had some 
troubles with the consequences of devolution. The main issue has been the level of 
autonomy that the parties should give to their regional branches and whether central 
party leaderships should leave the regional branches free to make their own decisions. 
A former senior official of the Labour party, Matthew Taylor, explained this dilemma 
in these terms: 
'Ever since referenda in 1997 made devolution to Scotland and Wales a 
reality the Labour Party has studiously avoided the central question it  
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raises: should a political party devolve as much autonomy to its members 
in  Scotland  and  Wales  as  Westminster  has  done  to  the  Scottish  and 
Welsh people?' (quoted in Laffin and Shaw 2007: 55). 
All the British and Spanish state-wide parties have had to deal with this issue. 
The  Spanish  parties  have  had  more  time  to  face  the  problem  and  have  more 
experience of institutional decentralisation and the potential problems it can cause for 
integrated parties: internal divisions, policy divergence, coalition incongruence, etc. 
Interviews have demonstrated that granting high levels of autonomy is considered by 
most  parties  as  a  source  of  possible  policy  divergence  between  levels  and  across 
regions, and therefore as a threat to party cohesion. The comparison has also shown 
that different forms of organisation could be found within the same political system.  
The study has shown, however, that the state-wide parties have adopted different 
organisational strategies. The Spanish parties have kept a rather tight grip on their 
regional branches, as they both require that the central party approves the lists of 
candidates and the manifestos for the regional elections. Still, the regional branches of 
the PSOE enjoy more real autonomy than those of the PP, even though their level of 
autonomy is often dependent on the position of the central party in power or in 
opposition.  The  regional  branches that  have  gained  the  most  autonomy  are often 
those with long-standing social-democratic presidents of autonomous communities, 
whose personal prestige and political clout at the regional level free them, at least 
partially, from central pressures.   
 Within the PP, the presence of strong regional 'barons' is a more important 
factor than the institutional autonomy of the region, even though they may coincide, 
as in Galicia (Hopkin 2003: 233). The central party however has the upper hand over 
regional party affairs. Regional party branches can adapt the party's massage to the 
regional context, but it is more a matter of emphasis than content. Party cohesion and 
the  interests  of the  central  party  always  prevail,  and  regional  party branches  have 
integrated this in their strategies and relationships with the centre.  
In  contrast,  the  Liberal  Democrats  have  had  a  very  smooth  adaptation  to 
devolution. Their statutes already contained the principles of federalism and the party 
had no problem leaving its regional branches select their leaders and candidates and 
make  their  own  party  manifestos  for  Scottish  and  Welsh  elections.  The  Liberal 
Democrats  are  the  party  that  comes  closest  to  the  stratarchical  model  of  party 
organisation: the central party focuses mainly on state-wide politics and the regional 
branches on regional politics. Each level could work quasi-independently from the 
others.  
The Conservative party has also left its Scottish and Welsh branches rather free 
to adapt to the new devolved reality of British politics. The Scottish party is however 
more  developed  and  independent  than  the  Welsh  party,  which  was  only  recently 
created and is organisationally closer and more dependent on the central party. The 
central party has focused on state-wide politics since the Conservative party lost the 
1997 general elections. For the Conservative party, the conquest of power starts in 
England, which is crucial because of its demographic weight and the number of MPs 
it elects, but also because England, and in particular southern and rural England, is the 
party's  stronghold.  Scotland  and  Wales  are  regions  where  the  Conservatives  have 
come in second or third position for a long period of time. As a result, Scottish and 
Welsh politics have not been a major concern for the state-wide party. 
The case of the Labour party is well known and is the best documented because 
the  party  has  been  in  power  in  central  government  since  1997  and  has  found  it  
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difficult  to  leave  its  regional  branches  autonomous.  The  Labour  party  has  also 
governed Scotland in coalition with the Liberal Democrats between 1999 and 2007 
and Wales also with the Liberal Democrats between 2000 and 2007 and with Plaid 
Cymru since 2007. The interventions of the central party in regional party affairs often 
made the state-wide party appear hypocritical, as it was Labour that implemented the 
devolution  reforms  in  Scotland  and  Wales.  After  the  party  suffered  from  internal 
disputes in the 1990s to such an extent that it lost four consecutive general elections, 
the party underwent organisational reforms that contributed to increasing the power 
of  the  central  party  leadership.  The  leadership  was  unwilling  to  see  this  situation 
change once it returned into power in 1997. The fact that Labour was expected to win 
the elections in Scotland and Wales represented an additional incentive for the state-
wide party to make sure that Scottish and Welsh party elites would adopt the same 
policies as the central government.  
The adaptation to devolution has often been met with some reluctance because 
parties tend to fear the effects of party decentralisation on party cohesion. Evidence 
shows  however  that  intra-party  decentralisation  does  not  always  lead  to  increased 
intra-party  divergence.  For  instance,  the  cases  of  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  the 
Conservative party show that while the regional branches are able to make their own 
election programmes for Scottish and Welsh elections and adapt the state-wide party's 
policy to the regional context, divergence has been very limited. On the contrary, 
interviews have shown that there is a strong sense of loyalty to the state-wide party, 
which is reflected in a high level of policy convergence with the central party line. The 
Scottish and Welsh party branches adapt party policy to the regional necessities of 
their region but abide by the same principles and political beliefs as the central party. 
The parties with government experience at the central level (Labour, the PSOE and 
PP) have been more reluctant to risk intra-party policy divergence, as they fear that 
they could be accused of having different messages in different parts of the country. 
In Spain the PP has often used this argument against the PSOE, emphasising instead 
the fact that it was a unified party with the same message across the country.  
 
Problems with the integration of territorial interests in state-wide decision-making 
Overall,  it  appears  that  the  adaptation  of  the  state-wide  parties  to  the  multi-level 
context is more important with respect to regional autonomy than for the integration 
of the regional branches in central decision-making. The Liberal Democrats are the 
party that allows the largest degree of involvement of its regional branches in central 
party organs  and  decision-making  processes.  It  remains,  however,  that  the  central 
(federal) party is much more concerned with English affairs, as there is no devolution 
there and England represents over 80% of the electorate. In addition, as devolution 
became a more ordinary feature of political life and devolved institutions started to 
function properly, Scottish and Welsh party branches started to become less interested 
in state-wide politics. As a result, party conferences have seen the number of delegates 
from Scotland and Wales decrease. 
The same phenomenon was observed in the Labour and Conservatives parties. 
Their  Scottish  and  Welsh  branches  have  a  very  limited  input  in  central  decision-
making.  In  the  Labour  party,  regional  party  branches  do  not  have  any  special 
representation in the executive committee nor are they involved in candidate selection 
for state-wide elections. Their role in policy-making is moreover marginal. The party, 
in power at the central level, has also concentrated power at the centre since the mid-
1990s. As a result, the central party has focused on increasing party cohesion and  
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placed  the  interest  of  the  central,  state-wide  party  above  those  of  the  regional 
branches.  
The situation of the Conservatives is rather particular. The party is officially a 
unionist  party.  In  practice,  its  representation  in  Westminster  is  quasi-exclusively 
English. In 1997, the party did not return any MP from either Scotland or Wales; in 
2001 it only returned 1 Scottish MP and failed to win a single seat in Wales; and it won 
one seat in Scotland and three in Wales in 2005. Compared to 165, 166 and finally 194 
English MPs, this means that the Conservative party in Westminster is an English 
party. This English predominance is reflected in the party's discourse on the union. 
Since  1999,  it  has  raised  the  issue  of  the  'West  Lothian  question',  that  is,  the 
participation of Scottish MPs in central decision-making over issues that are devolved 
in Scotland, on many occasions. In a way, it has become the spokesperson of English 
nationalism in the aftermath of devolution in Scotland and Wales.  
The Spanish parties also display limited levels of integration of their regional 
branches in central decision-making. In both PP and PSOE regional party branches 
are  somehow  involved  in  central  party  organs  and  processes,  with  a  number  of 
representatives  in  party  conferences  and  executive  commissions.  However,  their 
impact is limited either because of their small number or by the dominance of the 
party leadership. In the PP, the integration of regional branches in central party organs 
serves mainly as a means for the central party to control its peripheries.  
The participation of regional branches (federations) in the PSOE was originally 
rather limited, mainly because the pair Felipe González-Alfonso Guerra kept a tight 
grip on the party organisation and because strong regional leaders had yet to emerge in 
the early days of the democratic, decentralised system. Regional leaders were however 
called to play an important role within the central party in the mid-1990s, when the 
central party was weakened by internal divisions, and they played the role of a referee 
between the factions of the central party. However, once the disputes were settled and 
a  new  leader  was  elected  in  2000,  the  role  of  the  regional  leaders  at  the  centre 
decreased. The creation of the Territorial Council provided regional party leaders and 
socialist presidents of autonomous communities with an arena where they can discuss 
the party's institutional policy. At the same time, the state-wide leadership used this 
institution as a justification to limit the number of regional representatives in the much 
more powerful central executive.  
Overall, this lack of effective integration of regional representatives in central 
party decision-making leaves state-wide leaders relatively free to determine state-wide 
party policies, which influence regional policies to a great extent. In addition, state-
wide politicians and party leaders often try to impose these policies on the regional 
branches in order to maintain party cohesion. In Spain, the interests of the state-wide 
party often prevail over territorial interests in the choice of party policy. In the UK, 
the difference in size between England on the one hand, and Scotland and Wales on 
the other, and the absence of devolution in England strengthens the English bias of 
the central organs of the British state-wide parties. 
Even  when  there  is  a  certain  level  of  representation  of  regional  branches, 
territorial interests are rarely channelled to the central level in an efficient way. In both 
countries, the institutional system is rather deficient in terms of integrating regional 
interests in central decision-making. Intergovernmental relations are under-developed 
in the UK, but formal institutions such as the Joint Ministerial Committee are more 
rituals  than  real  forums  where  policy  is  discussed,  and  legal  disputes  over  the 
allocation of competences and resources have been very scarce (Trench 2004: 175-6). 
Political convergence between the governments at the centre and in Scotland and  
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Wales has allowed inter-governmental relations to take a rather informal style in which 
leaders of the same party discuss topics and discuss contentious issues. The state-wide 
parties, and Labour in particular, are not actually organised to deal systematically with 
territorial issues. The party has instead relied on informal networks and discussion.  
In Spain, intergovernmental relations also suffer from a lack of regularity and 
regional representatives only form a minority of Senators. The issue of competence 
attribution has led to a higher number of conflicts, in particular when the systems was 
being set in place in the 1980s (Aja 2003: 155), while intergovernmental meetings are 
irregular and autonomous communities sometimes prefer direct bilateral relations with 
the central government to multi-lateral discussions.  Like in the UK, the Spanish state-
wide parties are not organised to compensate for the lack of participation of regional 
governments or representatives in central decision-making. 
In  both  countries,  this  lack  of  effective  representation  of  territorial  interests 
either  within  the  institutions  of  government  or  within  state-wide  parties  can  be 
counterproductive  for  the  state-wide parties.  Spain  and  the  UK  are  two  countries 
where  territorial  issues  have  become  very  important  over  the  last  30  to  40  years. 
Ethnoregionalist  or  minority  nationalist  parties  have  seen  their  share  of  the  vote 
increase, and they have become significant players at the regional level, occasionally 
even replacing state-wide parties as first parties at the regional level. Ignoring territorial 
interests can therefore be dangerous for state-wide parties, as this strengthens the 
argument  of  ethnoregionalist  parties  according  to  which  they  are  the  only  true 
representatives of regional interests.  
 
The complexity of party change and the importance of party factors and agency 
This  dissertation  has  examined  the  multi-level  organisation  of  state-wide  political 
parties in Spain and in the UK up to 2005. This study started with one contention: 
that  the  literature  on  federalism  was  certainly  overestimating  the  influence  of 
institutional  factors  and  of  federalism  in  particular  on the  vertical  organisation  of 
state-wide political parties. In order to evaluate the influence of a larger range of 
factors, the framework was relatively agnostic with regard to which factors should 
wield the most influence on the way parties organise and on the way they change. The 
framework nevertheless believed that the institutional bias common in the literature 
on  federalism  failed  to  grasp  the  complex  nature  of  party  organisations  and  the 
multiple factors that contribute to party change.  
The study has shown that the decentralisation of power to regional units of 
government  and  the  development  of  regional  political  arenas  with  strong 
ethnoregionalist parties forced state-wide parties to adapt their organisation. Different 
types of responses can however be observed. Some parties, and the Liberal Democrats 
are the best example of this organisational strategy, have decentralised party structures 
and given relatively large levels of organisational and decisional autonomy to their 
regional branches. Others have preferred to maintain party cohesion through central 
party oversight or control of the regional branches, emphasising the advantages of a 
unified party with a coherent message throughout the country. This is the case of the 
Spanish Partido Popular but also of the British Labour party. 
Environmental factors (institutional factors such as the regionalisation of the 
state and the institutional asymmetry, but also electoral factors such as the electoral 
rules and the voting patterns in state-wide and regional elections) seem to have an 
effect when they all go in the same direction rather than individually. For instance, 
they appear to have a larger impact on the parties when the regions enjoy a large  
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degree  of  autonomy,  when  regional  voting  patterns  differ  from  state-wide  voting 
patterns and when state-wide and regional election have their own, separate stakes. 
This combination of factor is likely to have a greater impact on party organisation and 
facilitate the devolution of power to the regional branches. However, the fact that the 
political parties of a same country can display different forms of organisation shows 
that the parties themselves play a role in processes of organisational adaptation.  
The  type  of  organisational  response  to  the  challenges  posed  by  institutional 
regionalisation  and  regional  party  politics  depends  on  the  parties  themselves:  the 
historical  conditions  of  their  formation,  their  ideology  and  their  perception  of 
decentralisation,  and  internal  party  relations.  The  cases  studied  here  provide 
compelling examples of the importance of party formation and the context of party 
institutionalisation.  The  parties  in  both  countries  still  display  organisational 
characteristics that reflect the historical circumstances of their birth and prove the 
lasting effects of early forms of organisation: the organisation of the party conference 
and the role of trade unions in the Labour party, the separate status of the Scottish 
Conservatives, the leadership-driven birth of the Partido Popular.  
This dissertation has shown that political parties were more than simple elements 
of the institutional framework. In the first place, they are actors that can shape the 
institutional system by their own actions. They are also complex organisations shaped 
by their own history, their members and the balance of power between the various 
groups and interests that compose them. More particularly, it has shown that party 
organisations, and especially party leaders at the central level, filtered the effects of 
changes in the environment to make sure that their positions remained secure and that 
the achievement of the party goals remained possible. Political parties and their leaders 
were expected to be adverse to change, preferring instead to maintain existing power 
structures to unknown organisational practices. Party change was therefore expected 
to occur when the central leadership accepted the need for change, either under the 
pressure of other party sectors or in order to attain party goals, or has to change the 
organisation in order to maintain the party's ability achieve its goals or to maintain the 
stability of the party.  
The empirical research has shown that unless the party culture was compatible 
with decentralisation of power, which is the case of the Liberal Democrats, party 
leaders  were  rather  reluctant  to  change  their  organisation  and  decentralise  power 
internally when the state becomes decentralised. Central party leaders tend to try and 
limit  the  possibilities  of  party  decentralisation  and  empowerment  of  the  regional 
branches.  However,  the  development  of  regional  political  arenas  has  led  to  the 
constitution  of  regional  elites,  which  have  proved  instrumental  to  the  success  of 
processes of organisational change. In this respect, incumbency plays a crucial role in 
the relationships between the levels, as holding office provides party leaders at either 
level  with  important  resources  that  they  can  use  inside  the  party  to  further  their 
interests and those of their organisational level.  
It has indeed been easier for national party leaders to keep a tight rein on the 
regional  party  branches  when  they  were  in  power.  When  the  party  is  in  power 
nationally, the incentive to maintain a level of central control is higher, as the central 
leadership  does  not  want  to  see  its  policies  contradicted  by  the  party’s  regional 
branches. The cases of the Labour party and the PSOE show that when the party is in 
power it is better able limit the autonomy of its regional branches. The PSOE is also 
demonstrates that when the central party is in the opposition the regional leaders, 
especially  those  who  hold  executive  power,  attempt  to  (and  often  succeed  in) 
increasing  their  level  of  autonomy.  Overall,  the  effects  of  incumbency  on  the  
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relationships between central and regional levels  of party organisation expected in 
table 2.3 (p. 51) were verified. The British Liberals and Conservatives also show that 
when a state-wide party is in the opposition centrally, its regional branches can be 
quite autonomous, even though they may not always use this autonomy to adopt a 
different strategy to that of the central party. 
 
The approach used throughout the dissertation and the choice of independent 
variables and indicators were intended to provide conclusions that assured a high level 
of internal validity to the results. The framework also provides a template for the 
study of other state-wide political parties in other countries. This framework, but also 
approaches  that  focus  on  leadership  behaviour  such  as  that  of  van  Houten 
(forthcoming), as we have seen the importance of agency and leadership impulse in 
processes of party change, can help further our understanding of multi-level party 
organisation. A larger number of cases, such as for instance Italy, Germany, Austria or 
Canada, may be necessary to wield firmer conclusions about the causal links between 
independent  variables  and  between  the  independent  variables  and  the  dependent 
variable. In this case, other in-depth studies would be necessary, as the data is not 
always available and many aspects of party organisation are to be taken into account. 
The dissertation has shown that combining historical and institutional perspectives 
with a model that includes room for agency can improve our understanding of how 






APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS  
Conservative Party     
Scott Kelly  07/02/2005, 
London 
Member of the Conservative Party 
Policy Unit 
Raymond Monbiot  09/02/2005, 
London 
Member of the Board, of the Finance 
Committee, Chairman of the 
National Convention 
David McLetchie  26/01/2005, 
Edinburgh 
Member of the Scottish Parliament 
(MSP), leader of the Scottish 
Conservative Party 1999-2005, MSP 
Margaret Goodman  09/06/2005, 
Edinburgh 
Deputy leader of the Scottish 
Conservative Party and member of 
the Board 2001-2005 
Paul Valerio  31/01/2005, 
Cardiff 
Chairman of the Assembly 
Candidates Panel 
David Melding  30/06/2005, 
Cardiff 
Member of the Welsh Assembly 
(AM) 
     
Labour Party     
Iain Luke  08/02/2005, 
London 
MP (Scottish constituency) 
Rosemary McKenna  09/02/2005, 
London 
MP (Scottish constituency), member 
of the Scottish Executive Committee, 
responsible for the Scottish candidate 
selection panel in 1999 
Bristow Muldoon  25/01/2005, 
Edinburgh 
MSP, chairman of the Scottish Policy 
Forum 
Steven Lawther  10/06/2005, 
Edinburgh 
Scottish Labour polling co-ordinator,  
Stuart Clark  28/01/2005, 
Edinburgh 
Treasurer of the Scottish Labour 
Party, member of the Scottish 
Executive Committee, party 
organiser of 1999 campaign 
Michael Penn  01/02/2005, 
Cardiff 
Head of office for the Labour group 
in the National Assembly for Wales, 
Welsh Labour party 
Chris Roberts  01/02/2005, 
Cardiff 
Organiser of the Welsh Labour Party 
     
Liberal Democrats     
Matthew Taylor  08/02/2005, 
London 
MP, campaign manager in the 1997 
election  
Roger Williams  09/02/2005, 
London 
MP (Welsh constituency) 
Jeremy Hargreaves  10/02/2005, 
London 
Member of the Federal Policy 
Committee and Federal Conference 
Committee, candidate in 2001 
elections 
Robert Brown  25/01/2005,  MSP, member of the Scottish  
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Edinburgh  Executive Committee and Scottish 
Policy Committee 
Douglas Herbison  12/12/2004, 
Brussels 
Treasurer of the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, candidate in 2005 
Scottish election 
Derek Barrie  26/01/2005, 
Edinburgh 
Chief of staff of the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats 
Jenny Randerson  02/01/2005, 
Cardiff 
AM, former Welsh minister and 
former Deputy First Minister, 
member of Candidates and 
Campaigns Committee, Policy 
Committee, Welsh Liberal 
Democrats 
Stephen Smith   30/06/2005, 
Cardiff 
Chief executive, Welsh Liberal 
Democrats 
Rob Humphries  30/06/2005, 
Swansea 
President of the Welsh Liberal 
Democrats 
     
PSOE     
Óscar López Águeda  11/10/2005, 
Madrid 
Member of Congress, co-ordinator of 
the Secretariat for Organisation and 
Electoral Action of the PSOE 
Agustín Baeza Díaz-Moreno  10/10/2005, 
Madrid 
Co-ordinator of the Secretariat for 
Institutional Relations and 
Autonomous Policy 
Xavier Carro Garrote  14/02/2006, 
Madrid 
Member of Congress (from Galicia), 
member of the Executive 
Commission and the National 
Executive Committee of the PSdeG  
Arantxa Mendizábal Gorostiaga 14/02/2006, 
Madrid 
Member of Congress, member of the 
Executive Committee of the PSE-EE 
Lentxu Rubial Cachorro  15/02/2006, 
Madrid 
Senator (Basque country), member of 
the Federal Executive Committee 
María Isabel Celaá Diéguez  09/01/2006, 
Bilbao 
Member of the Basque Parliament, 
member of the Executive Committee 
of the PSE-EE, Secretary for Social 
and Sectoral Policy  
Joana Madrigal Jiménez  09/01/2006, 
Vitoria 
Member of the Basque Parliament, 
member of the Executive Committee 
of the PSE-EE  
Ricardo Varela Sánchez  22/02/2006, 
Santiago de 
Compostela 
Regional Councillor (minister) for 
Labour; Secretary for Organisation of 
the PSdeG 
Francisco Cerviño  22/02/2006, 
Santiago de C. 
Member of the Galician Parliament  
Carlos Pajares Vales  23/02/2006, 
Santiago de C. 
Secretary for Education and 
Innovation in the Executive 
Committee of the PSdeG 
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PSC     
Teresa Cunillera i Mestres  10/10/2005, 
Madrid 
Member of Congress, member of the 
Federal Executive Committee of the 
PSOE, former member of the 
Consell Nacional of the PSC 
José Zaragoza  9/11/2005, 
Barcelona 
Secretary for Organisation and 
Finance  
Josep María Sala  9/11/2005, 
Barcelona 
Member of the Executive 
Commission, Senator for Catalonia 
1989-1997, Secretary for 
Organisation 1982-1995 
Carme Figueras i Siñol  10/11/2005, 
Barcelona 
Member of Catalan Parliament since 
1995, former member of Congress, 
1993-1995 
Daniel Fernández González  11/11/2005, 
Barcelona 
Member of Congress, co-ordinator of 
PSC members of Congress, member 
of the National Executive 
Commission 
Maria Badia i Cutchet  19/10/2005, 
Brussels 
Member of the European Parliament, 
member of the National Executive 
Commission, Secretary for European 
and International Affairs 
     
Partido Popular     
Juan Carlos Vera Pro  11/10/2005, 
Madrid 
Member of Congress, Secretary for 
Organisation, Executive secretary for 
Territorial Organisation 1990-2004 
Gabriel Elorriaga Pisarik  11/10/2005, 
Madrid 
Member of Congress, Executive 
secretary for Communication, co-
ordinator of Studies and Formation, 
former secretary of State for 
Territorial Organisation 
José Luis Ayllón Manso  14/02/2006, 
Madrid 
Member of the Executive Committee 
of the PP, Executive secretary for 
Analysis since 2004, Secretary for 
Studies and Formation 2002-2004, 
member of the Catalan Parliament 
2000-2004 
Xavier García Albiol  8/11/2005, 
Barcelona 
Executive secretary for Organisation 
of the PPC since 2004, Secretary for 
Local policy 2002-2004, Deputy 
secretary for organisation 2000-2002 
Joan López  9/11/2005, 
Barcelona 
Member of the Catalan Parliament, 
Executive secretary for Participation 
since 2002 
Rafael Luna  10/11/2005, 
Barcelona 
General secretary of the PPC since 
1996, Member of the Catalan 
Parliament  
Santiago Rodríguez i Serra  11/11/2005, 
Barcelona 
Member of the Catalan Parliament  
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José Eugenio Azpiroz Villar  15/02/2006, 
Madrid 
Member of Congress (Basque 
country), former President of the PP-
PV 1989-1992 




Member of the Basque Parliament, 
member of the Executive Committee 
of the PP-PV, member of the 
National Steering Committee  
Fernando Maura Barandiarán  10/01/2006, 
Vitoria 
Member of the Basque Parliament, 
member of the Executive Committee 
of the PP-PV, former Secretary-
general of the PP-PV 1989-92 
Jesús Palmou Lorenzo  22/02/2006, 
Santiago de C. 
Member of the Galician Parliament, 
General-secretary of the PPdeG 
1999-2006, member of the National 
Executive Committee (PP) and 








1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Can you please start by telling me a little bit about yourself as a member of 
the  [NAME  OF  PARTY]/  party  official  [TITLE]/  member  of  the 
administrative  staff  of  the  [NAME  OF  THE  PARTY]/  elected  official, 
describing briefly your evolution within the party? 
 
1.2. Can you please describe the position(s) you have held within the party since 
_____? 
 
1.3. Since ____, have you ever been: 
 
- A member of the [NEC/ Board/ FEC]? YES   NO 
 
 When? 
 In what position? 
 
-A member of the [SCOTTISH/ WELSH] executive? YES    NO 
 
 When? 
 In what position? 
 
-Involved in the selection of the Scottish/Welsh party leader (i.e. voting 
member)? YES    NO 
 
-Involved in the selection of candidates for general election? YES   NO 
 
As  a  member  of  the  candidate  selection  commission  in  charge  of 
establishing lists of approved candidates [OFFICIAL NAME]? 
As a member of your constituency candidate selection committee? 
As a prospective candidate? 
 
-Involved in the selection of candidates for Scottish/Welsh elections? 
YES   NO 
 
As a member of the candidate selection panel [OFFICIAL NAME] for the 
regional elections 
As a member of your constituency selection committee? 
As a prospective candidate? 
 
-Involved in policy-making at the national level? YES   NO 
 
As a member of the [NPF/ CPF/FPC]? 




-Involved in policy-making at the Scottish/Welsh level? YES    NO 
 
As a member of the [Sc/W PF/…]? 
As a member of the Scottish/Welsh party conference? 
 
-Involved in election campaigns? YES   NO 
 
At the national level? 
At the Scottish/Welsh level? 
At the constituency level? 
 
-Involved  in  matters  regarding  party  discipline,  as  a  member  of  the 
disciplinary committee? YES   NO 
 
When? 
In what quality? 
 
-Is there something you would like to add at this point, for instance, 




2.  MEMBER OF STATE-WIDE EXECUTIVE  
2.1 To what extent is the [NEC/ Board/ Federal Executive] responsible for 




2.1.1  What is the extent of the [NEC/ Board/ Federal Executive]'s 
involvement  in  the  selection  of  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  party 
leaders? 
 
2.1.2  How has this changed with devolution? 
 
2.1.3  How much is the [NEC/ Board/ Federal Executive] responsible 
for candidate selection in Scotland and Wales? 
-  for general elections? 
-  for Scottish/Welsh election? 
-  Who  is  responsible  for  the  screening  process  (establishing  lists  of 
approved candidates)? 
 
2.1.4   How has this changed with devolution? 
 
2.1.5  To  what  extent  is  the  [NEC/  Board/  Federal  Executive] 
responsible for making policy for Scottish/Welsh elections? 
 
2.1.6  To what extent is the [NEC/Board/FE] involved in preparing 
the manifestos for Scottish and Welsh elections? 
 
2.1.7  To what extent is the [NEC/ Board/ FE] involved in the making 
of the Scottish and Welsh manifestos for the general elections?  
 
2.1.8  With devolution, have there been any changes in the way the 
[NEC/  Board/FEC]  intervenes  in the  preparation  of  Scottish 
and  Welsh  manifestos  for  the  general  and  Scottish/Welsh 
elections? And since? 
 
2.1.9.  To  what  extent  is  the  [NEC/  Board/FE]  responsible  for 
organising the campaign for Scottish and Welsh elections? 
 
2.1.10.  How has this changed with devolution? And since devolution? 
 
2.2  Are the regional party branches involved in the National Executive? 
 
 
2.2.1.  Are there some regional representatives in the national executive? 
 
2.2.2.  Are  there  some  other,  maybe  more  informal,  ways  in  which 




2.2.3.  Have there been any changes in the representation of the Scottish 
and Welsh parties in the national executive since 1997/99? 
 
2.2.4.  To  what  extent  are  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  party  branches 
involved  in  the  preparation  of  the  manifesto  for  the  general 
elections? 
 
2.2.5.  How has this changed with devolution? Has it changed after that? 
 
2.2.6.  To  what  extent  are  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  party  branches 
involved in the campaign for general elections? 
 
2.2.7.  How  has  this  changed  with  devolution?  Has  it  changed  after 
1999? 
 
2.2.8.  Have there been any changes in the way regional party branches 
influence the party as a whole? 
 
 
2.3.  Party Finance 
2.3.1. Does the national/federal party contribute to the budget of the 
Scottish and Welsh parties? 
 
 
2.3.2.: What proportion of their budget does this contribution represent? 
 
2.3.3. How is the contribution provided? (block grant, or needs-based?) 
 
2.3.4. Who decides how much money is attributed to the Scottish and 
Welsh branches? 
 
2.3.5. How has this contribution evolved since devolution?  
 
2.3.6. Whose responsibility is it to pay for regional electoral campaigns? 
Does  the  British  party  pay  for  election  campaigns  for  the  Scottish 
Parliament and Welsh Assembly? 
 
2.3.7. Are there some differences between the financial situation of the 
party in Scotland and the financial situation of the party in Wales? 
 
2.3.8.  Has  the  financing  of  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  party  branches 












3.  MEMBER OF THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE  
Presentation 
 
3.1.  What  are  the  most  important  responsibilities  of  the  [Scottish/Welsh] 
executive? 
 
3.1.2 How important is the management function, that is, management 
of the daily affairs of the [Scottish/Welsh] party branch? 
 
3.1.3. What is the role of the [Scottish/Welsh] in the preparation of the 
manifesto for regional elections? 
 
3.1.4.  What  is  the  role  of  the  [Scottish/Welsh]  executive  during  the 
campaign leading to [Scottish/Welsh] elections? 
 
 
3.1.5.  What  is  the  role  of  the  [Scottish/Welsh]  executive  during  the 
campaign leading to general elections? 
 
3.1.6. How important is the linkage function between the British party 
and the [Scottish/Welsh] branch? 
 
3.1.7.  Have  the  responsibilities  of  the  [Scottish/Welsh]  executive 
changed since devolution? 
 
3.2. Involvement of national party in Scottish and Welsh affairs 
3.2.1.  Are  there  some  representatives  of  the  national  party  in  the 
[Scottish/Welsh] executives? 
 
3.2.2. What is their role? How do they affect the decisions taken?  
 
3.2.3.  In  general,  how  much  is  the  British  party  (national  executive, 
leadership, other) responsible for or involved in [Scottish/Welsh] affairs? 
 
3.2.4. Who, in the national party, intervenes most in [Scottish/Welsh] 
affairs? 
 
3.2.5. To what extent is the British party involved in leadership selection 
in Scotland and Wales? Change? 
 
3.2.6. To what extent is the British party involved in candidate selection 
in [Scotland/ Wales]? Change? 
 
3.2.7. To what extent has the British party been involved in adopting 
party policy in [Scotland/Wales]? Change? 
 
3.2.8.  To  what  extent  is  the  British  party  involved  in  drafting  and 





3.2.9. And what about general election manifestos? Change? 
 
3.2.10.  To  what  extent  is  the  British  party  responsible  for  the 
organisation  of  the  campaign  for  general  elections  in 
[Scotland/Wales]? Change? 
 
3.2.11. And what about [Scottish/Welsh] elections? Has there been any 
change since 1999? 
 
3.2.12. Overall, has the level and/or type of involvement of the national 
party in [Scottish/Welsh] affairs changed since devolution? 
 
 
3.3.  How  are  the  interests/  demands/  proposals  of  the  [Scottish/Welsh] 
parties channelled/ transmitted to the British party? 
 
3.3.1. Are there official representatives of the [Scottish/Welsh] branches 
in the some organs of the British party? 
 
3.3.2. How significant is their input in the British party? 
 
3.3.3. Is there any other, more informal, way, in which [Scottish/Welsh] 
branches are represented in the SWP? 
 
3.3.4. Has the representation of [Scottish/Welsh] interests at the national 
level changed within the party since devolution? 
 
3.3.5. Can you give examples of Scottish and/or Welsh influence on the 
national party, in the domain of policy making, for example? 
 
3.3.6. Has this influence changed since 1999? 
 
 
3.4. Party Finance 
3.4.1. What are the sources of the funds used by the [Scottish/Welsh] 
branch? 
 
3.4.2. What is the proportion of funds coming from the [CAs/ CLPs/ 
LOCAL  PARTIES]  and  individual  membership  fees  in  the  overall 
budget of the [Scottish/Welsh] party branch? 
 
3.4.3. What is the proportion of funds coming from the British party in 
the overall budget of the [Scottish/Welsh] party branch?  
 
3.4.4. In what form are these funds distributed? (block grant or needs-
based) 
 




3.4.6.  What  is  the  proportion  of  funds  coming  from  other  sources 
(LABOUR:  trade  unions)  in  the  overall  budget  of  the  [Scottish/ 
Welsh] party branch? 
 
3.4.7. How are campaigns for the general election funded in 
[Scotland/Wales]? 
 
3.4.8. How are the campaigns for election to the [Scottish Parliament/ 
Welsh Assembly] funded? 
 





4.  SELECTION OF THE REGIONAL LEADER  
4.1. Selection process 
4.1.1. What are the stages of the selection process? 
 
4.1.2. Does a party member need the support of MPs and/ or Members 
of the [Scottish/Welsh] parliament in order to become a candidate? 
 
4.1.3. How is the electoral college composed? 
 




4.2. Influence of the British party 
4.2.1. Is the British party formally involved in the selection process? 
 
 
4.2.2. Are there some informal ways in  which the national party can 
intervene in the selection process? 
 
4.2.3. Has there been any change to the selection procedure with/since 
devolution? 
 
4.2.4. Do you think that the composition and internal balance of the 
national (Shadow) Cabinet has some impact on the selection of the 
[Scottish/ Welsh] leader? 
 
4.2.5. Do you think that the personality and preferences of the [Shadow] 
Secretary  of  State  for  [Scotland/  Wales]  has  any  impact  on  the 
selection of the regional leader? 
 
LABOUR 
4.2.6. How does the system of double leadership (Secretary of State 
for Scotland/ Wales + leader of the Scottish/Welsh parliamentary 
party) affect the party?  
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5.  SELECTION OF CANDIDATES – GENERAL ELECTIONS 
  5.1. Member of candidate screening commission  
LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE 
5.1.1.  To  your  knowledge,  how  many  of  the  member  of  the 
___________ come from [Scotland/ Wales]? 
 
5.1.2. For an applicant who wishes/d to be a prospective candidate in 
Scotland or Wales, how important was his/her position on devolution? 
 
5.1.3. For the selection of prospective candidates for Scotland or Wales, 
were  the  Scottish  or  Welsh  leaderships  consulted  on  the  selection 
criteria or individual personalities? 
 
5.1.4. At what stage of the selection process was the regional leadership 
consulted? 
 




LIBERAL DEMOCRATS (SCOTLAND AND WALES): 
5.1.6. During the selection process, was the federal leadership or some 
other central party organ consulted on some aspect(s) of the process?   
 
5.1.7. Was the federal party consulted on the suitability of specific 
candidates? 
 
5.1.8. Has this changed with devolution? 
 
 
5.1.9.  Did  the  federal  party  try  to  intervene  in  the  selection  process 





LIBERAL DEMOCRATS (FEDERAL PARTY) 
5.1.10. Is the federal party in any way involved in the process of 
candidate selection? 
 




5.2. Member of Constituency Selection Committee 
5.2.1. How many people were on the list approved by the [NEC/ CCO/ 
State Party]? 
 
5.2.2.  How many prospective candidates were included in the shortlist 




5.2.3.  What were the selection criteria? Who established them?  
 
IN SCOTLAND AND WALES 
5.2.4.  Was  the  [Scottish/  Welsh]  leadership  consulted  on  the 
proceedings at any stage of the selection process? 
 
5.2.5.  Was  the  [Scottish/  Welsh]  leadership  kept  informed  of  the 
evolution and results of the selection process? 
 
5.2.6.  Did you experience or do you know of attempts of the [Scottish/ 
Welsh] leadership to get involved in the selection process? 
 
5.2.7.  What  about  the  British  leadership,  was  it  consulted  on  the 
proceedings during the selection process?   
 
5.2.8.  Did you experience or do you know of attempts of the British 
leadership to get involved in the process? 
 
5.2.9.  According  to  you,  what  weighs  more  on  the  vote  of  party 
members for a candidate for the general elections? The support of the 
central leadership or that of the [Scottish/ Welsh] leadership? 
 
5.2.10.Has the selection process changed with devolution? 
 
 
5.3. Prospective candidate  
5.3.1. Can you describe your experience with the candidate screening 
commission (commission in charge of establishing lists of approved 
candidates)? What can you tell me about your hearing? 
 
 
5.3.2. Can you describe the various steps of the selection process at the 
level of the constituency? 
 
 
5.3.3. At any stage of the selection process at constituency level, did you 
feel that the central leadership was trying to influence the selection?  
 
 
5.3.4. Did you feel that (or know that) the regional [Scottish/ Welsh] 
party was trying to influence the selection? 
 









6.  CANDIDATE SELECTION – REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
6.1. Member Candidate Selection Panel  
6.1.1. What are the criteria used in the selection process? 
 
6.1.2. Who established them? 
 
6.1.3. Is the approval of the candidates by the British party necessary? 
 
6.1.4. How easy is it to get it? 
 
6.1.5. Were there any candidates who had been selected at the local level 
but were subsequently rejected by the British party? 
 
6.1.6. Does the fact that the British party has to approve the selection in 
some  ways  constrain  the  selection  at  the  regional  level?  (e.g.,  self-
imposed  rules  because  they  know  that  the  central  party  would  not 
accept a candidate?) 
 
6.1.7.  Did  the  British  party  try  to  intervene  in  the  selection  process 
without being specifically asked to? 
 
6.1.8. Has the selection process changed with devolution? 
 
 
6.2. Member of Constituency Candidate Selection Committee  
6.2.1. How many people were on the list of approved candidates? 
 
6.2.2. Was the [Scottish/Welsh] leadership/executive kept informed of 
the proceedings at any stage of the selection process? 
 
6.2.3.  Did  you  experience  or  do  you  know  of  attempts  of  the 
[Scottish/Welsh] leadership/executive to get involved in the process? 
 
6.2.4.  Was  the  British  leadership/executive  kept  informed  of  the 
proceedings at any stage of the selection process? 
 
6.2.5. Did you experience or do you know of attempts of the British 
leadership to get involved in the process? 
 
6.2.6. Has the selection process changed since 1999? 
 
 
6.3.   Prospective candidate 
6.3.1.  Were  you  applying  to  be  a  constituency  candidate  or  a  list 
candidate? 
 
6.3.2.  Can  you  please  describe  your  experience  with  the  candidate 
screening commission? (What can you tell me about your hearing?) 
 






6.3.4. Can you please describe the various stages of the selection process 
at the constituency level? 
 
6.3.5. At any stage of the selection process at constituency level, did you 
feel (or know) that the central British leadership was trying to influence 
the selection?  
 
6.3.6. Did you feel (or know) that the regional [Scottish/ Welsh] party 
was trying to influence the selection?  
 




6.3.8. Can you please describe the process that led to the constitution of 
candidate lists? 
 
6.3.9. Did the British executive (or some other central party organ) try to 
influence the composition of the top-up lists? 
 
6.3.10. Do you think that the Scottish/Welsh executive tried to influence 
the composition and order of the top-up lists?  
 






7.  FORMULATION OF STATE-WIDE POLICY 
7.1. Participated in NPF/CPF/FPC   




7.1.2.  Can  you  please  describe  the  consultation  process  for  the 
[NPF/Con PF/ FPC] at the regional level? 
 
7.1.3. Were you consulted on proposals formulated at either the local or 
central level?  
 
 
7.1.4. Could you make alternative proposals? 
 





7.1.6. Did you feel your proposals were taken into account by the central 
party? 
 
7.1.7.  Are  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  leaderships  specifically  consulted 
during the process? 
 
7.1.8. Overall, what do you think really is the role of the Scottish/Welsh 
party branches in the development of national policy? 
 
7.1.9.  How  has  the  role  of  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  party  branches 








7.1.11. Who is in charge of making the original policy proposals? 
 
7.1.12.  Can  you  please describe  the  involvement  of  the  Scottish  and 
Welsh parties in the formulation of national party policies? 
 
7.1.13.  Are  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  caucuses  involved  or  consulted 
during the whole process? 
 
7.1.14. Has this changed since devolution? 
 
 
7.1.15. Can you please give me a recent example of a policy proposal 
successfully put forward or amended by either the Scottish or Welsh 
party branch that became party policy? 
 
 
7.2. DELEGATE AT PARTY CONFERENCE 
7.2.1. Can you describe the proceedings of the party conference? 
 
 
7.2.2.  Who  is  in  charge  of making  the proposals  put  forward  to  the 
conference? 
 
7.2.3.  Can  you  please  describe  the  involvement  of  the  Scottish  and 
Welsh party branches? 
 
7.2.4. Do the Scottish/ Welsh leaderships or regional executives play a 




7.2.5. Now, think about the most recent policies adopted by the party. 
How much say did the Scottish and Welsh parties have had in the 
formulation of these policies? 
 
 
7.2.6. Has the role and involvement of the Scottish and Welsh parties 
changed with devolution? 
 
 
7.2.7. How significant are the policies adopted by the conference with 







8. FORMULATING REGIONAL POLICY 
8.1. Member of [Scottish/ Welsh] Policy Forum/ Policy Committee  




8.1.2.  Who  made  the  policy  proposals  that  you  were  considering? 
(constituencies/ ad hoc committees/ national party) 
 
 




8.1.4. Has this since changed between 1999 and 2003? 
 
 
8.1.5. What was the impact of the contents of the manifesto for the 
[2001/  1997]  general  elections  on  the  making  of  [2003/  1999]  the 
programme? 
 
8.1.6. What was the input of the British party in the process of making 
[Scottish/ Welsh] policy? 
 
 
8.1.7. Did some member of the British party make direct interventions in 
order to influence the content of the [Scottish/ Welsh] programme? 
 
 
8.1.8.  Has  there  been  any  change  in  this  part  of  the  policy-making 





8.2.  Member of [Scottish/ Welsh] party Conference  
8.2.1. Can you describe the proceedings of the conference? 
 
 
8.2.2.  Who  made  the  proposals  that  you  were  considering? 
(Constituencies/ ad hoc committees/ national party)  
 
8.2.3. What was the impact of the contents of the manifesto for the 
general elections on the making of the [Scottish/ Welsh] programme? 
 
 
8.2.4.  What  was  the  input  of  the  British  party  (executive,  leadership, 




8.2.5. Have the proceedings of and decisions taken by the [Scottish/ 
Welsh] conference changed since devolution? 
 
 
8.2.6. Who makes the regional manifesto? 
 
 
8.2.7. How close did you find the manifesto to be to the policy proposals 






9. MAKING ELECTION MANIFESTOS 
9.1.  General elections manifesto 
9.1.1.  Who in the party is formally in charge of making the election 
manifesto? 
 
9.1.2.  How were the most prominent issues of the manifesto chosen? 
How was it decided that some issues should be more prominent in the 
manifesto than others? 
 
 
9.1.3.  How close to the programme adopted by the party conference 
was the manifesto of the last general election? 
 
 
9.1.4.  Are  the  [Scottish/Welsh]  party  branches  consulted  during  the 
process? 
 
9.1.5.  What about when the manifesto contains provisions about areas 




9.1.6.  How  does  your party  feel  about the  issue  of  devolving  more 
powers to Scotland and Wales? 
 
9.1.7.  Are there any Welsh and Scottish general election manifesto? 
 
 
9.2.  Regional manifestos for general elections 
9.2.1.  Who  is  in  charge  of  making  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  general 
election manifestos? 
 
9.2.2.  How are they made? 
 
9.2.3.  To what extent is the [British party/ Scottish or Welsh party 
branch] involved in the process? 
 
9.2.4.  To what extent is the [Scottish/ Welsh] version of the general 
election manifesto adapted to the [Scottish/Welsh] context? 
 
9.2.5.  How was it decided that some issues should be more prominent 
in the manifesto than others? 
 
9.2.6.  Were there issues that were emphasised in [Scotland/Wales] and 
that were not in the main manifesto? 
 




9.3. Manifestos for [Scottish/Welsh] elections 
9.3.1.  Who in the party is responsible for making the manifesto for the 
[Scottish/ Welsh] elections? 
 
 
9.3.2.  How is the manifesto for [Scottish/Welsh] elections made? 
 
 
9.3.3.  How is it decided that some issues should be more prominent 
than others? 
 
9.3.4.  How close to the programme adopted by the [Scottish/Welsh] 
party  conference  was  the  manifesto  for  the  last  [Scottish/Welsh] 
election? 
 
9.3.5.  How  important  was  the  issue  of  devolving  more  powers  to 
[Scotland/Wales]? 
 








10.1  General election campaign 
10.1.1.Who is in charge of making the manifesto? 
 
 
10.1.2.Are they also the people who run the campaign? 
 
10.1.3.Who is responsible for running the campaign? 
 
 




10.1.5.How  important  was  the  issue  of  devolving  more  powers  to 
Scotland and Wales? 
 




10.1.7. Did the Scottish and Welsh parties have any role in the campaign 





10.2. General election campaign in Scotland and Wales 
10.2.1.Who is in charge of making the manifesto? 
 
 
10.2.2.Are they also the people who run the campaign? 
 












10.2.6.Were  the  Scottish  and  Welsh  parties  involved  in  the  general 





10.1.7. Did the Scottish and Welsh parties have any role in the campaign 
in Scotland and Wales? 
 
 
10.3. Regional election campaign 
10.3.1.Who is in charge of making the manifesto? 
 
 
10.3.2.Are they also the people who run the campaign? 
 
10.3.3.Who is responsible for running the campaign? 
 
 
10.3.4.How was the campaign devised? 
 
 









APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF RESERVED POWERS  
 
(SCOTLAND ACT 1998, SCHEDULE 5) 
 
(i)  the  Constitution:  the  Crown,  the  Union  of  Scotland  and  England,  the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
(ii)  the registration of political parties. 
(iii)  foreign  affairs  and  relations  with  the  European  Union  (exception: 
implementing international obligations and assisting Ministers of the Crown). 
(iv)  the civil service. 
(v)  defence. 
(vi)  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  (exception:  local  taxes  to  fund  local  authority 
expenditure). 
(vii)  currency. 
(viii)  financial services and markets 
(ix)  elections and the franchise for local government elections (exception: other 
rules regarding local government elections). 
(x)  firearms legislation. 
(xi)  immigration and nationality. 
(xii)  extradition. 
(xiii)  emergency powers. 
(xiv)  rules of business associations and insolvency. 
(xv)  market competition, import and export control, consumer protection. 
(xvi)  telecommunications and the Post Office. 
(xvii)  energy policy. 
(xviii) essential aspects of transport policy. 
(xix)  social security (with few exceptions), child support and pensions. 
(xx)  employment, industrial relations, and health and safety. 
(xxi)  abortion, surrogacy, medicines. 
(xxii)  broadcasting. 




APPENDIX 4 – COMPETENCE FIELDS 
TRANSFERED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR 
WALES 
 
(GOVERNMENT OF WALES ACT 1998, SCHEDULE 2) 
 
(i)  agriculture, forestry, fisheries and food 
(ii)  ancient monuments and historic buildings 
(iii)  culture 
(iv)  economic development 
(v)  education and training 
(vi)  the environment 
(vii) health and health services 
(viii) highways 
(ix)  housing 
(x)  industry 
(xi)  local government 
(xii) social services 
(xiii) sport and recreation 
(xiv) tourism 
(xv) town and country planning 
(xvi) transport 
(xvii) water and flood defence 





APPENDIX 5 – GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS IN 
CATALONIA, THE BASQUE COUNTRY AND 
GALICIA 
 
Table A.1. Results of elections to the Congress of Deputies in Catalonia, 1977-2004   
  UCD/CDS  PSC-PSOE  AP/PP  PCE/IC  CiU  ERC 
  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%) 
ENEP  ENPP  D  L 
1977  16.9  9 
(19.2)  28.6  15 
(31.9)  3.6  1 
(2.1)  18.3  8 
(17.0)  22.6  13 
(27.7)  4.7  1 
(2.1)  5.6  4.6  6.1  30.7 
1979  19.4  12 
(25.5)  29.7  17 
(36.2)  3.7  1 
(2.1)  17.4  8 
(17.0)  16.4  8 
(17.0)  4.2  1 
(2.1)  5.4  3.9  6.9  22.2 
1982  2.0  _  45.8  25 
(53.2)  14.7  8 
(17.0)  4.6  1 
(2.1)  22.5  12 
(25.5)  4.0  1 
(2.1)  3.5  2.7  6.7  23.4 
1986  4.1  1 
(2.1)  41.0  21 
(44.7)  11.4  6 
(12.7)  3.9  1 
(2.1)  32.0  18 
(38.3)  2.7  -  3.5  2.8  6.1  27.7 
1989  4.3  1 
(2.2)  35.6  20 
(43.5)  10.6  4 
(8.7)  7.3  3 
(6.5)  32.7  18 
(39.1)  2.7  -  4.0  2.8  7.9  28.2 
1993  0.8  _  34.9  18 
(38.3)  17.0  8 
(17.0)  7.5  3 
(6.4)  31.8  17 
(36.2)  5.1  1 
(2.1)  3.8  3.2  4.6  29.5 
1996  _  _  39.4  19 
(41.3)  18.0  8 
(17.4)  7.6  2 
(4.4)  29.6  16 
(34.8)  4.2  1 
(2.2)  3.5  3.1  4.8  28.6 
2000  _  _  34.1  17 
(37.0)  22.8  12 
(26.1)  3.5  1 
(2.2)  28.8  15 
(32.6)  5.6  1 
(2.2)  3.9  3.2  5.1  28.0 
2004  _  _  39.5  21 
(44.7)  15.6  6 
(12.8)  5.8  2 
(4.3)  20.8  10 
(21.3)  15.9  8 
(17.0)  4.0  3.4  4.5  30.5 
Notes: 'votes' stands for 'share of the votes'; 'ENEP' refers to the effective number of electoral parties 
and 'ENPP' stands for effective number of parliamentary parties; 'D' refers to Gallagher's least squares 
index of disproportionality; L stands for the Lee index of regional distinctiveness. 
Sources: http://www.eleweb.es 
 
Table A.2. General election results in the Basque country, 1977-2004  
  UCD/CDS PSE-PSOE  AP/PP  PCE/IU  PNV  HB  EE  EA 
  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%)  Votes Seats 
(%) 
1977  12.8  4 
(19.1)  26.3  7 
(33.3)  7.1  1 
(4.8)  4.5  _  29.3  8 
(38.1)  _  _  6.1  1 
(4.8)  _  _ 
1979  16.9  5 
(23.8)  19.1  5 
(23.8)  _  _  4.6  _  27.6  7 
(33.3)  15.0  3 
(14.3)  8.0  1 
(4.8)  _  _ 
1982  1.8  _  29.2  8 
(38.1)  11.6  2 
(9.5)  1.8  _  31.7  8 
(38.1)  14.7  2 
(9.5)  7.7  1 
(4.8)  _  _ 
1986  5.0  _  26.3  7 
(33.3)  10.5  2 
(9.5)  2.2*  _  27.8  6 
(28.6)  17.7  4 
(19.1)  9.1  2 
(9.5)  _  _ 
1989  3.5  _  21.1  6 
(28.6)  9.4  2 
(9.5)  3.0  _  22.8  5 
(23.8)  16.9  4 
(19.1)  8.8  2 
(9.5)  11.2  2 
(9.5) 
1993  .8  _  24.5  7 
(36.8)  14.7  4 
(21.1)  6.3  _  24.1  5 
(26.3)  14.6  2 
(10.5)  _  _  9.9  1 
(5.3) 
1996  _  _  23.7  5 
(26.3)  18.3  5 
(26.3)  9.2  1 
(5.3)  25.0  5 
(26.3)  12.3  2 
(10.5)  _  _  8.2  1 
(5.3) 
2000  _  _  23.3  4 
(21.1)  28.3  7 
(36.8)  5.5  _  30.4  7 
(36.8)  _  _  _  _  7.6  1 
(5.3) 
2004  _  _  27.2  7 
(36.8)  18.9  4 
(21.1)  8.2  _  33.7  7 
(36.8)  _  _  _  _  6.5  1 
(5.3) 
* PCE+IU 






Table A.3. Electoral indicators, general elections in the Basque country, 1977-2004 
  ENEP  ENPP  D  L 
1977  5.38  3.37  10.47  32.95 
1979  5.77  4.05  8.72  46.55 
1982  4.40  3.22  6.61  48.4 
1986  5.00  4.05  6.36  48.65 
1989  6.40  4.96  6.61  53.4 
1993  5.72  3.80  11.81  42.75 
1996  5.47  4.46  7.10  39.9 
2000  4.25  3.14  8.85  33.15 
2004  4.25  3.14  9.63  38.25 
 
Table A.4. General electoral results in Galicia, 1977-2004 
  UCD/CDS  PSOE-PSG  AP/PP  PCE/IU  BNG 
  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%)  Votes  Seats 
(%) 
ENEP ENPP  D  L 
1977  53.6  20 
(74.1)  15.5  3 
(11.1)  13.1  4 
(14.8)  3.0  _  2.0  _  2.98  1.72  15.52  23.35 
1979  48.2  17 
(63.0)  17.3  6 
(22.2)  14.2  4 
(14.8)  4.2  _  6.0  _  3.44  2.13  12.81  23.9 
1982  17.7  5 
(5.5)  32.8  9 
(33.3)  37.6  13 
(48.2)  1.6  _  3.0  _  3.54  2.65  8.19  21.6 
1986  8.6  2 
(7.4)  35.8  11 
(40.7)  39.2  13 
(48.2)  1.1  _  2.1  _  3.39  2.47  8.15  16.5 
1989  7.8  1 
(3.7)  34.6  12 
(44.4)  39.0  14 
(51.9)  3.3  _  3.6  _  3.54  2.14  12.74  15.35 
1993  1.5  _  36.0  11 
(42.3)  47.1  15 
(57.7)  4.7  _  8.0  _  2.78  1.95  10.98  15.55 
1996      33.5  9 
(36.0)  48.3  14 
(56.0)  3.6  _  12.9  2 
(8.0)  2.75  2.22  7.14  17.6 
2000  0.1  _  23.7  6 
(24.0)  54.0  16 
(64.0)  1.3  _  18.6  3 
(12.0)  2.61  2.08  8.54  23.75 
2004  0.1  _  37.2  10 
(41.7)  47.2  12 
(50.0)  1.8  _  11.4  2 
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RESUME 
 
Alors  que  de  nombreux  pays  ont  aujourd'hui  adopté  une  forme  d'organisation 
décentralisée,  les  questions  du  fédéralisme,  de  la  gouvernance  multi-niveaux  et  du 
régionalisme sont devenues d'importants objets de recherche. Cette thèse doctorale 
applique  la  perspective  multi-niveaux  à  l’étude  des  partis  politiques  et  demande 
comment les partis nationaux, c'est-à-dire les partis qui présentent des candidats pour 
les  élections  nationales  et  régionales  sur  l'ensemble  du  territoire,  organisent  les 
rapports internes entre niveau central et branches régionales. Les partis nationaux ont 
un  problème  particulier  dans  les  systèmes  décentralisés:  d'une  part,  ils  doivent 
présenter une front uni et un message cohérent sur tout le territoire national lors des 
élections nationales, et ils doivent d'autre part s'adresser aux électorats régionaux et à 
leurs intérêts particuliers lors des élections régionales. L'existence de différents niveaux 
de gouvernement et d'élection pose donc un problème de coordination verticale aux 
partis nationaux. 
Cette thèse cherche à répondre à cette question à travers l'exemple de trois partis 
britanniques (le Parti travailliste, le Parti conservateur et les Libéraux Démocrates) et 
deux  partis  espagnols  (le  Parti  Populaire  et  le  Parti  Socialiste  Ouvrier  Espagnol). 
L'articulation entre niveaux national et régionaux se compose de deux dimensions: 
l'intégration  des  branches  régionales  dans  les  processus  décisionnels  centraux  et 
l'autonomie des branches régionales dans les processus décisionnels régionaux. Cette 
étude se concentre sur l'organisation des partis nationaux dans seulement trois des dix-
sept communautés autonomes espagnoles (Catalogne, Pays basque et Galice) et sur 
l'organisation des partis britanniques en Ecosse et au Pays de Galle.  
Ces cas permettent de tester qualitativement un nombre d'hypothèses tirées d'un 
cadre  théorique  néo-institutionnel  large  qui  inclut  un  ample  éventail  de  facteurs  à 
même d'influencer la façon dont les partis s'organisent dans un cadre multi-niveaux: 
facteurs institutionnels d'abord (type de structure de l'Etat, niveau de compétence des 
institutions  régionales),  facteurs  sociaux  ensuite  (clivages  sociaux,  régionalisme  et 
identification régionale des électeurs), puis facteurs relatifs à la compétition électorale 
au niveau national et au niveau régional, et enfin facteurs propres aux partis, tels la 
façon dont ils se sont formés, leur type et leur idéologie.  
L'étude empirique montre une variété de formes organisationnelles. Les partis 
d'un même pays ne sont pas forcément organisés de la même façon, de même que les 
branches  régionales  d'une  même  région  n'ont  pas  toutes  le  même  niveau  de 
compétence. De manière générale, il semble que le cadre institutionnel n'importe que 
dans  la  limite  où  il  crée  une  structure  d'opportunité  dans  laquelle  des  structures 
régionales peuvent se développer au sein des partis nationaux. Le type et le niveau de 
compétence des régions ne sont pas reflétés dans le degré d'autonomie des branches 
régionales  ni  dans  leur  intégration  dans  le  parti  central.  En  revanche,  les  facteurs 
propres aux partis, que ce soit leur idéologie, la façon dont ils ont été créés ou le statut 
de  parti  de  gouvernement  ou  d'opposition  de  chaque  niveau  s'avèrent  être 
particulièrement importants. Le rôle des chefs de parti nationaux et régionaux est ainsi 
crucial, et une position de pouvoir exécutif est une ressource importante dans les 
relations  de  pouvoir  entre  les  niveaux.  Cette  thèse  montre  ainsi  l'importance  des 
facteurs propres aux partis et le rôle déterminant des acteurs dans les processus de 
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Aangezien een talrijke groep van landen vandaag  de dag één of andere vorm van 
decentralisatie heeft aangenomen, zijn vragen rond federalisme, meerlagig beleid en 
regionalisme  belangrijke  onderzoeksobjecten  geworden.  Deze  doctoraatsthesis  past 
het meerlagig perspectief toe op de studie van politieke partijen en onderzoekt hoe 
nationale  partijen  –  dit  zijn  partijen  die  kandidaten  voor  nationale  en  regionale 
verkiezingen presenteren over het gehele territorium - de interne relaties organiseren 
tussen  het  nationale  niveau  en  de  regionale  partijafdelingen.  De  nationale  partijen 
worden geconfronteerd met een specifiek dilemma in gedecentraliseerde systemen: aan 
de  ene  kant  dienen  ze  zich  tijdens  nationale  verkiezingen  met  een  coherente 
boodschap voor het hele nationale territorium als één front te presenteren en aan de 
andere kant moeten ze zich tijdens regionale verkiezingen richten op een regionaal 
electoraat met haar eigen specifieke belangen. Het bestaan van verschillende beleids- 
en verkiezingsniveaus stelt de nationale partijen dus voor een probleem van verticale 
coördinatie.  
Deze doctoraatsthesis probeert deze vraag te beantwoorden via de voorbeelden 
van 3 Britse partijen (de Socialistische partij, de Conservatieve partij en de Liberaal-
democratische  partij)  en  2  Spaanse  partijen  (de  Conservatieve  partij  en  de 
Socialistische partij). De koppeling tussen het nationale en regionale niveau bestaat uit 
twee  dimensies:  de  integratie  van  de  regionale  partijafdelingen  in  de  centrale 
beslissingsorganen en de autonomie van de regionale partijafdelingen in de regionale 
beslissingsniveaus.  Deze  studie  concentreert  zich  op  de  organisatie  van  nationale 
partijen  in  slechts  3  van  de  17  autonome  gemeenschappen  in  Spanje  (Catalonië, 
Baskenland en Galicië) en op de organisatie van de Britse partijen in Schotland en 
Wales.  
Deze  studie  staat  toe  om  kwalitatief  een  aantal  hypotheses  te  testen  die 
geformuleerd worden in een ruim theoretische neoninstitutioneel kader en die een 
brede waaier aan variabelen bevat die de manier beïnvloeden waarop de partijen zich 
organiseren  in  een  meerlagig  kader:  ten  eerste  institutionele  variabelen  (type  van 
staatsstructuur,  niveau  van  regionale  bevoegdheden),  ten  tweede  sociale  factoren 
(sociale  breuklijnen,  regionalisme  en  regionale  identificatie  van  het  kiezerspubliek), 
vervolgens variabelen die verbonden zijn met de electorale competitie op het nationale 
en regionale niveau en tenslotte factoren die de eigenheid van de partijen illustreren, 
zoals de manier waarop ze gevormd werden, het partytype en hun ideologie. 
De empirische studie toont een verscheidenheid aan organisatievormen. Partijen 
in eenzelfde land zijn niet noodzakelijkerwijze op dezelfde manier georganiseerd, net 
zoals regionale afdelingen in eenzelfde regio niet altijd hetzelfde bevoegdheidsniveau 
hebben. Over het algemeen lijkt het institutionele kader enkel een rol te spelen in de 
mate  dat  het  de  kansen  creëert  waarbinnen  de  regionale  structuren  zich  kunnen 
ontwikkelen te midden van de nationale partijen. Het type van staatsstructuur en het 
regionale bevoegdheidsniveau worden niet weerspiegeld in de mate van autonomie 
van  de  regionale  partijafdelingen  en  ook  niet  in  hun  integratie  in  de  centrale 
partijorganen. De factoren die de eigenheid van de partij bevestigen aan de andere 
kant, zoals hun ideologie, de manier waarop ze gevormd werden en hun plaats binnen 
het huidige politieke landschap, op ieder beleidsniveau, als zijnde regeringspartij of in 
de oppositie blijken bijzonder belangrijk te zijn. Zo blijkt de rol van de nationale en 
regionale partijleiders cruciaal, en blijkt een regeringspositie een belangrijk hulpmiddel 
te  zijn  in  de  machtverhoudingen  tussen  de  verschillende  beleidsniveaus.  De 
doctoraatsthesis toont op deze manier het belang aan van de factoren die de eigenheid  
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van  de  partij  beklemtonen  en  de  bepalende  rol  van  de  spelers  in  het  proces  van 
organisationele verandering.  
 